SED Central Committee Department of International Relations Archival Signature: SAPMO-BA, Berlin, DY 30, IV A 2/20/250 [GDR Ministry for Foreign Affai

Transcription

1 Digital Archive International History Declassified digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org May 02, 1963 The Development of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Reunification Policy Citation: The Development of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Reunification Policy, May 02, 1963, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, SAPMO-BA, Berlin, DY 30, IV A 2/20/250. Translated for NKIDP by Bernd Schaefer. Summary: The report offers a summary and an evaluation of North Korea's reunification plans from 1945 through Credits: This document was made possible with support from the ROK Ministry of Unification. Original Language: German Contents: English Translation Korean Translation

2 SED Central Committee Department of International Relations Archival Signature: SAPMO-BA, Berlin, DY 30, IV A 2/20/250 [GDR Ministry for Foreign Affairs] 1 st Extra-European Department/2 Berlin, 2 May 1963 The Development of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Reunification Policy I. On 15 August 1945 Korea was liberated by the Soviet Union from the Japanese colonial yoke. On 8 September 1945 U.S. forces landed in Korea's South. Two zones of occupation were created: The territory north of the 38 th parallel was occupied by Soviet forces, and the one in the South by American troops. At the Foreign Minister Conference in Moscow in December 1945 Soviet and American policy for Korea's future was agreed upon: establishment of a provisional democratic government, and turning the country into a democratic and independent state. A Soviet-American commission was established to monitor this process. While the Soviet Union strictly adhered to the Moscow agreements, the United States sabotaged them from the beginning. Only in the north of Korea it was possible to implement democratic measures like land reform and the establishment of democratic people's committees. The U.S. imperialists strived toward getting all of Korea under their rule. In order to achieve this goal, U.S. machinations wanted to hold all-korean elections under supervision of the United Nations. Therefore on U.S. initiative a Korea Commission of the United Nations was established in The commission was supposed to monitor elections to form a national government in Korea. The Soviet Union condemned this interference into the internal affairs of the Korean people. Soviet authorities denied members of the U.N. commission access into North Korea. They demanded to solve the Korean question based on the Soviet-American agreements [of 1945]. However, the U.S. imperialists were unwilling to adhere to these agreements. They openly moved towards a policy of division. While maintaining the U.S. occupation, separate elections were held in South Korea on 10 May 1948 controlled by the U.N. commission. On 15 August 1948 the Republic of Korea was proclaimed and Syngman Rhee became its first president. In response to these machinations by U.S. imperialism and South Korea's reactionary forces, the progressive forces all over Korea prepared all-korean elections without foreign interference. Free all-korean elections were held on 25 August Based on a turnout of percent, in North Korea percent of voters opted for the candidates of the Democratic Front. In South Korea elections were held illegally. In spite of terror, 77.5 percent of eligible voters turned out. 360 deputies from South Korea and 212 from North Korea were elected. The 1 st Session of the Supreme People's Assembly ratified on 8 September 1948 the constitution of

3 the DPRK and proclaimed the foundation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It was comprised of the entire Korean territory with Seoul as its capital. On 9 September 1948 an all- Korean government was formed. II. Concerning their policy on South Korea and reunification, the Korean comrades argue the DPRK comprises of all of Korea, and the DPRK government represents the entire Korean people. They base this argument on the all-korean elections of August They resulted in an all-korean Supreme People's Assembly, which adopted the DPRK constitution and formed an all-korean government. In contrast, elections in South Korea and the foundation of the Republic of Korea were illegal and did not conform to the will of the Korean people. The DPRK constitution rests on the position that there exists only one state in Korea, namely the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. A part of it is temporarily and illegally occupied by the United States and ruled by a reactionary regime. Since the constitution does not have a preamble, this position is reflected in some concrete provisions. Article 103 says: The capital of the DPRK is Seoul. Article 7 states: In places in Korea's interior, where land reform is not yet implemented, the latter will be conducted at a time to be determined by the Supreme People's Assembly. Though after 1945 two Korean states were de facto established, the DPRK and the Republic of Korea, the Korean comrades insist on the thesis of an existence of one Korean state only. In international diplomacy, however, one could note that the DPRK does not follow through consistently on this one-state-theory. While it generally talked about South Korean administrations, in some documents addressed to the U.N. it referred to the government of the Republic of Korea. In the context of South Korea's request for admission into the United Nations in 1957, for instance, at the meeting of socialist states in preparation for the VIII UN Session the DPRK representative stated (Prague, 25 and 26 June 1957): The unilateral admission of Syngman Rhee, and the refusal to let a representative of our republic participate, stands in contrast to the basic principles of the United Nations. Such is ignoring the de facto existence of two sovereign states in North and South Korea. It is also an attempt to undermine a just resolution of the Korean question. In accordance with this declaration, the Soviet delegate proposed on 13 November 1957 in the Political Committee of the United Nations to accept both parts of Korea into the United Nations, since peaceful reunification can only occur through acceptance of the fact that two states with different social systems exist in this country. Proposals by the DPRK from 1960 and 1962 to establish a Korean confederation invite the conclusion that the DPRK recognizes the actual existence of two Korean states without saying so explicitly. In Kim Il Sung's government declaration from 23 October 1962 as well there are references to the government of the DPRK and the government of the Korean Republic without talking about two states. III. First proposals for a peaceful reunification of Korea were presented by Comrade Nam Il at the Geneva Conference in 1954: 1. Holding all-korean election for a National Assembly, which will form a government for all of Korea; 2. Formation of an all-korean commission of North and South Korean representatives to prepare and hold free all-korean elections, and implement urgent measures in order to achieve economic and cultural rapprochement between North and South Korea; 3. Withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea within six months;

4 4. States, which are interested the most in preserving peace in the Far East, guarantee a peaceful process in Korea in order to create favorable conditions for the peaceful unification of Korea to an united, independent, and democratic state. Nam Il's proposals were supported by the delegations from the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. The Western powers (i.e. the states participating in the Korean War) rejected both the DPRK proposals and the additional compromises and motions submitted by the Soviet Union and the PR China. Additional proposals were made by the DPRK at the 8 th Session of the Supreme People's Assembly on 30 October An appeal to all fellow Koreans stipulated the following: 1. Holding a conference about peaceful reunification in 1955 with the parties and organizations from North and South Korea, or having a joint session of both parliaments about the same subject 2. Holding a pre-conference meeting to discuss mutual economic and cultural relations, as well as the exchange of mail and goods 3. Establishing mutual contact through visits by political officials to the other part; respective administrations will have to guarantee their free movement The III KWP Party Congress in April 1956 also addressed the issue of Korea's reunification. DPRK positions were outlined in a document called For the Peaceful Unification of Our Country : IV. 1. Holding general elections in all of Korea without foreign interference; include representatives of the workers and peasants in a joint coalition government to be formed; 2. Turning the armistice into a permanent peace; reducing armed forces in both parts of the country; mutual commitment to refrain from using military force; withdrawal of all foreign troops; none of Korea's two parts is allowed to be member of a military alliance; 3. Creating democratic liberties and improve the living conditions of Korean workers; remove South Korea's economic dependency on the United States; implement democratic reforms in South Korea; 4. Facilitating traffic between both parts of the country; 5. Establishing a Joint Committee of representatives from parliaments and governments, or from party and societal organizations, to address in particular the issue of reunification; 6. Building a united front to fight against American imperialism; 7. Ratifying an international agreement to preserve peace in Korea, and for the peaceful resolution of the Korean question. In the following years as well, the DPRK made concrete proposals for Korea's peaceful reunification and for the establishment of certain relations between DPRK and South Korea. All those proposals testify to the eagerness of the DPRK to solve the Korean question and achieve a peaceful reunification of the country. However, the Syngman Rhee clique rejected those DPRK proposals. On the other hand, there was no force in South Korea strong enough to exert the necessary pressure on ruling circles to pursue a national policy in the interest of the Korean people. As a result of the Syngman Rhee clique's reactionary rule, all progressive forces in South Korea were brutally persecuted and forced to operate in deep illegality. Since 1950 there exists no Communist Party in South Korea. Therefore progressive forces lacked an instrument to lead them in the national and social struggle. The democratic movement in South Korea primarily opposed Syngman Rhee's dictatorship. Struggle

5 for Korea's reunification just played a subordinate role. Also, it was difficult to widely circulate DPRK proposals in South Korea. There are no links whatsoever between the north and south of Korea. Effects of DPRK broadcasts on the South Korean population must be considered minimal. It is also worth mentioning that the DPRK did not propagate its proposals with the insistence required, and it did not conduct a consequent struggle for the realization of its proposals. The DPRK first had to work out a clear concept for Korea's reunification. Core elements of all DPRK proposals were holding all-korean free elections and the demand for a withdrawal of U.S. occupation forces from South Korea. These DPRK proposals have to be seen in the context of U.S. attempts to hold elections through the United Nations and the U.N. Commission in Korea under American control. This would have meant an interference into the internal affairs of the Korean people. Thus the DPRK proposal to hold all-korean free elections has to be considered as correct during that period. An actual reunification of Korea is only achievable through the struggle of the entire Korean people. Yet DPRK proposals remained unsuccessful. U.S. imperialism, which had made South Korea strongly dependent, and the Syngman Rhee clique were not interested in reunification on a democratic basis. They wanted to incorporate the DPRK into South Korea. So, due to the actual situation in Korea it was impossible to unite both Korean parts from one day to the next. DPRK efforts to achieve reunification through free elections in all of Korea failed due to the ruling South Korean circles' reactionary policy. This required the DPRK to come up with new proposals taking into account the actual situation in Korea, namely the existence of two Korean states. It had to emphasize the need for a transitional period of peaceful coexistence between both Korean states until Korean reunification. This requirement was met by the proposal of 15 August 1960 to build a Korean confederation. In the spring of 1960 a broad popular movement overthrew South Korean dictator Syngman Rhee. Based on this new situation, [in August 1960] the DPRK government again made proposals for Korea's peaceful reunification. As before, it referred to the holding of free elections as the most effective and realistic path. However, for the first time the DPRK went beyond that. The DPRK government declared to undertake, in case of South Korea's rejection of free elections, at least transitional measures, which cannot be delayed in the national interests of the Korean people: 1. Building a confederation, while maintaining the current political systems in South and North Korea and the autonomous operation of governments in the DPRK and the Republic of Korea; 2. Establishing a Supreme National Committee of representatives from both governments in order to jointly coordinate economic and cultural processes in South and North Korea; 3. Holding subsequently all-korean elections leading to full implementation of Korea's peaceful reunification; 4. Reducing armed forces mutually to 100,000 or less; 5. Meeting of representatives from South and North Korea in Panmunjom, Pyongyang, or Seoul in order to discuss all these issues; 6. In case those proposals will be rejected as well, the DPRK suggested to form an economic committee with business representatives from both Korean parts to guarantee the exchange of goods as well as cooperation and support for economic reconstruction. These proposals have to be considered as more realistic and constructive, even when they still defined the holding of free elections as the best method. They take into account objective conditions, without saying so explicitly, that after 1945 two states have emerged in Korea. Those proposals are showing the only possible path towards a peaceful resolution of the Korean question. Proposing to build a confederation is based on the realization that Korea's reunification is

6 unachievable from one day to the next. It is necessary to arrive at rapprochement between DPRK and ROK based on peaceful coexistence and to create realistic conditions for peaceful reunification. Even if the [North] Korean side does not say so, this step signifies in fact a move away from the one-state-theory. Those DPRK proposals received a broad echo all over the world. Also, among South Korea's population it was received much better than previous DPRK proposals. However, the South Korean people were not in a position to force American imperialism and South Korea's ruling class -which continued the old reactionary policy- to implement those DPRK proposals. So this move as well remained without a result. V. After the overthrow of the Syngman Rhee rule the government of Chang Myon was formed. Though in more moderate ways, it continued anti-democratic and anti-communist policies and embarked on a course of South Korea's economic consolidation. Due to more opportunities for the democratic forces, a democratic movement geared towards reunification came to the fore. It threatened to become a danger for the ruling circles. Thus the Chang Myon government was overthrown and a military junta led by General Park Chung Hee came to power. The DPRK government initially misjudged the actual character of this coup and welcomed Chang Myon's fall. Only a week later it arrived at a clear-eyed assessment of the events of 16 May 1961 as a fascist military coup. With the fascist coup also came a liquidation of democratic organizations and the end of semi-legal opportunities for progressive activities. Still, due to the incorrect initial assessment opinion [in the DPRK] was widespread that Korea will be united soon. At its IV Congress in September 1961 the KWP declared South Korea's occupation by the United States as the main obstacle for Korea's peaceful reunification. The only possible way out for the South Korean people from their actual situation would be the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, the overthrow of the fascist military dictatorship, and the peaceful reunification of the country. The KWP outlined its positions as follows: 1. Peaceful Unification of Korea on a democratic basis by the Koreans themselves without foreign interference; 2. Establishing a united government through all-korean free elections on a democratic basis without foreign interference; 3. Guarantee of free political activities in all of Korea for all political parties, societal organizations, and individuals; 4. Precondition for free elections is the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea and the removal of any interference by foreign forces; 5. Uniting all forces of the people to an anti-american united front, and its mobilization for struggle against the U.S. occupation and for peaceful reunification. So the IV KWP Party Congress no longer talked about a confederation. In conversations [with DPRK officials] this move was justified by stating one cannot negotiate and cooperate with a fascist regime. Yet free elections in all of Korea the DPRK apparently deemed possible despite these conditions. Also the presumption, according to which South Korean rulers would collapse after the withdrawal of U.S. troops and thus pave the way for a democratization of South Korea, does not quite square with the facts. This temporary deviation from a policy of confederation between DPRK and South Korea demonstrates how the DPRK did not follow a consistent line in its reunification policy. It became

7 especially apparent in the period between January and May 1962 when the Korean people were called up to expel U.S. imperialism from South Korea and to violently overthrow the Park Chung Hee clique. This movement bordering on adventurism reached its peak when on 15 February 1962 a statement by the United Patriotic Front of Korea was made public. It contained slogans about the forceful liberation of South Korea from U.S. imperialism and coincided with military demonstrations in the DPRK. Especially the month of April saw large manifestations under the slogan of expelling U.S. troops from South Korea by liberating the South Korean brothers and sisters. Although the DPRK continued with its official claim to advocate peaceful reunification, those orientations [mentioned above] must be seen as a tendency towards non-peaceful reunification. This tendency is in sync with Chinese tactical considerations and the PRC military build-up in Eastern China directed against Taiwan during this period (spring 1962). Origins of this policy must be seen in DPRK positions on basic questions of Marxism-Leninism: war and peace, peaceful coexistence, and the national question. This DPRK policy caused grave concerns among the socialist countries and was not supported by them. Other countries, especially young national states, began to lose faith into the peaceful intentions of the DPRK. Imperialist states and South Korea's ruling circles exploited this policy to accuse the DPRK of aggressive intentions and to justify South Korea's ongoing occupation by the United States. Consequently, the DPRK again oriented increasingly towards a peaceful resolution and accordingly submitted new proposals. VI. These proposals for reunification were part of Choe Yong-geon [Choe Yong Gon]'s [?] speech at the 11 th Session of the Supreme People's Assembly in June 1962, the Letter of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK to the Supreme Council for National Transformation of the Republic of Korea, the representatives of societal organizations, the politicians, and the entire people of South Korea, and part of the Letter of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK to the Parliaments of all the States in the World. They have the following contents: 1. Joint struggle of all classes of the North and South Korean population for the withdrawal of U.S. troops; 2. If the South Korean rulers are currently not willing to negotiate about reunification, then this can occur in the course of a process of rapprochement between both parts of Korea; 3. Signing of a non-aggression treaty between North and South Korea and reduction of armed forces to 100,000 men each after the withdrawal of U.S. forces; 4. Negotiations between South and North Korea on issues of economic and cultural relations, as well as about travel. Objectives of these proposals were to increase the international reputation of the DPRK, to demonstrate before the eyes of the world peaceful intentions of the DPRK in solving the Korean question, to counter anti-communist propaganda about alleged aggressive intentions of the DPRK, to activate people's struggle in South Korea for the withdrawal of U.S. forces, and to achieve the support of all people for its struggle. VII. In his government declaration of 23 October 1962 before the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK Comrade Kim Il Sung again outlined proposals for Korea's reunification: 1. It would be necessary to eliminate the tension between the South and the North created by

8 the United States. An agreement on non-aggression between South and North Korea has to be signed. Armed forces of both parts of Korea ought to be reduced to 100,000 each or less. 2. After the ending of the state of tensions, the next step could be exchange and cooperation in the economic and cultural field. For this purpose an economic committee ought to be formed, consisting of representatives from both parts of Korea. 3. After the implementation of this step, it will be appropriate to build a confederation. Current social systems and autonomous operations of the DPRK and ROK governments are supposed to be maintained. A Supreme National Committee comprised of representatives from both governments could solve joint issues of all-national interest. According to their political convictions, both the South Korean and DPRK government will become free to operate without mutual interference. They will jointly solve only those questions on which they agree upon in the confederative organ and which concern general national interests. 4. Through such intermediary stages the full reunification of Korea can, and must, be achieved. At the end of this process an united central government is to be established. It has to represent all parts of the population and will come about through all-korean free elections on a democratic basis. Model for these programmatic ideas is the proposal for establishing a confederation in Korea from 1960, but they are more concrete and comprehensive. They are based on the assumption that Korea's reunification is a complicated and lengthy process, which will succeed only gradually and with intermediate steps. In a talk with a GDR government delegation in September 1962, Kim Il Sung stated the majority of the South Korean population still thinks South Korea's viability depends on aid from the Americans and Japanese, as well from the West German monopolists. While all previous [DPRK reunification] proposals centered on holding free elections, the latter are now considered as the end of a process of rapprochement and cooperation between both parts of Korea. It is correctly stated that preconditions for such elections are the removal of any interference from outside and establishing an actual democratic situation in South Korea. This objective, however, can only be achieved if one succeeds to create a united front for the struggle against American imperialism and the domestic reactionary forces in South Korea, and for Korea's peaceful reunification. The center of this movement would have to consist in a Marxist- Leninist party [in South Korea] capable to lead the working class and form an alliance with the peasantry. Overall, this new program represents a more realistic base for uniting all forces in favor of peaceful reunification. It could lead to an upswing of the struggle towards Korea's peaceful reunification. In order to realize this grand reunification program, the DPRK is willing to cooperate with all forces in South Korea, notwithstanding their respective past. VIII. Recently, however, we see again tendencies contrasting this peaceful policy. From 10 to 14 December 1962 the KWP [Central Committee] held its 5 th Plenum. It decided to arm the entire population, to feature the slogan arms in one hand, hammer and sickle in the other, to strengthen DPRK defense capabilities, and to turn the entire country into a fortress. Although the DPRK government declaration of 23 October 1962 and various documents addressed to the United Nations strongly emphasized a peaceful resolution of the Korean question -and even though the plenum mentioned above also referred to the peaceful path-, the measures decided [at the 5 th Plenum] just point in the opposite direction. Summary:

9 1. The foundation of the DPRK party and government's reunification policy is the existence of one Korean state. In documents and conversations the Korean comrades in general circumvent the question whether there exist one or two Korean states. In particular, proposals for building a confederation in Korea demonstrate that the DPRK de facto moved away from the one-state-theory. 2. Korea's reunification can only be achieved on a peaceful path. Any other path would be adventurism. It would create immense damage to the Korean people and threaten the [global] peace. Peaceful coexistence and negotiations between DPRK and South Korea are the only realistic basis for solving the Korean question. 3. It was always the DPRK that launched initiatives for Korea's reunification. However, DPRK policy was inconsistent and contradictory. Those oscillations had negative impacts on the credibility of DPRK proposals. Party and government issued wrong tactical slogans. They did not focus on workers and peasants in South Korea as the force representing the progressive parts of the population. Reasons for this are, among else, false assessments of the balance of forces and the political groupings in the South, also the insufficiently differentiated evaluation of South Korea's economic development. The DPRK did not consequently fight for realization of its proposals. In general, it just left it at proclaiming them. 4. DPRK proposals, which were always actively supported by the DPRK population, were met with insufficient resonance in South Korea. Although a broader movement for reunification was possible under Chang Myon, this democratic movement was liquidated by Park Chung Hee. The faint resonance [to this liquidation] is a result of facts like that there are no relations whatsoever between DPRK and South Korea, and that there are still just scant opportunities for the DPRK to influence South Korea's population. Also, DPRK party and government have undertaken insufficient efforts to gain international support in their struggle for Korea's peaceful reunification. 5. Preconditions for Korea's peaceful reunification are the withdrawal of U.S. forces and South Korea's democratization. The South Korean population has to be mobilized for this struggle. Precondition for this mobilization is the formation of a Marxist-Leninist party capable to lead the masses in the struggle for the withdrawal of U.S. forces, for South Korea's democratization, and for Korea's peaceful reunification. However, such a party must not be viewed as an appendix of the KWP, as the Korean comrades are still doing it. Currently, they are still the intellectuals and students who represent the progressive forces [in South Korea]. Until now there are no indications for getting the workers and peasants organized. For this, as well as for the formation of a party, conditions in South Korea are extremely difficult since under Park Chung Hee all legal and semi-legal opportunities got eliminated. Successes are only possible through a consequent DPRK reunification policy. Decisions of the 5 th KWP plenum are already turning out to inhibit the latter, as they distract from focusing all energies on strengthening the DPRK economically. [signed] Wegricht Senior Associate CC: 1x Minister Schwab

10 1x Central Committee, International Relations Department, Comrade Ott 1x Embassy Pyongyang 1x Section Korea

11 SED 중앙위원회 대외관계부 기록서명 : SAPMO-BA, Berlin, DY 30, IV A 2/20/250 [ 독일민주공화국외무부 ] 탈유럽 1 국 /2 베를린, 1963 년 5 월 2 일 조선반도의통일에있어조선민주주의인민공화국의정책변화 I 년 8 월 15 일조선은일제의식민지상태에서소비에트연방에의해해방되었다 년 9 월 8 일에는미군이조선반도의남쪽에상륙하였다. 조선반도는 38 도선이북의소비에트연방점령지역과이남의미군점령지역이라는두개의지역으로나뉘었다 년 9 월모스크바에서열린모스크바 3 상회의에서소비에트연방과미국은장차한국에민주적인임시정부를세우고더나아가민주적이고독립적인국가를수립하기로합의하였다. 이러한과정을감시하기위하여서미소공동위원회가설립되었다. 소비에트연방은모스크바회의의협의사항을준수하기위하여노력했으나미국은처음부터이를방해하였다. 조선반도의북쪽에서만토지개혁이라던가인민위원회의결성과같은민주적인조치들이가능하였다. 미국제국주의자들은조선반도전역을자신들의지배하에놓기위하여노력하였다. 자신들의지배를위하여, 미국은국제연합의지도하에서전국총선거를치르고자하는책략을꾸몄다 년미국주도하에국제연합의한국위원회가설립되었는데, 해당위원회는한국정부구성을위한선거활동감시가그목적이었다. 소비에트연방은이를조선인민의내정간섭행위라비난하였다. 소비에트연방은한국위원회의구성원들이북측에진입하는것을막았다. 소비에트연방은한국문제를모스크바에서합의한것에기초하여풀고싶어하였다. 그러나미국제국주의자들은합의를이행하고자하는마음이없었으며공공연히분단정책을거론하였다 년 5 월 10 일한국위원회의감시하에미군이점령한남조선에서총선이시작되었다 년 8 월 15 일대한민국이건국되었고리승만이초대대통령이되었다. 미제국주의와남조선반동세력의술수에대응하기위하여조선의진보세력들은외세의개입없는총선거를실시하고자하였다 년 8 월 25 일자유총선거가실시되었다. 투표율은 99.7% 였으며북조선민주주의민족전선의공동후보에게 98.49% 의유권자들이찬성표를던졌다. 이남에서는공개선거가불가능한특수한사정을고려하여비밀지하선거가실시되었다. 갖은방해에도불구하고, 77.5% 의투표율을기록하였다. 남측의대표자 360 인과북측의대표자 212 인이선출되었다. 제 1 차최고인민위원회는 1948 년 8 월헌법을제정하고, 조선민주주의인민공화국의건국을선포하였다. 헌법은조선반도전체를영역으로하면서, 수도를서울로규정하였다 년 9 월 9 일공화국이수립되었다. II.

12 남조선과통일에대해서, 조선의동지들은조선민주주의인민공화국이조선반도전역을다스리며, 전조선인민을대표한다는입장을견지하였다. 이는 1948 년 8 월에실시된총선거로인해선출된북측과남측의대표로최고인민회의가구성되었으며, 본회의에서공화국이수립되고헌법이제정되었다는사실에근거한것이었다. 반면에, 남쪽에서의선거와대한민국의건국은불법적이었으며전체인민의뜻을반영하지도못하였다. 조선민주주의인민공화국의헌법은조선반도에는하나의국가만이존재하며이는조선민주주의인민공화국이라고하였다. 미제에의해국토의일부분이잠시동안불법적으로점거되어있으며, 반동적인세력에의해통치되고있다. 해당헌법은전문이없기때문에이러한입장은일부조항에서확인된다. 예를들어 103 조는 ' 조선민주주의인민공화국의수부는서울시다 ' 라고규정하고있으며 7 조는 " 아직토지개혁이실시되지아니한조선안의지역에있어서는최고인민회의가규정하는시일에이를실시한다." 고하였다 년이후조선반도에는두개의정부가생겼지만양측은한개의국가만이조선반도에존재한다고주장하였다. 그러나국제무대에서까지조선민주주의인민공화국이 ' 한개의국가 ' 이론을사용한것은아니었다. 유엔에보낸문서들에서는남측정부를가리키면서 ' 대한민국정부 ' 라고언급한부분이있다. 예를들어국제연합제 13 차총회를준비하기위한사회주의국가간의회의에서조선민주주의인민공화국의대표는 " 리승만정부를단독가입시키고, 우리공화국의대표가국제연합에참여하는것을막는것은국제연합의기본적인원칙과배치되는것입니다. 이는조선반도에사실상두개의정부가있다는것을무시하는처사이며한국문제에대한공평한해결을막으려는시도로밖에보이지않습니다." 고발언하였다. ( 프라하, 1957 년 6 월 25 일 ~ 26 일 ) 1957 년 11 월 13 일국제연합의소비에트연방대표는 ' 평화적통일은두개의정부가다른사회구조를가지고한국가안에있다는것을인식하는데에서시작된다 ' 는인식하에국제연합정치위원회에조선반도에있는양측모두의가입을허용하자는제안을내놓았다 년과 1962 년언급된조선민주주의인민공화국의고려연방제안은명시적으로밝히고있지는않지만, 사실상조선반도에있어두개의정부를인정하는것을전제로하는것이었다 년 10 월 23 일김일성의선언에도 ' 두국가라고는명시하고있지않지만, ' 조선민주주의인민공화국정부와대한민국정부 ' 라는표현이들어가있다. III 년제네바정치회담에서북조선의남일외무상은평화로운통일을위한제안을내놓았다. ㄱ. 조선의통일정부를형성할국회총선거를실시할것. ㄴ. 조선국회의자유총선거를준비실시하며남북조선간의경제및문화적접근에대한긴급한조치를취하기위하여조선민주주의인민공화국최고인민회의와대한민국국회에의하여각각선출된남북조선대표들로서전조선위원회를조직할것. ㄷ. 6 개월내에조선지역으로부터일체외국무력이철거하여야할것 ㄹ. 극동에서의평화유지에가장관심을가진해당국가들측으로부터조선의평화적발전을보장하며또이렇게함으로써조선을단일독립민주국가로평화적으로통일시킬과업의급속한해결에도움이될조건들을지어줄필요성을인정할것. 위와같은남일의제안은소련과중공대표들로부터지지를받았다. 반면서방측은 ( 한국전

13 쟁에참여했던국가들 ) 조선민주주의인민공화국의안과중공, 소련이거기에덧붙여서만든안, 둘다를반대했다 년 10 월 30 일에개최된조선최고인민회의에서조선의전인민에게다음과같은조선민주주의인민공화국의추가적인제안이나왔다. 1 조국의평화적통일문제를토의하기위하여남북조선의각정당사회단체및각계각층대표자연석회의혹은조선민주주의인민공화국최고인민회의와대한민국국회의합동회의를평양혹은서울에서 1955 년내소집할것. 2 상기회의의소집에관한문제와남북간의경제및문화교류, 통상, 통행, 서신거래의개시에관한문제를토의하기위하여남북조선대표들의회의를소집할것. 3 남북조선각정당 사회단체들과각계각층애국적인사들은조국의평화적통일을위한대책을강구하기위하여호상연락하며호상내왕하며호상접촉하여야할것이며남북조선의주권당국은전조선지역에서이들의활동자유를보장할것 년의로동당제 3 차전당회의에서도 ' 조국의평화적통일을위한 ' 조선민주주의인민공화국의통일방안이제시되었다. 1 외세의개입없이조선의노동자와농민의대표가참여하는통일정부가전체조선인민의총선거에의해수립되어야한다. 2 현재의정전상황을영구적평화로전환시키기위하여감군이추진되고, 군사력사용은호상합의간에억제되어야하며, 모든외국군대는철수하고쌍방은제 3 의다른국가와군사동맹을맺어서는안된다. 3 조국의평화적통일을위한투쟁에광범한인민대중이참가하며그들의애국적열성과적극성이유감없이발휘되도록하기위하여서남조선의전반적사회 정치생활에서민주주의원칙이실현되어야하며인민대중의생활이안정개선되어야한다. 4 남북조선간호상접촉과왕래를증진시킨다. 5 통일의문제를토론하기위하여서의회와정부, 혹은각정당과사회단체의대표들로구성된합동위원회를설립한다. 6 미제국주의를반대하는전민족적통일단결을강화하며남북조선의전체애국적역량을단합하여평화적통일의적을반대하는공동투쟁을강화하여야한다. 7 조선에서의평화유지와조선문제의평화적해결을위한국제적협정이달성되어야한다. IV. 그이후에도조선민주주의인민공화국은조선반도의평화적통일을이룩하고조선민주주의인민공화국과남조선사이에관계를수립하기위한구체적인제안을계속해서내놓았다. 이러한모습은조선민주주의공화국이조선문제를해결하여평화적인통일을달성하는데얼마나적극적이었는지를보여준다. 그러나리승만일당은조선민주주의인민공화국측의제안을모두거절했다. 남조선에는지배계층을압박하여조선인민전체의이익을위한정책을펼치게할만한세력이없었다. 리승만일당의반동적인통치의결과로서, 남조선의모든진보세력들은극심하게탄압당했고지

14 하로숨어비밀리에활동할수밖에없었다 년이래남조선에는공산당이없었다. 그렇기때문에진보세력이민족과사회문제에대해목소리를낼수있는방법또한없었다. 리승만의독재에반대하여남조선에민주주의운동이일어났다. 시위에서통일문제는부차적인것이었다. 또한조선민주주의인민공화국측의제안을남측의구성원들에게퍼트리는것은쉽지않았다. 양측간에교류할수있는통로가없었기때문이다. 조선민주주의인민공화국의방송이남조선측에송출되는것은매우제한적이었다. 조선민주주의인민공화국은먼저통일의대략적인형태를잡아나가야했다. 모든안들은전조선자유선거의실시, 미제국주의세력의철수에대한요구로압축된다. 이는미국이국제연합과한국위원회를통하여선거를실시함으로써조선반도를자국의지배권하에넣으려고시도했다는맥락에서나온주장이다. 이는조선인민의내정문제에대한명백한간섭이었다. 따라서조선민주주의인민공화국은전조선자유선거를통하여역사의과오를바로잡고자하였다. 조선반도의진정한통일은조선인민전체의투쟁을통해서만달성될수있는것이었다. 그러나조선민주주의인민공화국의안은받아들여지지못하였다. 남조선을종속상태로몰아넣은미제국주의와리승만일당은민주적인통일을이룩하는데관심이없었다. 그들은조선민주주의인민공화국을남조선에흡수하는데만관심이있었다. 이런이유로조선반도가하루아침에통일이되는것은불가능했다. 전조선자유선거를통하여서통일을달성하고자하는북측의노력은남조선지도층의반동적인책략에의해좌절되었다. 조선민주주의인민공화국은현실을반영하여 2 개의조선을인정하는새로운제안을내놓을필요가있었다. 이러한맥락에서 1960 년 8 월 15 일남북연방제안이나왔다 년남조선에서는독재자리승만이광범위한인민시위에의해물러났다. 이러한상황속에서 1960 년 8 월북측의제안이나온것이다. 전조선자유선거를현실적이고효과적인방안으로인식한것은전의다른제안들과다르지않다. 그러나처음으로조선민주주의인민공화국은남측이총선거를거절할경우에, 더이상지체할수없는조선인민전체의리익을위하여최소과도적인조치를취할것을약속하였다. 1. 남북조선의현재정치제도를그대로두고조선민주주의인민공화국정부와 ` 대한민국정부 ` 의독자적인활동을보존하는것 2. 두정부의대표들로구성되는최고민족위원회를조직하여주로남북의경제문화발전을통일적으로조절하는방법으로실시 3. 그뒤조선반도의통일을위하여서전조선자유선거를실시 4. 남북조선의군대를각각 10 만또는그아래로줄일것 5. 평양이나서울또는판문점에서라도한시바삐남북조선대표들이모여앉아이상의모든문제들을협의 6. 만일남조선당국이우리가내놓는연방제까지도아직받아들일수없다고하면남북조선의실업계대표들로구성되는경제위원회라도조직하여남북사이의물자를교역하며경제건설에서서로협조하고원조하도록할것 위의제안은여전히자유총선거를최선의방법으로여기고있다는한계가있었지만, ( 전의다른안들보다 ) 보다현실적이고건설적인제안이었다. 명시적이지는않았으나, 1945 년이후조선반도에두개의정부가들어섰다는사실을고려한것이었다. 이제안은조선문제의평화적으로해결하기위한유일한방법을보여주었다. 또한이는조선반도의통일이하루아침에이루어질수있는것이아니라는현실인식을전제로한것이었다. 조선민주주의인민공

15 화국과대한민국양국의평화로운공존에입각한친선관계는평화적통일을위한현실적인전제조건인것이다. 북측이이를명시적으로말한적이없더라도남북연방제안은기존의 1 국가이론에서벗어나는것을의미한다. 조선민주주의인민공화국입장에서는세계다른국가에서도호응을얻은제안이었다. 남조선인민들도전의유사제안보다이안을보다긍정적으로평가했다. 그러나남조선인민은아직미군제국주의와남조선지도부의반동정책을꺾고조선연방제안이받아들여지도록할수있는위치에있지못하였다. 이런이유로연방제안은큰성과를거두지는못하였다. V. 리승만정권이무너지고장면내각이구성되었다. 리승만정부만큼은아니었지만장면정부도반민주, 반공산주의정책을추진하였고경제를우선시하였다. 전반적인민주화분위기속에서통일을위한민주적인제안들이나오기시작했다. 이는지도층에부담이되었기때문에장면정부는무너지고군사쿠데타에의해서박정희장군이권력을잡게되었다. 조선민주주의인민공화국은처음에이쿠데타의성격을잘못파악하였고장면내각의실패를환영하였다. 일주일이지나서야 1961 년 5 월 16 일의쿠데타가파쇼군그룹에의한것임이명확해졌다. 군부세력은민주적인기구들을청산하고진보적인법적활동을끝냈다. 조선민주주의인민공화국내에서는잘못된사태파악으로인하여곧통일이될것이라는분위기가팽배하였다 년 9 월에열린로동당제 4 차당대회에서미국의남조선반도점령이통일의가장주요한방해중에하나라는선언이있었다. 따라서남조선인민들을해방시키기위해서는남조선에서의미군철수, 파시스트군부정권의독재종식, 조국의평화로운통일이필요하였다. 이 4 차당대회에서는다음과같은제안이나왔다. 1. 어떠한외세의간섭도없이민주주의적원칙에기초한평화적인통일추진 2. 어떠한외세의간섭도없이민주주의적원칙에기초한전조선자유선거를통하여통일정부를수립 3. 남북조선의모든정당 사회단체및개별적인사들에게남북조선전지역에서정치활동의자유를보장 4. 진정한자유선거를보장하기위한선결조건으로써조선으로부터미국군대를철거시키고일체외세의간섭을배제하는것 5. 반미연합전선을결성하며, 미국의지배에맞서투쟁하며평화적인통일을이룰수있도록연대하는것 제 4 차로동당대회에서는남북연방제에대한이야기가없었다. 조선인민공화국관리와이야기해본결과파쇼적반동세력과는일체의협상도, 협력도할수없다는점에서남북연방제가빠진것이었다. 반면남북한전역에서의자유총선거는여러호재에도불구하고가능성이없어보였다. 미군이철수함에따라자연스레남한내부의반동적지도부가무너지고, 남조선의민주화가이루어질것이라는가정또한사실과잘맞지않았다. 남북연방제에대한언급이일시적으로빠진사실은조선민주주의인민공화국측의통일정책이일관되지못하였음을보여준다 년 1 월과 5 월사이북측이미제와박정희일당을몰아내고자인민들을선동한사실에서명백히드러났다. 이런위험한행태는 1962 년 2 월 15 일조선연합애국전선의대중선언에서정점에이르렀다. 해당선언에는남조선을미제로부터해

16 방시키자고되어있었는데시기적으로북측의군사도발과겹쳤다. 특히 4 월에는남조선의형제와자매들을해방시키기위하여미군을몰아내자고하는구호를외쳤다. 조선민주주의인민공화국은계속해서평화통일을위한공식적인주장을계속해서제기했다. 그러나지금까지언급한부분은무력에의한적화통일의의도로읽혀진다. 이러한경향은 1962 년봄당시중국이자국영토의동쪽에타이완을겨냥한군사기지를건설한중국의전략적움직임과도그궤를같이한다. 이러한공세적입장은전쟁과평화, 평화적공존, 민족문제와같은마르크스 - 레닌주의가제기하는질문에대해조선민주주의인민공화국이기본적으로견지하는태도에서나온것이다. 다른사회주의국가들사이에서는북측의정책에대한염려가늘어나기시작하였고지지하는국가가줄어들게되었다. 다른국가들특히신생국가들은조선민주주의인민공화국측의평화적인의도에대해의문을품게되었다. 제국주의국가들과남조선의지도세력들은조선민주주의인민공화국측의공세적인의도를비난하고, 남조선에있어서의미군점령을정당화하는근거로삼았다. 이런상황속에서평화적인의견을낼필요가커졌고북측은새로운제안들을내놓게되었다. VI. 이제안들은최용건최고인민회의의장이 1962 년 6 월, 제 11 차최고인민회의에서발표한 ' 대한민국국가재건최고회의및남조선사회정치활동가들과전체인민들에게보내는조선민주주의인민공화국최고인민회의서한 ' 과 ' 세계각국의의회에보내는조선민주주의인민공화국최고인민회의서한 ' 의일부이다. 내용은다음과같다. 1. 미군의철수를위하여서남북조선의각계각층인민들이공동투쟁할것 2. 남조선당국이지금당장통일문제를가지고토론할의사가없다면, 우선양측간의관계개선을위해노력할것 3. 미군의철수후, 남북간의불가침조약발효와 10 만명규모로양측의군대를감축할것 4. 남북간의경제, 문화적교류와자유로운교류실현을위하여협상할것 이러한제안은조선민주주의인민공화국의국제적위상을높이며, 세계인들의관심을한국문제에대한북측의평화적인의도에집중시키는데있었다. 또한그동안자신들을공세적이라매도해왔던반공산진영의선전에대응하며남조선에서미군의철수를원하는민중들의투쟁을활성화시킴으로써전인민의지지를이끌어내고자하였다. VII 년 10 월 23 일최고인민회의제 3 기제 1 차회의에서김일성동지는그간의통일에대한입장을정리한연설을하였다. 1. 미제국주의자들에의하여남북간에조성된긴장관계를제거하는것이무엇보다중요하다. 미국군대를철거시키고남북상호간의불가침평화협정을체결하여남북조선의군대를각각 10 만또는그이하로축소하여야한다. 2. 남북간에긴장상태가제거되면우리는한걸음더나아가경제문화의교류와협조를실현할수있을것이다. 이를위하여남북조선대표들로경제위원회를조직하는것이필요하다고인정한다.

17 3. 남북간의교류와호상협조가실현되면다시한걸음더나아가연방제를실시하는것이합리적이라고생각한다. 남북조선에현존하는사회정치제도는그대로두고호상간섭없이조선민주주의인민공화국정부와대한민국정부의독자적인활동을보존하면서두정부의대표들로최고민족위원회를조직하여민족공동의관심사로되는문제를공동으로처리하려는것이다. 4. 우리는이러한중간걸음들을거쳐조국의완전한통일에도달할수있으며또반드시도달해야한다. 완전한통일을달성하기위하여서는민주주의적원칙에기초한전조선자유선거에의하여남북조선의각개각층을망라한통일적인중앙정부를수립하여야합니다. 이렇게통일을위해서여러단계의과정을정하는것은 1960 년고려연방제에대한제안에서그기원을찾을수있다. 하지만김일성의제안은더욱포괄적이며구체적인것이었다. 일련의북측제안들은조선의통일이복잡하여시간이걸리는과정이라는과정이기때문에점진적이고여러단계를거쳐이루어져야한다는가정에서시작한다 년 9 월독일민주공화국사절단과의대화에서김일성은여전히남조선인민중다수가자국의생존이미국과일본그리고서독독점자본가들의원조에달려있다고인식한다는점을지적했다. 이전북측의통일관련제안들이자유선거실시에초점을맞추었다면이제김일성의제안은양자간의관계개선을통하여서협력관계를창출하는데집중하였다. 어떠한외국세력도조선반도에서철수해야만총선이자유롭게치러질수있었고그렇게할때만이진정한민주주의가남조선에꽃필수있었다. 그러나김일성의제안은오직미제와남조선의반동세력에대한투쟁, 그리고평화통일을위한연합전선형성을통해서만가능했다. 여기서핵심은남조선에있는마르크스 - 레닌주의정당이근로자계층을이끌면서소작농들과연대를구현해내는데있었다. 대체로위의제안은평화적인통일에호의적인모든세력의지지를모을수있는현실적대안으로평가된다. 조선반도의통일에대한여론을호전시킬수있었기때문이다. 다음과같은원대한통일계획을실현하기위해조선민주주의인민공화국은과거자신의편이아니었던세력까지도포용하여협력하고자하였다. VIII. 최근다시금평화적정책에반하는북측의제안이나왔다 년 12 월 10 일부터 14 일까지열린조선로동당중앙위원회제 5 차전당대회에서전인민의무장을지시하는결의안이나왔다. 이는 ' 한손에는무기를, 다른한손에는망치와낫을 ' 이라는슬로건으로요약되는데조선민주주의인민공화국측의방어력을극대화하고전국토를요새화하기위한조치였다. 비록조선민주주의공화국정부가 1962 년 10 월 23 일의선언과국제연합에보낸다른문서들에서평화적해결을강조하여왔고, 위의제 5 차전당대회에서도평화로운해결을이야기했지만, 실제로 5 차전당대회에서결정된방향은정반대였던것이다. 요 약 1. 조선민주주의인민공화국의정부와로동당의통일정책은한개의국가정책이다. 여러문서들과조선동지들과대화에서조선반도에몇개의정부가있는지의문제를피해가고있다. 그러나고려연방제구상은조선민주주의인민공화국이사실상한개의국가정책에서벗어났음을보여준다. 2. 조선반도의통일은오로지평화적인방법으로만추구될수있다. 그렇지못할경우위험이커진다. 평화롭지못한방법들은조선인민에게막대한손해를끼칠분아니라세계의평화도위협한다. 양측은평화적인공존과협상을통하여서진정으로조선문제가해결될수있는실마리를찾을수있다.

18 3. 항상통일에대한논의는북측의제안에서시작되었다. 그러나조선민주주의인민공화국측의결정은비일관적이며모순되는모습을보여왔다. 이는제안의신뢰성에의문을던지게하였다. 이는로동당과정부의잘못된전략에서비롯된것이다. 이들은진보세력을이끌어나가기위한중심세력으로써남조선의노동자나소작농에초점을맞추지않았다. 다른이유도있겠지만주된이유는남측세력간의균형및정치적위상에대한판단실수, 남조선의경제발전에대한불충분한평가때문으로풀이된다. 조선민주주의인민공화국은계속해서제안을실현하고자노력하지않았다. 대개선언은선언에서그쳤다. 4. 북조선인민들의전폭적인지지를얻고있는조선민주주의인민공화국의제안들은남측에서는그다지호응을얻지못하였다. 장면정권하에서는통일을위한다양한운동들이용납되었으나, 박정희정부가들어오면서민주적인운동은점차줄어들었다. 이는남북간의교류채널이없고, 조선민주주의인민공화국이남측의인민들에게영향을줄수있는통로가없기때문이다. 또한로동당과북측정부도조선반도의평화적통일을위한국제적지지를얻는데충분한노력을기울이지않고있다. 5. 조선반도의평화적통일을위한조건은미군의철수와남조선의민주화이다. 남측의인민들은이를위해투쟁해야한다. 마르크스 - 레닌주의에기반한정당이미군의철수와남조선의민주화, 조선의평화적통일을위한투쟁에민중들을포섭할수있어야한다. 그러나이는현재북조선동무들이하고있듯이조선로동당의조종을받는단체처럼보여서는안된다. 최근까지도남조선의진보세력으로는학생과지식분자가꼽힌다. 노동자나소작농들은아직그들만의진보적인조직이나정당을만들지못한것으로보인다. 박정희의집권이래남조선에서의법적혹은그와유사한기회들이박탈되면서상황이극도로악화되었다. 통일의성공여부는조선민주주의인민공화국측의일관적인통일정책에달려있다. 그러나제 5 차로동당전당대회의결정은경제분야에총력을기울이는것을막음으로써벌써통일정책에장애가되고있다. [ 서명 ] Wegricht Senior Associate 참조 : 1x Schwab 장관 1x 국무부중앙위원회, Ott 동지 1x 평양대사관 1x 조선업무담당자