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1 2013

2 International Issues & Prospects

3 2013 겨울주요국제문제분석

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5 국립외교원외교안보연구소는국제정치 경제정세및외교현안에대한전문가와국민들의이해를높이고자매주 주요국제문제분석 을발간하고있으며각논문의영문요약본 (IFANS Brief) 을포함하여분기별계간지를발간하고있습니다. 이책자는집필자의견해를바탕으로 열린외교 의구현과외교정책수립을위한참고자료로작성된것으로서, 외교부의공식입장과는무관합니다.

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7 목차 중국-일본의대아프리카전략분석및한국적함의 Analysis of China and Japan s Strategies in Africa and Implications for the Republic of Korea 변웅 ( ) 년 ASEAN 관련정상회의결과분석 : 한-ASEAN, ASEAN+3, EAS를중심으로 The 2013 ASEAN-related Summits: From the Perspectives of Korea-ASEAN, ASEAN+3 and the EAS 배긍찬 ( ) 33 사이버스페이스거버넌스의현안과쟁점 Cyberspace Governance: Current Issues and Policy Implications 유준구 ( ) 55 중국 대만관계 : 양안 ECFA의정치경제적시사점 Cross-Strait Relations: Political and Economic Implications of the ECFA between China and Taiwan 윤근노 ( ) 이란핵문제제네바합의의함의와전망 Implications and Prospects of the 2013 Geneva Interim Agreement on the Iranian Nuclear Program 인남식 ( ) 109 G20의발전을위한중견국의역할 Middle Powers Role for the Development of the G20 이동휘 ( ) 131 미국의군사적재균형의추이와전망 The U.S. Rebalancing Strategy: Recent Trends and Future Prospects 최우선 ( ) 163 미국의셰일가스개발과국제에너지안보환경의변화 The US Shale Gas Revolution and Changing Structure of Int l Energy Security 최원기 ( ) 187 EU 사이버안보전략의현황과전망 The Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union and its Implications for Korea 전혜원 ( ) 219

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9 주요국제문제분석 중국 - 일본의대아프리카전략분석및한국적함의 중국-일본의대아프리카전략분석및한국적함의 * 변웅 ** 1 문제제기아프리카는탈식민지이후정상적인국가로정착하는데매우고전하며 암흑의대륙 으로불리며내전, 기아, 잦은군사쿠데타등버려진땅으로인식되고있었음. 최근까지도수단사태, 말리사태, 콩고사태등연이은내전과군사쿠데타로인한정치적불안정이지속되고있음. 그럼에도불구하고지난세기와비교하여전반적인내전의수와정치적불안정의정도는줄어들고있는추세이고민주주의규범이점차확산되고있는추세임. 목차 1. 문제제기 2. 중국의대아프리카외교전략 3. 일본의대아프리카외교전략 4. 중국-일본의대아프리카전략비교와한국적함의 5. 한국의고려사항 특히세계각국및기업들이막대한지하자원과신흥시장으로서의아프리카의경제적가치와잠재력에주목하면서아프리카는 21세기기회의땅으로인식되고있음. - 다양한지하자원, 특히원유의경우타생산지역과비교하여상대적으로미개발되었기때문에향후개발가능성이높고 (2020년세계 25% 공급추정 ), 향후안정된정치적환경이전제되고국가재건프로젝트를수행할경우막대한국가기간산업의가능성, 사망률저하및보건역량이강화할경우인구증가 (2050년 20억명추정 ) 로인한거대소비시장형성등아프리카의성장가능성은매우높을것임. 아프리카의잠재적성장가능성과에너지자원에대한세계적요 * 발표 ** 객원교수 1

10 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 각국의대아프리카외교전략중한국의인접국인중국과일본을비교하고긍정적인부분과한계를위주로파악하여후발주자로서한국의향후대아프리카외교전략에대한함의를찾아야 구가높아진현재새로운시장확보와자원확보에대한각국의경쟁은아프리카대륙에서본격화되고있음. 특히중국의대아프리카공략은그속도와양적인면에서전통적인우호국가인인도, 서방각국, 일본등기존의아프리카진출국의견제를만들어내고있음. 중국의산업화를위한자원분야뿐만아니라인프라, 농업, 제조업, 금융, 일반소매업등다양한분야에전방위적으로진출하고있음. 중국의진출은아프리카와기존대외협력국가들간의관계를질적으로변화시키는측면이있음. 일본의경우아프리카에서의중국의부상을견제하고기존의관계를더욱발전시키기위해 2013년 6월 3일제5차아프리카개발회의 (Tokyo International Conference on African Development, TICAD) 를통해공공-민간분야포함 320억달러를 5년간지원하겠다고공언하고있음. 본보고서는각국의대아프리카외교전략중한국의인접국인중국과일본을비교하고긍정적인부분과한계를위주로파악하여후발주자로서한국의향후대아프리카외교전략에대한함의를찾는데있음. 2 중국의대아프리카외교전략 가. 아 중역사를바탕으로한외교관계 (1) 1955 년반둥회의부터 1990 년대이르는근현대우호관계형성 대아프리카중국외교는최근그양과질에있어급격히높아지고있지만중 아관계는 1950년부터시작하여지금까지이르는오랜외교관계의축적물임. 특히미 소대결양상에서벗어나려는중국과아프리카의비동맹노선전략이맞물리면서상호관계는우호관계로발전됨. 이는서방의식민지관계와달리중국의일방적인외교전략이아니라상호이해관계속에서형성된관계임. 2

11 중국 - 일본의대아프리카전략분석및한국적함의 - 중국공산당정부는 1955년반둥회의 (Bandung Conference) 에서채택된평화공존 5대원칙 ( 내정불간섭 평화공존 영토주권의상호존중 상호불가침 호혜평등 ) 을적극지지하면서아프리카의절대적우호세력으로등장하게되고, 아프리카신생국의성립이후잇달아외교및협력관계를발전시켜나감 년기니대통령을필두로탄자니아 (1965년), 가나 (1966년), 자이르 (1973년) 등여러아프리카대통령들이경쟁적으로중국을방문하는등아프리카신생국의주요전략국가로중국이부상하게됨. 외교관계의확대시기 ( ): 이후 70년대, 80년대초에이르기까지중국의원조는약 25억달러로원조총액의반이상을차지했고 1970년대말에이르러 33개국과수교하게됨. - 우호적외교관계는중국이대만의지위를박탈하고 UN에서상임이사국의지위를얻는데중요한역할을하게됨. 외교관계의정체기 ( ): 기존의무상원조는차츰줄어들고중국은자국의경제발전에주력하면서아프리카와상호평등호혜원칙에입각해경제협력에치중하게되었음. - 특히소련과미국의관계가호전되면서상대적으로아프리카의전략적가치는쇠퇴하게됨. 외교관계회복기 ( ): 중국은천안문사태를국제적으로해결하기위해아프리카와긴밀한관계를다시시작함. 특히아프리카의지도자들은중국의입장을적극옹호하고나서게되었고 1990년대이후다양한분야에서외교협력이이루어지고외교부장의첫방문지는아프리카의국가로정착됨. 아-중관계의급성장기 (2000-현재) 대아프리카중국외교는최근그양과질에있어급격히높아지고있지만, 중 아관계는 1950 년부터시작하여지금까지이르는오랜외교관계의축적물이며 3

12 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 나. 중국대아프리카외교전략의주요특징 (1) 제도기제 : 중국 - 아프리카포럼을통한정상외교 < 중국 3 대지도부 ( 국가주석 총리 외교부장 ) 의아프리카방문현황 (2000 년대 )> 2000 년대들어중국의아프리카외교형태가양자중심에서다자적관계로발전하였으며, 2000 년에는 중국 - 아프리카협력포럼 (CACF) 을창설하고 3 년주기로정상회담을개최해 연도방문인사방문국가 2000년 1월 외교부장 나이지리아 앙골라 나미비아 짐바브웨 모잠바크 세이셸 모리타니 튀니지 4월 국가주석 이집트 남아공 2001년 1월 외교부장 리비아 중앙아프리카공화국 가봉 앙골라 세이셸 11월 외교부장 나이지리아 2002년 1월 외교부장 남아공 에티오피아 에리트레아 4월 총리 이집트 케냐 4월 국가주석 리비아 튀니지 나이지리아 8월 총리 알제리 모로코 카메룬 남아공 2003년 1월 외교부장 모리셔스 토고 베냉 낭아공 11월 총리 이집트 2004년 1월 외교부장 케냐 짐바브웨 잠비아 나이지리아 2월 국가주석 레소토 세이셸 마다가스카르 모리셔스 9월 외교부장 이집트 2005년 1월 외교부장 레소토 세이셸 마다가스카르 모리셔스 2006년 1월 외교부장 리비아 나이지리아 라이베리아 말리 세네갈 카보베르데 4월 국가주석 나이지리아 모로코 케냐 6 월총리 12 월외교부장 2007 년 1 월외교부장 남아공 탄자니아 이집트 가나 콩고공화국 앙골라 우간다 베냉 적도기니 기니비사우 차드 중앙아프리카공화국 에리트레아 베냉 적도기니 기니비사우 차드 중앙아프리카공화국 에리트레아 우간다 1월 국가주석 카메룬 라이베리아 수단 잠비아 나미비아 남아공 모잠바크 세이셸 2008년 1월 외교부장 남아공 콩고공화국 브룬디 에티오피아 2009년 2월 국가주석 탄자니아 세네갈 말리 모리셔스 11 월원자바오 ( 총리 ) 이집트 가나 콩고공화국 앙골라 남아프리카 탄자니아 우간다 2010년 1월 외교부장 콩고공화국 베냉 말리 세네갈 지부티 나이지리아 8월 총리 이집트 출처 : KIEP, 세계주요국의아프리카진출전략및시사점 (2011), p

13 중국 - 일본의대아프리카전략분석및한국적함의 2000년대들어중국의아프리카외교형태가양자중심에서다자적관계로발전함. 2000년에는 중국-아프리카협력포럼 (China and Africa Cooperation Forum, CACF) 을창설하고 3년주기로정상회담을개최하게됨. - 아프리카 53개국중스와질란드, 상투메프린시페, 감비아, 부르키나파소, 말라위를제외한 48개국의정상들이중국에모여정상회담을개최하는대규모의정상회담임.(3차 2006년베이징회의 ) - 또한중국지도부의잦은아프리카방문횟수는아프리카의전략적중요성을가늠할수있는중요한척도가됨. (2) 담론전략 : 개도국주도의개발과효율성 중국은개도국의가장선두적인입장을표방하면서개도국의입장에서개발과경제발전을표방하는 남-남 관계의담론을제시함. - 서방식민지경험이있는아프리카국가들은식민지담론과서방강대국의직 간접적인개입에매우민감하기때문에민주화나인권에대한의문을제기하지않는내정불간섭원칙은매우매혹적인담론으로받아들여짐. 중국은또한서방의정체된경제발전에비해빠른발전속도를내고있는중국경제모델의 효율성 을강조하면서서방강국들에대한상대적우위를강조함. - 특히중국이미국과유럽연합의대아프리카원조협의에서중국경제모델의우위성을강조하면서점차중국의대외협력및국제개발모델이새로운규범담론으로자리잡아가고있음. 서방식민지경험이있는아프리카국가들은식민지담론과서방강대국의직 간접적인개입에매우민감하기때문에민주화나인권에대한의문을제기하지않는내정불간섭원칙은매우매혹적인담론으로받아들여져 공자학당 (Conficius Institute) 은중국의전반적인문화와담론을전파하는기제로운영되고있음. 특히 중국은가장큰개발도상국 이라는담론을확산시키며중국적소프트파워의확산거점이됨 년케냐나이로비대학에첫공자학당을설립한이후, 2010년말현재 18개국에 23개의공자학당이운영되고있음. (3) 원조전략 : 자원확보 - 사회간접자본건설 - 차관원조의공조화 대규모의공적원조를통한인프라와자원확보를위해서접근하 5

14 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 고있는중국은대부분의대아프리카비즈니스를차관원조에서비롯하고있음. - 이는사회간접자본을차관으로건설해주고그대신원유나원자재또는자원획득권을보장받는식의 패키지딜 방식으로진행됨. - 앙골라모델 은자원담보차관의원조형태이며중국이 2004년앙골라전후복구사업에 10억달러의차관을제공하고석유담보권을확보한것에기인함. - 중국은앙골라거래방식을이용하여후발주자로서의약점을보완하며기존서방국가의주도권을점차잠식해가고있음. 또한아프리카의엘리트들도중국의방식을 윈-윈 하는협력모델로인식하고있음. (4) 중점국전략 : 자원확보를위한집중적인공세후발주자인중국은수단, 콩고, 앙골라, 짐바브웨등정치적으로불안정한국가들에서서방강국들과의자원확보경쟁이심하지않기때문에이들을집중공략함. - 인권문제, 부패문제, 내전등의이유로서방국가들이관계를단절하는동안중국은내정불간섭과남- 남공조를명분으로이들국가들을집중적으로공략했음. - 우대차관을제공한국가는앙골라 (80%), 수단, 짐바브웨, 나이지리아, 콩고 (DRC), 기네아, 적도기니등이며대부분이금융차관이제한되거나통치가불량한국가들임. 다. 중국대아프리카외교전략의문제및한계 (1) 불균형적인경제관계의노정 중국은앙골라거래방식을이용하여후발주자로서의약점을보완하며기존서방국가의주도권을점차잠식해가고있어 남-남 관계의 윈-윈 이라는매력적인담론에도불구하고자원을수입하는중국과중국의공산품과노동력을제공받는아프리카국가의입장에서는항상중국이우선적인이익을얻는구조가정착됨. - 초기에우호적인반응을보이던아프리카지식인이나시민사회도중국의일방적인교류와정착화되어가는경제적불평등에대한반발이거세어지고있으며남아프리카공화국은여러국제회 6

15 중국 - 일본의대아프리카전략분석및한국적함의 의를통해중국의정책을정면비판하고있는실정임. (2) 반중국정서의발현과국내정치화중국의자원개발이급증하면서진출한기업들의지역정서를고려하지않은기업행위가지역노동자들의반발을사고있어사회문제화됨. - 잠비아의경우 2005년구리광산노동자들 52명이사망한후적절한조치가없었던사건으로인해노동자들의극심한반발을불러일으켜노동조합이조직적으로파업을하는사태가벌어짐. 진출한중국기업이현지노동법을준수하지않는등현지의노동조합문화등의현지사회를고려하지않아잠비아는반중국정서가가장심한곳임. 남 - 남 관계의 윈 - 윈 이라는매력적인담론에도불구하고자원을수입하는중국과중국의공산품 노동력을제공받는아프리카국가의입장에서는항상중국이우선적인이익을얻는구조가정착돼 (3) 현지인의중국상인들에대한반감심화중국에서수입되는저렴한소비제품을대거로판매하는현지중국상인들의독점으로인해현지상인들의불만이폭증됨. - 특히세네갈의경우사회주의적경제문화에기반한상인조합의정치력이매우강하기때문에조합의압력으로중국이민을제한하는조치를취하였음. - 또한몇세대에걸쳐정착한중국상인들과는달리최근이주한중국상인들에대한즉각적인반발과반감이증가하고있는추세임. 라. 중국대아프리카전략의변화 (1) 제조업육성정책자원착취와신식민주의를펼치고있다는비판에직면하여시진핑신지도부는제조업에대한투자활성화를제시하였고, 현지의생산력과제조업역량을제고하는이미지를보여주기시작함. - 기존의인프라건설이나자원개발의패러다임을벗어나공장건설이나현지인력고용을늘리는방향으로투자의방향을계획함. 예를들어에티오피아에신발공장을설립하기위해 15억유로투자를계획하고있음. 7

16 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 - 중국보다싼인건비를고려하여아프리카현지에산업공장건립을계획중이며, 중국자동차업체인길리기차와후쿠다기차가케냐에공장설립을준비중임. (2) 미디어를통한현지이미지개선악화된현지의중국이미지를개선하고중국에대한우호감을높이기위해서 CCTV는나이로비에방송국을개설하고뉴스를신설하여전아프리카지역에송출함. - 방송내용은신식민지주의에대한부정적이미지를개선하는것이중요한내용이고중국의지원이긍정적이라는선전이주를이룸. 지역대상국에대한이해도나네트워크확보에어려움을안고있는중국은기존의양자간접근에서삼자간, 다자간협력을활용하여아프리카에접근을시도하고있어 (3) 중국정부의중국진출기업계도노력현지에진출할중국기업들에게현지의사회문화와법적의무사항을교육하고현지의문화와가치에대해존중할수있도록유도하고있음. - 하지만중국보다더구속력이강한민주문화나법제도, 노동문화가있는지역에파견될경우중국기업이적응하는데어려움을겪고있음. (4) 양자간접근에서다자간접근및파트너십구축으로 지역대상국에대한이해도나네트워크확보에어려움을안고있는중국은기존의양자간접근에서삼자간, 다자간협력을활용하여아프리카에접근을시도하고있음. - 특히불어권아프리카공략을위해중국당국은파리에중국수출입은행 (Exim Bank) 대표부를설치하고공적원조의효율성을제고하기위해정기적인전략대화를개최함. - 민간기업또한파트너십을체결하여공동투자개발을추진하고있음. 앙골라의유전개발을위한프랑스 Total 사와중국석유화학공사의파트너십체결이대표적인사례임. 8

17 중국 - 일본의대아프리카전략분석및한국적함의 3 일본의대아프리카외교전략 가. 원조정책중심의일본 - 아프리카외교관계 (1) 대아프리카원조정책과외교정책의동조 일본의대아프리카외교정책은전후급속한산업화를뒷받침하기위한 1) 자원확보와 2) 미 일안보의우호관계유지 ( 예 : 2차대전후아프리카역내반공지역및자유지역확장, 탈유럽열강화등에미 일동조 ) 및 3) 일본의국제적인위상제고와연결되어있음. - 일본의전후산업화는일차적으로자원을확보해야하는절대적인요청이있었으며시장의확보가절실히필요한상황이었음. 특히 70년대석유파동이후, 아프리카는주요전략지역으로서급격히협력관계가증대됨. - 또한 1961년 OECD의 DAC창설맴버로서 ODA를외교전략적으로활용하여아프리카국가들과외교및개발정책을진행하는주요기제가됨. - 냉전시기의미국의대아프리카정책에동조하여아프리카지역의미국이익에부합하는외교정책을실시함. -UN 상임이사국으로선출되기위한주요전략으로아프리카국가들과우호관계를증진하는전략을구사함. (2) 일본대아프리카원조정책의전개 일본은 1961 년 OECD 의 DAC 창설맴버로서 ODA 를외교전략적으로활용하여아프리카국가들과외교및개발정책을진행하는주요기제가돼 제1기 ( ): 전후배상정책과원조정책 - 일본은 2차대전의패배이후전후배상정책 (War compensation policy) 을실시하였고주로 ODA형태로인도네시아, 미얀마, 필리핀, 한국, 태국, 말레시아, 대만등으로아시아지역에머무른시기임. 제2기 ( ): 자원확보와원조정책 년석유파동이후아프리카지역의자원확보지역으로주목을받게된후일본의대아프리카원조는급격히증가하게됨. 1970년에서 1980년사이양자간원조의양은 27.5배로급격하게상승함. 또한 1978년안전보장이사회진출에실패한이후안전보장이사회에선출되기위해아프리카국가들의포섭전략으로서원조의양을늘려감. 9

18 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 일본은수원국의정치적비관여주의의한계를넘기위해수원국의정치상황에대해적극적인자세를취하는정책을펴고, 정부개발원조대강 (1992 년 ) 을제정하여원조정책의개혁을단행해 제3기 ( ): 흑자해소와인도주의적전환시기 -80년대는일본의무역흑자가지속되면서흑자해소의일환으로 ODA를통해자국의기업과자본을이용함. 아프리카원조액의경우 3.5억달러에서 12억달러로세배이상증가추세를보임. - 이시기는처음으로일본의 NGO가적극적으로 ODA의논의에개입하여인도주의적인담론이형성된시기임. 특히사헬지역의난민문제를해결하기위한캠페인과사회적관심이증대되었음. - 일본기업의 ODA를통한대외사업진출과연동되어대외정치경제적인요소도포함되었지만일본의국제사회의위상을확보하기위한 국제규범을준수하고선도하는선진국의이미지 제고전략의일환이기도함. 제 4 기 ( ): 주체적이고적극적인원조정책마련시기 - 원조공여국 1 위 (1989 년 ) 가된일본은공적원조를단순한경제, 안보기제의차원을넘어좀더적극성을띤, 요청중의 및 자조노력 이라는원칙을강조하는원조정책을실시함. - 수원국의정치적비관여주의의한계를넘기위해수원국의정치상황에대해적극적인자세를취하는정책을펼침. 정부개발원조대강 (1992년) 을제정하여원조정책의개혁을단행함. 제 5 기 (2000- 현재 ): 인간안전보장개념도입및 ODA 감소시기 < 일본의아프리카양자간개발원조공여실적 > 무상자금협력 1,278.7 (19.6) 증여 - 다자간 - 증여 기술협력 (10.3) 증여합계 1,552.9 (16.9) ( 단위 : 백만달러, 순지출액기준 ) 누계 2,824.3 (56.0) (40.4) (9.9) 3,081.8 (40.3) 1,567.1 (45.9) (46.8) (10.5) 1,837.4 (30.7) (19.8) (64.9) (9.8) 1,237.7 (15.9) 차관 ODA 합계 1,102.6 (10.6) 2,595.8 (35.7) 1,766.4 (30.6) 1,571.4 (23.6) 1,040.6 (47.1) (52.9) (11.8) 1,410.0 (26.5) 88.6 (13.2) 1,498.7 (25.0) 주 : ( ) 안은각형태별전체 ODA 에서아프리카지역이차지하는비중 (%). 출처 : KIEP, 세계주요국의아프리카진출전략및시사점 (2011). 21, , , , , ,

19 중국 - 일본의대아프리카전략분석및한국적함의 나. 일본대아프리카외교의주요특징 (1) 담론기제대아프리카외교관계수립이후특징적인담론전략은미비하였으나냉전의종식이후 종합적안보 (Comprehensive Security) 라는새로운개념을도입하고일본외교전반에대한새로운로드맵을구성함. 종합적안보 라는새로운외교목표아래에서 1993년 6월 ODA Charter를기반으로시민적권리, 민주주의원칙, 인권존중, 사회경제개발, 기술이전등새로운개발및외교원칙및규범을강조하기시작함. - 새로운위보편적정치, 경제, 사회원칙들을존중하고추구함으로써국제평화와안보를유지, 확장할수있다는담론으로서기존의일본외교담론과비교하여좀더보편적이고국제규범에맞는내용으로외교전략개념을구상함. 요시로모리수상은 2001년아프리카를방문하는계기로 인간안보 (Human Security) 의개념을외교담론화시킴 년 1월케냐, 나이제리아, 남아프리카공화국을방문한요시로모리수상은 아프리카에서 인간안보 를정착시키느냐의성공여부에따라일본의외교성패가달려있다. 고선언하면서기본적인정치, 경제, 문화를포괄한사회발전및인간 ( 안보 ) 발전이없이는아프리카의발전은없다고천명함. 북-남- 남경제발전의안행 ( 雁行 ) 모델 (Flying geese model) 담론을확산시킴. - 동아시아의개도국들이일본의선진적발전모델과연계되고일본모델을따라가는데서비약적발전이온다는 동아시아의기적 (The East Asian Miracle, World Bank 1993 출판 ) 의담론을아프리카의발전에연계함. - 특히일본 ( 북 ) 을중심으로동아시아 ( 남 ) 와아프리카 ( 남 ) 를연계해일본식안행모델을확장하여적용함. 실질적으로아시아 -아프리카포럼 (Asia-African Forum), 아시아-아프리카비즈니스포럼 (Asia-Africa Business Forum) 등을조직하여담론을조직화에연계시킴. 또한냉전종식이후 종합적안보 (Comprehensive Security) 라는새로운개념을도입하고일본외교전반에대한새로운로드맵을구성해 11

20 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 (2) 제도기제 : 동경아프리카개발회의 (Tokyo International Conference on African Development, TICAD) 동경아프리카개발회의는단순한개발협력을넘어일본의정치 경제 외교전략및안보전략을아우르는종합적인일본-아프리카정책을압축적으로보여주는사례임. 1993년동경에서첫회의가열리면서 2013년 5회를맞이하고있음. 제1회 (1993): 아프리카 48개국참여. 원조피로현상등으로아프리카에대한관심이적어진시기에아프리카에관심을환기시키는데일조하며일본의포괄적인개발원조정책을수립하여제시하였음. 동경아프리카개발회의는단순한개발협력을넘어일본의정치 경제 외교전략및안보전략을아우르는종합적인일본 - 아프리카정책을압축적으로보여주는사례이며 제2회 (1998): 아프리카 51개국참여. 아프리카의자조노력을강조하는 Ownership( 파리선언 ) 의원칙과남-남협력을강조함으로써 NEPAD의담론적기초를만들었음. 제3회 (2003): 아프리카 50개국참여. 인도네시아, 말레시아, 베트남각료가참석하고각료연설을하는등남-남협력의구체적인장을만듦. 제4회 (2008): 아프리카 51개국참여. 인간안전보장 개념을확립하고환경- 기후변화등에대한논의를 요코하마행동계획 에천명함. 제5회 (2013): 아프리카 51개국참여. 개발협력에서경제협력으로전략적방향선회. 선언의이행. (3) 원조형태일본의원조형태는증여와유상자금협력으로구분됨. 증여분야는무상자금협력, 기술협력, 부채탕감, 긴급원조, NGO 지원등임. - 일본은달러가아닌엔화로차관을제공하고있어 엔차관 이라불림. 이러한관례로인해일본의유상자금협력은일반적으로 엔차관 이라불리고있음. 일본은유상원조형태를고수하는대표적인 OECD DAC 회원국으로, 예외적으로유상원조의비중이전체 ODA의절반가까이차지함.(2008년기준 49.6%). - 이러한이유는수원국의책임성을제고하고전후복구과정에서차관을이용한경제발전을이루었다는측면에서설명되고있음. 12

21 중국 - 일본의대아프리카전략분석및한국적함의 지리적접근성과소득수준에따라수원국에대한 ODA 지원방식의차별화를시도함. - 예를들어경제적협력이밀접한인접아시아지역에대해서는유상원조와기술협력 ( 전문가파견, 연수생초청등 ) 중심으로지원하고, 최빈개도국 (LDCs) 에해당하는, 원거리에위치한사하라이남아프리카국가를대상으로는무상원조중심의지원방식을택하고있음. (4) 무역정책 TICAD V에서대아프리카대규모투자및무역플랜을선언했음에도불구하고현실은일본과아프리카사이의교역활동은매우미미한수준이며 2010년일본과아프리카의무역거래액은 2조 879억엔으로일본전체무역액의 1.63% 에불과함. - 실질적으로현재까지는 ODA 차원의일부아프리카무역진흥정책이대부분을차지하고있음. < 그림 > 일본의대아프리카교역규모추이 (1980~2010년) ( 단위 : 백만엔 ) 일본과아프리카사이의교역활동은매우미미한수준이며 2010 년일본과아프리카의무역거래액은 2 조 879 억엔으로일본전체무역액의 1.63% 에불과해 자료 : 일본재무성무역통계출처 : KIEP, 세계주요국의아프리카진출전략및시사점, p.223. 일본-아프리카의교역은초기 (1960년대), 경공업제품의주요수출시장이자자원수입국이었으나지속적으로아프리카와의교역량이감소해감. 13

22 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 - 그러나최근주요지하자원의보고이자신흥소비시장으로서아프리카가주목을받으면서다시활기를띠고있는상황임. TICAD V의아베총리의대아프리카투자및원조에대한공헌은이를반영한것임. 다. 일본대아프리카외교전략의한계 TICAD를통한원조및투자정책이일본의아프리카개발원조가자국의 UN 상임이사국가입을위한정치적인수사일뿐, 실질적인성과를내지못하고있다며비판적인반응을볼수있음. 또한구속적원조를지속함으로써일본기업의진출과성장에초점을맞추어현지의산업발전과고용창출에미약한효과를내고있다는평가도존재함. 정치인- 고급관료-기업들의견고한권력관계형성으로인한관료적성격의밀실적이고닫힌외교를형성함. - 특히일본외무성의아프리카- 중동국내두개의아프리카과가대아프리카외교정책수립및실행을전담하고있으며정치적으로민감한이슈나경제적으로이권이걸린이슈들은방위성, 경제산업성, 재무성, 농림수산성등의관료들과이권관계가연계된기업인들에의해아젠다가셋팅되고정책적으로실행되는구조임. - 이런정치- 경제- 행정의엘리트적구조는 NGO나시민사회의실질적이해와비판을수용하는구조적한계를드러냄. TICAD 를통한원조및투자정책이일본의아프리카개발원조가자국의 UN 상임이사국가입을위한정치적인수사일뿐, 실질적인성과를내지못하고있다며비판적인반응이제기돼 아프리카국가정상들과일본정치엘리트와의고급관료중심만의제한적인관계로인해사회실질수혜자들의참여가아직도미약하다는지적도있음. -TICAD V의회의에서 NGO의참여가매우저조하였고결과보고도질문이없는프레스컨퍼런스라는점에서아직닫힌구조로보임. - 이미시민사회에서는 TICAD V의선언이결국부패위정자들및고위관료들과이득을같이하는집단만이수혜를얻고실질적인아프리카의사회발전으로이어질수없다는회의론을펼치기도함. 14

23 중국 - 일본의대아프리카전략분석및한국적함의 그럼에도불구하고기존의일본대아프리카개발원조는그질적측면에서소기의성과를거둔것으로평가됨. - 거시적 가시적인인프라건설사업보다는지역공동체발전과지역주민의복리후생향상에목적을둔특수사업 ( 일촌일품운동, 풀뿌리, 인간안전보장무상자금협력사업등 ) 이나역량개발에초점을둔협력사업 ( 교육, 전문가파견, 연수생초청등 ) 을활발히추진하여중국과비교효과성의측면에서는긍정적으로평가됨. 또한원조정책의집행력과추진력은아프리카국가와국제사회로부터긍정적인평가를받는데도주목할필요가있음. 아프리카에서의중국의급부상은일본의정책을급선회하게하는계기를가지고왔으며, 이를극명히나타내는것이 TICAD V 의내용 라. 일본대아프리카전략의변화아프리카에서의중국의급부상은일본의정책을급선회하게하는계기를가지고옴. 이를극명히나타내는것이 TICAD V의내용임. - 일본은향후 5년간약 140억달러상당의개발원조를포함, 민관합계최대 320억달러규모의아프리카지원계획을발표했음. 이는기존 5년간 90억달러약속규모 (TICAD IV) 에비해대폭높아진것임. - 특히민간분야의무역투자 ( 투자보험지원및무역관련제도- 시설지원 ), 금융 (ADB 와협조융자 ), 자원 ( 석유천연가스, 광물, 관련분야인재양성 ) 이경제성장명목으로포함됨. - 평화안보및민주주의분야도강화되었고이는자국기업의활동과일본민간인의보호차원에서도요청되는사안이라평가됨. 정부의지원에힘입어민간차원에서도자발적인투자와개발사업이전전을보일것으로보임. - 세계금융위기로 2008년이후직접투자액이다소감소하는추세였지만중국의대아프리카진출에대한경계와대응을위해일본정부가적극나섬으로써다시증가추세에있음. 2011년말통계에따르면전년대비 31.5% 증가한 80억 8000만달러임. - 예로모잠비크의미쓰이물산이가스전개발에참여하고있는신일철주금속이원료탄광산개발을위해지분취득을시도하여 2014년생산개시예정임. 15

24 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 4 중국 - 일본의대아프리카전략비교와한국적함의 중국 - 일본대아프리카전략비교 중국대아프리카전략 일본대아프리카전략 담론기제 조직기제 개발및무역 - 산업전략 - 중국의비약적경제발전의 효율성 강조 - 개도국간의남 - 남관계를강조한탈서구중심주의담론 ( 내정불간섭주의 ) - 중 - 아프리카협력포럼 (CACF) 을통한정상급외교 (2000 년이후매 3 년주기로개최 ) - 자원확보 -SOC 건설 - 차관원조의공조화를통한패키지딜전략 ( 앙골라모델 ) - 자원확보를위한중점국전략 - 일본의안행모델경제발전론을중심으로한동아시아를아프리카에연결하는북 - 일본이연결자역할을하는남 - 남관계담론제시 - 종합적안보, 인간안보의담론을통한보편규범의준수및확산 - 동경아프리카개발회의 (TICAD) 를통한정상급외교 (1993 년이후매 5 년주기로개최 ) -ODA 를중심으로한일 - 아프리카대외경제관계 - 아프리카와실질적인교역이나투자는미비 ( 일본전체무역액의 1.63%) 전략적한계 - 아프리카의실질적개발과발전 ( 고용창출및산업개발 ) 을동인하지못하고중국에흡수되는비대칭경제관계형성 - 남 - 남관계담론이실제상북 - 남관계로고착 - 내정불간섭정책으로현지의사회발전 ( 민주화, 인권, 빈곤등 ) 을외면하거나저해시키는외교관계노정 - 현지를고려하지않은중국현지인들로인한대중이미지의악화 - 구속적원조의지속으로인한산업발전및고용창출에미미한원조정책 - 정치 - 관료 - 기업중심의정책입안과실행등닫힌구조의대아프리카외교 ( 시민사회의의견반영의미비 ) - 무역및산업개발정책부재로인한실질적경제성장을담보하지못함. - 양국정상주심의외교로인한실질사회요구반영미비 최근전략변화 - 아프리카현지제조업육성정책 - 대중국우호감향상을위한소프트파워정책 ( 공자학당및 CCTV 아프리카지부건립 ) - 중국진출기업현지문화교육및계도노력 - 양자협력에서다자및파트너협력으로다각화 -TICAD V(2013 년 ), 중국의대아프 리카영향력을따라잡기위한기존지원대비비약적으로증액된 320 억달러규모의지원계획선언 - 기존과달리민간분야의무역투자, 자원, 금융등실질경제교류분야를강조 - 민간차원의적극적인산업개발참여및정부독려정책 16

25 중국 - 일본의대아프리카전략분석및한국적함의 가. 담론기제비교중국의경우아프리카국내의현안에대한내정불간섭원칙에기초하여 남-남 협력관계를통한 효율적 발전모델을제시하고있음. 하지만아프리카국가들의민주거버넌스문제, 기아문제, 분쟁문제, 현지문화고려등을회피하고아프리카현지의실질적경제및사회발전에기여하는경제관계가형성되지못해서구와같은신식민지주의라는비판에직면함. - 이를극복하기위해최근공자학당과방송등을통한소프트파워전략과현지산업육성및현지화전략으로선회하고있지만기존의구조를변화시킬수있을지는아직불투명해보임. 일본의경우 80년이후부터국제규범에근거한, 종합안보, 인간안보등의담론을제시하고이에근거한국제협력사업 (ODA중심 ) 을추진해옴. ODA분야의국제규범준수노력및새로운규범담론제시부분은선도적인역할이었다고평가됨. 하지만일본주도의안행모델경제발전론은실질적인무역및직접투자가미약한상태에서실효적인아프리카사회 경제발전에기여하지못한것으로평가됨. - 이를극복하기위해민간투자및민간경제교류를전폭지원하기로천명하였지만일본의경제엘리트및관료중심적인조직체계와아프리카정치엘리트간의다소닫힌협력구조가실질적인경제발전에기여할지는다소불투명한상태임. 중 일비교에서보듯이, 저개발국가들의스스로의노력과그들간의협력을증진해야한다는담론 ( 남 - 남협력 ) 은매우유효하고설득력있는담론이라고평가할수있어 중 일비교에서보듯이, 저개발국가들의스스로의노력과그들간의협력을증진해야한다는담론 ( 남-남협력 ) 은매우유효하고설득력있는담론이라고평가할수있음. 실질적으로아프리카국가들과관계를맺는파트너국가의전략적위치가매우중요하며중국의 남 의수장으로서위상, 일본의 남-남 협력의가교자로서의위상등을고려할수있음. - 하지만이러한담론들의한계는 남 의자구적이고실질적인사회 경제발전에기여하는데빈약했다는것이고결과적으로발전적상호관계를유지하기보다기존의서구열강들과의관계와큰차이점이없다는점임. 17

26 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 아프리카의모든국가를아우르는정상회담급의협력구조는비효율적인조직기제로변질될가능성이있으므로, 이를극복하기위해아프리카각지역경제협력조직과전략적외교관계를맺고지역별전략을추진할필요가있어 나. 조직기제비교중국과일본은 중-아프리카협력포럼 (CACF, 3년주기 ) 과 동경아프리카개발회의 (TICAD, 5년주기 ) 를중심으로정상회담차원의대규모협력조직을운영하고있음. - 하지만아프리카국가들의실질적인발전과협력파트너들의유기적인소통과의견이반영될수있는아래로부터의조직 (bottom-up organizations) 들의역동적인참여가부족한실정임. - 아프리카정상들이대거참석하는대규모정상회담중심의조직관계는각회담이일회적행사나외교적과시용으로끝나는경우가많으며행사의비용대비실질적협력관계진전에효율적인지비판이제기되고있음. 중국의경우내정불간섭원칙에근거한양국관계에초점을맞추어외교관계를진행해왔으나현지에대한역사적, 문화적이해의한계로현지화에어려움을겪고있음. - 이를극복하기위해중국은서방국가나국제기구, 다국적기업등과파트너십을통해다자적이고협력과파트너십형성으로전략적선회를하고있는상황임. 일본의경우일본의전통적인정치 행정 기업엘리트간의닫힌정책입안과실행에서보듯일본사회내의 NGO나실질적협력사업파트너들의의견과의제가진입하기어려운구조임. 또한아프리카정상및정치엘리트들간의닫힌협력관계는실질적인사회개발로이어지는효율적인구조로정착하기엔한계를노정함. 중국과일본의대아프리카조직기제의비교에서파악할수있는것은대규모의정상회담급협력체는재정 비용적측면을고려하면사회 경제개발의실효적인파급효과가제한적임. 또한개발의주체이고수효자인현지주민과다양한개발협력파트너 (NGO, 민간기업, 지역기구, 선진협력국가등 ) 의협력구조를정착하는데한계를가져옴. - 이를극복하기위해아프리카의모든국가를아우르는정상회담급의협력구조는비효율적인조직기제로변질될가능성이있음. 이를극복하기위해아프리카의각지역경제협력조직 ( 동아프리카공동체, 서아프리카경제공동체, 중앙아프리카경제공동체, 사 18

27 중국 - 일본의대아프리카전략분석및한국적함의 하라주변국가공동체등 ) 과전략적외교관계를맺고지역별전략을추진할필요가있음. 다. 개발및무역 산업전략비교중국의경우, 남-남협력 이라는담론으로아프리카의자체발전의청사진을제시했지만실질적으로중국에흡수되는경제관계를노정함으로써 신식민지주의 라는비판에직면함. 또한내정불간섭을이유로아프리카파트너국가의문화와역사를고려한사회발전 ( 민주주의, 인권, 기아, 환경등 ) 에기여하는부분이미약하다는비판적평가가대두됨. - 중국기업의진출에서도보듯이진출기업인들의현지에대한문화적, 역사적이해가빈약해현지화의어려움에직면해있고현지인들의조직적인반발은중국의전반적인이미지에타격을미치기시작했음. 일본의경우, 개발분야에서국제규범준수와일본적규범생산 ( 인간안보등 ) 에적극적이어서개발효과성측면에서긍정적인평가도있음. 하지만구속적원조 (tied aid) 에집중되어있는원조구조와무역및실질적산업투자의미비로아프리카국가의실질적성장에기여한부분은미비한실정임. 중국-일본의대아프리카전략변화에서공통적인부분은아프리카현지의실질적산업화에적극참여해야한다는것임. - 이를극복하기위해서중국과일본은현지에공장을설립하고민간분야의투자를확대하려는계획을세우고있음. 다만진출산업의현지화전략이선언적이거나일시적인비판무마용인지는향후판단해야할문제임. - 결국아프리카의실질적인개발과경제발전을도모하려면고용창출및산업개발로이어져야하며이를위해파트너국가의민간기업들의참여독려와다국적기업등과의다각적인파트너십도활용해야한다는시사점이있음. 아프리카의실질적인개발과경제발전을도모하려면고용창출및산업개발로이어져야하며이를위해파트너국가의민간기업들의참여독려와다국적기업등과의다각적인파트너십도활용해야 19

28 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 라. 중 - 일비교를통한한국의전략적함의 (1) 담론전략 : 중견국가로서국제사회와공동보조및대아프리카 공감외교 (Empathy Diplomacy) 구상 한국은아프리카의식민자적입장, 경제적기회주의적입장을지양하고상생하는개발과발전을위해경험과미래를공유할수있는 공감국가 (Empathetic State) 의담론전략을펼칠필요가있어 중국과일본의경험에비추어보듯국제사회에서는보편규범에대한준수와국익의실익사이에서적절한균형을이루는것이중요하며한국의장점을잘살릴수있는 대아프리카공감외교 를구상하여야함. - 중국과일본의대아프리카전략에대한비판적인시각에서항상볼수있는것은신식민지주의적성향의접근과태도라는점을상기하여함. - 아프리카를경제적이익의확보라는단기적이고실용적인관점만이지배하는한신식민지주의라는비판을피해갈수없다고보임. 경제적이익만을취하려는이기적인모습이비추어질때아프리카국가의엘리트들과주민들은바로반감을가질것임. 그렇기때문에좀더보편적인관점에서균형있게접근해야될필요성이요청됨. 한국은아프리카의식민자적입장, 경제적기회주의적입장을지양하고상생하는개발과발전을위해경험과미래를공유할수있는 공감국가 (Empathetic State)' 의담론전략을펼칠필요가있음. - 한국은전쟁의폐허에서현재까지발전하면서전후재건, 산업화, 민주화, 현재세계화에이르기까지눈부신성장을해왔음. 그렇기때문에각시기마다축적된경험을토대로정치, 경제, 사회, 문화분야에다양하게정책적조언과전문지식을전수할수있는능력을보유함. 다양한세대와분야에해당하는우리의경험을체계적으로전수할수있는시스템과정책구상이요구됨. (2) 조직전략 : 다자주의적접근과전략지역권선정의필요성 식민지경험과네트워크를확보하고있는중국의경험에서도알수있듯이독자적인진출은매우많은리스크가존재함. 이런현실을감안할때한국이향후대아프리카외교를펼치기위해서 20

29 중국 - 일본의대아프리카전략분석및한국적함의 는기존의다자적외교네트워크를활용하거나자체적인아프리카외교협력네트워크를형성해야함. - 유럽각국이 EU를통한아프리카외교를진행하고있고, 실례로아프리카국가들도서아프리카경제협력공동체 (CEDEAO) 를통해말리사태에개입하는것을볼때, 한국도아프리카외교를위해지역협력기구를활용해기존네트워크를활용하여리스크를줄이고효과적인외교를펼쳐야함. - 특히지역협력기구나아프리카국가가포함된기존다자간협력체들 [ 불어권국제기구 (L Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, OIF), 영국연방 (Commonwealth of Nations) 등 ] 을중심으로중점국가이외에중점지역권을선별하여일본이나중국과는차별적으로접근할필요가있음. 한국의역량을고려하면중국이나일본식의양적으로대규모의접근전략보다질적으로보장할수있는타겟지역을잡는것이매우효율적일것이라사료됨. - 중장기적으로한국의국익과한국적규범에일치하거나공감하는아프리카국가들을규합하여자체적인외교네트워크를형성함으로써한-아프리카다자협력체 (multilateral organization) 를구상하고시민사회의활발한교류를통해점진적상호이해를증진시킬필요가있음. (3) 개발및무역 - 산업전략 : 상향식개발정책입안과실시및민간분야참여의장려및확대의필요성 대아프리카개발원조정책의효과적인실현은현지의실질적인수혜자인주민의 행복증진 으로이어져야함. 중국 일본의경우에서보듯이국가행위자및특정엘리트집단에정책입안과실행의권한이편중된경우일회적지원이나주민의요구에부응하지못하고효과적인정책실현이정체되는경향이있음. - 특히현지의지식과노하우를가진현장참여자 (NGO, 학자및전문가등 ) 들의의견을청취하고정책입안과정부터아래로부터의정책입안이필요하며정책실현에있어서도이들을적극활용할필요가있음. 개발정책입안과실현에있어직접적인참여보다정부의각참여자간의조정역할과연계역할이더욱강조되어야함. 한국의국익과한국적규범에일치하거나공감하는아프리카국가들을규합하여자체적인외교네트워크를형성함으로써한 - 아프리카다자협력체 (multilateral organization) 를구상하고시민사회의활발한교류를통해점진적상호이해를증진시켜야 21

30 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 대규모지원사업보다는실현가능성이높은한국의장점을살린개발사업참여를통해효과성을증진시킬필요가있음. 대부분의대규모개발사업들은, 중국의앙골라모델에서보듯이, 자원개발이나그에따른이권분배에연계되어엘리트들간의협력단계에머무를수있기때문에작은규모의사업이라도주민에게혜택이직접돌아갈수있는실효적인사업을추진해야함. - 특히농촌과농업의발전이절실히요구되는아프리카의상황에서새마을운동의창조적변용과적용은아프리카국가들에게매우효율적이고매력적인도움이될것임. 민간사업자진출을적극적으로독려하고현지의공장설립및비즈니스기회를확대하기위한정책적독려와지원방안을마련해야함. 아프리카국가들과의경제관계를일방적인지원과반대급부로서의자원수급의일차원적인수준에서유지하게되면중국사례에서도보듯이지속적일수없는명확한한계를보여줌. 이를위해서아프리카의우수한인력을양성및이용하여현지의한국산업을진출을장려하는시스템구축이필요하며이는아프리카국가의경제사회발전과한국기업의동반성장이라는관점에서추진되어야함. - 하지만아직한국에는아프리카각지역과영역별 ( 정치, 경제, 사회문화등 ) 전문가집단이부족한실정이라기초적인연구와전문가양성이필요한실정임. (4) 소프트파워전략 : 아프리카의시각으로아프리카를보는지역학적자세의필요성과전문가육성 아프리카의우수한인력을양성 이용하여현지의한국산업을진출을장려하는시스템구축이필요하며이는아프리카국가의경제사회발전과한국기업의동반성장이라는관점에서추진돼야 서구제국주의식민통치의실패와현재여러국가 ( 특히중국 ) 및민간자본의현지적응실패사례에서보듯이현지의문화와사회를그들의시각에서보는자세와접근방법이필요함. 특히아프리카는오랜식민지역사와종교 문화적으로다양한사회행위자들간의복잡한관계에기초한사회임. 이를아프리카의맥락에서깊게이해하고분석하는것은향후대아프리카외교를수행하는데결정적인밑거름이될것임. - 중국의실패사례에서보듯이현지에적응하지못하는대부분의민간기업들이현지어나현지에대한문화의이해가전무한상태 22

31 중국 - 일본의대아프리카전략분석및한국적함의 였음. 이는단순히정부가사전교육을통해서해결할수있는문제가아니며향후중장기적인안목을갖고준비해야함. 지속적이고효율적인대아프리카외교를수행하기위해서는각지역별, 국가별전문인력의체계적인양성과훈련이필요한시점임. 대아프리카소프트파워전략의기초는단순히한국의우수성을알리거나친한파의양성에만국한된일방적인확산 (unilateral diffusion) 을넘어아프리카현지의역사, 문화, 사회등을한국에대중적으로인식시킬수있는정책이필요함. 장기적으로양국국민간의간문화적 (intercultural) 인접촉을확산시킬제도를마련하여한-아프리카관계의실질적인우호관계를구축할수있는전략을수립해야함. 대아프리카소프트파워전략의기초는단순히한국의우수성을알리거나친한파의양성에만국한된일방적인확산 (unilateral diffusion) 을넘어아프리카현지의역사 문화 사회등을한국에대중적으로인식시킬수있는정책이필요해 5 한국의고려사항 가. 외교부산하아프리카전략연구센터설립아프리카외교, 정치, 경제, 문화전문가로구성된테스크포스를발족하여장기적인전략수립과구체적인협력이슈, 논리, 협력방안을개발할수있는아프리카전략연구센터의설립을추진해야할필요성이요청됨. - 우선적으로정부- 민간합동 T/F를발족시켜대아프리카전략에대한방안과연구를본격화하는한편, 향후국립외교원산하에본센터를만든다면가장적합할것으로사료됨. 나. 접근성이용이하고효율적인국제및지역다자체와전략적파트너십체결 아프리카와활발히외교협력을진행하며효율적인개발협력을펼치고있는불어권국제기구 (L Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, OIF) 나영국연방 (Commonwealth of Nations) 등에옵서버나파트너로참여하여대아프리카진출의리스크를줄이고실무적교류를통해효율성을제고함. 23

32 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 아프리카와활발히외교협력을진행하며효율적인개발협력을펼치고있는불어권국제기구 (OIF) 나영국연방 (Commonwealth of Nations) 등에옵서버나파트너로참여하여대아프리카진출의리스크를줄이고실무적교류를통해효율성을제고해야 전략적지역의중요성을고려하여아프리카지역협력기구를선별하고파트너십을체결할필요성이있음. 특히역내협력이활발한불어권서아프리카경제공동체 (CEDEAO) 나영어권동아프리카공동체 (EAO) 를우선적으로고려할수있음. 다. 문화외교기제를활용한아프리카대학및연구기관과전략적파트너십구축 한국교류재단의한국학센터설립사업과문화부의대외문화정책의일환인세종학당건립사업등을활용하여전략지역과국가의대학과전략연구소에센터설립과확장의필요성이요청됨. 아프리카의중요성대비턱없이부족한공공및문화외교관련예산과인원을확보하고충원해야할필요성이절실히요청되고있음. 라. 국내아프리카의붐조성국내의대아프리카여론을긍정적으로조성하기위해아프리카의현실과미래의가능성을알리는프로그램편성및확산이필요함. - 문화행사, 방송, 학술대회등을개최하고아프리카의역사와사회및문화의긍정적측면을부각시키는한편, 대중의흥미를유발할수있는미술, 음악, 문학등의예술분야와아프리카대중음악등의대중문화에대한소개를통해친아프리카적대중이미지를제고할필요성이있음. 24

33 Analysis of China and Japan s Strategies in Africa and Implications for the Republic of Korea Analysis of China and Japan s Strategies in Africa and Implications for the Republic of Korea BYUN Oung Visiting Professor K nown as the Dark Continent for its wide areas of derelict land, internal conflicts, famine, and frequent military coups, the African continent has faced numerous difficulties during its process of development and modernization following the decolonization period. Even now political instability in Africa persists, with crises in Sudan, Mali, and the Congo, as well as other civil wars and coup d Etats. Fortunately, civil wars have been occurring less frequently and the political situation has become more stable than in the previous century, with democracy also continuing to spread throughout the continent. As Africa s potential for further growth and the global demand for energy have been steadily increasing, the competition for market share and resources in Africa has grown more intense as well. In particular, China s rapid implementation of its large-scale Africa strategy has raised concern among countries that have made earlier inroads into the African market, including India, Japan, and the Western countries. China has made progress not only in the field of industrial resources but also in infrastructure, agriculture, manufacturing, finance, and retail business. China s involvement in Africa has changed the nature of the relationships among Africa s traditional partner countries. In addition, during the fifth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), held on June 3, 2013, Japan announced that it will provide USD 32 billion to both the public and private sector in Africa over a five-year period, in order to contain the expanding influence of China on the continent and further develop its own relationship with the African countries. In this context, comparing the Africa policies of China and Japan may provide meaningful insights to the Republic of Korea (ROK), which is a relative latecomer to Africa compared to its two closest neighbors. A close examination of the positive aspects and limitations of the two countries policies will be of great help to South Korea in formulating its future diplomatic strategies toward Africa. 25

34 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 Comparison of China and Japan s Policies toward Africa Discursive strategies China has proposed a developmental model that focuses on building efficiency through South-South cooperation, based on the principles of non-intervention and respect for national sovereignty. However, China has been neglecting other important issues, such as the lack of democratic governance, famine, and internal conflicts. Moreover, China has showed little respect for the local cultures in Africa, while also failing to build a constructive relationship that could lead to tangible economic and social development of the African countries. Many are criticizing China for its activities in Africa which mirror the Western neocolonialist policies of the past. In response to this criticism, China is working to strengthen its soft power through the establishment of Confucius Institutes and TV broadcasts, and by employing various localization strategies in the development of local industries. Nevertheless, whether a fundamental change in China s strategy will occur is still unclear. Since the 1980s, Japan has been involved in a discourse on comprehensive security and human security issues, carrying out numerous Official Development Assistance (ODA) projects that adhere to the norms of international development cooperation. The fact that it initiated the first serious discussion on international development norms and made sincere efforts to conform to them is highly respected. However, resulting from a lack of real trade and direct investment, the flying geese model that Japan proposed has not contributed much to the actual development of Africa s economy and society. In order to overcome this shortcoming, Japan has declared that it will actively support private investment and economic exchange. Nevertheless, due to Japan s organizational system, which is heavily centered on elite bureaucrats, and the relatively closed cooperation structure of African political elites, it is still uncertain whether this investment will actually lead to any significant economic growth in Africa. As can be seen from a comparison of China and Japan s strategies, the theory of South-South cooperation, which emphasizes the importance of the developing countries own efforts and cooperation, is highly valid and persuasive. The strategic positions of Africa s partner countries, such as China as the head of the developing nations, and Japan as a bridge-builder in South-South cooperation, are immensely important from a practical standpoint. However, the limitation of this discourse on international development is that it rarely contributes to the actual economic and social development of the South. As a result, China and Japan have failed 26

35 Analysis of China and Japan s Strategies in Africa and Implications for the Republic of Korea to maintain a relationship of mutual development with the African countries, instead creating a relationship that is no different from that formed by the Western powers. Organizational strategies China and Japan are currently managing a wide cooperation network that is similar in scale to a major summit, centered on the China-Africa Cooperation Forum (CACF, triennial) and the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD, quinquennial). However, bottom-up organizations, which have the potential to foster the growth of African countries and active communication among partner countries, are not willing to participate in this collaborative effort. These organizational relationships that rely on large-scale summits involving the participation of African heads of state face a critical problem that each summit usually ends up being only a one-time event or a diplomatic tool for showing off. Many are questioning whether these events are actually cost-effective in improving the cooperative relationship among the participating countries. Until now, China has adhered to the principle of non-intervention in its diplomacy with the African countries. However, its limited understanding of Africa s history and culture has led to the failure of its localization efforts. In order to overcome this obstacle, China has initiated a new strategy of multilateral cooperation that is based on building partnerships with Western countries, international organizations, and multinational corporations. In Japan s case, its process of policy formulation and implementation has traditionally been conducted exclusively among the political, administrative, and corporate elites. Because of this closed political atmosphere, the opinions of Japan s nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or joint business partners are generally excluded from the policymaking process. Furthermore, with limited cooperation among Africa s heads of state and political elites, the establishment of an effective system of cooperation that can lead to social development is incredibly difficult. A comparison of China and Japan s characteristics strongly suggests that this type of cooperation network, which is overly large in scale and requires high maintenance costs, is likely to have a limited effect on Africa s development, with the possibility of degenerating into a highly ineffective system. Moreover, these networks make it more difficult for an effective cooperation structure to be established between the development partners (NGOs, private enterprises, local organizations, advanced partner countries, etc.) and Africa s local residents, who are the main agents and beneficiaries of development. Therefore, Korea should 27

36 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 form strategic partnerships with Africa s local economic cooperation organizations (for example, East African Community, Economic Community of West African States, Economic Community of Central African States, Community of Sahel-Saharan States, etc.) and pursue specific development strategies tailored to each region. Development, trade, and industrial strategies China has devised the theory of South-South cooperation as a blueprint for Africa s autonomous development. However, it has been harshly criticized for its neocolonialist-like policies, which have been revealed to lead to the African economies heavy dependence on China. Furthermore, many are voicing criticism that its policy of non-intervention has led China to neglect the culture and history of the African countries while helping with Africa s social development (democracy, human rights, famine, environment, etc.). The Chinese entrepreneurs lack of understanding of local culture and history has led them to face immense difficulties in achieving localization, and the organized resistance movements of local residents have caused great harm to China s reputation. On the other hand, Japan has been receiving some positive responses, as a result of its efforts to formulate norms with Japanese characteristics (on areas such as human security) and abide by the international development norms. Nevertheless, because of its aid structure that is heavily centered on tied aid, as well as a lack of trade and industrial investment, Japan has contributed little to the actual growth of the African countries. China and Japan both face the urgent need to actively participate in Africa s actual industrialization process. Recognizing this necessity, the two countries have built production plants in Africa and devised plans to expand private investment. However, whether these localization strategies are merely a temporary measure to avoid criticism is yet to be determined. The important lesson here is that in order to promote Africa s development, partner countries should actively encourage the participation of private companies and effectively utilize partnerships with multinational corporations, which will eventually lead to the creation of jobs and development of various industries. 28

37 Analysis of China and Japan s Strategies in Africa and Implications for the Republic of Korea Strategy Implications for the Republic of Korea Discursive strategy: mapping out the strategy of Empathy Diplomacy toward Africa As can be seen from the experiences of China and Japan, countries need to find the right balance between following the universal international norms and pursuing their own national interests. Based on this principle, Korea should plan out a strategy of Empathy Diplomacy toward Africa that effectively brings out Korea s own national strengths. The fact that China and Japan have been criticized for their neocolonialist tendencies implies that any country attempting to view Africa solely from a practical standpoint that is, considering it only as a means of gaining economic advantage is bound to receive the same type of criticism as well; the African elites and residents will react with intense animosity when they recognize this selfish motive. Therefore, it is necessary to assist Africa s development through a more balanced and universal approach. Instead of taking the opportunistic actions of a colonizer, Korea should pursue mutual development with the African countries, performing the role of an Empathetic State with whom they can share past experiences and plan for the future. Since the end of the Korean War, Korea has achieved remarkable success in its post-war reconstruction, industrialization, democratization, and globalization. Therefore, it has the ability to offer policy advice and professional knowledge in various fields, including politics, economics, society, and culture, based on the experiences it has accumulated throughout its history. An effective policy plan that can facilitate the systematic transmission of our knowledge and experiences to the African countries is also required. Organizational strategy: the need to take a multilateral and regional approach The experiences of China, which faced numerous difficulties in Africa despite the various networks it established during its own colonial period, suggest that taking a unilateral approach to Africa carries significant risks. Therefore, in future diplomatic exchanges with Africa, Korea should either utilize the existing multilateral channels or formulate its own independent cooperation network with African countries. The European nations have been implementing their policies toward Africa through the European Union (EU), and African nations have intervened in the Mali conflict through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS; CEDEAO). Following these examples, Korea should act through the 29

38 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 already established regional organizations, reducing the risks involved in conducting diplomacy with Africa and increasing the efficiency of its activities. In addition, it is crucial to employ a unique strategy that differs from that of China or Japan. In particular, Korea should designate a group of countries or subregions as those deserving special attention, and focus on regional or multilateral cooperation organizations that have African countries as members (L Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, Commonwealth of Nations, etc.). Rather than following China and Japan s path, which emphasizes quantity over quality, Korea ought to concentrate its efforts on a specific target region, a strategy that is definitely more suitable for a country like Korea which has fewer resources than either China or Japan. In the long term, it should also consider forming multilateral organizations with African countries that can serve Korea s national interests and respect the Korean norms, thereby formulating its own independent diplomatic network. By utilizing these channels and actively communicating with African civil society, Korea will gain the ability to enhance mutual understanding with the African countries. Development, trade, and industrial strategies: formulating and implementing a bottom-up development policy Development assistance to Africa must directly promote the welfare of the African people, who should be the ultimate beneficiaries of development aid. The examples of China and Japan highlight the fact that if the right to draft and implement policy is concentrated on a small number of policy actors or elites, the support could become only a one-time event or fail to meet the demands of the residents. In particular, Korea s past experience with its New Village Movement (Saemaul Undong) could be highly beneficial to the African nations, most of which are in dire need of agricultural development. Soft power strategy: the need to view Africa from the Africans perspective The failure of the Western imperialists past colonial rule in Africa, as well as the more recent failed attempts at localization by various countries (especially China) and private capital owners, hints at the need to look at African culture and society from the Africans point of view. Africa is a society with a long colonial history, based on complex relationships formed among culturally and religiously diverse actors. Gaining an understanding of these complexities of African society from the Africans perspective will serve as a crucial foundation for the implementation of future policies toward Africa. One of the reasons for China s 30

39 Analysis of China and Japan s Strategies in Africa and Implications for the Republic of Korea failure in Africa is that the participating companies lacked an understanding of local languages and culture, making it difficult for them to adapt to the local environment. Rather than employing temporary measures, such as educating the company employees in advance, the government should seek a fundamental solution to the problem with a mid to long-term vision. In order to execute sustainable and effective diplomatic policies toward Africa, it is necessary to develop an education and training process that can produce more specialized professionals. Africa possesses great potential for economic, demographic, and cultural development, but there are also numerous risks involved in the development process. Analyzing and predicting these factors will be the first step toward promoting Korea s national interests within the region and enhancing its reputation as a middle power. Policy Recommendations Through a comparison of China and Japan s strategies toward Africa, we should consider taking the following actions: Forming strategic partnerships with international and regional organizations Organizations such as L Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) and the Commonwealth of Nations have carried out effective development cooperation in Africa through active diplomatic exchange. By participating in these institutions as an observer or a partner, Korea can reduce the risks involved in implementing its policies toward Africa, and improve the efficiency of its activities through working-level exchange with the African countries. In selecting its partner organizations, Korea should carefully consider the strategic importance of each region. Institutions such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS; CEDEAO) or the East African Community (EAC), which have been especially active in Africa, would likely be the first choices to consider. Forming strategic partnerships with African academic institutions The process of building and expanding centers for Korean studies at universities and research institutes in strategically important African countries is crucial. This objective can be achieved by utilizing a number of programs, such as the Korea Foundation s support for Korean Studies Centers and the Ministry of Culture s project to establish Sejong Institutes. Supplementing the budget and personnel of these programs, which are severely lacking relative to Africa s strategic importance, is also essential. 31

40 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 Creating the African boom in Korea In order to create public opinion that is favorable to Africa, the government should plan and execute programs that inform the public of Africa s current situation and its potential for future development. By organizing numerous cultural events, television programs, and symposiums, the government should underscore the positive aspects of Africa s history, society, and culture. Furthermore, various forms of African art, music, and pop culture that can attract public interest should be introduced as well, thereby presenting a more positive image of Africa to the Korean people. 32

41 주요국제문제분석 2013 년 ASEAN 관련정상회의결과분석 2013 년 ASEAN 관련정상회의결과분석 : 한 -ASEAN, ASEAN+3, EAS 를중심으로 * 배긍찬 ** 년 ASEAN 관련정상회의개최동남아 ASEAN 10개국 ( 태국, 필리핀, 인도네시아, 말레이시아, 싱가폴, 부르나이, 베트남, 라오스, 캄보디아, 미얀마 ) 은 2013년 10월 9-10일간브루나이에서제22차 ASEAN 정상회의를시작으로한국, 중국, 일본과제16차 ASEAN+1 양자회의에이어, 제 16차 ASEAN+3( 한 중 일 ) 정상회의와미국, 러시아, 호주, 뉴질랜드, 인도등이추가로참여하는제8차동아시아정상회의 (EAS: East Asia Summit) 를연이어개최했음. 목 차 년 ASEAN 관련정상회의개최 2. 정상회의의주요내용 3. 평가및전망 4. 한국의고려사항 이와동시에 ASEAN은제1차 ASEAN-미국정상회의와제11 차 ASEAN-인도정상회의도함께개최하였음. - 하지만미국오바마대통령이국내문제로이번정상회의에참석하지못한관계로케리국무장관이대신참석하였으며, 양측은 2014년미얀마에서제2차정상회의를개최키로함. 반면 ASEAN+3 정상회의와연계하여정례적으로개최되었던한 중 일 3국정상회의는최근중 일, 한 일간역사문제및영토갈등의여파로 2012년에이어금년에도개최되지못했음. * 발표 ** 아시아태평양연구부교수 33

42 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 한국은 ASEAN 측에게 신뢰와행복의동반자 비전을제시하고, 공동평화, 공동번영, 공동발전을지향하자는대 ASEAN 관계강화메시지를천명하고 2 정상회의의주요내용가. ASEAN 정상회의 ASEAN 정상들은 2013년 10월현재 2015년말까지완결목표인 ASEAN 공동체형성달성률이 82.5% 임을확인함. - 각각정치안보공동체 78%, 경제공동체 79.7%, 사회공동체 90% 가달성됨. - 이와관련 2015 ASEAN 공동체비전을위한반다르세리베가완선언 을채택하여 ASEAN 공동체지속을위한협의및결속강화를강조함. 정상들은 ASEAN 정치안보공동체형성을위해대화상대국및역외국들과활발한접촉은물론남중국해문제해결을위해유엔해양법 (UNCLOS, 1982) 준수를재확인함. 또한 ASEAN 경제공동체형성을위해보호무역반대입장고수, 대외 FTA체결확대그리고대화상대국및역외국들을상대로 RCEP+ASEAN+1 FTA 모델 추진에대해논의함. 동시에 2014년 ASEAN 의장국수행과관련하여미얀마의인프라구축및정세안정에대한각회원국들의노력과지원을약속함. 나. 한-ASEAN 정상회의이번회의에서한국은 ASEAN측에게 신뢰와행복의동반자 비전을제시하고, 정치, 안보, 경제, 사회, 문화분야의협력을강화하여공동평화, 공동번영, 공동발전을지향하자는대ASEAN 관계강화메시지를천명했으며, ASEAN측도이를환영하며함께전략적동반자관계를보다심화시켜나갈것을제안함. - 한국은한-ASEAN 간정치및경제분야의새로운협력사업으로 한-ASEAN 안보대화 와 한-ASEAN Business Council 신설을각각제안했으며, ASEAN측은이를환영함. 양측은 2009년한-ASEAN FTA 타결, 한-ASEAN 센터설립, 2010년한-ASEAN 전략적동반자관계격상, 2012년주 ASEAN 대표부설치등최근한-ASEAN 간일련의관계발전을긍정적으로평가함. 34

43 2013 년 ASEAN 관련정상회의결과분석 - 양측은한-ASEAN FTA 체결이후양측교역액이지속적으로증가하여 2012년에 1300억불을돌파한것을평가하고, 한- ASEAN FTA를더욱심화 (upgrade) 시켜 2015년까지 1500억달러교역액달성을위해노력할것을합의함. - 양측은 2015년 ASEAN 공동체출범을위해역내개발격차해소와연계성 (connectivity) 증진이핵심과제라는점에공감했으며, 한국은 2014년 한-메콩교류의해 지정등을통해메콩지역지원을확대하고, 2012년 9월국내에서출범한 ASEAN 연계성 TF 활동을강화해나갈것을약속함. - 이와함께 ASEAN측은 2014년한-ASEAN 대화관계수립 25주년을맞아 2014년에한-ASEAN 특별정상회의개최를환영함. 한편한국은북핵포기와한반도평화와안정을위해 ASEAN의건설적역할을당부했으며, ASEAN측은우리의한반도신뢰프로세스와동북아평화협력구상에대해지지를표명함. 다. ASEAN+3 정상회의 각국정상들은 ASEAN+3 협력체가 1997년출범이후금융, 식량, 보건, 교육등분야에서실질적성과를도출함으로써, 동아시아공동체형성을위해역내가장제도화된협력체로발전해온점을평가함. - 정상들은 ASEAN+3 Work Plan 이제출된것을환영하고, 동계획이향후 5년간 ASEAN+3 차원의협력을심화, 발전시켜나가는데구체적가이드라인이될것으로기대함. - 정상들은 2015년말까지역내포괄적경제동반자협정 (RCEP) 협상이종료되기를기대하며, 치앙마이이니셔티브다자화 (CMIM) 2배확대, ASEAN+3 거시경제감시기구 (AMRO: ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office) 의국제기구화, 아시아채권시장발전방안 (ABMI) 새로운로드맵플러스 (New Roadmap+) 의진전등을환영하는동시에, 금융위기시회복력제고차원에서 CMIM 등에대한지속적강화필요성에공감함. - 또한 ASEAN+3 비상쌀비축협정 (APTERR: ASEAN Plus 각국정상들은 ASEAN+3 협력체가동아시아공동체형성을위해역내가장제도화된협력체로발전해온점을평가하고 35

44 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 Three Emergency Rice Reserve) 의원활한이행을통한역내식량안보증진을기대함. 이와함께정상들은한국의제안으로 2012년 12월채택된제2차동아시아비전그룹 (EAVG II) 보고서의후속조치가계획대로원활히이행되어, 2014년차기정상회의에권고사항별구체행동계획이포함된최종보고서가제출되기를기대함. -ASEAN 정상들은 2015년까지 ASEAN 공동체출범을위해추진하고있는 ASEAN 연계성마스터플랜 (MPAC) 의이행에있어한 중 일 3국의협력및지원을요청함. - 정상들은 ASEAN과한 중 일각국간무역, 투자, 관광, 교육활성화에있어 3국 ASEAN 센터의중요성을평가하고, 3국센터상호간경험및아이디어공유제안을환영함. EAS 협력점검및미래발전방향, 기존 6 개협력사업, 남중국해문제, 북핵및시리아문제등에대해의견을교환하여 한편각국의정상들은한국의한반도신뢰프로세스와동북아평화협력구상을환영함. 라. 동아시아정상회의각국정상들은 EAS 협력점검및미래발전방향, 기존 6개협력사업 ( 환경, 에너지, 교육, 금융, 자연재해, 연계성등 ), 남중국해문제, 북핵및시리아문제등에대해의견을교환했음. - 정상들은아태지역의재난예방, 관리및위기대응을위한회원국들의협력필요성을강조하고, 식량안보에관한제8차 EAS 선언 채택을환영함. 한국은향후 EAS의성격과방향성에대해심도있는논의를위해 2014년에 EAS의미래방향 track II 포럼개최를추진중임을발표함. 또한러시아는지역안보협력을강화하기위한회의를제안하고 2014년러시아개최를추진하고있음을표명함. 북핵문제와관련하여미국, 중국, 일본, 러시아등대부분의주요국가들이한반도비핵화를강조하고, 시리아내화학무기사용을비난함. 또한시리아내화학무기폐기를위한 UN 안보리결의이행촉구및제2단계제네바회의개최를지지함. 남중국해문제에대해대부분의국가들은중국-ASEAN 간남 36

45 2013 년 ASEAN 관련정상회의결과분석 중국해행동규범 (CoC) 을채택하기위한협의개시를환영하고, 동협의가실질적진전을이룩하여조속한 CoC 체결로이어질것을기대함. - 중국과 ASEAN측은 2013년 9월중국쑤저우에서최초로 CoC 협의를시작한바있음. 한편 EAS 정상들은한국의한반도신뢰프로세스와동북아평화협력구상을환영함. 3 평가및전망 가. ASEAN+3 와 EAS 간역할분담필요성대두 EAS가출범한이래기존 ASEAN+3와 EAS 간중복성의문제와역할분담의문제가꾸준히제기되어왔음. - 애초 EAS 설립구상은 ASEAN+3 국가들이동아시아공동체를구현하기위한장기적과제였으며, 기존 ASEAN+3 국가들을중심으로출범할것을전제로했던것임. - 그런데느닷없이 2004년초부터말레이시아와중국이 EAS를조기출범시키는과정에서, 중국의 EAS 주도가능성을우려했던일본, 인도네시아, 싱가폴등이호주, 뉴질랜드, 인도를 EAS에추가로참여시키면서부터문제가발생했던것임. ASEAN+3 와 EAS 는상호보완적협조관계라기보다는상호중복적또는심지어상호경쟁적성격마저띠어왔으며 이러한혼선은 2005년 ASEAN+3와 EAS가동시에개최되면서가시화되었음. - 제1차 EAS 주요결과는첫째, 향후동아시아공동체형성에 ASEAN이 주도적역할 (driving force) 을담당하고, - 둘째, 기존의 ASEAN+3 협력체제는 계속하여 (continue to be) 동아시아공동체형성에 주된기제 (main vehicle) 가될것이며, - 셋째, 역내지도자들간전략대화체인 EAS는보완적기제로서 이지역 ( 구체적으로동아시아라고명시하지않은 ) 의공동체형성에의미있는역할을담당할수있다 (could play a significant role in community building in this region) 는것이었음. 이후 ASEAN+3와 EAS는상호보완적협조관계라기보다는상호중복적또는심지어상호경쟁적성격마저띠어왔음. 37

46 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 - 일차적으로동아시아경제통합방안과관련하여중국과일부 ASEAN국가들은 ASEAN+3 중심의 EAFTA를일본과일부 ASEAN국가들은 EAS에참여하는 ASEAN+6 중심의 CEPEA 를각각주장해왔음. - 뿐만아니라호주, 뉴질랜드, 인도등은동아시아지역협력에실질적으로참여하기를원했으며, EAS 차원에서 6개의우선협력분야를선정, 추진함으로써기존 ASEAN+3 협력사업과중복성의문제를야기하게되었음. - 특히호주, 인도, 일본등일부국가들은 EAS 협력사업을제도화하려는움직임도보여왔음. 더욱이 2011년미국과러시아가 EAS에참여함으로써 EAS의대외적위상은높아졌으나 EAS내역학구도는한층더복잡하게되었으며, 2012년제2차 EAVG를통해향후 ASEAN+3 경제통합의기제로서 EAFTA가아닌 ASEAN+6국가들이참여하는 RCEP이채택됨으로써 ASEAN+3와 EAS 간경계가더욱더모호해지게되었음. - 결과적으로 ASEAN+3 중심의동아시아공동체형성문제는모멘텀을상실하게되었음. ASEAN+3 는지역경제통합을위한실질적협력체가되어야하며, EAS 는본연의전략대화체로서역내정치 안보문제를집중적으로다루어나감으로써양대협력체간시너지효과를극대화해야 따라서 EAS 참여국간 ASEAN+3와 EAS 간역할분담의필요성이제기될수밖에없는상황이되었음. 애초전략대화체로출범한 EAS가 ASEAN+3와중복된협력사업을진행하게됨에따라 EAS의성격에대한논란이계속되고있기때문임. 이와같은맥락에서이번회의를통해한국은향후 EAS의발전방향을새롭게모색하기위한 EAS 미래방향 트랙II 포럼개최를제안하게된것임. - 단적으로가장바람직한역할분담은 ASEAN+3는지역경제통합을위한실질적협력체가되어야하며, EAS는본연의전략대화체로서역내정치 안보문제를집중적으로다루어나감으로써양대협력체간시너지효과를극대화하는것임. - 하지만 EAS내다양한회원국들이 ASEAN+3와 EAS에대해상이한전략적이해관계를갖고있기때문에, EAS의발전방향을새롭게재정립하기란결코쉽지않은과제가될것으로보임. 38

47 2013 년 ASEAN 관련정상회의결과분석 나. 한-ASEAN 양자관계의중요성증대한국에있어서이번회의의가장중요한시사점은한-ASEAN 관계의중요성이다시한번부각되었으며그중요성이계속증대될것이라는점임. - 무엇보다도 ASEAN은무역, 투자, 건설등경제분야에있어서한국에게중국다음으로규모가큰중요한협력의파트너라는점이며, 향후양측의경제관계는더욱심화 확대될여지를갖고있다는것임. - 뿐만아니라 ASEAN은 ARF, ADMM+, EAS 등역내정치 안보문제를다루는협의체들을주도하고있다는측면에서한반도및동북아문제해결에중요한논의의장을제공하는주체임. - 따라서 ASEAN은전통적으로정치 안보적측면에서미국, 중국, 일본, 러시아등소위동북아 4강에버금가는전략적중요성을갖는외교의대상이라할것임. ASEAN 은전통적으로정치 안보적측면에서미국, 중국, 일본, 러시아등소위동북아 4 강에버금가는전략적중요성을갖는외교의대상이며 또한이번회의가전년도와비교하여 ASEAN+3와 EAS가다소지지부진한모습을보여주었다는점도한국에게 ASEAN과의실질적양자협력이더욱중요한과제라는인식을갖게했음. -ASEAN+3 는여전히구체적이고실질적인협력들이이루어지고는있으나, 핵심과제라고할수있는동아시아경제통합과관련하여 ASEAN+6 중심의 RCEP 추진이결정되면서동아시아공동체형성과관련한모멘텀을상실케되었음. -EAS도미국대통령의불참으로전년도와비교하여대내외적으로크게주목받지못했으며, 오히려내부적으로 EAS 성격과발전방향을재정립해야하는상황에직면하고있음. 특히이번정상회의는한국신정부의첫번째대ASEAN 접촉이었다는데의의가있었음. 이러한측면에서이번회의는한국에게의미있는성과를도출했다고평가됨. - 한국의신정부는대ASEAN 중시입장을천명했는바, ASEAN 국가들은이에기존의전략적동반자관계를더욱심화 발전시켜나가자고응답했음. - 사실일부 ASEAN국가들은한국신정부의한반도신뢰프로 39

48 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 세스, 동북아평화협력, 중견국외교등 3대외교기조에동남아가빠진데대한일말의의구심을가질수있었는바, 이러한우려는일단해소되었음. 한국의외교적성과는한국정부의주요외교이니셔티브인한반도신뢰프로세스와동북아평화협력구상에대해국제적지지를확보했다는점이며 보다구체적으로한국은양측관계를심화, 발전시키기위한방안으로서 한-ASEAN 안보대화 와 한-ASEAN Business Council 설치를제안했으며, ASEAN은이를적극환영했음. - 특히한-ASEAN 안보대화는 ASEAN이역외국가들과최초로시작한양자안보대화라는점에서그의미가심장하다고할수있음. - 물론초기단계에서한국은한반도및동북아문제에대해한국의입장을제고하는데주력할것이며, ASEAN은관심사인비전통안보문제를협의하려할것임. - 하지만한-ASEAN 안보대화는그이상의전략적의미를부여할수있는바, 동아시아지역에서첨예화되고있는미 중경쟁구도하에서중견국인한국과중소국가연합체인 ASEAN이공동의대응을모색해나갈수도있기때문임. 이와같은맥락에서 2014년한국에서개최될한-ASEAN 대화관계수립 25주년기념특별정상회의는한-ASEAN 관계의새로운이정표가될수있을것임. 다. 한국의외교구상에대한국제적지지확보이번회의를통하여가장가시적인한국의외교적성과는한국정부의주요외교이니셔티브인한반도신뢰프로세스와동북아평화협력구상에대해국제적지지를확보했다는점임. - 한-ASEAN 정상회의, ASEAN+3 정상회의, EAS 의장성명에각국의정상들이한국의외교구상을환영 (welcomed) 한다는문안이포함되었음. 이는그간한-미, 한-중, 한-베트남등양자차원에이어다자정상회의에서는처음으로한국의외교구상에대한지지를확인했다는의의가있음. 특히미국, 중국, 일본, 러시아등주요국정상들이참여하는전략포럼인 EAS는한국의외교안보정책에대한이해를제고할수있는최적의회의체라할수있음. 40

49 2013 년 ASEAN 관련정상회의결과분석 라. 남중국해문제와미 중경쟁구도지속이번회의를통해남중국해영유권분쟁과관련하여다소의진전이있었음은확인되었으나, 이문제를둘러싼미 중간전략적경쟁구도는지속되고있는양상을보여줌. -EAS에서지난 9월중국수저우에서개최된중국-ASEAN 간 CoC 협의개시에대해대체로환영과진전기대등긍정적언급이많았으나, 동협의가중국측의시간벌기수단으로이용될가능성을우려하는 ASEAN국가들과미국, 일본등은 CoC의조속한체결을강조함. 특히미국과중국은 2011년과 12년에이어 EAS에서남중해문제에대해설전을이어나갔음. - 남중국해문제는당사국간의문제라는중국의주장에대해미국이아태지역해양안보는모든국가들공통의관심사라는주장을개진하자, 중국은이에강력히반박함. - 중국측은남중국해문제는항해의자유와영유권분쟁의두가지측면이있는바, 전자는모든국가들의이익에영향을미치나항해의자유원칙에대해서는이미국제적합의가형성되어있으며, 분쟁의소지는영유권에관한문제로서이는당사국간의문제라는논리로재반박하였음. - 그러나전체적으로미국과중국은남중국해문제를신중히상호관리하는태도를유지했음. 남중국해영유권분쟁과관련하여다소의진전이있었음은확인되었으나, 이문제를둘러싼미 중간전략적경쟁구도는지속되고있는양상을보여 한편이번회의를통해전반적으로미국의역내영향력은두드러져보이지않았으며, 중국은조용히 ASEAN 국가들에게실질적접근을강화해나감으로써 2010년이후실추된이미지를서서히회복하고있는것으로평가됨. - 일차적으로오바마미국대통령이국내문제로이번정상회의에불참한것자체가이지역에대한미국의관심과존재감을보여주는데부정적요인으로작용했음은부인하기어려울것임. - 반면중국의시진핑주석과리커장총리는 APEC과 ASEAN+3 및 EAS를전후로다수역내국가들을분주히순회방문하면서중국과 ASEAN 국가간양자관계를증진하는모습을연출했기때문이기도함. 41

50 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 향후동남아지역에대한미국과중국의전략적경쟁구도는계속유지될전망이며 그러나보다근본적인문제는일부 ASEAN 국가들이오바마집권 2기미국의외교정책에대해회의적시각을갖기시작하고있다는점임. - 최근 ASEAN 국가들간에는미국의 아시아회기 (Pivot to Asia) 정책에회의적인시각들이대두되고있는바, 집권 1기오바마행정부가 EAS 가입등아시아에대한관여를강화했던것과는대조적으로, 집권 2기오바마행정부는중동문제에매달려동아시아, 특히동남아지역을거의방관시하고있다고보고있음. - 특히케리국무장관은전임힐러리국무장관과는대조적으로미국의아시아개입정책의일부재고가능성을시사한바있기때문임. - 이러한미국의대동남아태도변화와관련하여일부동남아국가들은내부적불안감을갖기시작한것으로보이며, 미국의개입강화를통해중국을견제하려는구도가흔들리는것이아니냐는인식도갖고있는것으로보임. 반면 2009년과 2010년사이에강경한대외행태로주변국들, 특히다수 ASEAN국가들에게신뢰를크게상실한중국은이후 ASEAN국가들과양자및다자차원에서각종지원과호의적외교제스쳐등을통하여상당부분입지를회복해나가고있는것으로관측되고있음. - 중국은 ASEAN측이계속요구해온 CoC 체결을위한협상을개시했으며, 역내국가들과다양한형태의경제협력사업을지속적으로추진해오고있음. - 따라서최근에는지난 1-2년전까지도표명되었던중국에대한 ASEAN국가들의공개적인반감도거의눈에띠지않고있는상황임. - 한편남중국해에대한중국의유화적태도에대해상당수 ASEAN 국가들은여전히중국의시간벌기전술이라는시각을갖고있는것도사실임. 그럼에도불구하고향후동남아지역에대한미국과중국의전략적경쟁구도는계속유지될전망됨. - 비록미국이중동문제와국내문제로당장외교적손실을감수할 42

51 2013 년 ASEAN 관련정상회의결과분석 수밖에없는상황이기는하지만, 중장기적으로대중국견제를위해결코동남아를포기할수는없을것이기때문임. - 하지만문제는최근의여러가지상황들이시사하듯이미국의패권은점진적으로쇠퇴하고있고, 중국은경제적으로지속성장하여어느시점에가서는미국과위치가역전될가능성이남아있다는점일것임. 마. 한 중 일 3 국협력의불확실성증대 주지하다시피금년에도 2012년에이어 ASEAN+3 정상회의와연계하여정례적으로개최되었던한 중 일정상회의는중 일, 한 일간최근의역사및영토문제로결국개최되지못했음. - 지난 2년동안한 중 일 3국정상회의는물론한 일, 중 일간양자정상회의도사실상개최되지못했음. 문제는당분간한 중 일 3국정상회의는물론중일, 한 일간양자정상회의가개최될가능성도크지않아보인다는점임. 뿐만아니라 3국간경제통합을상징하는한 중 일 FTA 협상도공식개시되기는했으나, 금년에단한차례회의가개최된이후사실상중단된상태라는점도우려스러운부분임. - 이회의에서 3국은상호입장차이를확인했는바, 특히일본은 3 국 FTA의개방수준을미국이주도하는 TPP 수준으로끌어올려야한한다고주장했던것으로알려짐. 따라서향후한 중 일 3국협력을기대하거나낙관하기어려운상황이며, 이는 ASEAN+3 및 EAS 등동아시아지역협력에도부정적변수로작용할것임. 한 중 일 3국협력이원활치못할경우결국동아시아지역협력은관성적으로 ASEAN에의해주도될수밖에없을것임. 한 중 일 3 국협력이원활치못할경우결국동아시아지역협력은관성적으로 ASEAN 에의해주도될수밖에없을것으로보여 43

52 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 4 한국의고려사항 가 한-ASEAN 특별정상회의개최준비한국은 2014년 12월한-ASEAN 대화관계수립 25주년기념특별정상회의를성공적으로개최하여한-ASEAN 관계의새로운이정표로만들어나가야할것임. 주지하다시피 2014년정상회의는 2009년에이은두번째행사인만큼, 준비기획단출범, 관계법령준비, 관련부대행사개최등내실있는준비를통해한 -ASEAN 관계를한차원높게발전시킬수있는가시적성과를도출할필요가있음. 한국은기존의인프라투자중심의대동남아 ODA 정책을기술협력중심의 ODA 정책으로전환해나갈필요가있어 이와함께한국은 ASEAN과기존의상호협력관계를뛰어넘는새롭고도구체적인협력사업들을적극적으로제안할필요가있는바, 이를위해 ASEAN이한국에게기대하고있고우리가실제로수행할수있는협력사업이어떤것들인지면밀히검토해나가야할것임. 나. 대동남아 ODA 정책전환향후한국은기존의인프라투자중심의대동남아 ODA 정책을기술협력중심의 ODA 정책으로전환해나갈필요가있음. - 기존의인프라투자중심의한국의 ODA는그규모면에서일본이나중국에비교할수없을정도로작기때문에, 기존의정책을지속하는것은그다지효과적이지못한측면이있음. -ASEAN도한국의인프라투자 ODA에크게의존하고있지않은점도중요한고려사항임. 반면 ASEAN국가들은한국으로부터산업화를위한기술이전및협력을강력히요망하고있음. - 현재 ASEAN국가들이채택하고있는해외다국적기업 (FDI) 중심의경제성장모델은자체연구개발 (R&D) 능력이취약하며부가가치창출능력이매우낮기때문임. - 따라서다수 ASEAN국가들은한국처럼자국기업중심의경제성장모델로전환을모색하고있는바, 한국이과거기술개발을 44

53 2013 년 ASEAN 관련정상회의결과분석 위해정부, 기업, 학계가어떻게협력했고어떠한제도적지원이있었는지한국의경험을전수받기를원하고있음. - 향후한국이 ASEAN국가들의기술역량제고를위한기여방안들을제시할경우, 이는일본및서국국가들의 ODA 정책과차별화가가능하며, ASEAN국가들도전폭환영할것으로전망됨. 따라서이러한기술협력중심의대ASEAN ODA 정책을 2014년한-ASEAN 특별정상회의에서천명함으로써, ASEAN 국가들에게실질적으로도움이되는 ODA 정책을추진해나갈필요가있음. - 이와관련한국이양측간중소기업협력을활성화하기위해제안한한-ASEAN Business Council을연계 활용할수있는방안에대한검토도필요할것임. 다. EAS 미래방향선도주지하다시피한국은 EAS 미래발전방향을재정립하기위한트랙II 포럼을추진할예정임. 따라서내년에동회의개최시우리와입장이유사한다른회원국들의적극적인참여를유도하여일차적으로저변을확대해나가야할것임. 또한성공적인포럼개최를통해 EAS 미래방향에대한권고안을 EAS에제시함으로써, EAS의방향성에대한논의를선도하는역내역동적중견국가로서역할을담당해나갈필요가있음. EAS 미래방향에대한권고안을 EAS 에제시함으로써, EAS 의방향성에대한논의를선도하는역내역동적중견국가로서역할을담당해나갈필요가있어 라. EAS 내중견국협력모색최근한국은멕시코, 인도네시아, 터키, 호주등과함께중견국연합체인 MIKTA를공식출범시킨바있음. 이는중견국외교를강화해나감으로써외교적행동반경을확대하려는한국정부의의미있는외교성과로평가되며, 국제사회에대한유무형의기여와국제질서재편과정에능동적인참여를통하여한국의국제적위상을제고할수있는중요한외교적수단이될것으로보임. 이와관련하여한국은중견국으로서동아시아에서도지역적역할을확대해나갈수있는방안들을모색해나갈필요가있음. - 현재 EAS에 MIKTA 국가중한국과인도네시아, 호주가회원 45

54 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 국으로참여하고있는바, 한국은동북아의역동적중견국이며, 인도네시아는동남아 ASEAN의중심국가인동시에호주는대양주의대표세력임. - 따라서향후 EAS 틀안에서이들 3개국이중견국으로서역내문제를해결하기위해일정한지역적역할을모색하고강화해나갈수있는방안들을신중히연구 검토해나갈필요가있음. 46

55 The 2013 ASEAN-related Summits The 2013 ASEAN-related Summits: From the Perspectives of Korea-ASEAN, ASEAN+3 and the EAS BAE Geung-chan Professor Dept. of Asian and Pacific Studies 1. Major Outcomes of Each Summit T he 10 member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar) convened at the 23rd ASEAN Summit held in Brunei from October 9-10, Other meetings were held as well including the 16th ASEAN+1 Summit with Korea, China and Japan, the 16th ASEAN+3 (Korea, China and Japan) Summit, and the 8th East Asia Summit (EAS) with eight dialogue partners of the United States, South Korea, China, Russia, Japan, India, Australia and New Zealand. The Trilateral Summit between Korea, Japan and China which usually takes place on the sidelines was not held again this year (following 2012) due to recent territorial disputes and conflicts involving historical issues among the three countries. During the ASEAN-ROK Summit, Korea outlined a vision of furthering the partnership based on mutual trust and understanding. It pointed in particular to the pursuance of enhanced bilateral cooperation in the areas of politics, security, society and culture for realizing the ultimate goal of shared peace, shared prosperity, and shared progress. Welcoming Korea s vision for cooperation, ASEAN leaders also proposed that the two sides strengthen strategic partnership. To further the collaboration, Korea suggested a Korea-ASEAN security dialogue and the establishment of the Korea-ASEAN Business Council, with suggestions warmly received by its ASEAN counterparts. Leaders participating in the ASEAN+3 Summit highly evaluated the tangible progress and achievements realized in the various fields of finance, food security, health and education since the summit s inception in 1997, and the efforts made by all parties to build a reputation for the ASEAN+3 as a well-organized regional 47

56 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 cooperation scheme that has made significant contributions to the East Asian community. During the summit, the ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation Work Plan ( ) was adopted, and the leaders expect the plan to function as a detailed guideline for deepening and advancing cooperation of ASEAN+3 countries over the next five years. The plenary session of this year s EAS saw participating state leaders discussing various issues ranging from EAS cooperation, future directions for development, and the six existing collaboration programs (concerning environment, energy, education, finance, natural disaster and connectivity),to territorial disputes over the South China Sea, North Korean nuclear development, and the Syrian issue. In regard to the South China Sea territorial issue, the majority of participants noted the launch of negotiations to establish a Code of Conduct (CoC) between ASEAN and China, expressing their hope that the CoC would be agreed to by the two parties sooner rather than later through earnest negotiations. Korea proposed to hosta Track II forum to discuss the future direction of the EAS in 2014,whereas Russia put forward a proposal for a framework of principles on strengthening security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, and said it is working on organizing a forum to discuss regional security collaboration issues. 2. Evaluation and Prospects (1) Division of Labor between ASEAN+3 and the EAS Since the launch of the EAS concerns have been raised continuously about overlapping issues and roles of the ASEAN+3 and the EAS. Initially, the EAS was created as part of ASEAN s long-term endeavor to build an East Asian community, assuming the participation of ASEAN+3 countries. However, Malaysia and China hurried to launch the EAS in early 2004 and Japan, Indonesia and Singapore, fearing the possibility of creating a China-led meeting, went on to engage Australia, New Zealand and India, leading to the presence of non-east Asian countries. Signs of trouble were first witnessed in 2005 when the 1st EAS was held back-to-back with the ASEAN+3 Summit. In the Chairman s Statement, the leaders agreed that the ASEAN Plus Three Process would continue to be the main vehicle towards the long-term goal of building an East Asian community with ASEAN as the driving force, and stated that as a complementary mechanism the EAS could play a significant role in community building in the region, though East Asiawas not particularly specified. 48

57 The 2013 ASEAN-related Summits However, the relationship between ASEAN+3 and the EAS and their roles continued to cause confusion rather than leading to cooperation and complementation, with roles and issues sometimes overlapping and in some cases even the occurrence of competition between the two. China and some ASEAN member countries championed the East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA) consisting of ASEAN+3 nations, whereas Japan and other ASEAN members called for the Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA), consisting of mainly ASEAN+6 countries but allowing for the presence of EAS participating countries. In addition, Australia, New Zealand and India have long aspired to directly engage in East Asian regional cooperation and when the EAS selected and announced six cooperation projects with these countries, projects which overlapped with existing ASEAN+3 programs, questions started to be raised over the roles of each entity. When the United State sand Russia joined the EAS in 2011, though the summit s profile on the international stage improved, the dynamics of the EAS grew more complicated. In the second East Asia Vision Group meeting in 2012, the participants adopted the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), comprised of ASEAN+6 countries, instead of the EAFTA, as a mechanism to realize economic integration of the ASEAN+3, further blurring the distinction between the ASEAN+3 and the EAS. As a result, the momentum for community building led by the ASEAN+3 mechanism was lost. Under the circumstances, the roles and responsibilities of the two entities need to be clearly defined. To solve this issue, Korea proposed a Track II forum on the future direction of the EAS. Ideally, the ASEAN+3 should take the initiative for regional economic integration while the EAS should remain as a forum for strategic dialogue focusing on regional political and security issues so that synergy can be created between the two mechanisms. However, participating states of the EAS have varying strategic interests relative to the ASEAN+3 and the EAS, making it all the more challenging to redefine future directions of the EAS. (2) Growing Importance of Korea-ASEAN Relations One critical implication for Korea is that the 2013 ASEAN-related summits once again highlighted the importance of the bilateral relationship between Korea and the ASEAN, a relationship that will grow in significance in the future. It should be clearly noted that the ASEAN is the second largest cooperation partner for Korea after China in a wide range of economic sectors, including trade, investment and construction, and that the bilateral relationship, especially in 49

58 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 economic terms, is likely to deepen in the coming years. In addition, given that the ASEAN is an overarching regional mechanism for addressing regional political and security issues encompassing the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), it also provides a critical forum for dialogue in dealing with inter-korean and Northeast Asian issues. The 2013 ASEAN Summit was significant in that it was the first engagement of the new Korean administration with ASEAN, and Korea obtained meaningful results from the summit. The new administration stated that it would make moves to enhance the bilateral relationship with the ASEAN to which ASEAN member countries responded positively, expressing their wish to deepen the strategic partnership. Among a number of options that can be employed to further strengthen Korea-ASEAN relations, Korea proposed the Korea-ASEAN security dialogue and the creation of the Korea-ASEAN Business Council, suggestions well received by ASEAN leaders. The Korea-ASEAN security dialogue, if realized, holds particular significance in that it will be the first bilateral security talk in which ASEAN engages with a non-asean member. Of course, Korea will utilize the forum so that it can bolster its position in inter-korean and Northeast Asian issues, whereas ASEAN is likely to bring up nonconventional security matters. However, the security dialogue can be regarded to bear more significant strategic meaning in that under the ever-intensifying drive for regional hegemony between the United States and China, a middle power like Korea and a coalition of medium and small sized countries will be able to explore and present viable measures to deal with relevant issues. (3) Enlisting International Support for Korea s Diplomatic Initiatives One of the most visible outcomes of the ASEAN Summit for Korea is that the nation garnered endorsement for its major diplomatic initiatives, including the Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula and the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative. The Chairman Statements for the ASEAN-Korea Summit, the ASEAN+3 Summit, and the EAS include wording that expresses the leaders welcoming of Korea s diplomatic initiatives. In particular the EAS, participated by key state leaders of the United States, China, Japan and Russia, provided an optimal forum for Korea to promote its diplomatic and security policies. (4) Continued Territorial Disputes over the South China Sea and Competition between the United States and China It was affirmed that progress is slowly being made on territorial disputes over the South China Sea but the United States and China are still at odds with each 50

59 The 2013 ASEAN-related Summits other over the issue. When ASEAN and China agreed to launch negotiations on a CoC in September 2013 in Suzhou, it was viewed positively and welcomed by many leaders who hoped to see significant progress made. However, some ASEAN countries and the United States and Japan called for a swift agreement based on their worry that China would use the negotiations to buy sometime before making any concrete commitment. Throughout the summit the United States was judged as not wielding much influence while China was viewed as taking careful but pragmatic approaches in dealing with ASEAN countries, slowly recovering its reputation which had been tainted since The fact that President Obama chose not to attend the summit due to domestic issues did not serve him or his country well in demonstrating U.S. interest and presence in the region. Meanwhile, President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang made visits to a number of countries in the region before and after the APEC, ASEAN+3 and EAS meetings in efforts to enhance bilateral relations with ASEAN member countries. What should be noted here is that some ASEAN countries have begun to develop pessimistic views on the diplomatic policies of the second Obama administration. Some countries in the region were disgruntled about the U.S. pivot to Asia. Contrary to the first administration which made efforts to strengthen engagement in Asia as evidenced in the United States joining the EAS, the leadership of the second term is caught up with Middle East issues, not tending to or seemingly sitting on its hands when it comes to East Asia, and in particular, the Southeast Asian region. Particularly U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has shown a very different attitude from his predecessor Hilary Clinton, even implying that the United States may reconsider its Asian policies. Meanwhile China, which had lost trust from surrounding countries, mainly ASEAN member countries, due to its assertive foreign policies, has improved its relationship with ASEAN countries using both bilateral and multilateral opportunities to show support and friendly gestures. It finally agreed to open negotiations for a CoC as was requested by ASEAN for many years and is pursuing various economic cooperation projects with other countries in the region. Until one or two years ago, some ASEAN countries showed no hesitance in openly expressing hostility toward China, which is not so much the case these days. Despite such latest developments, the U.S.-China strategic confrontation is likely to remain in the Southeast Asian region. Though the United States has suffered some diplomatic loss due to its focus on issues in the Middle East and in its 51

60 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 own territory, from a long-term perspective, it will never loosen its grip on Southeast Asia as a means of checking the rise of China. However, as implied in many recent incidents, the U.S. hegemony is in a gradual decline while China s economic advancement will continue to an extent where it will, at some point in time, catch up and outgrow the U.S. economy. (5) Growing Uncertainty over Trilateral Cooperation between Korea, China and Japan Following 2012, this year again the trilateral summit between Korea, China and Japan was not held due to lingering conflicts over historical issues and territorial disputes. What is worrisome is that neither the trilateral summit nor any bilateral meetings between China and Japan, or Japan and Korea, are likely to occur. The CJK (China, Japan and Korea) FTA negotiations, symbolic as an economic integration between the three major Asian economies, officially started in 2013 but have been very slow by this time. Not many remain positive on the prospects of trilateral cooperation for the time being and this mood is likely to dampen the spirit of East Asian regional cooperation led by the ASEAN+3. If the three countries fail to reconcile and cannot cooperate smoothly, regional cooperation in East Asia will fall into the hands of ASEAN. 3. Considerations for Korea (1) Preparation for the Special Korea-ASEAN Summit 2014 Korea should do all it can to successfully hold the special Korea-ASEAN Summit in December 2014, a summit proposed to celebrate the 25 years since South Korea established a dialogue partnership with the regional organization. The special summit will be the second meeting of the two parties since 2009, and it will be imperative for Korea to produce tangible results based on thorough preparations in order to take the bilateral relationship to the next level. In addition, Korea should actively propose new, detailed cooperation projects to move beyond the existing cooperation relationship, by reviewing viable projects that would meet the expectations of its partner. (2) Shifts in ODA Policies on Southeast Asia In the coming years, Korea should shift its infrastructure investment-oriented ODA programs for Southeast Asian countries to technological cooperation-driven ones. The existing ODA programs are of extremely small scale when compared to that of China and Japan; thus, continuing to make infrastructure investment 52

61 The 2013 ASEAN-related Summits in Southeast Asian countries will prove not so effective. ASEAN members themselves are demanding technological transfer and cooperation to boost industrialization in their countries. The economic growth model that these countries have adopted relies on the investment and technology of multinational companies (FDIs) and does not offer strong proprietary R&D capabilities, thus generating very low levels of added value. Therefore, a number of ASEAN countries are seeking to nurture domestic companies, as was the case with Korea s economic development, and desire to learn from the Korean case how the government, industry and academia worked together in this regard and the kinds of supports that were made available. If Korea offers workable programs that can help ASEAN countries improve their technological capabilities, it will be able to differentiate itself from Japan and other Western countries, and ASEAN countries will also welcome such a transition in ODA policies. Therefore, Korea should announce technology cooperation-oriented ODA policies in the upcoming special summit and implement programs that can provide practical supports to beneficiaries. Korea can also tap into the Korea-ASEAN Business Council it has proposed to facilitate cooperation between small and medium-sized companies of the two sides in implementing ODA programs. (3) Cooperation among Middle Powers of the EAS Recently, Korea came to an agreement with four other middle-power nations Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey and Australia to establish a joint consultation group of middle powers. It is evaluated as a meaningful diplomatic feat, as it should help Korea expand its diplomatic influence by mustering collaboration with its peer countries. The new organization is expected to function as a useful diplomatic tool for Korea in its efforts to make tangible and intangible contributions to the global community and be actively involved in the changing dynamics of the internationalorder,therebyenhancing Korea s profile on the global stage. As a genuine middle power, Korea should explore ways to expand its role in the region. MIKTA members Korea, Indonesia and Australia are now part of the EAS. Korea is a dynamic middle power in Northeast Asia, Indonesia a key member of ASEAN, and Australia an influential player of Oceania. Therefore, within the framework of the EAS, these middle powers should carefully explore and identify their roles in the region so that they can make significant contributions to addressing regional issues. 53

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63 주요국제문제분석 사이버스페이스거버넌스의현안과쟁점 사이버스페이스거버넌스의현안과쟁점 * 유준구 ** 1 문제제기사이버공간에대한의존도가높아지면서단순한개인차원의개인정보보호및사이버범죄를넘어최근국제적인일련의사이버위협은국가간사이버전장화가능성까지대두시키고있는현실임. - 현재 650만개의독립도메인 (domain) 이사이버범죄자및테러조직들에의해이용되면서, 사이버공격으로인한피해는연간 1,200억달러에달하고, 2012년한해에만 150억건의웹에기초한사이버공격이발생하였음. - 또한, 모바일을이용한인터넷침입이증가함에따라사이버범죄나테러의수단이더욱확대되고있음. - 이러한상황에서, 최근사이버기술의발달과해커집단의전문화에따라국내외적으로사이버범죄, 사이버테러, 핵티비즘등개인행위자에의한위협이외에도사이버스파이, 사이버위협등국가또는대리행위자에의한위협이점증함에따라국가안보에대한위협으로작용하고있는현실임. - 그럼에도불구하고사이버분야를포괄적으로규율하는보편적규범과국제기구는부재한상태인바, 각국은국내보안조치강화및국제협력을통해이를해결하고자시도하고있음. 목 차 1. 문제제기 2. 사이버이슈의현황과특성 3. 지역 다자적대응기조와과제 4. 거버넌스차원의국제규범의쟁점과전망 5. 고려사항 사이버공간에서의범죄및안보문제는공간, 행위자, 책임성, 대응조치의특성상다층적이고복합적인성격을갖고있음. * 발표 ** 객원교수 55

64 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 사이버공간에서의범죄및안보문제는공간, 행위자, 책임성, 대응조치의특성상다층적이고복합적인성격을갖고있어 - 사이버공간을규율하는국제규범역시이러한성격으로인해기존국제법규범적용의한계가있어이에대한국제사회및지역기구의다양한논의들이시도되고있는상황임. - 그러나여전히사이버안보에대한미국, 유럽을포함한서방측과중 러간의시각차가현저하고포괄적인국제규범및국제기구창설의필요성에도불구하고지역적차원의논의로축소되고있는현실임. - 다만사이버공간상의행위에대한규제는국제규범에대한기본인식의차이가있지만큰틀에서사이버범죄와사이버안보의관점에서수렴되고있음. 향후국제규범에대한논의의주된쟁점은사이버공간의이용에대한국가주권의개입정도, 사실상국가가배후인행위에대한국가책임의추궁여부, 국제규범및기구의창설문제등을중심으로논의될것으로전망됨. - 현재이에대한논의는 UN(United Nations), EU(European Union), NATO(North Atlantic treaty Organization: 북대서양조약기구 ), CIS(Common Wealth of Independent States: 독립국가연합 ), SCO(Shanghai Cooperation Organization: 상하이협력기구 ), ARF(ASEAN Regional Forum: 아세안지역안보포럼 ), AU(African Union: 아프리카연합 ) 등과같은다양한다자 지역적협력체를중심으로전개되고있음. - 이러한상황에서 2013년서울사이버스페이스총회는사이버분야의제반사항과관련한포괄적인의제를제시하면서향후논의의준거가될수있는지침으로써의역할을할것으로기대됨. 이에본고에서는사이버스페이스논의의특성과사이버범죄및사이버안보와관련한국제사회의논의의검토를통해향후전개될국제법적쟁점과포괄적인국제규범의가능성을전망하여우리나라의사이버관련정책적시사점을제시하는것이목적임. 56

65 사이버스페이스거버넌스의현안과쟁점 2 사이버이슈의현황과특성 가. 사이버위협의형태와변화최근사이버공격의주된경향은탐색보안기술의발달로악성소프트웨어의양은줄어들고있으나랜섬웨어 (ransomeware) 등다양한형태의진화된악성소프트웨어를이용, 소규모의보다표적화된공격이이루어지고있음. - 이에따라핵심데이터파괴공격이발생할수있고, 네트워크데이터보다는클라우드 (cloud) 데이터공격가능성이높아지고있는추세임. - 공격대상의경우, 정보채널에서연결고리가약하면서도민감한정보를가진, 즉시스템관리자가아닌컨설턴트, 연구자, 계약담당자등에집중되는경향이있음. 사이버공간에대한의존도가높아지면서, 사이버범죄는물론최근국가간사이버공간이 제5의공간 으로서전장화될가능성까지언급되고있어향후국제안보관계의근본적인변화가예상됨. - 또한, 사이버무기가향후재래식무기또는동수준의무기로발전할수도있다는우려가존재함. 최근수년간디도스 (DDoS: Distributed Denial of Service) 사태, 에스토니아사이버공격, 스턱스넷 (Stuxnet) 사태등과같은일련의국가주요기간시설에대한사이버공격이발생하고있는현실임. - 앞으로도일부국가들이비대칭전략강화의수단으로사이버공격을모색할가능성이있고, 이에따라발원지의명확한확인없이안보적차원의공세적인대응역시취해질수있음. - 사이버무기는비국가행위자들간경계가모호하고무기사용이시작된공격발원지확인이거의불가능하여전형적인비대칭전력증강수단으로부상하고있음. - 다만, 사이버안보분야를포괄적으로규율하는보편적국제규범이부재한상황에서각국은국내보안조치확대및국제협력강화에집중하고있는현실임. 사이버안보분야를포괄적으로규율하는보편적국제규범이부재한상황에서각국은국내보안조치확대및국제협력강화에집중하고있는현실이어서 57

66 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 나. 사이버분야논의의특성점증하는사이버위협에대응하기위해국제사회는최근몇년사이 UN을비롯한지역 다자국제기구혹은개별국가차원의국제규범논의및대응전략을제시하고있으나아직행위자및적용범위뿐만아니라개념에있어서도국가, 다자 지역협력체간현저한입장차이가존재하고있는현실임. - 이러한혼란은 사이버공간 이라는용어의관념성과특이성, 안보 보안 안전 범죄간개념의혼동, 사이버공간의익명성및초국경성으로인한대응조치의곤란함에기인함. 사이버분야논의에있어국가, 다자 지역협력체간현저한입장차이가있는바, 이러한혼란은 사이버공간 이라는용어의관념성과특이성, 안보 보안 안전 범죄간개념의혼동, 사이버공간의익명성및초국경성으로인한대응조치의곤란함에기인하며 사이버공간에서벌어지는문제는불법행위및위협의가해자와대상이국가인지, 혹은개인이나사회에관한것인지에따라안보문제가되거나범죄의문제가될수있으며, 침해대상이개인인경우에도그규모가심각한경우국가에대한위협으로간주될가능성이있음. - 사이버공간상의위협의유형과주체에따라사이버무력공격 ( 전쟁 ), 사이버테러리즘, 사이버스파이행위, 사이버범죄, 사이버사고로분류될수있지만이러한분류도사이버공간의활용이정부와민간으로명확히구분하기어려운관계로 회색지대 가존재하고있는현실임. - 이러한상황에서사이버공간상의범죄및안보는일국차원의대응만으로는부족하고비국가행위자및 다중이해관계자 (multi- stake holder) 가참여하는좀더포괄적인국제협력을바탕으로한국제규범이모색되어야할시점임. 사이버범죄 안보문제해결을위한주된현안으로, 사이버분야에서국제적으로적용가능한규범과기구가부재하다는점이꾸준히지적되어지역 다자적차원의논의가있으나단기간에가시적인성과가있을것으로보이지는않음. - 이는사이버분야의공간적특성, 행위자, 행위유형, 대응조치등여러복잡한문제가얽혀있는반면, 이에대한거버넌스논의는비교적최근에부각되었기때문임. 국제적으로사이버공간상의문제를정보및정보통신망보안의관점, 사회경제적관점, 범죄대응관점, 국가안보관점으로볼수있고이에따라개별국가의정책체계가존재함. 58

67 사이버스페이스거버넌스의현안과쟁점 - 현재사이버공간상의위협을규제하려는국제규범은사이버범죄와국가안보차원의대응으로크게나눌수있으며이에대한 UN 및지역협의체간논의에서국가간의입장이대립하고있는상황임. 3 지역 다자적대응기조와과제 가. 국제범죄적차원의논의 사이버범죄는사이버공간의특성상국경을넘는경우가많아국제범죄적성격이강해이에대한국제사회의공동대처가필요하였고, 이에지난 10년간사이버범죄에대응하려는국제사회의노력은다양한지역적 다자적인구속적 비구속적국제규범을창출하였음 년 6월유럽이사회에서성안 (2004년 7월발효 ) 된 사이버범죄협약 (Convention on Cybercrime) 은사이버범죄를다루는최초의포괄적인국제조약임. - 사이버범죄협약은유럽중심으로출범하였으나점차미국, 일본, 호주등이참여 ( 총 51개국참여, 40개국비준, 11개국서명 ) 하는등글로벌차원의국제규범으로확대되어가면서다른지역적규범창설도촉진시키고있음. - 동협약은국제사회가사이버범죄에효율적으로대처하기위하여가입국들이국내법을제정하여이를처벌해야하고각국의수사기관이협조하도록의무를부과하고있음. - 즉컴퓨터시스템이나데이터에대한불법접속, 지적재산권침해, 바이러스개발및유포, 아동포르노그래피배포, 돈세탁, 사기테러리즘모의등에대해국내법으로금지하고처벌하는등국제형사공조를강화함과동시에형사재판관할권통일을추구. 현재사이버범죄에관한구속적인국제규범은 EU, CIS 및 SCO, AU, 아랍연맹 (Arab League), UN 등 5 개그룹의규범이있고, 그밖에사이버범죄관련양자 다자적정부간전략대화를통해법적 협력적플랫폼이만들어지고있어 현재사이버범죄에관한구속적인국제규범은 EU, CIS 및 SCO, AU, 아랍연맹 (Arab League), UN 등 5개그룹의규범이있고, 그밖에사이버범죄관련양자 다자적정부간전략대화를통해법적 협력적플랫폼이만들어지고있음. 59

68 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 - 이들 5개지역의사이버범죄관련국제규범중특히 2012년에제정된 AU 사이버안보프레임워트설립협약 (AUCC: AU Convention on the Establishment of a Legal Framework Conductive to Cybersecurity in Africa) 은전자상거래, 사이버안보, 개인정보보호, 사이버범죄등사이버분야의중요영역을모두규율한최초의국제규범으로 2014년 AU회의에서채택될예정임. - 이들국제규범을통해현재전세계 82개국이한두개의사이버범죄관련국제규범에가입하고있음. 기구 / 지역 EU CIS SCO 아프리카 < 표 > 사이버범죄관련구속적국제규범 국제규범명칭 Convention on Cybercrime and Additional Protocol Convention on Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Offences related to Computer Information Cooperation in the Field of International Information Security EOCWAS Directive on Fighting Cybercrime AU Convention on the Establishment of a Legal Framework Conductive to Cybersecurity in Africa (AUCC) 아랍연맹 Convention on Combating Information Technology Offences UN Optional Protocol th the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children Prostitution and Child Pornography 다양한형태의지역 다자적국제규범을통해현재전세계 82 개국이한두개의사이버범죄관련국제규범에가입하고있어 UN 차원의사이버범죄논의는 UN 총회결의 65/230에따라 사이버범죄정부전문가그룹 이 UNODC(United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: 유엔마약범죄사무소 ) 소관하에설치, 국가간구체협력방안모색을위해포괄적연구정부전문가회의를개최함. - 동회의는기본적으로사이버범죄분야와관련된것이나, 제2차회의 ( ~28) 제시된보고서에서는새로운 UN 차원의규범마련을제안하는내용을포함하면서논의범위가확대되는경향이있음. - 또한, 동회의에서는새로운국제법제정시도에반대하고유 60

69 사이버스페이스거버넌스의현안과쟁점 럽평의회사이버범죄협약의보편화및현재진행중인국가간신뢰구축에집중할것을주장하는미국, 유럽, 일본등서방그룹과새로운법규제정에찬성하는중국및러시아의입장이첨예하게대립되고있음. 사이버범죄협약등사이버범죄거버넌스논의가활발히전개되고있어일련의국제기준으로기능할것은분명하지만, 향후지역적한계를극복하고국제사회의보편적규범이되기에는한계가있음. - 즉사이버범죄규범의지역적 분절적체제와새로운국제규범창설에있어서방측과중 러간입장차이가뚜렷함. - 또한, 최근사이버스파이문제와같은국가행위자규율문제, 사이버활동의새로운범죄행위, 사이버공간에서의자유로운정보이용과의조화문제등도향후해결해야할과제임. 사이버범죄규범의지역적 분절적체제와새로운국제규범창설에있어서방측과중 러간입장차이가뚜렷하고또한, 최근사이버스파이문제와같은국가행위자규율문제, 사이버활동의새로운범죄행위, 사이버공간에서의자유로운정보이용과의조화문제등도향후해결해야할과제이며 나. 안보적차원의접근사이버안보에대한국제사회의대응은 UN 총회등을중심으로꾸준히제기되온바, UN 총회제1위원회에서러시아주도로 국제안보맥락에서의정보통신분야발전총회결의안 이 1999년부터매년채택되고있음 년결의안은국제정보안보분야에서의위협평가, 대응가능수단평가가포함되어있으며국제개념정립등을위해 2004년부터 UN 정보안보정부전문가그룹회의 (GGE: Group of Governmental Experts on Information Security) 가출범하여현재까지총 3회 (2004~5년, 2009~10년, 2012~13년 ) 의 GGE가개최됨. -3차례의회의에서서방측은사이버공간규제에반대하면서사이버위협대처에있어투명성제고, 신뢰구축조치 (CBM: Confidence Building Measures) 의이행이필요하다는입장을견지하였으며중 러측은국가주권, 영토보존, 정치적독립, 적절한국내법및새로운국제규범의합의등을강조하였음. 한편 2013년제68차 UN 총회에서제3차 UNGGE 보고서가총회 군축및국제안보 ( 제1위원회 ) 와인권위원회 ( 제3위원회 ) 에제출되어두위원회의결의가각각채택됨. 61

70 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 - 첫번째결의인 국제안보차원에서의정보통신분야발전 에서는국제법의원칙에따라 책임있는국가행동규범 과 투명성, 예측성, 협력 및 사이버공간에서의자유로운정보소통 원칙이강조됨. - 또한스노든 (Edward Snowden) 사건으로불거진불법감청과사이버테러리즘대응조치문제는독일, 브라질, 인도네시아의주도로제3위원회에제출 채택 ( 디지털시대프라이버시권 ) 됨. - 다만, 현재 UN 차원의논의가상기한두방향으로수렴되는것이사이버안보문제해결의그릇된접근일수있음. 이는각위원회의의제가통합적이지못하며현사이버스페이스거버넌스이슈를적절하게반영하지못하기때문임. 현재 UN 차원의논의가상기한두방향으로수렴되는것이사이버안보문제해결의그릇된접근일수있음. 이는각위원회의의제가통합적이지못함과동시에현사이버스페이스거버넌스이슈를적절하게반영하지못하기때문이어서 지역적차원의사이버안보대응과관련 NATO는 2002년프라하정상회의에서사이버안보를주요의제로포함함. - 이후 2007년에스토니아에서발생한대규모사이버공격의대응차원에서사이버안보총괄기관으로 CDMA(Cyber Defence Management Authority) 을설치하고사이버연구 훈련담당사이버방위센터를설치운영함 년 6월 NATO는사이버방위정책및실천계획을수립하였고사이버방위센터 (CCDCOE: Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence) 는독립적인국제전문가그룹을구성하여사이버교전을규율하는법에대한매뉴얼을마련하여작성토록의뢰최근발간함. - 동매뉴얼은기존에확립된무력사용관련국제관습법이사이버활동을통한무력사용에도적용가능하다는전제로, 무력공격에상응하는사이버활동에대해자위권의원용이가능하고유엔안전보장이사회를통한강제조치도규정함. 한편, 중 러 우즈베키스탄 타지키스탄등 SCO 4개회원국은정보통신기술의급속한발전과이에따른악용가능성증대에따른대응취지로 국제정보행동수칙안 (International Code of Conduct for Information Security) 을 2011년 UN 총회에서회람함. - 동수칙안은유엔헌장및보편적국제규범준수를전제로적대행위, 침략행위, 국제평화안보위협, 정보무기확산등을야기하 62

71 사이버스페이스거버넌스의현안과쟁점 는정보통신기술의이용금지를규정하였고또한, 정보통신기술을활용하는범죄테러행위및테러 분리 극단주의를선동하거나타국의정치 경제 사회안정을저해하는행위에대한대처협력을규정함. - 동결의안은정보공간및핵심정보기반시설을보호하기위한국가의권리와책임및관련국내법및규제가허용하는조건내에서정보공간관련권리와자유 ( 정보검색, 습득, 배포권 ) 를존중한다고규정하여사이버안보에대한서방측시각과차이를보임. 4 거버넌스차원의국제규범의쟁점과전망가. 국제규범에대한기본인식의차이사이버공간에대한국제규범의논의는우선사이버공간에대한기본인식의차이에서비롯되는바, 사이버공간을국제공역 (global commons) 으로파악하고정보의자유로운흐름을강조하는입장과국가영토일부로파악하고국가주권및정부의사이버공간통제가필요한입장으로나누어짐. - 따라서사이버공간을규제하는국제규범에관한기본입장또한중 러는사이버공간을규제하는국제규범이부재하기때문에사이버위협이발생하고이를해결하기위해국가행위를규율하는구속력있는국제법형성을주장함. - 이에반해미국및유럽국가들은새로운국제법을만들경우현재의자유로운인터넷거버넌스모델을훼손한다는우려를제기하고있는상황임. 사이버공간에대한국제규범의논의는우선사이버공간에대한기본인식의차이에서비롯되는바, 사이버공간을국제공역 (global commons) 으로파악하고정보의자유로운흐름을강조하는입장과국가영토일부로파악하고국가주권및정부의사이버공간통제가필요한입장으로나누어지고 두입장은모두사이버공간상의사이버범죄와사이버안보관련국제규범을구분하여접근하고있고각각적용되는국제법에대한입장역시상이함. - 즉서방그룹은사이버상안보위협의경우기존전쟁법및국제인도법을적용하려는입장임. 각국사이버범죄협약의적용을확대하여각국형법의강제집행력을제고시키는국제협력체제를공고히하면사이버공간이보다안전하게만들어질것 63

72 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 비록국제법상금지되는무력공격내지무력충돌수준에까지는미치지못한상황에서향후사이버범죄협약이확대 강화되지않을경우일정한법적진공상태가존재할수있어 이고이는궁극적으로사이버공간이군사행동으로부터도안전하게될것이라고주장함. - 반면중 러는여타군축조약과같은새로운국제법이필요하다는입장이고기존사이버범죄협약의적용을확대하자는주장에반대하는상황임. 나. 국가책임의적용가능성최근사이버공격이단순해킹이나 DDoS 공격차원을넘어사회기반시설까지공격대상으로진화되어경제적 사회적피해가막대한상황에서, 에스토니아, 조지아, 미국과한국에대한사이버공격에서처럼그배후가국가인경우로의심되는경우가빈번하게발생함. - 따라서비록국제법상금지되는무력공격내지무력충돌수준에까지는미치지못한상황에서향후사이버범죄협약이확대 강화되지않을경우일정한법적진공상태가존재할수있음. - 이경우현행국제법상인정되는국가책임을통해해결할수밖에없는바, 이에적용여부가문제되며, 귀속가능성의문제와개인의행위에대한국가의주의의무 (due diligence) 가쟁점임. 재래식무력충돌과는달리사이버공격은대부분 비대칭형공격행위 (asymmetric attack) 형태중하나로서자신을은닉하거나위장하려하기때문에행위주체의파악이문제시됨. - 이경우피해국은자신이피해를입었다는사실을입증해야하는데, 사이버공간의동시성과익명성이라는특성으로인해가해국에대한국가책임을추궁하기가어려운현실임 년 7월초에감행되었던우리나라와미국의전산망을무력화시키기위해동원된컴퓨터와서버는전세계혹은피해국에산재해있고이를규명하는데걸린시간만 3개월이소요되었음. - 또한, 제3국의서버를이용한경우제3국이국제공조수사에협조하지않을시피해국이독자적으로역해킹을통하여서버에침해하여기록을확인할경우에는또다른국제분쟁을초래할수있음. 64

73 사이버스페이스거버넌스의현안과쟁점 다수의 IT 전문가들은에스토니아 (2007), 조지아 (2008) 및미국과한국 (2009) 에대한사이버공격에서처럼국가가공격의배후에있다고추정하고있지만, 관련국은거의이를부인하고있는현실임. - 이경우국제관습법상국가는개인의행위에대한주의의무로서예방하거나, 실제로개인에의한불법행위가발생한경우이런행위가더는이루어질수없도록사후조치할의무가있음. - 다만이경우에도사이버공격의경우개인의사이버공격행위에대한해당국의인지여부및구체적인제공여부를입증해야하는의무는남아있다는한계가있음. 다. 포괄적국제규범및국제기구창설가능성 사이버범죄를포함한사이버안보문제는이제개별국가차원을떠나상당히심각한양상을띠고있는바, 이를포괄적으로규율하는국제규범및국제기구창설론이힘을얻고있는상황임. - 포괄적국제규범의경우앞서설명한바와같이현단계에서포괄적으로논의할수있으나사이버공간전체를포괄적으로규율하는국제규범이창설되기는어렵고사이버범죄와사이버안보분야로양분되어논의될것으로전망됨. - 이는양분야가본질적으로행위자및적용대상이다른것에서기인하기도함. 다만 UN 차원의국제규범이논의될경우양분야의각각의적용대상의범위가확대될수있어법적진공상태를메울수는있을것으로예상함. - 포괄적인국제기구구상은 2007년부터 2009년까지발생했던세계적 DDoS 사이버테러또는공격이계기가되어논의되고있음. - 국제통신연합 (ITU), 경제협력개발기구 (OECD) 등국제기구와 NATO, 아시아태평양경제공동체 (APEC) 등지역협력기구가조금씩관여해왔지만, 구심점이없다는한계가있음. 한편, 2011년제1차회의이후서울에서열린제3차사이버스페이스총회 (Conference on Cyberspace) 는글로벌차원의사이버공간상의제반이슈와국제규범및거버넌스를논의하는글로벌협의체로서의의가있음. 포괄적국제규범의경우앞서설명한바와같이현단계에서논의포괄적으로논의할수있으나사이버공간전체를포괄적으로규율하는국제규범이창설되기는어렵고사이버범죄와사이버안보분야로양분되어논의될것으로전망되며 65

74 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 제 1 차 ( 런던 ), 제 2 차 ( 헝가리 ) 총회가유럽국가위주, 인권과표현의자유가주로강조된반면, 2013 년제 3 차서울사이버스페이스총회는서방과비서방국가간의사이버공간과관련된원칙및규범정립에관한시각차를극복하려는노력을시도하며 - 특히, 제1차 ( 런던 ), 제2차 ( 헝가리 ) 총회가유럽국가위주, 인권과표현의자유가주로강조된반면, 2013년제3 차서울사이버스페이스총회에서서방과비서방국가간의사이버공간과관련된원칙및규범정립에관한시각차를극복하려는노력을시도됨. - 서울총회에서채택된서울프레임워크는두차례회의결과를구체화하는방향을제시하면서그동안 UN과지역기구에서논의된사이버관련기본원칙을포괄함. - 즉, 서울사이버스페이스총회에서는 개방되고안전한사이버공간을통한글로벌번영 이라는주제로사이버보안, 사이버범죄, 국제안보이슈뿐만아니라사이버공간의이용을통해경제성장과발전, 사회문화적혜택의공유와전제조건으로서의역량개발분야의의제를추가함으로써사이버스페이스관련규범정립에있어포괄적인가이드라인을제시함. 5 고려사항가. 사이버거버넌스논의의주도적역할지속서울사이버스페이스총회는우리나라가주도하여사이버관련글로벌거버넌스논의에최소한의공통분모를제시함과동시에선진국과개도국의참여를제고한정치적의미가있음. - 향후에도다양한형태의양자 지역 다자적차원의사이버분야에관한이슈화가확대될것이므로이에대한주도적역할을지속해야할것임. - 사이버거버넌스문제는기술적 경제적 전략적특성상서방과중 러및개도국간입장차가현저하기때문에중견국가들의역할이중요한분야이고같은맥락에서우리나라가주도할수있는글로벌아젠다임을인식할필요가있음. 나. 다중이해관계자의역할제고와협력확대사이버분야는그특성상민간기업, 비국가행위자등다중이해관계자의행위및참여와역할이중요한바, 이들과의협력네트워크를강화해야할것임. 66

75 사이버스페이스거버넌스의현안과쟁점 - 또한, 인터넷거버넌스를실질적으로주도하고있는국제전기통신연합 (ITU: International Telecommunication Union), 국제인터넷주소관리기구 (ICANN: Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers), CERT(Computer Emergency Response Team) 와같은국제기구및민간기구의영향력이다른분야에비해현저하고이들기구의권한과역할에대해서도진영간블록적인대립양상이존재함. - 이에비해사이버문제의대응과글로벌거버넌스형성에있어우리나라다중이해관계자의역할과민 관협력은유기적이고체계적이지못한현실이어서이를제고할필요가있음. - 실제, 2013년서울사이버총회에서도 87개국국가와함께 18 개국제기구및민간기구등이참여하였고 2014년 10월부산에서개최될 ITU 전권회의 (PP: Plenipotentiary Conference) 에서도 193개국정부대표단과더불어수많은국제기구 기업 연구기관관계자등이참가하여사이버분야의다양한이슈를논의할예정임. 다. 사이버방어능력강화와주요국간의기술 정보협력추진우리나라는사이버의존도가높은반면국가와사기업간보안문제및민 관의협력네트워크가취약한관계로사이버방어능력이매우취약한상황임. - 이는수차례의 DDoS 공격에서확인되었으며앞으로도우리나라를직접공격하거나타국의공격이우리나라를경유하여피해를입을가능성이높음. - 사이버안보의속성상조기에정보를확인하고대응하는것이중요한바, 주요국과양자 다자차원의정보교류와기술협력을추진하여비대칭전력을강화할필요가있음. 사이버문제의대응과글로벌거버넌스형성에있어우리나라다중이해관계자의역할과민 관협력은유기적이고체계적이지못한현실이어서이를제고할필요가있어 라. 사이버관련국제규범확대에따른국내적체제정비사이버안보의특성상단기적으로글로벌차원및지역적차원의국제규범이창설될가능성은희박한상황이지만기존사이버범죄협약에참여하는국가가확대되거나새로운국제규범의창설논의는활발히전개될것임. 67

76 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 UN 차원의결의및사이버범죄협약등이새로운형태로변화될수있으므로이에대한주요국정책및동향을모니터링하고국내적차원의준비가필요하며 - 이에따라국제협력을위한통제기준등국제규범및가이드라인과우리나라의관련기술, 국내정책, 법 제도가일치하지않은부분이존재함. - 또한, UN 차원의결의및사이버범죄협약등이새로운형태로변화될수있으므로이에대한주요국정책및동향을모니터링하고국내적차원의준비가필요함. - 이런맥락에서사이버협약에참여한 51개국의대부분이특정범죄및국제협력을위한의무적국내조치에대해유보를두고있는바, 우리나라도주요국의유보사례를검토하여가입을위한국내정책및법 제도를정비해야할것임. 68

77 Cyberspace Governance Cyberspace Governance: Current Issues and Policy Implications YOO Joonkoo Visiting Professor Center for International Law 1. Background P eople s increasing dependence upon cyberspace has opened up the world to growing security threats that have gone beyond infringement of personal information and cybercrime committed by individuals to potential digital warfare waged between nations, as witnessed recently in a series of international cyber-attacks. Later, the G20 became the premier forum for international economic cooperation and came to be regarded as the core mechanism for global governance on the economic front. Furthermore, it has sought to make a transition from simply a crisis management body to a steering committee which facilitates sustainable and balanced development of the world economy. Today, some 6.5 million unique domains have been infiltrated by cyber criminals and terrorist organizations, causing damage estimated at around 120 billion dollars annually. In 2012 alone, there were more than 1.5 billion incidents of web-based attacks around the world. In addition, the increasing access to the Internet through mobile devices opens the playing field even further for cybercrime and cyber terrorism. Due to these circumstances as well as the advancement of Internet and computer technologies and increasingly specialized hacker groups in recent years, the world has seen a steady increase in attacks perpetrated by individual actors, including cybercrime, cyber terrorism, and hacktivism, as well as increasing cyber espionage and cyber threats posed by nation-states or proxy actors, posing a significant threat to national security. Consequently, due to the absence of universal norms and governing bodies to comprehensively deal with these cyberspace issues, countries across the world are working to address the situation by tightening local security and bolstering global cooperation. 69

78 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 The issues of crime and security in cyberspace are multilayered and complex in nature, as they involve factors such as domains, actors, responsibilities, and response measures, all with their own unique characteristics. This complexity limits the use of existing international legal instruments to deal with cyberspace issues, prompting various international and regional dialogues on the problem. However, differences of opinion regarding cyber security still run deep between Western countries, such as the U.S. and the EU, and China and Russia, and despite the need to create comprehensive international norms and governing bodies, discussions on cyber security issues have been reduced to the regional level. The regulations governing conduct on cyberspace are generally delineated from the perspectives of cybercrime and cyber security in a larger framework, and countries have varying opinions on the universal norms. Future discussions on these universal norms will mainly focus on the extent of the state s intervention in the use of cyberspace, the issue of state responsibility for cybercrimes sponsored by state actors, and the creation of universal norms and governing bodies. Currently, these issues are being discussed at multilateral and regional forums, including the UN, EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the African Union (AU). In this context, the results of the Seoul Conference on Cyberspace 2013 present a comprehen-sive agenda covering wide-ranging issues related to cyberspace, and will serve as a guideline for future discussions on this subject. Hence, this paper aims to provide policy implications for the cyberspace sector in Korea based on reviews of the unique issues covered by cyber-related discussions as well as the debates that were led by the international community on cybercrime and cyber security. This paper also explores possible solutions to issues related to international law and the possible emergence of universal norms in the future. 2. Current Status and Unique Characteristics of Cyberspace Issues 2-1. Types of Cyber Threats and Their Evolution The recent trend of cyber-attacks shows that the advancement of malware detection technology has helped reduce the amount of malicious software in circulation. Yet, the number of more precisely-targeted attacks has increased, using various forms of more advanced methods, such as ransomware. As a result, more attacks are targeting core data, and the potential for attacks on cloud data, rather than network data, has increased. In terms of subjects of attacks, the focus has 70

79 Cyberspace Governance been shifted from system managers to weak links in the information channel that have sensitive information, such as consultants, researchers, and contract management staff. With the ever increasing dependence on cyberspace, there are rising concerns over cybercrime and the potential for cyberspace to become the fifth dimension of warfare between countries, which alludes to a fundamental change in international security regimes. Furthermore, there are concerns that cyber weapons may evolve to pose a threat equal to that of conventional weapons. In recent years, a series of cyber attacks have been carried out against governments and key state facilities. Some examples are the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks in South Korea, the cyber-attacks in Estonia, and the Stuxnet attack against Iran and other countries. Some states may incorporate cyber-attacks into their strategies for asymmetric warfare, spurring other states to organize counter-attacks without the time or resources to properly identify the origins of the attacks. Cyber weapons are emerging as an ideal means to strengthen asymmetric capability since non-state actors using cyber weapons have ambiguous geographic boundaries and identifying the source of their origin is almost impossible. Due to the lack of universal norms governing cyber security, countries are focusing on fortifying their domestic security measures as well as enhancing international cooperation Features of Cyber-related Debates Over the last few years, the international community, including the UN and individual countries, has been holding debates on and proposing strategies for universal norms at the regional and multilateral level to combat growing cyber threats. However, a sharp division persists between countries and regional and multilateral organizations over the interpretation of actors, the scope of application, and even the concepts involved in the cybercrime issue. Such discord stems from the abstract and unique characteristics of cyberspace, conceptual confusion between national security, public security, safety and crime, and the anonymity and transnationality of cyberspace, all of which add to the difficulty in formulating countermeasures. Illegal acts and attacks committed in cyberspace can become a security issue or a criminal issue depending on whether the perpetrator or the victim is a state, an individual, or society in general. Moreover, even if the attack was intended to harm only an individual, it may be considered a threat against a state if it is of a significant scale. Cybercrimes, depending on their nature and the entities 71

80 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 involved, can be classified as cyber armed attacks (warfare), cyber terrorism, cyber espionage, cybercrimes, or cyber accidents. However, since there is no distinct boundary between government and private sector use of cyberspace, there are grey areas. Given this situation, cybercrime and cyber security cannot be addressed by a single country alone, but more concerted international cooperation that includes non-state actors as well as multi-stakeholders will be required to create the necessary universal norms. The absence of universally applicable norms and governing bodies has been constantly pointed out as one of the most pressing issues regarding cybercrime and cyber security, and has led to a range of regional and multilateral discussions. However, little progress is foreseeable in the near future, because of the complexly interwoven issues concerning cyberspace, such as the unique characteristics of domains, actors, types of acts, and response measures, and the fact that the question of how to properly govern cyberspace has emerged only recently. Internationally, cyberspace issues are viewed in the context of information network security, socio-economics, response to crime, and national security, and accordingly, each country has developed their own individual policy regimes. Currently, attempts at creating universal norms to govern cyberspace can be divided into the cybercrime approach and national security approach, and there has been much disagreement on this issue at discussions among the UN and regional organizations. 3. Regional and Multilateral Responses and Agenda 3-1. Discussions in the Context of International Crime Cybercrime, given its characteristics, frequently transcends borders and can certainly be considered international crime, thus requiring a joint response from the international community. Therefore, global efforts to combat cybercrime over the past ten years have led to a range of regional/multilateral and binding/ non-binding international instruments. The Convention on Cyber-crime drafted by the Council of Europe in June 2001 and enforced in July 2004 is the first international treaty seeking to address cyber crime. The Convention, initially adopted by European countries, has since been joined by the U.S., Japan, and Australia. With a total of 51 member states, ratified by 40 countries, and signed by 11 countries, the Convention is gradually turning into an international treaty, and is encouraging the creation of similar agreements in other regions as well. 72

81 Cyberspace Governance [Table] Binding International Cybercrime Instruments Organization/ Region EU CIS SCO Africa Arab League UN International Instrument Convention on Cybercrime and Additional Protocol Convention on Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Offences related to Computer Information Cooperation in the Field of International Information Security EOCWAS Directive on Fighting Cybercrime AU Convention on the Establishment of a Legal Framework Conducive to Cybersecurity in Africa (AUCC) Convention on Combating Information Technology Offences Optional Protocol to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography The Convention on Cybercrime requires the member states to adopt domestic legislation regarding the administration of punishment for cybercrime, and ensures assistance among signatory parties in the implementation of procedures. In other words, it requires the signatories to combat and deal with criminal offences, thereby seeking to strengthen international cooperation in criminal matters and encourage common legal jurisdiction. The criminal offences covered by the Convention include the illegal access of computer systems or data, infringement of intellectual property rights, production and distribution of viruses, distribution of child pornographic materials, money laundering, computer-related fraud, and conspiracy to commit terrorist acts. As of today, binding international instruments aimed at countering cyber crime include those developed by: (i) the European Union (EU), (ii) the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), (iii) inter-governmental African organizations, (iv) the League of Arab States, and (v) the UN. Also, cyber crime-related bilateral and multilateral intergovernmental strategic dialogues are being held to create additional legal and cooperative frameworks. Among the international instruments of the five regions, the AU Convention on the Establishment of a Legal Framework Conducive to Cybersecurity in Africa, to be adopted at the AU Conference in 2014, will be the first international treaty to propose regulations for all of the important issues of cyberspace, such as electronic 73

82 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 transactions, cyber security, protection of personal data, and cyber crime. Globally, 82 countries have signed one or more cyber crime-related instruments. As required by the UN General Assembly s Resolution 65/230, the intergovernmental expert group established under the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) held a meeting to conduct a comprehensive study on cybercrime issues and seek tangible ways to bolster international cooperation. In general, the meeting was convened to address cybercrime, but the scope of the discussions seems to be expanding, as indicated by the report produced by the second session of the expert group, which included a proposal for the development of a new international instrument by the UN. Furthermore, the meeting has demonstrated the sharp divide between the Western group, including the U.S., Europe, and Japan, which opposes the creation of a new international treaty and instead favors the universalization of the Council of Europe s Cybercrime Convention and trust-building among states, and the Chinese and Russians, which support the proposal for new legislation. Active discussions are ongoing on cyberspace governance as well as the Cybercrime Convention, which indicates that the Convention will certainly function as a set of an international standard, however, there are still regional limitations preventing it from being adopted as a universal norm. In other words, due to the regional and fragmented nature of the current norms, the West and China-Russia still strongly disagree on the development of new universal instruments. Also, the issue of regulating state actors (as in the recent cases of cyber espionage and new and advanced cybercrimes), the issue of the free flow of information in cyberspace, and finding an acceptable middle ground between these two issues are problems that still remain to be tackled Approach from a Security Perspective The UN General Assembly and other international bodies have consistently called for a collective response to cybercrime. In 1998, in response to these calls, Russia introduced a draft resolution called Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of Security at the First Committee of the General Assembly, and the resolution has been adopted every year since then. The 2001 resolution called for the establishment of the Group of Governmental Experts on Information Security (GGE) to review threats in the field of international information security, develop possible measures to address them, and define international concepts. 74

83 Cyberspace Governance Commencing work in 2004, the GGE has convened three times so far (2004/2005, 2009/2010, and 2012/2013). The three meetings demonstrated distinct differences of opinion between the West and China-Russia. The Western states rejected the regulation of cyberspace and maintained that countering cyber threats required enhancing transparency and implementing Confidence Building Measures (CBM), while China and Russia stressed the issues of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and the need to formulate adequate local laws that can be applied in parallel with new universal norms for cyberspace. Meanwhile, the report of the third UNGGE was submitted to the Disarmament and International Security Committee (First Committee) and the Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee (Third Committee), and the resolutions of each committee were adopted at the 68th session of the UN General Assembly. The first resolution, titled Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of Security, emphasized the responsible behavior of states, transparency, consistency, cooperation, and the free flow of information in cyberspace, in accordance with the principles of international law. Regarding the issue of illegal interception of personal data, triggered by the Snowden case and incidents of cyber terrorism, Germany, Brazil, and Indonesia introduced a resolution on The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, which was adopted by the Third Committee. Nonetheless, the UN-led discussions, which are clearly divided on the issue, may not be the desirable approach to address cybercrime, since the UN committees have inconsistent agendas that do not adequately reflect the issue of cyberspace governance. With respect to regional responses to cyber security issues, NATO put forward defense against cyber-attacks as one of the main agendas at the Prague Summit in In 2007, in an effort to respond to the major cyber-attacks in Estonia, NATO member states created the Cyber Defense Management Authority (CDMA) to coordinate responses to cyber attacks against allied members. Also, the Cooperation Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCDCOE) was set up as a research and learning institute related to cyber defense. In June 2011, NATO adopted a new cyber defense policy and the associated Action Plan. The CCDCOE organized an independent international group of experts to author the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, and published the manual in March The manual is an examination of how existing customary international laws, such as the resort to force by States, can be applied to cyberspace, and suggests legitimizing exercising the right of self-defense against 75

84 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 cyber operations constituting an armed attack, and also calls on the UN Security Council to take enforcement measures. In the meantime, four SCO member states China, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan introduced the International Code of Conduct for Information Security at the UN General Assembly in 2011, aimed at responding to the rapid advancement of information and communication technology and the subsequently increased risks of abusing such technology. On the premise of complying with the UN Charter and the universally recognized international norms, this document calls for signatories not to use information and communications technologies to carry out hostile activities or acts of aggression, pose threats to international peace and security, or proliferate information, weapons, or related technologies. In addition, it stipulates that countries cooperate in combating criminal and terrorist activities that use information and communications technologies and in curbing the dissemination of information that incites terrorism, secessionism, extremism, or that undermines other countries political, economic, and social stability. The draft code of conduct requires signatories to reaffirm all the rights and responsibilities of States to protect their information space and critical information infrastructure from threats as well as to fully respect rights and freedom in information space, including the rights and freedom to search for, acquire, and disseminate information within the scope of relevant national laws and regulations, and thus, demonstrates the difference of opinion with the Western states regarding cyber security. 4. Universal Norms for Cyberspace Governance: Critical Issues and Prospects 4-1. Difference in Basic Understanding on Universal Norms Debates surrounding the creation of universal norms to regulate cyberspace are mainly concerned with the difference in basic understanding of cyberspace, with one side identifying cyberspace as part of the global commons and insisting on the free, unrestricted flow of information, but the other side considering cyberspace to be a part of sovereign state territory that government has the responsibility to regulate. This same difference arises in their fundamental views on universal norms governing cyberspace. China and Russia argue that increasing cyber threats are a result of the absence of universal norms regulating cyberspace, and to address 76

85 Cyberspace Governance this, binding international law should be formed to govern cyber operations. In opposition to this, the U.S. and European countries raise concerns that the formation of a new international law would undermine the existing free and open model of Internet governance. The two sides both have separate approaches to universal norms dealing with cybercrime and cyber security, and their interpretations of the relevant international laws also differ. Western countries refer to the existing law of war and international humanitarian law to address security threats arising from the cyber domain. They believe that expanding the Convention on Cybercrime and applying it to the wider global community will lead to stronger international cooperation, enhance coercive enforcement of the criminal laws in each country, lead to a safer cyberspace, and ultimately, protect them from military provocations as well. On the other hand, China and Russia maintain that a new set of international laws, such as a military treaty, is required, and they reject the idea of applying the existing Convention on a broader scale Issue of State Responsibility Over the last few years, cybercrime has moved beyond simple hacking and DDoS attacks to malicious activities that have even affected government facilities, incurring enormous amounts of economic and social damage. As shown by the cyber-attacks in Estonia, Georgia, the U.S., and Korea, there are now frequent cyber offenses that are suspected of being state-sponsored. Currently, these cyber operations do not qualify as armed attacks or armed conflict prohibited by existing international law, and failure to expand the scope of or strengthen the Convention on Cybercrime could create a legal vacuum in cyberspace. If this happens, the principle of state responsibility would be the only way to address the situation. When applying this principle, whether or not the conduct is attributable to the state as well as the state s due diligence for individual conduct would be the key questions to be addressed. Unlike traditional armed conflict, cyber-attacks as asymmetric warfare strategies try to hide or disguise themselves, making it difficult to identify the origin of the attacks. In order to call on an aggressor state to take responsibility for an attack, the victim state must be able to identify the attacker that has caused it harm, but the anonymity and simultaneity of cyberspace prevent the victim from making this identification. The computers and servers that paralyzed Korean and U.S. information systems in early July 2009 were mobilized from throughout the world, and it took three months just to trace them. If a certain cyber-attack uses 77

86 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 servers located in a third-party country, and that country refuses to cooperate with the international criminal investigation, the victim state might arbitrarily launch a counterattack to infiltrate the servers in that third-party country and check the records, which would spark yet another international dispute. Many information and technology experts presume that nation-states have been indirectly involved in committing cyber-attacks, as witnessed in the cases of Estonia (2007), Georgia (2008), and the U.S. and Korea (2009). The countries in question, however, deny any involvement. In these cases, the customary international law requires a state to prevent these attacks as part of its due diligence, and if in fact crime were perpetrated against a state, the state is obliged to take measures in response to ensure that it does not happen again. However, even in these cases, countries affected by cyber-attacks would need to prove that the country to which the attacker belongs is aware of the aggression committed by its citizen. It would also need to provide physical evidence of the state s involvement Creation of Comprehensive Universal Instruments and Governing Body The challenges posed by these cyber security issues, including cybercrime, are so grave that they can no longer be handled at the national level. Thus, calls to create universal norms and governing bodies to comprehensively regulate cyberspace are gathering support. As mentioned earlier, current discussions on the universal norms touch upon all aspects of cyberspace, but when it comes to actually forming the norms, it will be difficult to create the universal instruments that encompass all cyberspace issues. Therefore, the discussions on this issue will eventually focus on two major areas: cybercrime and cyber security. This is because these two areas are fundamentally different, with different actors as well as different subject matter. Should the universal instruments be created within the UN framework, the scope of applicability is likely to be expanded for both areas, and the norms would be able to fill up the legal vacuum in cyberspace. The idea of a comprehensive governing body has been under discussion ever since the world was victim to the DDoS cyber terror attacks between 2007 and International and regional organizations, such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), OECD, NATO, and APEC, have been working to create such bodies, but their efforts have been sporadic. Meanwhile, the Third Conference on Cyberspace, which was held in Seoul, was significant as a global forum dealing with comprehensive issues related to 78

87 Cyberspace Governance cyber-space as well as universal norms and governance. Particularly, while the first and second Conferences in London and Hungary, respectively, were European-based and focused on human rights and the freedom of expression, the Seoul Conference in 2013 made an attempt to address the gap between the Western states and the non-western states regarding principles within cyberspace and the issue of creating the governing norms. The Seoul Framework adopted at the Seoul Conference presented measures to transform the outcomes of the two previous conferences into tangible progress. The Conference embraced the basic principles that have been discussed at the UN and regional organizations so far. Under the main theme, Global Prosperity through an Open and Secure Cyberspace, the Seoul Conference touched on wide-ranging issues regarding cyberspace, such as cyber security, cybercrime, and international security, in addition to introducing a new agenda that includes the utilization of cyberspace for economic growth and development, social and cultural benefits, and capacity building. The Conference thus offered a comprehensive guideline for establishing the related governing instruments. 5. Policy Considerations 5-1. Leading the Global Discussion on Cyber Governance The Seoul Conference on Cyberspace was of great political significance in that Korea took the lead by emphasizing the least common denominator among states in discussions on the global governance of cyberspace while also encouraging the participation of both developing as well as advanced countries. Increasing and diverse bilateral, regional, and multilateral talks on a range of cyberspace-related issues are expected to be conducted. Thus, Korea will need to make consistent efforts to lead these discussions. The fact that a sharp divide exists between Western states and non-western states on the issue of cyberspace governance presents opportunities for middle powers to play an essential role. In this sense, Korea needs to recognize the issue as a global agenda on which it can provide leadership Strengthening the Roles of Multi-stakeholders and Expanding Cooperation Cyberspace is an area where multi-stakeholders, such as private sector and non-state actors, play an important role through their actions and participation. So, bolstering cooperative networks with these groups will be essential. Internet governance is currently being shaped by only a handful of international 79

88 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 and private organizations, including the International Telecommunication Union (TIU), the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), and the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), and these organizations exercise much greater influence over cyberspace than do most organizations in other fields. Determining the authority and roles of these organizations is another issue on which the two major camps are in conflict. That said, in Korea, the role of multi-stakeholders as well as public-private cooperation seem to lack systematic efficiency in responding to cyber-related issues and in shaping global governance. Korea will need to improve in these areas. In this respect, the Seoul Conference on Cyberspace 2013 offered a timely opportunity for Korea to outline its role, together with 87 countries and 18 international and private organizations. Also, the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference, scheduled to be held in October 2014, in Busan, will provide a venue for government delegations from 193 countries as well as experts from international organizations, corporations, and institutions to exchange views on a range of cyber-related issues Increasing Cyber Defense Capacity and Pursuing Technical/ Information Cooperation among States Korea is a highly cyber-dependent nation, and yet, it has relatively weak public-private networks for dealing with security issues and poor cooperation, and thus, its cyber defense capability is lacking. This has been proven true by numerous DDoS attacks in the past, and such attacks may hit the country again, either directly or by an attack routed through domestic systems. Cyber security requires early monitoring of data and prompt responses, so it is necessary for the Korean government to exchange information and cooperation on technical issues with major countries at both bilateral and multilateral levels in order to reinforce its asymmetric power Improving the Domestic Cyber Regime in Accordance with Expansion of Global Norms Although it is unlikely that effective and universal global or regional norms for cyberspace will emerge in the near future, given the characteristics of cyber security, members joining the Convention on Cybercrime are expected to grow, while discussions on the issue of creating universal norms will also flourish. Thus, areas will emerge where Korea s related technologies, local policies, laws, and institutions are not in accord with the universal norms and guidelines, such as the standard for regulatory criteria for international cooperation. Also, the UN 80

89 Cyberspace Governance resolutions and the Convention on Cybercrime could be transformed into new forms, so Korea needs to monitor policies and trends in major countries and take domestic measures in preparation for such changes. In the meantime, since most of the 51 member states of the Convention have made reservations to certain mandatory clauses requiring the adoption of domestic legislation to deal with cybercrime and international cooperation, Korea should also review the reservations made by major countries and examine its domestic policies, laws, and institutions in preparation for the accession. 81

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91 주요국제문제분석 중국 대만관계 중국 대만관계 : 양안 ECFA 의정치경제적시사점 * 윤근노 ** 1 문제제기개혁 개방과정에서안정되고평화로운주변국제환경을필요로하는중국은대만과일국양제 ( 一國兩制 ) 에기반을둔평화통일정책을추진함으로써양안간의교류협력에변화를보이고있음. - 양안관계는국력의상대적우위, 국제지위의변화, 이념과체제의상이성, 경제발전수준과산업구조등많은부분에있어상호대립적이면서도상호보완적인관계임. 목 차 1. 문제제기 2. 양안경제협력추진의정치경제적배경 3. 양안 ECFA의주요내용과전망 4. 한국의고려사항 양안관계에서과거대만독립과관련한일련의과정상쟁점은주도권과정통성을누가가지는가에대한해석과갈등인동시에양안관계의구조적특성상대외적정책요인이여전히영향력을지님. - 양안관계의안정과변화에영향을미치는요인은다양하며, 대외적요인으로대만문제에대한미 중간의기본적인식차이를비롯하여중 일관계에있어서도대만이가지는지정학적요소와역사적요인은동아시아에서민감한국제적현안임. - 국내적요인은대만의법적지위와관련하여 하나의중국 에대한입장으로, 하나의중국틀을유지하는것에대한 92공식 1) 의수용을통한관계진전을모색하고있음. 1) 92 공식 ( 九二共識, 1992 Consensus) 은양안관계를설명하는중요한개념으로, 양안간상호체제에대한해석틀 ( 一個中國, 各自表述 ) 을의미함. 양안관계에서하나의중국원칙에따라 오직하나의중국 (only one China) 이라는개념에동의하나, 그해석에있어서는달리함. 각각의정부가유일한 * 발표 ** 객원교수 83

92 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 대만은중국의지역경제통합추진에따른대만경제의경쟁력상실방지및양안관계의정상화를위해중국과의경제를중심으로한협력의제도화필요성을느껴 중국의지역경제통합추진으로인한대만경제의경쟁력상실을방지하고양안관계의정상화를위하여, 중국과의경제를중심으로한협력의제도화필요성을대만이제기하게됨. - 중국과대만은동아시아지역에서국가이익과상호간공동인식의존재라는측면에서한반도에도정치 경제적으로시사하는바가큼. 2 양안경제협력추진의정치경제적배경 가. 정치적배경과교류제도화양안간교류협력의제도화를추진하는과정에서 1990년 11월대만이해협교류기금회 ( 海峽交流基金會, Straits Exchange Foundation; 해기회 ) 를, 중국은같은해 12월해협양안관계협회 ( 海峽兩岸關係協會, Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits; 해협회 ) 를설립하여중재기구로활용함. 2) 양안관계는정치적긴장관계가고조됨에도불구하고 2001년중국, 2002년대만이국제무역기구 (WTO) 에가입하였으며, 제도적인장치와경제적요인으로투자와무역은높은성장세 (< 표 1> 참조 ) 를유지하게됨 년발표된 중화인민공화국대만동포투자보호법 의경우처럼적극적인대만기업우대정책으로인하여대만의대중무역 투자가크게확대되는시기인동시에대만의경제종속이나산업공동화등에대한우려가현실화되는시기임 년리덩휘 ( 李登輝 ) 총통의방미와 대만과중국은별개국 합법정부라는고유의해석에서출발, 즉 1992 년중국의 해협양안관계협회 ( 해협회 ) 와대만의 해협교류기금회 ( 해기회 ) 의접촉에서하나의중국원칙에는동의하고, 하나의중국에대한것은각자의해석에맡긴다는양안간의공감대를말함. 2) 해기회 와 해협회 는중국과대만상호간정부를인정하지않는현실에서우회적인협의기구로서민간기구성격을나타내고있지만, 실제대만행정원소속의대륙판공처와중국국무원소속의대만판공처에서주도하는반관반민 ( 半官半民 ) 의성격을지님. 84

93 중국 대만관계 가 라는양국론 ( 兩國論 ) 주장, 그리고 2000년대만의독립을주장하는민진당천수이비엔 ( 陳水扁 ) 의총통당선등정치적긴장관계가고조됨 년 3월중국은 반국가분열법( 反國家分裂法, Anti- Secession) 을통과시키면서대만의독립시도에대해무력을동원할수있음을명시하였으며. 이러한갈등하에서소위 제3 차국공합작 이라표현되는후진타오 ( 胡錦濤 ) 주석과국민당렌쟌 ( 連戰 ) 주석의회동이이루어짐. - 대만은중국과의경제협력에대한규제를강화하면서, 중국투자를제한하고주변동남아지역으로투자를유도하기위한정책을실시함. 3) < 표 1> 대만의대중국투자현황 > ( 단위 : 백만달러, %) 시기 대외투자총액 대중국투자총액 대중국투자비중 ,176 2, ,093 6, ,667 7, ,323 6, ,454 6, ,958 7, ,441 9, ,158 10, ,148 7, ,440 14, ,080 14, ,890 12, < 출처 > 대만재정부통계처, 產業經濟統計簡訊 재구성 2008 년글로벌금융위기에따른급격한경기침체로대만의새로 3) 대표적인제한정책으로자본금에따른투자상한선설정인데, 자본금 50 억대만 (NT) 달러미만의기업은순자산의 40%, 50 억 100 억대만달러미만의기업은 30%, 100 억대만달러이상의기업은 20% 이상의투자를금지함. 중국과의통일도, 대만의독립도, 양안간무력충돌도하지않겠다는 신 3 불 ( 不統, 不獨, 不武 ) 원칙을표방하고, 92 공식 에기초하여민감한독립, 통일논의보다는경제교류에주력할것임을표명 85

94 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 운성장동력이필요한상황에서국민당의마잉주 ( 馬英九 ) 총통이당선되면서정치적긴장완화와교류확대를강조하고중요동맹국인미국과함께중요경제파트너로중국과의협력을강조함. - 중국과의통일도, 대만의독립도, 양안간무력충돌도하지않겠다는 신3불 ( 不統, 不獨, 不武 ) 원칙을표방하고, 92공식 에기초하여민감한독립, 통일논의보다는경제교류에주력할것임을표명함. - 특히마잉주하의국민당은대외관계에서의소모적경쟁을지양하고경제 문화교류정상화, 그리고국제기구가입등에협조를제안함. 2008년 6월의베이징회담은새로운양안관계로규정할만큼양안에대한기존입장을탈피하고, 3통을포함한상호방문과교류등여러분야에서합의를도출함. 동아시아역내에서 FTA 를통해양자간경제및지역통합을추진하는중국의경제정책은대외무역의존도가높은대만경제의대외경쟁력을약화시켜 2012년 1월 14일실시된대만총통선거에서마잉주정부가민진당차이잉원 ( 蔡英文 ) 후보를누르고재집권에성공함. 선거과정에서경제나복지분야등정책의차별성을갖지못한채양안관계를놓고안정론과대만주권론으로대립하며입장차만부각됨. - 총통선거와입법위원선거에서국민당의재승리는안정론이라는핵심전략, 국내외적인안정기조와금융위기속에서의양안관계발전에대한반영이라고할수있음. - 양안관계불안에대한우려가확산되면서예상보다큰표차를보여주었으며, 연임에성공한마잉주정부는양안관계발전을지속적으로추진함과동시에경제적현안으로빈부격차및경제개혁을추진하며, 10년내환태평양경제동반자협정 (TPP) 가입을추진하겠다고밝힘 년 2월마잉주총통은양안간교류확대및심화등양안정책 3대중점과 5대방향을제시함. 나. 경제적배경과 ECFA 체결동아시아역내에서자유무역협정 (FTA) 을통해양자간경제및지역통합을추진하는중국의경제정책은대외무역의존도가높은대만경제의대외경쟁력을약화시킴. 86

95 중국 대만관계 -2008년세계금융위기영향이후아시아국가들은지역경제통합으로경제협력강화와경제이익을상호확대하려하고있으며, 중국은중화경제권경제통합의연장선상에서접근함 년 9월한국과아세안, 2010년 1월중국과아세안간의 FTA가전면발효하여양자간무역품목에서 90% 의관세가철폐됨. 대만은양안의경제협력기본협정 ( 經濟合作架構協定, ECFA: Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement) 체결을향후대외경제정책의교두보로상정하는동시에, 이로써양안관계의정치적안정을추구함. - 대만은 ECFA 추진으로동아시아역내에서의고립을탈피하고, 양안간의무역관계를정상화할수있으며, 향후중국시장에서경쟁력을확보하고, 대만무역투자의국제화를촉진코자함. - 즉, 대만은중국내수시장선점에유리하며, 대중국수출의증대와함께지리적으로도동북아와동남아의중간에위치하여대외무역에유리함. 중국과대만양안은 2010년 6월 29일북경에서 ECFA 체결에서명하며, 차이완 (Chiwan) 이라는새로운경제체제를구축함 년국민당마잉주집권이후대만경제회복과경제성장을추진하기위한대중국경제관계정상화정책으로 2009년 2월 포괄적경제협력협정 (CECA: Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement) 을발표함. 4) 대만은 ECFA 추진으로동아시아역내에서의고립탈피, 양안간의무역관계정상화, 향후중국시장에서의경쟁력확보, 그리고대만무역투자의국제화촉진을겨냥 4) 앞서 2003 년 6 월 29 일체결된중국과홍콩간의경제긴밀화협정 (CEPA: Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement) 처럼 CECA 가중국의특구처럼여겨지며, 대만지위에대한우려가제기됨. 실제 CEPA 의추진배경으로는두지역간무역과투자장벽철폐로지역경제협력에순응하고, 개혁 개방심화필요성에의함. 원칙적으로홍콩기본법, WTO 회원간의관계, 그리고호혜공영, 상호보완, 공동번영을준수하며, 2015 년서비스 무역자유화를실현한다는목표이며, CEPA 의경제효과로외국투자기업과중국기업의홍콩투자를촉진하며, 자유여행계획으로경제효과가나타남. 즉중국 홍콩간의 CEPA 와내용은유사하나형식적인면에서협정을의미하는용어로 Arrangement 는정당혹은중앙정부와지방정부간협정을의미하며, Agreement 는의회의비준절차로발효규정, 종료조항등국가간의정식협정을의미함. 87

96 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 - 종속적명칭의상징성으로인해대만내우려와민진당의비판으로명칭변경이있었으며, 국민당의 ECFA에대하여중국은 후진타오 6개의견 ( 胡六點 ) 5) 을통해긍정적반응에따라진행됨 년 5월우보슝 ( 吳伯雄 ) 국민당주석이북경을방문하여 ECFA에합의하며, 6개월의기간동안실무협상과준비회의를거쳐제5차양안회담에서중국해협회천윈린 ( 陳雲林 ) 회장과대만해기회장빙쿤 ( 江丙坤 ) 이사장이서명, 체결함. - 양안의특수한정치경제적상황이반영되어대만의경제적실리와중국의영향력확대라는 FTA와 CEPA의절충적형태인 ECFA는 2011년 1월공식발효되었으며, 추후협상을통해 FTA를완성하는기본협정의성격을가짐. 대만의새로운성장동력확보와국제적고립탈피등경제적필요성과중국의무역 서비스투자확대를통해대만에대한영향력을높이고장기적으로대만과의정치적통합을도모하려는전략적고려가양안관계에긍정적으로작용함. - 지난 11월 4일난징에서개막된양안기업인대표회의에서위정성 ( 兪正聲 ) 전국정협주석과쩡페이옌 ( 曾培炎 ) 이사장은양안의공정하고투명한투자환경바탕위에서상호윈윈 (win-win) 을, 대만샤오완창 ( 蕭万長 ) 이사장은서비스 무역과분쟁해결협의이후양안통화결제기제확대를강조함. 대만의새로운성장동력확보와국제적고립탈피등경제적필요성과중국의무역 서비스투자확대를통한대만에대한영향력확대및장기적인대만과의정치적통합도모라는전략적고려가양안관계에긍정적으로작용 5) 대만동포에게보내는글 ( 告台灣同胞書 ) 발표 30 주년기념좌담회에서후진타오는 양안관계의평화적발전을서로협력하고추진하여같은마음으로중화민족의위대한부흥을실현하자 라는연설에서첫째, 하나의중국엄수와정치적신뢰증진 ( 恪守一個中國, 增進政治互信 ), 둘째경제적합작추진과공동의발전촉진 ( 推進經濟合作, 促進共同發展 ), 셋째중화문화선양과정신적유대강화 ( 弘揚中華文化, 加强精神紐帶 ), 넷째인적왕래강화와교류확대 ( 加强人員往來, 擴大各界交流 ), 다섯째국가주권수호와외교적사무협상 ( 維護國家主權, 協商涉外事務 ), 마지막으로적대적상황종결과평화적협의로의해결 ( 結束敵對狀態, 達成和平協議 ) 이라는양안정책기본골격인 6 개의견 ( 胡六点 ) 을발표함. 88

97 중국 대만관계 3 양안 ECFA의주요내용과전망가. ECFA 의주요내용과 EHP ECFA는양안간관세인하협정으로대만에유리한제품에대한관세인하를선행하고, 향후산업발전동향을고려하여단계적관세인하를통한양안경제협력을촉진하고자함. 추후본격적인협상을규정하고있는기본협정성격을띠고있으며, ECFA 의효과를조기에실현하기위해주요공산품과서비스분야에대하여조기수확프로그램 (EHP: Early Harvest Program) 이포함돼있음. ECFA 협정문은간단한형식이지만, 상품 서비스 투자등양안간교역대부분을적용대상으로하는포괄적 FTA 의성격을지니며, 특히대만측요구로 EHP 라는우선개방품목이협상내용에포함된것이가장큰특징이며핵심 ECFA 협정문의구성은서언과 5개장, 16개조, 5개의부속서로구성됨. - 서언, 1장총칙, 2장무역및투자, 3장경제협력등향후확대 FTA 협상에서다루게될기본의제를명시하고있으며, 4장 EHP 관련상품무역및서비스무역조기자유화내용을서술하고있음. - 그밖에 5장기타에서분쟁해결, 집행기구, 후속협의등과부속서에상품무역 EHP 리스트와관세율, 임시원산지규정, 세이프가드조치등을포함함. ECFA 협정문은간단한형식이지만, 상품 서비스 투자등양안간교역대부분을적용대상으로하는포괄적 FTA의성격을지님. 특히대만측요구로 EHP라는우선개방품목이협상내용에포함된것이가장큰특징이며핵심임. - 협정문과시장개방분야를명기한양허안으로구성되는것이일반적인국제통상협정이며, ECFA와같은기본협정은구체적시장개방리스트를포함하지않음에도불구하고양안간의조기수확리스트가포함됨. - 특히조기수확분야의경제적효과를비교하면중국보다는대만쪽에유리하며, 이는중국측의정치적의도에의한경제적양보성격이강하다고평가됨. - 구체적으로양안간조기수확리스트품목수는석유화학, 방직, 기계, 운수산업등대만이 267개, 중국이 539개상품을 89

98 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 개방하는비대칭적형태를보여주며, 양안조기수확항목에포함된금액역시 억달러대 28.58억달러로차이가남. 실질및평균관세삭감율을반영하면, 중국측이 2.5~ 5% 삭감효과인데비해대만측은 10~15% 삭감효과를나타냄. ECFA 후속협정을통하여양안투자보장과촉진협정을체결했는데, 경제협력사항으로산업협력, 세관협력, 양안통상단체사무기관상호설립으로분류하여진행돼 또한, 상품분야이외에보험, 은행, 증권등금융서비스와영화, 의료, 컴퓨터, 연구개발서비스등 11개서비스분야에서 EHP를시행하고있음. - 서비스업조기수확리스트협상결과에따르면, 중국측은회계감사, 컴퓨터, 엔지니어링, 전문설계, 영화, 의료서비스업을허가했으며, 대만측은전시, 중국영화, 중개, 스포츠, 항공운송서비스업등을허가함. - 일례로대만독자의료기관이상하이에설립되었으며, 대만영화역시중국방송총국심사비준을거쳐 14편이상영됨. 금융서비스업의경우대만의토지은행, 합작금고, 제일은행등이중국지점을개설하였으며, 중국의중국은행, 교통은행이대만지점을설립하였음. - ECFA의 EHP 시행으로대만의대중국수출액대비조기수확품목수출액은 2011년 억달러대비 억달러, 2012년 억달러대비 억달러, 그리고 2013년 1월에서 7월까지 억달러대비 억달러로증가추세에있음. 나. ECFA 후속협정과양안관계전망 2012년 8월대만에서 ECFA 제11조구조배치규정에의거, 후속협정을통하여양안투자보장과촉진협정을체결함. 경제협력사항으로산업협력, 세관협력, 양안통상단체사무기관상호설립으로분류하여진행됨. - 투자보장과관련하여직접투자자와간접투자를포함하여투자자정의와투자법규의투명화를명시하고무력충돌, 긴급상황시손실보상, 인신자유에있어투자자의안전보장을주요내용으로하고있음. - 양안세관은정보자료교환을통해밀수를방지하고우량기업 90

99 중국 대만관계 에대한상호인증을통해통관절차의간소화와비용절감등상품시장경쟁력을제고하고자협조함. 2013년 6월상하이에서개최된양안 9차회담에서서비스 무역협정체결로양안서비스산업개방과함께연말까지상품무역과분쟁해결협정을마무리하는것으로예정함. - 양안서비스 무역협정에서중국이허가한전자비즈니스, 금융, 공공건설, 도서, 온라인게임등 80개항목은홍콩 CEPA 와동등하거나규모가큼. 또한, 양안은주식보유량제고, 서비스업무영역의확대, 비준절차의간소화등에합의함. 중국의 18대보고를중심으로대만정책방침을살펴보면, 과학발전관의첫째요건으로발전이며양안관계의평화발전이라는목표하에서양안의정치경제영역의심화를추진하고자함. - 당대회보고서에 92공식 과 하나의중국, 그리고 양안관계평화발전중요사상의전면실시 를정식으로기록함. 통일되지않은특수상황 의양안관계로정의하였듯이향후통일에접근하기위한순차적인접근을상정하고있음. - 시진핑시기중국은국내문제와미국관계등균형과안정에집중하며, 대만정책은큰변화없이 선경제, 후정치 의방식을유지할것으로보임. - 대만역시통일문제에서현상황유지에대한여론을반영하며, 양안관계를국가간의관계보다는특별관계로규정하여중국을자극하지않고있음. 이러한전략적접근으로대만은국제적지위문제에대하여일정정도대륙으로부터양보를받아내기도하였음. 6) 향후양안관계변수로대만의정치적상황에대한고려가필요한데, 4 년주기의정치적변화가능성과대만민진당의 92 공식 에대한수용여부에따라서양안관계심화여부가상당한영향을받게될듯 또한향후양안관계변수로대만의정치적상황에대한고려가필요한데, 4년주기의정치적변화가능성과대만민진당의 92 공식 에대한수용여부에따라서양안관계심화여부가상당한영향을받게될것임. 6) 대만은외교적고립을피하기위한차선책으로국제기구에옵서버로가입하는것을추진해오고있으며, 2009 년세계보건기구 (WHO) 에이어, 2013 년 9 월국제민간항공기구 (ICAO) 에옵서버로참여함. 91

100 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 양안간 정냉경열 ( 政冷經熱 ) 사례처럼남북관계가정부주도의남북경협에서탈피하여민간주도의교류협력으로전환할필요가있으며, 이러한측면에서중국의역할을활용하는것이유용 < 표 2> 양안회담주요합의내용 구분개최지양안회담주요합의내용 1 차 ~14 2 차 ~7. 3 차 ~29 베이징 타이베이 난징 양안항공중국 5 개, 대만 8 개직항개설 중국인의대만관광일일허용인원확대되고, 최장 10 일체류허용 해운직항운항허용및양안해운사업취득소득에대한세금면제, 중국 63개항구, 대만 11개항구개방과우편서신, 소포, 택배왕래 식품안전사고발생시쌍방간즉시통보및긴급협상으로가해자에대한수습책임독촉과피해자권익보호 은행, 증권, 보험등에대한공동금융감독시스템구축과점진적인상호간화폐결제시스템구축 중국 6 개공항추가개방으로총 27 개개방 주요범죄수사공조체계구축및협력 4 차 ~25 타이종 농산물검역, 양안어선선원협력, 중과세면제합의 5 차 ~30 충칭 양안경제협력기본협정 (ECFA) 체결합의 지적재산권보호 6차 의학위생협력타이베이 ~22 투자보장 7 차 ~21 텐진 원자력안전 투자, 산업협력 8차 ~10 9차 ~22 타이베이 ECFA 후속협정 ( 신변보장등양안투자보장협정 ) 상하이 서비스 무역협정 ( 서비스산업개방 ) 통신, 병원, 관광, 운송, 금융등 < 출처 > 대만해협교류기금회 ( 회담총람재구성 4 한국의고려사항 가. 경제교류협력의제도화와신기능주의통합 ECFA로인하여양안의교류협력은제도화단계로접어들었으며, 지속적협상과제도화, 그리고긍정적인대만여론으로인하여향후탄력을받을것임. 경제적교류확대와상호의존심화는공동이익을유발시키고, 상호신뢰와정치안보분야의협력으로이어지는신기능주의적접근이남북관계에서도필요함. 92

101 중국 대만관계 -ECFA는대만경제발전과대만의국제생존공간의확대에대한가시적인효과를보여주고있으며, 양안관계개선을통한장기적인통일접근이라는차원에서중국이원하는방향임. - 남북관계에있어경제 사회분야의교류협력보다정부간정치교류가활발하며, 상호이익과신뢰형성이부족한상태에서관 ( 官 ) 주도로진행되고있음. 양안간 정냉경열 ( 政冷經熱 ) 사례처럼남북관계가정부주도의남북경협에서탈피하여민간주도의교류협력으로전환할필요가있으며, 이러한측면에서중국의역할을활용하는것이유용할것임. - 나아가북한의인식변화와민족적동질성회복을위한장기적인접근차원에서남 북한구성원의상호이익에대한경제논의와문화적접근이필요함. 나. 균형적인대중화권통상전략과중국내수시장선점모색 한국과대만이유사한대중국수출구조로되어있는현실에서양안간 ECFA에따른한국의경쟁력약화우려가제기되고있지만, 한국은대중화권교역이라는큰틀에서접근이필요함 년한국수출은중화권 108억달러, 미국 180억달러, 일본 116억달러에서, 한국무역협회 2012년기준으로각각 1,817억달러, 585억, 387억달러로중화권은한국의최대교역대상지역이되었음. 중화권내비중에서올해 9월기준대중국수출이 1,068억달러를차지하고있지만, 여전히홍콩과대만에대한수출도증가함. 향후중국중심통상전략에서벗어나균형적인대중화권통상전략을마련하여야함. 한 중 FTA 추진과정에서한국은일괄타결방식으로수준높은협상을선호하고있으나, 중국측은점진적방식을선호하고있는상황에서 ECFA처럼다양한접근방안을검토할필요가있음. - 점진적방식은중 아세안, 한 아세안 FTA 등이해당하는데, ECFA 진행과정을추적연구하며상품, 서비스, 투자등순차적협상방식으로개방의충격완화효과를기대하는것이필요함. 또한, 가공무역밀집지역이나민감산업분야에서선행시험조치 (pilot basis) 가능성협의를고려하는것이바람직함. 한 중간 FTA 에서서비스산업의격차나가공무역비중등의고려도필요하며, 농수산분야와제조업의피해를최소화해야하지만, 더욱중요한것은중국내수시장을선점하는접근이필요 93

102 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 - 상품분류체계인 HS(Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System) 기준으로한 중간코드의공동개정과세분화등양국간산업보호및수출입규제와지원의목적에부합하고, 공동운영시마찰을최소화시키는작업이필요함. - 한 중간 FTA에서서비스산업의격차나가공무역비중등의고려도필요하며, 농수산분야와제조업의피해를최소화해야하지만, 더욱중요한것은중국내수시장을선점하는접근이어야함. 94

103 Cross-Strait Relations Cross-Strait Relations: Political and Economic Implications of the ECFA between China and Taiwan YOON Keun-no Visiting Professor 1. Issues C hanges have been witnessed in cooperation and exchange between the People s Republic of China (PRC or China) and the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) since China began efforts for peaceful reunification under the constitutional principle of one country and two systems, efforts which resulted partly from China s need for external stability in the course of its pursuance of reform and opening up policies. Though the relationship between China and Taiwan is in many ways contradictory mainly due to relative discrepancies in levels of national power and international status, as well as differences in ideology and political systems, and economic development and industrial structures, the relationship does at the same time possess some complimentary aspects. In the early years of the separation of the ROC from mainland China, the two sides continued to clash over different interpretations of their relations and both competed to be the legitimate government of China. In addition, the foreign policies of other countries have had a significant impact on their relationship. Multiple variables have impacted the stability of, and led to changes in, cross-strait relations. The United States and the PRC possess different attitudes toward Taiwan while the geopolitical and historical elements of the ROC arouse sensitive international issues in East Asia, particularly in Sino-Japanese relations. As for the legal and political status of Taiwan, the PRC and ROC have agreed to pursue the principle of the 1992 Consensus, 1) in which both sides recognize 1) The 1992 Consensus is an important concept in describing cross-strait relations and offers a vital basis for interpreting their relations. According to the Consensus, both sides recognize there is 95

104 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 there is only one China based on which they explore ways to develop their relations. In the meantime, when China was hoping to better integrate distinct regions economically, in particular Taiwan to prevent it from lagging behind, Taiwan proposed an institutionalized economic cooperation scheme with mainland China to improve bilateral relations. The relationship between the PRC and the ROC has many political and economic implications on the Korean peninsula in that the two sides share mutually recognized common interests. 2. Political and Economic Background of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) A. Political Background and Institutionalization of Cross-Strait Exchanges In the course of institutionalizing cross-strait cooperation and exchange, the ROC government created the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) in November 1990, and the following month, the PRC responded by setting up the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) as a means of engaging in cooperation dialogues. 2) Despite escalating political tensions between the two sides, the PRC joined the WTO in 2001, the ROC in 2002, and investment and trade maintained high growth thanks to various institutional apparatuses and economic drivers (Table 1). The Law of the People s Republic of China on the Protection of Investment of Taiwan Compatriots was enacted in 1994 and other similar measures gave significant preference to Taiwanese companies seeking to increase trade and investment flows into China. At the same time, there were concerns over deepening only one China i.e., both mainland China and Taiwan agree that they belong to the same China, but are free to interpret the meaning of that one China according to their own individual definition. Of course, each side argues that they are the sole legitimate representative of the sovereignty of China. The 1992 Consensus was the outcome of a 1992 meeting between the mainland China-based Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) and the Taiwan-based Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF). 2) The SEF and the ARATS are technically private organizations that were created by Taiwan and China, respectively, to effect negotiations without compromising each government s position of denying the other side s legitimacy. In reality, the nature of these two organizations is semi-government and semi-private as the SEF is controlled by the Mainland Affairs Council of the Executive Yuan, and the ARATS by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council. 96

105 Cross-Strait Relations economic dependence on mainland China as well as the industrial hollowing-out of Taiwan. ROC President Lee Tung-hui visited the United States in 1999 and proposed a two-state theory in which both the ROC and the PRC would acknowledge that they are two separate countries. In 2000, Chen Shui-bian, chairman of the Democratic Progressive Party, who is strongly pro-taiwan independence, was elected president of the ROC, which aggravated political tension with mainland China. China s parliament, the National People s Congress (NPC), passed an Anti- Secession Law in March 2005 formalizing the use of military action as a response option in the case of a declaration of independence in Taiwan. However, a dramatic overture was made in the same year, culminating in a meeting between Hu Jintao, president of the PRC, and then-kmt Chairman Lien Chan. Still, Taiwan strengthened its regulations on economic cooperation with mainland China, limiting investment into China, and implemented measures to divert investment flows to Southeast Asian countries. 3) The global financial crisis in 2008 and the subsequent domestic economic downturn in Taiwan spurred the need for new growth engines in Taiwan. In this challenging environment, the newly elected President Ma Ying-jeou stressed mitigation of political tension and expansion of contact with mainland China. In particular, he emphasized cooperation with the PRC as an important economic partner as well as cooperation with its major ally, the United States. He championed a new three-no s policy toward cross-strait relations that is, no unification, no independence, and no use of force that based economic exchange with the PRC on the 1992 Consensus rather than on the discussion of sensitive independence or reunification matters. The Kuomintang (KMT or Nationalist Party) led by President Ma Ying-jeou avoided unhealthy bickering in external relations and instead, proposed normalization in economic and cultural exchange and sought the PRC s cooperation in the ROC s 3) One example is the investment ceiling tied to capital stock. Companies with capital of lower than 5 billion Taiwanese dollars are prohibited from making investment in China exceeding 40% of its net asset. Companies estimated to have capital of 5 to 10 billion Taiwanese dollars cannot make investment exceeding 30% of its net asset and those having more than 10 billion not more than 20% of its capital. 97

106 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 joining international organizations. The meeting between the SEF and the ARATS held in June 2008 in Beijing was a breakthrough in cross-strait relations. Both sides set aside differences in their claim of sovereignty and came to agreements in various areas of exchange, such as allowing visits to the other side and beginning negotiations on restoring the three links (transportation, commerce, and communications). On January 14, 2012, the Ma Ying-jeou administration maintained its power after winning reelection by defeating Tsai Ing-wen of the main opposition Democratic Progressive Party. During the presidential campaign, the two candidates differed in their economic and welfare policy pledges, one arguing the importance of stable cross-strait relations, and the other claiming that Taiwan should be recognized as a sovereign state. The victory of the Kuomintang in the presidential and legislative election reflected the public s hope for a stable relationship with mainland China and improved cross-strait relations in a situation of domestic economic downturn ignited by a global financial crisis. Concerns over shaky cross-strait relations led to extremely one-sided election results. The overwhelmingly re-elected Ma Ying-jeou administration announced that it would continue its China-friendly policies and pursue major economic reform to reduce the gap between the haves and have-nots. It also stated its intention to commence negotiations to accede to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). President Ma in February 2013 laid down three key strategies for improving and expanding cross-strait cooperation and exchange along with five policy directions. B. Economic Background and Conclusion of the ECFA The PRC s economic policy of pursuing Free Trade Agreements with other East Asian countries to achieve bilateral economic and regional integration weakened the economic competitiveness of the ROC which is highly dependent on external trade. Since the global financial crisis in 2008, Asian countries have been seeking to enhance economic cooperation and increase mutual benefits through regional economic integration, and China s approach is to integrate other countries economically, putting them under China s economic block. 98

107 Cross-Strait Relations Year Table 1. ROC investment in the PRC (Unit: USD 1 million, %) Total outbound investment Investment in the PRC Investment in the PRC (%) ,176 2, ,093 6, ,667 7, ,323 6, ,454 6, ,958 7, ,441 9, ,158 10, ,148 7, ,440 14, ,080 14, ,890 12, Source: Industry and Economic Statistics Newsletter, Department of Statistics, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic of China (edited) FTAs between Korea and ASEAN, and China and ASEAN went into effect in September 2009 and January 2010, respectively, removing tariffs on 90% of bilateral trade items. The ROC was motivated to conclude the ECFA with the PRC so that it could also sign similar agreements with other countries in the region and ultimately achieve political stability based on favorable cross-strait relations. With the signing of the ECFA, the ROC sought to avoid isolation in the East Asian region and normalize cross-strait relations. Furthermore, it hoped to secure competitiveness in the Chinese market in the future and induce greater inflow of trade and investment. Taiwan enjoys favorable conditions to benefit from first-mover advantages in venturing into the Chinese market and in this way can increase its exports. As it is located between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, it can also take advantage of its geographical location for external trades. The two sides concluded the ECFA on June 29, 2010 in Beijing, launching a new economic system described as Chiwan. 99

108 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 After Ma Ying-jeou s Kuomintang came to power in 2008, the leadership announced in February 2009 that it would pursue a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) with the PRC so as to revitalize the ROC s economy and boost economic advancement, and ultimately normalize relations with the PRC. 4) Concerns and criticisms were raised over the title of the pact in that it alludes to the subordinate nature of the Taiwanese economy to that of China. Thus the title of the pact was changed to the ECFA and positive momentum was created for negotiations after PRC leader Hu Jintao made six-points propositions 5) on cross-strait relations. KMT chairman Wu Po-hsiung made a visit to Beijing in May 2009 and laid down the framework for the first round of ECFA talks with his counterparts. Working-level negotiations and preparation for the signing continued for six months and the final agreement was signed by Chen Yunlin, the president of the ARATS, and Chiang Pin-kung, the chairman of Taiwan s SEF. The ECFA, an agreement considered as being a cross between the FTA and 4) As was the case with the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) concluded between China and Hong Kong on June 29, 2003, the CECA designates Taiwan as a special zone belonging to China, which led to concerns over the status of Taiwan. When the two parties negotiated the terms and conditions of the CEPA, they sought to remove trade and investment barriers to promote regional economic cooperation and to facilitate ongoing reform and opening-up endeavors. The CEPA provisions, in principle, are in line with the Hong Kong Basic Law, describe Hong Kong s relationship with WTO members, and uphold mutually-beneficial co-existence, mutual complementation and mutual prosperity, with the ultimate goal of liberalizing service and trade between the two parties by The CEPA resulted in increasing investment in Hong Kong on the parts of Chinese and foreign investors and additional economic benefits from the free movement of people. The content of the CECA is similar with that of the CEPA but the former pursues a formal pact between the two parties. That is, the term agreement is used in the CECA which requires parliamentary ratification and provisions for its effectuation and termination, instead of the term arrangement which can be concluded between political parties or between the central government and local municipalities. 5) Hu Jintao made six-points propositions to describe cross-strait relations in a speech titled Realizing a great rise of Chinese people by cooperating to achieve peaceful development of cross-strait relations, delivered at a ceremony commemorating the 30th anniversary of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan. Essentially, Hu s six-points are: (1) Firm adherence to the one China principle; (2) Strengthening of commercial ties (i.e. negotiating economic cooperation agreements); (3) Promotion of personnel exchanges; (4) Exploration of and emphasis on the common cultural links of the two sides; (5) Allowance of Taiwan s reasonable participation in global organizations; and (6) Negotiation of a peace agreement. 100

109 Cross-Strait Relations CEPA, went into effect in January 2011 and reflects the special political and economic situations of the ROC and the PRC. Aimed at providing economic benefits to Taiwan and expanding Chinese influence in the region, the ECFA is a framework agreement which will later be replaced with a free trade agreement through further negotiations. The ROC signed the pact in order to secure new growth drivers and lift itself out of isolation in the international arena, whereas China s goal was to wield a bigger influence over Taiwan through increase in trade and service investment in Taiwan, and to integrate Taiwan politically. The strategic considerations of the two sides eventually worked favorably for cross-strait relations. During the 2013 Zijinshan Summit for Entrepreneurs across the Taiwan Strait, held on November 4 in Nanjing, Yu Zhengsheng, chairman of the Chinese People s Political Consultative Conference, and Zeng Peiyan, president of the mainland-based Council of the Zijinshan Summit, agreed that the reform and opening up of the mainland would lead to new opportunities for cross-strait enterprises and create a more impartial and transparent investment environment for both sides. Vincent Siew, president of the Taiwan-based Council of the Zijinshan Summit, said he expected the cross-strait service trade pact to be brought into effect at an early date and with it accelerated fulfillment of agreements on goods trade, expedited dispute settlement, and further reinforcement of the cross-strait currency clearing mechanism. 3. Major Provisions of the ECFA and Future Prospects A. Major Provisions of the ECFA and EHP The ECFA is a preferential trade agreement to reduce tariffs between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Tariffs on Taiwanese goods will be lowered first, and considering future industrial development, tariffs on other items will be reduced in phases to promote economic cooperation and trade across the Taiwan Strait. The ECFA includes provisions stipulating full-fledged negotiations for wider economic pact. It also includes an early harvest program (EHP) on major industrial products and services to give preferential tariff cuts first. The ECFA consists of the Preamble, 5 Chapters, 16 Articles and 5 Annexes. The Preamble and Chapter 1 General Principles, Chapter 2 Trade and Investment, and Chapter 3 Economic Cooperation describe basic agenda to be addressed in upcoming FTA negotiations. Chapter 4 Early Harvest provides for initial import tariff cuts on goods and services. 101

110 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 Chapter 5 Other Provisions addresses dispute settlement, institutional arrangements and subsequent agreements, and is followed by the Annexes which contain the EHP list, tariff reduction arrangements, provisional rules of origin, and safeguard measures. The ECFA document is in a relatively simple format but its nature is that of a comprehensive FTA covering most cross-strait trade including goods, services and investment. In particular, it is notable that the early harvest list was included in the agreement at the request of the ROC. In general, international trade agreements include schedules of concessions. The ECFA does not include such detailed schedules of concession for market opening but does include the early harvest list of tariff concessions. The agreement is structured to benefit Taiwan more than mainland China when the tariff reductions described in the early harvest program are compared. This has been evaluated as China making economic concessions based on political calculations. The EHP covers 539 Taiwanese products and 267 mainland Chinese goods from the petrochemical, textile, machinery and transportation industries, etc. In addition to the different number of items subject to tariff cuts between the two sides, benefits estimated from the early harvest program are unbalanced, with Taiwan expected to enjoy benefits of US$13.8 billion, while mainland China would receive benefits estimated at US$2.86 billion. Considering actual and average tariff reduction rates, the effective tariff reduction rate for China is estimated at 2.5~5%, while its counterpart will see its tariffs go down by 10~15%. In addition to tariff reduction in products, the two sides agreed to open markets in 11 service sectors including financial services like insurance, banking, and securities, as well as in motion pictures, medicine, computer and R&D. The PRC will open the markets of auditing, computer, engineering, specialty design, motion pictures and medical services; whereas the ROC will offer wider access to exhibition, Chinese-language motion pictures, brokerage, sports and air transport services. For instance, the first wholly Taiwan-owned hospital opened in Shanghai and 14 Taiwanese movies screened in China after passing the deliberation process of the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT). In the financial sector, Toji Bank, Taiwan Cooperative Bank and First Bank opened branches in 102

111 Cross-Strait Relations China, and the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications set up branches in Taiwan. With the early harvest program embedded in the ECFA, Taiwan s export volume of early harvest items relative to the total export to China is on the rise recording US$17.67 billion out of billion in 2011, US$18.57 billion out of billion in 2012, and US$11.67 billion out of billion from January to July, B. Future Agreements and Prospects for Cross-Strait Relations According to Article 11 Institutional Arrangements of the ECFA, the Cross-Strait Bilateral Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement was signed in August 2012 in Taipei. Discussions were held in the separate areas of industrial cooperation and customs cooperation, and for the establishment of a joint secretariat between trade and commerce organizations of the PRC and ROC. In regards to investment protection, the Agreement defines investors both direct and indirect and obligates transparency in investment-related laws and regulations. In addition, it provides for compensation for the investor losses of one party in the event of an armed conflict, state of emergency or similar event taking place in the other party. The customs service authorities of mainland China and Taiwan will exchange information to prevent or intercept smuggling, and through mutual acknowledgement of top-ranking companies, will also streamline customs clearance processes and reduce costs to make commercial markets more competitive. In the ninth round of negotiations held in June 2013 in Shanghai, the two parties concluded the Service Trade Agreement on the opening of service sectors and agreed to pursue and finalize the Agreement on Goods Trade, and the Agreement on Dispute Settlement. Under the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement, China will open up 80 service sectors including electronics, financial services, public construction, publishing, online games, etc., and the deal is deemed to open the two sides service sectors to the same or greater degree as the CEPA signed between Hong Kong and China in The two sides also agreed on allowing greater stock ownership by investors of the other party, expanding service business areas, and streamlining the ratification process. Reports made at the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China state that China s Taiwan policy is designed to deepen cross-strait cooperation 103

112 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 and exchange in the political and economic arenas, and achieve the ultimate goal of ensuring peaceful improvement of cross-strait relations. The official report of the Congress, acknowledged and recorded in the minutes of the 1992 Consensus, includes pursuance of the one China policy and full-fledged implementation of major principles to achieve peaceful development of cross-strait relations. In the report, the relationship is defined as a special circumstance where the two regions remain apart, but take gradual steps toward reunification. PRC President Xi Jinping is likely to focus on handling domestic issues and achieving a balanced and stable relationship with the United States, and under his leadership, no significant changes are expected in terms of Taiwan policies since economy will take precedence over politics. Reflecting public opinion that the status quo should be maintained in the reunification issue, Taiwan defines cross-strait relations not as a state-to-state relationship but as a special relationship so as not to provoke China. With this strategic approach, Taiwan was also able to receive some concessions from mainland China with regard to Taiwan s status in the international arena. 6) Consideration should also be given to Taiwan s political situation as a variable of cross-strait relations, since such relations are likely to be affected by Taiwan s four-year political cycle as well as whether the Democratic Progressive Party will accept the 1992 Consensus. 4. Considerations for the Republic of Korea A. Institutionalization of Economic Cooperation, and Exchange and Integration of Neo-functionalism The ECFA allowed formal and institutionalized cooperation and exchange between the PRC and ROC, and the positive momentum is likely to remain, if not increase, thanks to continued negotiations, institutionalization efforts, and positive public opinion in Taiwan. Expansion in economic exchanges and the deepening of interdependency will create more shared interests which will eventually lead to greater mutual trust and cooperation in politics and security matters. This kind of neo-functionalistic approach is also required in inter-korean relations. 6) In order to avoid diplomatic isolation, Taiwan has been pursuing accession to international organizations through observer status. It joined the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2009 and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in September 2013 as an observer. 104

113 Cross-Strait Relations Visible effects are being generated for Taiwan s economic advancement as well as its status in the international arena. This approach is also endorsed by mainland China as it seeks to reunify with Taiwan from a long-term perspective by gradually improving cross-strait relations. When it comes to inter-korean relations, cooperation and exchanges between the governments are more active in politics than in economic and social affairs, and cooperation initiatives are led by public institutions amid lack of mutual trust and shared interest. As in the case of cross-strait relations where the two sides pursued a policy of deliberate ambiguity when it came to sovereignty claims and other political issues but engaged with each other rather passionately in economic exchanges, inter-korean relations should shy away from ongoing government-led economic cooperation projects and shift to private-sector initiated exchange programs. China can also be leveraged wisely in inducing such efforts. First Chiang-Chen Meeting Jun , 2008 Round Venue Major Agreements Second Chiang-Chen Talks Nov. 3-7, 2008 Third Chiang-Chen Talks Apr , 2009 Fourth Chiang-Chen Talks Dec , Fifth Chiang-Chen Talks Jun , 2010 Table 2. Major Agreements of Cross-Strait Meetings Beijing Taipei Nanjing Taichung Chongqing Opening of cross-strait charter flights between five Chinese cities and eight Taiwanese destinations Expansion of the daily ceiling on the entry of Chinese tourists into Taiwan; allowance of a 10-day maximum stay Allowance of direct sea transport and tax exemption on cross-strait transportation business income tax; opening of 63 Chinese ports and 11 Taiwanese ports; and allowance of postal mail, parcels and delivery service between the two sides Immediate notification between the two sides in the event of food safety accidents and emergency negotiations to hasten remedial actions and protect victims rights Establishment of a joint financial supervisory service on banking, securities and insurance services, and gradual setup of cross-strait currency clearing mechanism Opening of an additional six Chinese airports (bringing the total to 27) Establishment of joint crime investigation and judicial assistance Inspection and quarantine of agricultural products; cooperation in maritime affairs; abolishment of double taxation Signing of the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (CEFA) Signing of the Cross-Strait Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Cooperation 105

114 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 Round Venue Major Agreements Sixth Chiang-Chen Talks Dec , 2010 Seventh Chiang-Chen Talks Oct , 2011 Eighth Chiang-Chen Talks Aug. 8-10, 2012 Ninth High-level Talks Jun , 2013 Taipei Tianjin Taipei Shanghai Signing of Cross-Strait Agreement on Medical and Health Cooperation Staged consensus reached on the Cross-Strait Agreement on Investment Protection Signing of the Cross-Strait Nuclear Power Safety Cooperation Agreement Pursuance of greater investment and industrial cooperation Signing of ECFA follow-up agreements (Cross-Strait Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement) Signing of the Trade Service Agreement (opening of service sectors, e.g., communications, medicine, tourism, transportation, financial services, etc.) Source: Chronology of Meetings, Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) ( (edited) In addition, from the perspective of a long-term approach to changing the North s attitude and recovering national homogeneity, economic discussions on shared interests as well as cultural cooperation are required. B. Balanced Trade Strategies Targeting the Greater China Market and First-Mover Advantage in the Chinese Domestic Market While Korea and Taiwan share similar export trends in trading with China, concerns are being raised that the cross-strait ECFA will weaken Korea s appeal to Chinese importers. However, Korea should take a larger view encompassing the Greater China Region. According to Korea International Trade Association s statistics, Korea s exports to China, the United States and Japan were estimated at US$10.8 billion, 18 billion and 11.6 billion, respectively. In 2012, the figures were US$181.7 billion to China, 58.5 billion to the United States, and 38.7 billion to Japan, making Greater China Korea s largest export destination. Out of the Greater China region, export to the mainland, as of September 2013, amounted to US$106.8 billion, but exports to Hong Kong and Taiwan also increased. Therefore, Korea should develop balanced trading strategies considering the Greater China region instead of focusing on the mainland. Korea is seeking a high-level package deal whereas China is taking a gradual approach in the on-going Korea-China FTA negotiations. As such, Korea should consider different approaches as in the case of the ECFA. A gradual approach was taken in the China-ASEAN and Korea-ASEAN FTAs, 106

115 Cross-Strait Relations and Korea needs to study and analyze the negotiation process of the ECFA and go for gradual or phased negotiations in different areas of goods, services and investment to provide a buffer against shock from market opening. In addition, Korea should consider market opening of sensitive industrial sectors and in processing trade regions on a pilot basis. Moreover, the traded product classification systems of Korea and China should be jointly revised based on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System. FTA provisions should be negotiated to protect both countries industries and ensure conformity with the purpose of import and export regulations, and support programs and careful negotiations are needed so that conflict can be minimized in the process of combining the two markets. Due consideration must be given to the different development level of the service sectors of Korea and China as well as the proportion of processing trade. Damage to the agriculture & fisheries sector and the manufacturing sector should be minimized of course, but what is more important is that with the FTA, Korea should be able to enjoy first-mover advantage in securing the Chinese domestic market. 107

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117 주요국제문제분석 2013 이란핵문제제네바합의의함의와전망 2013 이란핵문제제네바합의의함의와전망 * 인남식 ** 1 이란핵문제의배경및추이가. 배경이란핵문제는북핵과함께비확산양대쟁점으로국제사회의관심과우려를받아온바, 지난 11월 24일제네바에서열린 P5+1 (E3+3) 과이란간핵협상에서극적으로공동행동계획 (Joint Plan of Action) 이채택됨으로써향후이란핵문제해결을위한 6개월간초기단계협상이타결되었음. 목 차 1. 이란핵문제의배경및추이 2. 합의내용및타결배경 3. 합의의의미와향후전망 4. 한국의고려사항 1979년이란호메이니이슬람혁명이전, 미국은 1967년팔레비 (Mohammad Reza Pahlavi) 왕정에원자로판매및 1975년팔레비의우라늄농축및플루토늄재처리를허용하며냉전기이란과의에너지협력을진행했으나혁명이후이란과적대관계가되고, 이후 2002년부터이란핵개발의혹이불거지면서가장첨예한쟁점으로자리잡음. - 현재까지 3차에걸친유엔안보리결의안에추가결의안 (UNSCR 1929) 및연장결의안이지속되면서계속핵개발관련유엔제재가고조되어왔고여기에기존미국의대이란제재및유럽연합의제재등이얽히면서이란경제는심각한수준의압박을받아옴. 핵문제를위요하여그동안첨예하게대립해온미국과이란간화해및협상의의지를가진지도층이없었던것은아니나, 하타미 (Mohammad Khatami)-부시 (George W. Bush), 아흐마디 * 발표 ** 유럽아프리카연구부교수 109

118 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 이란하산로하니대통령의당선을계기로미 - 이란간 1979 년단교이래첫고위급공식회담이열리게되고 네자드 (Mahmoud Ahmadinejad)-오바마 (Barack Obama) 등양국에서강경파-온건파의리더십이교차하며들어서면서협상의기회를찾지못했으나, 이번하산로하니 (Hassan Rouhani) 의당선을계기로 1979년단교이래첫고위급공식회담이열리게됨. - 미국오바마행정부가이란과의관계개선의지를취임초기부터피력해왔음에도아흐마디네자드이란대통령의강경행보와충돌하는양상이었으며, 2012년국방수권법에따른제재강화이후이번로하니대통령이당선되면서상황의변화가일어남. < 표 1> 이란핵협상관련주요일지 이란핵협상관련주요일지 이란반정부단체 국민저항위원회 (NCRI), 이란중부나탄즈에비밀우라늄농축시설존재최초폭로 IAEA, 이란의핵활동보고의무불이행지적 이란, 시험용저농축우라늄추출성공발표 유엔안보리, 1 차제재결의안 (1737) 채택. 우라늄농축활동중단등 IAEA 결의이행불응시금융자산동결등경제제재조치경고 유엔안보리, 2 차제재결의안 (1747) 채택. 핵활동및미사일등과관련된품목수출금지및관련기관 35 개와개인 40 명자산동결대상지정 유엔안보리, 3차제재결의안 (1803) 채택. 이란항공, 해상화물에대한검색허용 이란, 우라늄농축시설 10곳추가증설계획발표 유엔안보리, 추가제재결의안 (1929) 채택 이란, 20% 농축우라늄 50kg 이상생산발표유엔안보리, 1년제재연장결의안 (1984) 채택 IAEA, 이란핵무기개발작업의심보고서공개 ~ 알마티, 모스크바, 바그다드, 이스탄불에서협상 유엔안보리, 13개월제재연장결의안 (2049) 채택 로하니행정부정식출범 ~16. 로하니정부출범이후, 제네바에서첫이란 vs P5+1 협상실시 ~9. 제네바에서제2차이란 vs P5+1 협상실시 ~24. 제네바에서제3차이란 vs P5+1 협상및합의안도출 연합뉴스 ( ) 110

119 2013 이란핵문제제네바합의의함의와전망 나. 2012년제재강화이후이란경제의심각성증대 2011년말미국국방수권법 (National Defense Authorization Act 2012, NDAA) 에의거석유수출중단및금융거래완전중단조치이후이란경제는최악의상황으로진전되었고, 국민들이감내할수없는임계점에다다랐기에그동안저항경제로내핍을통해버텨온이란의경제는위기국면으로진입, 이번협상타결에이란이적극적으로나섰다는분석이우세함. 가장중요한수입원인석유판매수입의감소가치명적이었으며, 이는국가전체현금수입의 80% 가석유부문에서생산되는전형적인지대추구국가 (rentier state) 경제유형인이란에는타격이컸음. - 석유판매금지로인해정부수입의 50% 를차지하는수익원이차단되었고, 일일 250만배럴을수출하던 2011년에비해미국의제재강화조치 (NDAA 2012) 이후수출량은 60% 가량감소 (2011년석유수출천억달러에서 2013년 350억달러로급감 ) 석유판매의차단뿐아니라, 원유생산자체도감소하는이중고 ( 二重苦 ) 를겪게된바, 판로중단으로원유재고가늘면서저장시설부족문제가발생했고, 2013년초기준부유저장시설에약 3천만배럴이저장된것으로알려져포화상태에이른것으로추정됨. - 판로도봉쇄되고저장여력도없으면결국생산을중단시킬수밖에없는데이경우추후재가동시막대한비용이소요됨 년대비 2013년에는저장여력포화로인해 400만배럴생산에서 260~280만배럴생산으로급감석유수입의급감은국내총생산감소와직결된바, 지난 20년간의소득감소효과가일거에발생한것과같은충격을준것으로분석되고있으며 ~ 소득 1.9% 감소 (IMF global report) 이후, 2013 하반기에도 1.3% 추가소득감소가추정됨. - 그러나미국전문가들은 IMF 통계와는달리실질적으로이란국민들은 년 1년간약 5~8% 의소득감소및실업률 20% 등의경제악화심각상을체감했을것으로파악하고있음 년말美국방수권법이후이란경제는최악의상황으로진전되었고, 국민들이감내할수없는임계점에다다랐기에이번협상타결에이란이적극적으로나섰다는분석이우세하며 111

120 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 현지화 ( 리얄화 ) 가치하락및인플레이션도이란경제의구조를흔드는요인인바, 일단금융제재로인한달러가뭄으로현지화가치가급락하여 2011년 9월달러당 13,000 리얄 ( 비공식환율 ) 에서 2012년 10월최고 4만리얄까지폭락한이후, 2013년 5월 37,000리얄선에서유지되던차, 로하니의당선이후완만한안정세를보여최근 3만리얄대에서보합중임. - 인플레이션의경우 2013년 4월월평균물가상승률 31% / 7월 45%( 이란중앙은행통계 ) 로공식발표되었으나, 실질물가상승률은동기간 50~70% 선이었을것으로추정되며, 이는아흐메디네자드의선심성국가보조금및연금의현금지급도원인중하나인것으로보임. 결국이과정에서중도파하산로하니가대통령에당선되면서안보 정보분야는보수파성향으로, 경제 외교각료들은실용주의자들로조각하며협상이재개되었고 이러한경제난은부유층과극빈층보다이란내중산층에게큰타격을주었으며, 내핍에기반을둔저항경제형태를견지해온이란은석유수출이막히자가스콘덴세이트 (Gas Condensate) 20% 증대수출 ( 제트유생산 ), 각종광물, 시멘트, 비료및농산물등생산을통해인근터키및중앙아시아수출등으로대응해왔으나최근에는점차임계상황에접근하고있었던것으로파악됨. 결국, 이과정에서중도파하산로하니가대통령으로당선되면서안보 정보분야는보수파성향으로, 반면경제 외교각료들은실용주의자들로조각하며협상이재개되었고초기단계협상이타결되었음. 2 합의내용및타결배경 가. 합의문 : 공동행동계획 (Joint Plan of Action) 6개월시한으로설정된초기단계조치를합의한공동행동계획전문은이란핵문제를궁극적으로해결하기위한첫단계로서본협상의목표를 이란핵프로그램이평화적성격임을보장하기위한포괄적해결책 (comprehensive resolution) 도출 로설정함. - 초기조치 를통해이란이 NPT 상의의무를수행할신뢰를구축하고이에따라 NPT 상불가양의권리로인정된평화적원자력 112

121 2013 이란핵문제제네바합의의함의와전망 이용권한을보장하는 최종조치 로이어지는상호적 단계적접근을천명함. 이를위해향후 6개월간이란측이수행하여국제사회의인정을받아야할초기단계조치로는, 1) 현재보유한 20% 농축우라늄의 50% 를희석 (dilute) 하여 5% 농축도이하수준의산업용우라늄으로전환보유, 잔여 50% 는연료용산화물 (oxide) 로변환 (convert) 시켜테헤란연구용원자로 (TRR) 용으로보관함. 2) 향후 6개월간여하한경우에도 5% 이상의농축은중단하며, 단축적을목적으로하지않는농축관련연구개발에한하여허용함. / 3.5% 저농축우라늄의경우재고통제. 3) 추가농축시설건설중단 / 원심분리기생산중단, 단교체용만일부생산허용 / 나탄즈 (Natanz) 원심분리기의 50%, 포르도 (Fordo) 원심분리기의 75% 를비가동상태화 4) 아라크 (Arak) IR-40 중수로건설중단을통해원자로가동개시금지, 연료및중수반입금지, 추가연료생산및실험중단및잔여부품설치중단 5) IAEA 사찰감독관의상시적접근허용등으로구성됨. 이에대한 P5+1 측의조치로는, 1) 제한적이고 (limited), 일시적이며 (temporary), 그리고가역적인 (reversible) 제재경감조치를설정한바, - 초기단계기간신규제재부과중단 - 귀금속, 자동차, 유화분야의특정제재중단 (15억불수입제공상당 ) - 이란항공기정비관련지원시작 ( 부품공급, 설치서비스, 안전검사, 수리기술등 ) - 이란원유판매를현감축수준에서유지, 추가축소조치정지 (42억불상당효과 ) 2) 인도적거래를활성화하여이란의해외소재원유판매수입을사용, 인도적성격의시급한구매가이루어질수있도록하는금융거래허용등으로구성됨. 제한적이고 (limited) 일시적이며 (temporary) 가역적인 (reversible) 제재경감조치를설정하였고 본초기단계관련공동행동계획은본문서채택이후 1년이내협상을타결하여본격적인이행에들어가도록목표시한을설정 113

122 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 하였으며, 이과정에서투명성조치및감시이행결과의포괄적해결책이성공적으로안착할경우, 이란핵프로그램은 NPT 상의여타비핵보유국의핵프로그램과동일하게평가, 인정할것임을명시함. 나. 국제사회의반응전반적으로 6개월에불과한미봉책이라는평가도있는반면, 2002년부터시작된이란핵문제관련처음으로핵프로그램의확장을중단시킨의미있는실질적사례라는평가가공존하고있으나, 본협상에대해서국제사회의다수국가들은조심스럽게환영을나타내는분위기임. - 그러나이란과적대관계에있는이스라엘및걸프아랍왕정국가들은 ( 오만제외 ) 본협상에대해명시적으로비판함. P5+1의경우모처럼유엔안보리상임이사국전원이참여한협상주체들이이루어낸성과라는데대해고무되어있으며, 모든참가국의정치적의지가확연히확인되었다는점에대한자신감을일부획득한것으로파악됨. - 이는시리아문제에있어미동도하지않는러시아와중국이이번이란핵협상에서는같은입장을취했다는점에서드러남. (E3+3 메커니즘 ) 본협상에대해서국제사회의다수국가들은조심스럽게환영을나타내는분위기이며 그러나최종단계에포함되는우라늄농축권리에대하여이란과미국양측이다른해석을하고있는상황이며, 향후넘어야할장애물이많다는점에서여전히섣불리낙관할수없다는기조가우세함. - 최종단계조치사항에 상호합의된척도 (mutually agreed parameters) 에따라, 상호정의된농축프로그램 (mutually defined enrichment programme) 을포함한다 고명시한부분이논란이되고있음. - 이란은이를근거로이란의궁극적우라늄농축권리를보장받은것으로해석하고, 상기공동행동계획과는별도로백악관이배포한 Fact Sheet에서미국은이에대해언급하지않으며 NPT 상 농축권리 라는것은명문화되어있지않음을강조함. 114

123 2013 이란핵문제제네바합의의함의와전망 다. 합의타결요인 (1) 오바마행정부의 비폭력적다원주의 대 ( 對 ) 중동정책기조견지 미국오바마행정부는부시행정부의패권적일방주의및공세적현실주의에입각한중동민주화구상에서탈피, 취임직후부터외교우선의노선을명확히한 비폭력적다원주의 (non-violent pluralism) 를견지하며대 ( 對 ) 중동정책을펼쳐옴. - 오바마는취임직후부터이슬람끌어안기에적극적으로나섰으며, 특히취임직후인 2009년 3월 20일이란신년 노루즈 (Norooz) 기념메시지를통해이란국민에대한우호적메시지를전달하며부시정부와차별화에나선바있음. 美오바마행정부는취임직후부터외교우선의노선을명확히한비폭력적다원주의를견지하며대 ( 對 ) 중동정책을펼쳐왔고 비폭력적다원주의 에입각한미국의중동정책은, 민주화를강제로추진하지않고대량파괴무기및테러리즘과의절연을전제로미국은어떠한정부와도협상과외교를통해평화를구축하겠다는노선으로, 중동에서더이상전쟁을수행하지않는다는기조하에무력수단이아닌제재와협상우선정책을견지함. 본노선은미국의새로운대외전략, 즉 아시아재균형 (Asia rebalancing) 과도맞물려있으며, 이를시현하기위해서이란을비롯한역내주요국가와무력긴장대신외교를통한현안해결을추진했음. - 추진과정에서시리아화학무기사용보복불발등으로미국의영향력약화라비판받았으나결과적으로미국의외교우선의지를고수한것으로볼수있음. (2) 대 ( 對 ) 이란제재압박의심화및이란리더십의교체이란이협상에나선주요동인은경제제재의효과로보이며특히 2012년국방수권법을통해석유금수조치가강화되면서경제상황의압박이더욱심화함에따라중산층경제의피폐가가속화됨. - 기존자산의여력이있는부유층 / 국가보조금으로생계를유지하는극빈층과는달리이란경제의허리를담당하는중산층 115

124 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 은경제제재지속에의한현지리얄화급락으로구매력하락과함께생활수준이급격히하향하였으며자칫민심이반가능성이높아짐. - 이란제재의효과에대해서는워싱턴내강경 온건파및이란을적대시하는이스라엘까지모두이견이없음. - 협상파는제재로인해이란이대화테이블로나왔다는반면, 강경파는조금더제재를강화해야만이란의완전한핵폐기가가능하다는입장임 년이후단교된미국과이란사이에서오만의중재역할이주효했던것으로알려지고있으며 이란이슬람공화국의이슬람법학자통치체제 (Velayat-e-faqih) 를이끄는최고지도자아야톨라하메네이 (Ayatollah Khamenei) 및지도층은 2009년대선직후시위사태 ( 녹색혁명 ) 및아랍정치변동이후역내민주화운동을목도하면서정치적격변으로휘말리지않도록각별히유의해왔음. - 따라서최근경제피폐및이에따른하산로하니의대통령당선결과를접하면서서방과의협상에본격적으로무게를싣기시작한것으로보임. 이란로하니대통령의당선이후핵협상과관련변화된기류가감지된바, 새내각구성시기존의대결위주외교노선과는다른내각인선을보여줌. - 각료인선시내무, 문화, 국방, 법무장관직은보수파인사를등용한반면, 경제및외교분야에서는자신과유사한성향의중도 실용주의인사들을대거등용함으로써균형을맞춘것으로보이고, 무엇보다핵협상주관기관을최고국가안보회의 (Supreme National Security Council, SNSC) 에서외교부로교체하며대외협상의지를밝힘. (3) 적극적중재자의역할 : 유럽연합 (EU) 과오만 (Oman) 1979년이후단교된미국과이란사이에서회담을성사시키기위한중재역할이필요했으며, 이를위해유럽연합과오만의중재역할이주효했던것으로알려짐. 협상과정에서유럽연합과오만은역할분담을한것으로알려지고있으며, 유럽연합은 P5+1 대이란의공식협상구도에서 116

125 2013 이란핵문제제네바합의의함의와전망 캐서린애쉬튼 (Catherine Ashton) 외교안보고위대표가중재역할을하며유럽과러시아, 중국등과의소통에큰역할을한것으로분석됨. 특히오만의술탄까부스 (Sultan Qaboos) 국왕의미-이란간비밀회담중재역할이돋보인것으로알려지고있으며, 오만의경우여타수니걸프왕정과는달리이바디 (Ibadhi) 파에속한이슬람으로이란과의오랜교류협력을유지해온바, 이란의정상국가화를주장하는오만왕실은이란아흐마디네자드정권말기부터적극적으로미-이란관계개선중재역할을자임함. - 케리국무장관의 5월오만방문은겉으로는오만과의양자군사협력을논의한것으로보도되었으나, 실제로는까부스국왕의중재역할에대한긴밀한협의였으며, 이란대선이로하니당선으로귀결됨에따라곧바로까부스국왕은중재를가속화, 미-이란간고위급양자대화가시작되었음. 최근개최된바레인 Manama Dialogue( 중동고위급안보포럼, 바레인 ) 에서오만은이란을견제하려는걸프왕정국가들과각을세우며이란과의우호관계의지를재차피력함. - 이란의부상에대응하여더욱강화된통합을추구하려는걸프협력위원회 (Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC) 6개왕정국가들의 걸프유니언 (Gulf Union) 결성움직임에대하여명시적인반대의사를표명, 이란과서방과의중재자의역할에더비중을둘것으로보임. 불확실성은여전히남아있으며, 협상결렬가능성도배제할수없는것이현실이며 3 합의의의미와향후전망 가. 불확실성의상존가운데최종합의안타결을위한노력지속예상 6개월초기단계이후포괄타결로가기위한과정에서의불확실성은여전히남아있으며, 비밀핵시설의존재유무, 농축우라늄중화과정에서의이견, 신형원자로증축재개여부등적지않은돌발변수가상존함에따라협상결렬가능성도배제할수없는것이현실임. 117

126 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 이란은초기단계합의직후부터석유생산및수출재개에열의를나타내고있으며, 특히석유장관은주요메이저사와의연쇄적접촉을가진것으로알려지고있고 그러나현재로서미국오바마행정부는이상황에서 6개월후포괄협상이결렬될경우향후대외정책에치명적인바, 어떻게해서든협상의동력을유지하려할것임. 이란으로서도경제회복의가시적인효과가나타나기전까지는협상을무력화시키기는쉽지않은것으로판단됨. - 협상의완전파기및최종결렬가능성은높지않으며, 돌발변수가발생할때마다밀고당기기를계속하면서생각보다길게만성적핵협상으로전개될가능성이있음. 다만현재로서는미-이란양국내에서협상을반대하는강경파들의입지가여전히강하고특히미의회에서의반대목소리가강하게나오고있는바, 이들의경우이스라엘로비및사우디등의압력을바탕으로협상파기를요구할것으로보여, 향후양국내부의이견을어떻게조율하며협상동력을유지할것인가가관건임. 나. 제재완화이후이란경제개방가능성증대현재까지이란에대한삼중경제제재, 즉유엔안보리제재, 미국의이란제재법그리고유럽연합의경제제재등이비교적효과적으로작동했다는데큰이견이없으며, 이란역시제재완화를희구하는메시지를지속적으로나타낸바, 향후협상결렬등의극단적인갈등으로치닫더라도일단무력분쟁으로이어질가능성은상대적으로낮음. 아울러이란은초기단계합의직후부터석유생산및수출재개에열의를나타내고있으며, 특히로하니내각에복귀한장가네 (Bijan Namdar Zanganeh) 석유장관은주요메이저사와의연쇄적접촉을가진것으로알려짐. - 토탈 (Total) 사와는이미구체적인생산개발논의를시작한것으로보이며, 외에도로열더치쉘, ENI 등의석유회사와개발투자를논의중인것으로보도됨. 향후포괄협상과정에서석유수출과관련된경제적개방이일정부분진척될경우, 경제효과에노출된이란대중들의정서를감안할때이란지도부가협상을파탄시키며다시제재수준의 118

127 2013 이란핵문제제네바합의의함의와전망 인내경제시스템으로돌아가기는쉽지않을것으로예상됨. - 동시에 6개월초기단계조치기간동안이란이석유수출관련개방을가속화할경우, 국제석유자본및상품의이란진입이본격화되어, 서방으로서도이를완전히되돌리는이전수준의제재를강행하기어려운측면이있음. - 이를두고협상반대파들은제재완화를 둑에생긴작은균열 로비유하며, 자본과상품이급속도로이란내부로진입할경우향후협상이결렬되어제재를다시강화하더라도기존제재효과를기대할수없다고주장함. 다. 미국의역내동맹패턴변화가능성노정이번초기단계조치협상타결과정에서미국은중동지역내에서최우방국인이스라엘과사우디아라비아의강력한반대에도불구하고이란과의협상을지속, 타결을이끌어냄으로써이들국가의박탈감과반발이고조됨. - 협상타결직후이스라엘의베냐민네타냐후총리는역사적실수 (historic mistake) 라칭하면서향후이스라엘은이란핵문제에있어기존의강경노선을지속할것임을천명함. - 일단사우디등걸프아랍국가들은협상타결에대해조심스럽게긍정적논평을내놓았으나, 시아파이란의부상이부담스러운이들로서는내심미국에대한불만이점증하고있는것으로알려짐. 특히사우디의경우최근아랍정치변동, 시리아사태, 그리고이란의부상과맞물려삼중안보위기의식을느껴오던바, 미국이이란과대화국면에나선것자체에심각한배신감을느끼고있음. 이에따라고전적인동맹국으로서의대미관계를재설정하여야하는것이아닌가하는내부여론이생성되고있음. 여기에최근이집트군부의재집권이후미국과의관계악화및리비아등역내불안정성심화에따라미국의기존동맹패턴에변화조짐이감지되고있음. 향후이란과의핵협상이순조롭게진행될경우이란은역내패권국가로부상할가능성이농후하며, 역내보수왕정및수니파공화정국가들이이에저항할경우미 미국은중동지역내에서최우방국인이스라엘과사우디아라비아의강력한반대에도불구하고, 이란과의협상을지속하여타결을이끌어냄으로써이들국가의박탈감과반발이고조되고있으며 119

128 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 국의기존대중동정책구도에대개편이일어날가능성도배제할수없는상황임. 4 한국의고려사항 가. 대북경제제재효과에대한면밀한검토필요이란에대한삼중경제제재를둘러싸고그동안유효성에대한논란이지속되어왔으나, 최근정황상결국엄격한경제제재를통해이란을협상테이블로이끌어냈다는의견이중론인바, 향후북핵문제와관련, 미국은이란의성공적인합의선례를바탕으로북한에대한보다적극적인제재의사를보일가능성이있음. 향후북핵문제와관련, 미국은이란의성공적인합의선례를바탕으로북한에대한보다적극적인제재의사를보일가능성이있으며 이란과북한의핵문제는각각차이점이많으므로이란사안을북핵문제에대입하거나직접원용하기는쉽지않으나, 군사적대안보다는제재가통할수있다는선례를가졌다는점에서향후미국은북핵문제를다루어감에있어제재수단을강조하고나설가능성이높아짐. 나. 농축논란가능성예의주시이번협상타결관련최대쟁점은이란의우라늄농축권리에대한국제사회의인정여부인바, 미국은공식적으로이란의우라늄농축권리를인정하지않는다고천명했으나, 동합의문에는최종포괄협상에서협상에따라우라늄농축을인정할수있는뉘앙스의문안이담겨있음. ( The final step of a comprehensive solution would involve a mutually defined enrichment programme with mutually agreed parameters consistent with practical-needs, with agreed limits on scope and level of enrichment activities, capacity, where it is carried out, and stocks of enriched uranium, for a period to be agreed upon. ) - 문맥상포괄적최종협상과정에서협의여하에따라이란내우라늄농축을허용할수도있다는의미가담긴것으로해석되어향후논란의소지가있음. 120

129 2013 이란핵문제제네바합의의함의와전망 국제사회가이란에평화적핵에너지이용관련우라늄농축을허용할경우, 이는북한핵관련우라늄농축사안에도적지않은파장을일으킬가능성이있음. - 아울러국제사회의원자력협정의핵주기완성논쟁까지촉발할수있는사안이므로한미원자력협정개정과관련, 향후진행사항을면밀히주목할필요가있음. 다. 향후포괄협상타결대비이란과의다면적유대관계구축 장기적인경제협력관점에서다면적협력채널을발굴 유지해야하는바, 경제제재일부완화국면에서기업및민간부문의적극적관계구축을추진할필요가있고 이란핵문제초기단계협상타결소식에국제경제는신속히반응하고있는바, 이란이향후정상적인시장으로전환될경우역내최대국가로자리매김할수있는잠재력을지녔기에경제부문은초미의관심사를두기시작함. 특히경제적측면을고려할때, 유럽국가의경우제재완화상황에적극적으로대응하는것으로알려지고있으며, 일본, 인도등아시아국가들도신속하게대응하는분위기임. - 무엇보다협상타결전인지난 8월부터최근이란과일본의관계가급속도로진전되어왔으며, 이는유엔총회계기일본-이란정상회담및다수의각료급회담개최를통해드러나고있는바, 각별한관심이필요함. 본이란핵문제협상은최종타결까지난제및돌발변수가많은과정이므로섣부른낙관론은바람직하지않으나, 이란의잠재력을감안할때장기적인경제협력관점에서다면적협력채널을발굴 유지해야하는바, 경제제재일부완화국면에서기업및민간부문의적극적관계구축을추진할필요가있음. 121

130 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 Implications and Prospects of the 2013 Geneva Interim Agreement on the Iranian Nuclear Program The Agreement and its Background C IN Nam-sik Associate Professor Dept. of European and African Studies onsidered one of the two most critical challenges to the global nonproliferation regime, the nuclear program of Iran, along with that of North Korea, has long been a serious concern to the international community. In the nuclear negotiations held between the P5+1 (E3+3) and Iran in Geneva on November 24, 2013, the Joint Plan of Action was adopted, marking the first step toward resolving the Iranian nuclear problem. The first step period is expected to last for six months. The Agreement: Joint Plan of Action Since the Joint Plan of Action symbolizes the first step toward solving the Iranian nuclear problem, its goal was set as to reach a mutually-agreed, long-term comprehensive solution that ensures Iran s nuclear program will be used for exclusively peaceful purposes. These initial measures are expected to build trust with Iran by leading it to conform to the obligations listed in the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Later, these efforts will result in the final step that guarantees Iran s right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which is recognized as an inalienable right by the NPT. To fulfill this objective and alleviate the concerns of the international community, Iran should carry out the following procedures: 1) Dilute half of its existing 20% enriched uranium to the level of industrial uranium, which is no higher than 5%, and convert the remaining half of its UF6 to working stock of uranium oxide powder to be used in fabrication of fuel for the TRR (Tehran Research Reactor). 2) Announce that it will not, under any circumstances, enrich uranium over 5% for a period of six months, except when it is to be used for enrichment R&D purposes that are not related to the accumulation of enriched uranium. 122

131 Implications and Prospects of the 2013 Geneva Interim Agreement on the Iranian Nuclear Program Put its 3.5% low-enriched uranium (LEU) under control as well. 3) Halt the construction of additional enrichment facilities and centrifuges, except for those designed for replacement purposes. Also, cease operation of 50% of the centrifuges at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant and 75% of those at Fordow. 4) Halt the construction of IR-40 heavy-water reactors at Arak, thereby forbidding the operation of nuclear reactors at the site. It will also not transfer fuel or heavy water to the reactor site, not produce or test additional fuel, nor install the remaining components of the reactors. 5) IAEA inspectors are allowed frequent access to workshops, storage facilities, uranium mines, and mills. In return, the P5+1 will undertake the following voluntary measures: 1) Since limited relief measures, though temporary and reversible, have been adopted, the P5+1: Will not impose new nuclear-related sanctions for six months. Will suspend sanctions on gold and precious metals, the auto industry, and petrochemical exports, providing Iran with approximately $1.5 billion worth of revenue. Will start subsidizing Iran s aircraft maintenance sector, providing machine parts, installation and security check services, repair technologies, etc. Will suspend efforts to further reduce Iran's crude oil sales, maintaining the current sales level (which earns approximately USD 4.2 billion for Iran s economy). 2) Establish a financial channel to facilitate humanitarian trade for Iran's domestic needs, using Iranian oil revenues held abroad. These first step measures are expected to be fully implemented as the signatories reach the final agreement within one year after the adoption of the Joint Plan of Action. If the transparency measures and enhanced monitoring process do result in a successful settlement on the comprehensive solution, Iran s nuclear program will be evaluated and acknowledged as equal to those of other NPT non-nuclearweapon states. 123

132 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 The international community s response While some consider the plan to be merely a temporary measure lasting only six months, others think highly of the fact that it is the first practical measure that has suspended the expansion of Iran s nuclear program. Most countries seem to generally welcome this new nuclear deal. However, Israel and other Gulf monarchies, except Oman, that have a hostile relationship with Iran are harshly criticizing this deal. The P5+1 are excited that the deal was successfully reached when all UN Security Council members were present as participants. Furthermore, they have gained confidence in that all participating states demonstrated willingness to solve the problem. This general consensus was evident in the fact that Russia and China, neither of which showed the slightest willingness to change their stances regarding the conflict in Syria, supported the deal in this round of negotiations with Iran (E3+3 mechanism). However, the United States and Iran still have different interpretations regarding Iran s right to enrich uranium, which was one of the elements mentioned in the final step. Since there are still obstacles that need to be overcome in the near future, the majority opinion is that it is too early to be optimistic about the remaining negotiation process. In particular, the statement that the final step would involve a mutually defined enrichment programme with mutually agreed parameters is still highly controversial. While Iran has interpreted this phrase as an ultimate approval of its right to enrich uranium, the White House did not mention it in the Fact Sheet that was distributed separately from the Joint Plan of Action, and it has strongly emphasized that the right to enrichment is not stipulated in the NPT. The factors that successfully led to the Agreement 1) The Obama Administration s policy of non-violent pluralism toward the Middle East The Obama Administration has broken away from the Bush Administration s plan to bring about democratic change in the Middle East, which often involved acts of unilateralism and offensive realism. Ever since the start of his term, Obama has maintained non-violent pluralism as his official Middle East policy, highlighting his diplomacy first approach in foreign policy. America s policy of non-violent pluralism toward the Middle East rests on 124

133 Implications and Prospects of the 2013 Geneva Interim Agreement on the Iranian Nuclear Program the premise that it does not enforce the democratization of any country, and that it seeks to put a stop to the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and acts of terrorism. By pursuing this policy, the United States has demonstrated that it will work toward world peace through diplomatic means and negotiations, regardless of the type of regime that it must approach. Following the principle that it will carry out sanctions or negotiations first, instead of taking military action, the United States has promised that it will not engage in any more wars in the Middle East. This line of policy is also connected to America s new strategy of Asia rebalancing. In order to put this plan into action, the United States has relied on diplomacy, rather than military means, to solve key issues with major countries in the region, such as Iran. America s refusal to launch a military strike against Syria, after the Syrian government s alleged use of chemical weapons, invited much criticism many considered it a sign of America s declining influence. However, by refraining from using military force, the United States successfully demonstrated its adherence to the policy of diplomacy first. 2) The tightening of sanctions on Iran and change in Iran s leadership Iran s main motive for joining the negotiations seems to be the detrimental effect of sanctions on its economy. Especially as the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 strengthened the restrictions on Iranian oil exports, Iran s economic situation worsened and the middle class became impoverished. The sanctions pushed Iran s middle class, which is technically the heart of Iran s economy, into a difficult situation, unlike the wealthy class who are financially stable or the poor who can rely on national subsidies to support their livelihood. The enduring economic sanctions resulted in a rapid decline in the value of the Iranian rial, which severely reduced the middle class purchasing power and quality of life. With these devastating economic conditions, the public became highly discontent with the government. While those who prefer negotiations argue that Iran came to the negotiating table because of the effect of the sanctions, the hard-liners contend that Iran s complete denuclearization is only possible with even stronger sanctions. Current Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and other rulers of the Islamic Republic of Iran who run the Velayat-e-faqih, Iran s system of government that strictly adheres to Islamic law, have witnessed the demonstrations (Green Movement) and democratization movements following the political change in other Arab 125

134 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 countries after the 2009 presidential elections. These incidents have made Iran s leaders especially wary of becoming embroiled in any political upheaval. Therefore, with the recent economic decline and election of the new president Hassan Rouhani, Iran seems to have embarked on serious negotiations with the West. Regarding the nuclear negotiations, Rouhani has demonstrated an attitude that is different from that of the previous administration. His selection of new cabinet members also differs considerably from that of the previous administration, which mainly consisted of hard-liners in foreign policy. He filled the posts of Ministers of Home Affairs, Culture, Defense, and Law with conservatives, while balancing them out by appointing numerous centrists and pragmatists, who share his political views, to economy and diplomacy-related posts. Most importantly, he transferred the duty of overseeing nuclear negotiations from the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, demonstrating his willingness to engage in serious nuclear dialogue. 3) The role of the European Union (EU) and Oman as active mediators Since the United States and Iran severed diplomatic relations with each other in 1979, the arbitrating role of third parties EU and Oman was crucial in the resumption of talks between the two countries. The EU and Oman are known to have shared their duties during the negotiation process. Especially through the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton s shrewd arbitration between the P5+1 and Iran, the EU played an active part in communication with Europe, Russia, China, and other countries. In particular, the ruler of Oman Sultan Qaboos is known to have played a remarkable role in mediating between the United States and Iran during their secret talks. Unlike other Sunni monarchies in the Gulf, Oman belongs to the Ibadhi sect, and it has long engaged in exchange and cooperation with Iran. Since the late stage of the Ahmadinejad Administration, the royal family of Oman, in favor of the normalization of Iran, has posed itself as an active player in improving US-Iran relations. Secretary of State Kerry was reported to have discussed bilateral military cooperation with Oman during his visit to Oman in May. However, in reality, the meeting was an intimate discussion on the arbitrating role of King Qaboos. The election of Rouhani as the new Iranian president further stimulated King Qaboos to make serious efforts toward rebuilding the relationship between the two countries. 126

135 Implications and Prospects of the 2013 Geneva Interim Agreement on the Iranian Nuclear Program Finally, the United States and Iran started to engage in high-level talks. In the recent Manama Dialogue held in Bahrain, Oman directly confronted the Gulf monarchies that seek to contain Iran, again demonstrating its willingness to enter into a friendly relationship with Iran. Oman has expressed its opposition to the formation of the Gulf Union, an attempt by the six monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to strengthen their integration and counter Iran s rise. As can be seen from this declaration, Oman seems to put more weight on its mediating role between Iran and the West. The Agreement s Implications and Future Prospects Continuation of efforts to reach the final agreement The upcoming process toward reaching the comprehensive solution following the six-month first step period is still filled with uncertainty. The reality is that various factors, such as whether secret nuclear facilities exist, whether Iran may resume the construction of new nuclear reactors, and differences in opinion regarding the neutralization process of enriched uranium, may cause a breakdown in the negotiations. However, since any major setback would deliver a critical blow to the Obama Administration s foreign policy, Washington will by any means attempt to continue negotiating with Iran. Also, Iran cannot easily step away from the negotiations until it makes a considerable economic recovery. Complete cancellation or breakdown in the last round of negotiations is unlikely rather, the participating countries could engage in a constant tug of war whenever an unexpected situation breaks out, causing them to become bogged down in protracted negotiations that may last much longer than expected. Hard-liners who oppose the negotiations still have a significant political clout in both the United States and Iran; in particular, many members of the US Congress are expressing strong opposing opinions. These people may demand a cancellation of the negotiations due to the Israeli lobby and pressure from Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the key to success is continuing the steps toward the final agreement by resolving the wide differences in opinion within each country. Prospects for Iran s economy after the easing of sanctions The general consensus so far has been that the three-way sanctions against Iran, imposed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the United States, 127

136 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 and the EU, have been effective, while Iran has also consistently demanded for easing of the sanctions. Therefore, even if the participants of the negotiations come into extreme conflict, such as a breakdown in negotiations, the possibility of the conflict escalating to a military confrontation is relatively low. In addition, Iran has shown eagerness to resume oil production and exports soon after the agreement on the first step measures. In particular, Iranian Minister of Petroleum Bijan Namdar Zanganeh, who has returned to Rouhani s Cabinet, is reported to have had regular contact with major energy companies. He seems to have already started discussing specific production development plans with Total, while also consulting with oil companies such as Royal Dutch Shell and ENI on development investment plans. If Iran s economy experiences some degree of oil export liberalization as a result of future negotiations, it will make it much more difficult for the Iranian regime to back out of the negotiations and revert to its past economy of resistance, due to the positive effect that economic liberalization will have on the lives of Iranian citizens. At the same time, if Iran speeds up its economic liberalization of oil exports during the six-month first step period, international oil capital and oil products will penetrate the Iranian market, making it harder for Western countries to impose sanctions at the level they did in the past. Those who oppose the negotiations call this situation a crack in the dike, arguing that if the negotiations do break down and the countries decide to strengthen the sanctions once more, the rapid introduction of capital and commodities in Iran could undermine the effect of the sanctions. The possibility of change in regional alliance patterns of the United States During the process toward the first step measures, the United States continued negotiating with Iran despite facing strong opposition from Israel and Saudi Arabia, its two most important allies in the Middle East. Its success in the initial steps stirred up an intense animosity among these two countries. Immediately after the agreement was reached, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu denounced it as a historic mistake, declaring that Israel will maintain its original hard-line stance toward the Iranian nuclear issue. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab states have made positive statements regarding the success of the negotiations, but because they fear the rise of Shiite-majority Iran, their grievances against the United States are also growing. 128

137 Implications and Prospects of the 2013 Geneva Interim Agreement on the Iranian Nuclear Program Especially Saudi Arabia, struggling with a national security crisis due to the recent political turmoil in the Arab states, the Syrian Civil War, and the rise of Iran, has felt betrayed by America s recent diplomatic engagement with Iran. The opinion that Saudi Arabia should review its traditional alliance with the United States is gaining traction within the country. In addition, the deteriorating Egypt-US relations after the return of the military regime in Egypt, as well as the rising insecurity in Libya and other countries in the Middle East, has caused the original alliance patterns of the United States to undergo a gradual change. If the negotiations proceed smoothly, there is a significant possibility that Iran could become a regional hegemon in the Middle East. Furthermore, if conservative monarchies and Sunni republics in the region resist Iran s rise, the United States could completely restructure its entire Middle East policy. Republic of Korea s Concerns The need to evaluate the effect of economic sanctions on North Korea Although the effectiveness of the three-way sanctions on Iran has been a controversial topic for many years, the recent majority opinion is that the tight economic sanctions did succeed in bringing Iran to the negotiating table. Therefore, in the upcoming years, the United States may demonstrate a willingness to levy strict sanctions on North Korea as well, following the successful precedent set with Iran. Since the North Korea nuclear problem differs from that of Iran in various ways, the success with Iran cannot be easily applied to the case of North Korea. However, since the agreement provided a precedent in which employing sanctions, rather than relying on military measures, was effective in altering a state s behavior, it is now highly likely that the United States will emphasize sanctions as way to deal with the nuclear North Korea. The possibility of controversy over uranium enrichment The biggest issue in this round of negotiations is whether the international community acknowledges Iran s right to enrich uranium, with the United States having officially declared that it does not approve of it. However, the draft agreement hints at the possibility of acknowledging Iran s right to enrich uranium, depending on the result of the final round of negotiations. ( The final step of a comprehensive solution would involve a mutually defined enrichment programme with mutually 129

138 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 agreed parameters consistent with practical needs, with agreed limits on scope and level of enrichment activities, capacity, where it is carried out, and stocks of enriched uranium, for a period to be agreed upon. ) This controversial clause could be interpreted as implying that Iran may eventually obtain permission to enrich uranium, depending on the characteristics of the agreement reached during the final negotiations. If the international community acknowledges Iran s right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, this precedent may have dramatic implications for the issue of North Korea s uranium enrichment activities as well. In addition, it may incite an international dispute regarding the issue of whether nuclear negotiations should complete a full nuclear fuel cycle. Therefore the progress of the Iranian nuclear talks deserves special attention, especially with the upcoming renewal of the US-ROK Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. Preparing for the final agreement on a comprehensive solution The global economy has been reacting quickly to the news that the first step agreement has been concluded. Since Iran has the potential to become the most powerful country in the Middle East if it transitions into a normal economy, it has been receiving much attention in various economy-related fields. European countries, as well as Japan, India, and other Asian countries, are actively reacting to the easing of sanctions on Iran. Above all, the improvement in Japan-Iran relations since last August, even before the conclusion of the first step agreement, requires special attention. This improving relationship is evident in the recent Japan-Iran summit meeting at the UN General Assembly, along with other numerous minister-level conferences that have been held between the two countries. Since the remaining negotiations with Iran will likely encounter a number of unexpected difficulties, excessive optimism should be avoided. However, considering Iran s potential for future development, Republic of Korea ought to develop multidimensional ties with Iran, through which it can pursue long-term economic cooperation. In order to seize the opportunities provided by the easing of sanctions on Iran, Republic of Korea should pursue active cooperation with Iran through large enterprises and other private channels. 130

139 주요국제문제분석 G20 의발전을위한중견국의역할 G20 의발전을위한중견국의역할 * 이동휘 ** 1 문제의제기제8차 G20 정상회의가 20개회원국과스페인, 세네갈, 에티오피아, 카자흐스탄, 브루나이및싱가포르등 6개초청국이참석한가운데 2013년 9월 5일~6일간러시아상트페테르부르크에서개최되었음. 목 차 1. 문제의제기 2. G20 발전과정상의문제점 3. 중견국의부상 4. 중견국의역할 5. 한국의고려사항 정상들은거시경제정책공조와일자리창출의제들을포괄하는정상선언문 ( 부록1 참조 ) 에합의하고그부속서로서 상트페테르부르크행동계획 을비롯한 9개보고서를채택하였는데, 이에는 G20 5주년기념비전선언문 이포함되어있음. 2008년미국에서발발한금융위기가전세계적차원에서의경제위기로확산되자, 위기를극복하기위한국제적인노력의하나로국가간경제정책공조를강화하기위한주요 20개국의모임인 G20이태동되었음. 이후 G20은국제경제문제논의를위한 최상위협의체 (premier forum) 로명명되고, 경제관련글로벌거버넌스의핵심구조로인정되었음. 나아가, 단순한위기관리체제 (crisis management body) 로부터세계경제의지속가능하고도균형잡힌발전을가능케하는상설협의체 (steering committee) 로의발전적변환을지향하여왔음. 그러나세계경제가일단위기국면을벗어남에따라 G20의역 * 발표 ** 경제통상연구부교수 131

140 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 향후외교환경의상당부분이글로벌거버넌스구축문제를둘러싸고벌어지는국가간의경쟁과협력으로조성될것으로보이며 할에대한기대가희석되는가운데, 유럽과미국의재정위기가자국중심의경제운용을우선시하게하는경향을고조시켜국제공조의기본토대가취약해졌음. 이에따라출범 5년이지난이시점에서 G20은발전과정체의기로에직면하게되었으며, 재활성화를위해서는새로운동력이마련되어야할것으로보임. 한편, 최근한반도주변동 ( 북 ) 아시아의안보환경을평가하는데있어소위 아시아패러독스 (Asia paradox) 라는용어가많이언급되고있는데, 같은맥락에서세계적차원에서도 글로벌패러독스 (global paradox) 로명명할수있는모순적상황이전개되고있다고볼수있음. 즉, 정치 군사분야에서는힘의정치를바탕으로한전략적경쟁이강대국을중심으로여전히전개되고있는반면, 경제문제를위시한비 ( 非 ) 군사분야에서는세계화의급진전으로대두되고있는범세계적이슈들에대해국제협력을통해공동으로대처하고자하는글로벌거버넌스의재편및구축작업이진행되는이중적양상이공존하고있다는것임. 이러한배경을염두에두고향후전망을해보면다음과같이상호연관된세가지변화를중심으로국제관계가형성되어나갈것으로정리해볼수있는데, 이에따라외교환경의상당부분이글로벌거버넌스구축문제를둘러싸고벌어지는국가간의경쟁과협력으로조성될것으로보임. 첫째, 힘의이동 (power shift) 결과로힘의분포가변하기시작하였다는점, 둘째는힘의분포가변하기때문에국제질서를유지하는관리체계로서의글로벌거버넌스가재편되거나새롭게구축되어야하는상황이라는점, 셋째로는그진행과정에서기존질서를주도해왔던강대국들과질서변경을원하는신흥국들사이에서대립적상황이발생할수있는데, 이는중견국가들이중재역할을할수있는틈새 (niche) 의생성을시사하고있다는점등임. 특히, 세번째관찰인중견국을위한기회발생은중견국들이적정한협조체제를구축해나갈경우, G20을위시한주요글로벌거버넌스구축과정에서건설적인역할을해나갈수있게됨으로써국제정치 경제적행동반경의확대가가능해짐을시사하고있음. 132

141 G20 의발전을위한중견국의역할 이러한국제환경의변화속에서중진국, 중급국가및중도적국가등어느척도로계량하더라도중견국의자격을충분히갖추고있으며제5차 G20 정상회의를서울에서개최하는등지난발전과정에서주요한역할을수임하였던한국으로서는 G20을주요무대로, 최근결성된 MIKTA 등다양한중견국간협의채널들을주요수단으로하는중견국외교를강화해나감으로써외교역량의강화를모색할수있을것임. 이러한인식하에서본보고서는여덟차례에걸친지난정상회의에대한간략한평가를바탕으로 G20의발전과정상에서노정된문제점을정리하고, 이를중견국의특징및이에바탕하여가능한역할과연결시켜봄으로써 G20의재활성화를위한중견국의역할을검토해보고자함. 2 G20 발전과정상의문제점 2008년이래여덟차례의정상회의를통해글로벌거버넌스재편의대표적사례가되어온 G20은비록세계경제현안을다루는중요한회의체로자리매김해왔으나, 회원국간의견상충으로인해명실상부한최상위협의체로의전환은이루지못했다고평가되고있음. 그배경에는각국간경제력의격차, 경제운용방식의차이, 정치시스템의상이성등다양한구조적문제들이존재하고있으나, 본보고서에서는우선정상회의의결과를중심으로평가하고자함. G20의발전과정을개관해보면세단계 ( 부록2 참조 ) 로대별해볼수있는데, 1단계 위기극복기 는당면한위기를관리하는데초점이모아진태동기로 1차와 2차회의가이에해당됨. 이어 2단계는 G20을위기관리체로부터상설협의체로전환하기위한노력이시작된시기로 전환모색기 로명명될수있는데, 3~5차회의가그범주로분류될수있음. 이후 G20은 6차회의에서부터최근의 8차회의에이르기까지유로존의위기와미국의재정적자등연이은악재들의돌출로표 G20 은비록세계경제현안을다루는중요한회의체로자리매김해왔으나, 회원국간의견상충으로인해명실상부한최상위협의체로의전환은이루지못했다고평가되고있어 133

142 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 류하는양상을보이면서급기야발전과지속의기로에서게되어 답보정체기 에처하게되었음. 지난 5년간여덟차례에걸친정상회의에대한상기한간략한평가를바탕으로 G20의발전과정상에서노정된문제점을정리하면다음과같음. 가. 주도력의부재 (Who) G20 발전과정에서가장두드러지게나타난취약성은 G20의발전과정을주도해나갈수있는주도력이부재 ( 不在 ) 하다는점임. G20 발전과정에서가장두드러지게나타난취약성은 G20 의발전과정을주도해나갈수있는주도력이부재하다는점으로 G20은그리스에서촉발된재정위기에대한회원국간의견대립, 그리고경제난이지속된미국과여타중국을위시한신흥국들의개입주저등의변수들로인해적절히대처하지못했다는평가를받음으로써국제경제문제해결을위한최상위협의체로서의 G20의위상에대한부정적인시각이고착화될수도있는위험성을더욱확대시켜왔음. 또다른변수는미국과관련된것으로, 양적완화정책 (QE: Quantitative Easing) 의지속과재정적자문제의상존이미국의국제경제문제에대한주도적입장에서의전향적입지설정을어렵게하였다는것임. 또한신흥국인중국과브라질등도각각정치 경제분야에서개혁작업이느리게진행되고, 자국의경제운영에서도애로가점증되어다른지역에대한경제지원을논의할충분한여유가없다는상황도주도력의부재에일정수준영향을미치고있음. 이렇게볼때, G20의유용성에대한회의감확대가능성과주도력공백이향후 G20의발전전망과관련해가지는시사점은미국, 중국, EU 등주요국들이다기 ( 多岐 ) 한이유로 G20의향후발전과정에서필요한주도력을개별적으로또는집단적으로발휘하지못할경우, 과연누가지도력의공백을메울수있을것인가가되고있음. 134

143 G20 의발전을위한중견국의역할 나. 의제의미비 (What) 경제 금융문제들을중심으로하는 G20의현재주요의제와그논의를위한준비과정들이아직도 G7의주요국들의영향력이미치는가운데이루어지고있음 (financial capture) 에반해, G7 의주요국들인미국과 EU는세계경제적차원보다는자국의경제문제에우선적인관심을두고있어문제해결능력이저하되고있는실정임. 이러한이유로대두되고있는 G20의경제 금융의제편중문제에대한재검토필요성과는별도로 G20에서무절제하게지속되고있는의제확대의문제 (agenda creep) 도향후 G20의발전과관련해재검토되어야할필요성이있는것으로보임. 2010년서울정상회의는기존의제외에소위새로운의제로서글로벌금융안전망구축과함께개발의제를추가한바있음. 이어 2011년깐느회의는식량안보와원자재가격변동성완화문제를, 그리고로스까보스회의는녹색성장을, 최근러시아는고용문제를의제에추가하기에이르렀으며, 이외에도 G20의진행과정에서반 ( 反 ) 부패등의문제도다루게됨. 이러한의제확대는기존의거시경제정책공조체로서의 G7을넘어서신흥국들과여타개도국들의관여를높일수있고, 국제정치 경제상의새로운현상인복합적성격의의제 (hybrid issues) 들을다룸으로써 G20의존립기반을공고히할수있다는점에서원칙적으로는타당함. G20 의경제 금융의제편중문제에대한재검토필요성과는별도로 G20 에서무절제하게지속되고있는의제확대의문제도향후재검토되어야할필요성이있으며 그러나의제선정이 G20의향후발전을숙고한가운데회원국들간공동합의로이루어지기보다는해당연도의개최국이자국의관심도를적극반영하거나, G20의발전과정에또다른발자취를남기려는과욕에서무리하게추진되는경향도존재하고있음 년상트페테르부르크정상회의에서주최국의주장으로정치의제인시리아사태를논의하였는데, 의제범주의확대가가져올수있는긍정적가능성이존재하였음에도불구하고, 결과적으로회원국간이견만을노정하였다는점은이러한예의하나라고볼수있음. 이렇게볼때, G20의또다른과제는경제거버넌스의재편을위 135

144 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 한상설협의체로서의역할제고는물론, 의미있는의제를여하히절제있게선정할수있을것인가의문제일것임. 다. 효율성의부족 (How) 세계경제가일단위기국면을벗어남에따라 G20의위기관리체제로서의역할에대한기대감이희석되는가운데, 유럽과미국이자국중심의경제운용을우선시함으로써국제공조의기본토대는더욱취약해짐. 이러한변화는현재 G20의주요의제가경제 금융문제들만을중심으로하고 (financial fetishism), 논의를위한준비과정들이지나치게기술적이어서정상들의모임으로서의 G20의효율성저하를초래할수있다는관찰과도결부되며, 또한국제관계에있어서너무빈번한정상회의에대한피로감 (summit fatigue) 이표출되고도있는실정임. 이러한복합적인상황전개의근본원인은 G20 정상회의가 2008 년의금융위기를조속히극복하고자 1999년이래존재해온 G20 재무장관회의를확대 격상하여개최하게되었다는데서연유함. -G20 정상회의의의제관련준비는실질적으로아직 G7의영향력이크게작용하는 G20 재무장관회의가담당하며, 이를받아각국지도자들의개인대표자격을지닌셰르파 (sherpa) 들이회의를준비하는것으로되어있음. 이러한취약성은궁극적으로 G20 이 토크샵 (talk shop) 으로폄하되는경향을강화시키거나실제로 잡화점 이되게함으로써그유용성이훼손될수도있을것이며 이렇게볼때, 향후 G20의기본성격이위기극복을위한기술적차원의경제위주논의의장으로부터점차기존의주도세력이었던 G7과신흥국들이비 ( 非 ) 경제영역을포함하여정상모임의수준에걸맞은포괄적이고도정치적인틀로바뀌어나가는것이바람직하다면, G8의경우와같이재무장관회의와병렬적으로외무장관회의를신설해야한다는필요성이제기될수있음. 한편, 이와관련된우려는특히지도력이부재한상황하에서지속적으로확대되는의제들에대한논의를체계적으로기획 운영할수있는시스템이갖춰지지못한상황, 예컨대사무국또는이의역할을해야하는트로이카의기능이충분히발휘되지못한다는연유로도더욱증폭되고있음. 이러한취약성은의제취 136

145 G20 의발전을위한중견국의역할 급의부실로이어지고궁극적으로 G20이 토크샵 (talk shop) 으로폄하되는경향을강화시키거나실제로 잡화점 이되게함으로써그유용성이훼손될수도있을것임. 이렇게볼때, 향후발전을위한추가적인과제는외무장관회의의신설과함께사무국설치를포함하여여하히운영상의효율성을높일것인가와관련된제도적정비의문제들일것임. 이렇듯발전과정체의기로에직면한 G20이향후글로벌경제거버넌스로서그위상을구축해나가기위해서는, - 첫째, 미국, EU 등주요국들간에 G20을명실상부한최상위협의체로만들고자하는정치적의지의재확인과주도력의발휘, - 둘째, 의제의재조정, 특히에너지안보, 기후변화및개발문제등과같이기존의경제와밀접한연관이있으면서도 3자간의상호연계성을감안한새로운시각과접근법이요구되는문제들을신 ( 新 ) 의제화하려는노력, - 셋째, 정상의모임이라는수준에맞추어의제를재조정함과동시에이들의제들을체계적으로준비하고다루어나갈수있도록외무장관회의의병렬적개최와사무국설치를포함한관리방법의제도적개선등이요구되고있다고할수있음. 글로벌거버넌스의재편요구는필요조건으로서의세계화의진전과충분조건으로서의힘의분포변화가맞물리면서국제관계변화의동력으로작용하고있으며, 이러한상황전개는현상유지세력과현상변경세력간의협력과갈등을초래하게되며 3 중견국의부상 가. 중견국부상의배경과특징글로벌거버넌스의재편요구는필요조건으로서의세계화의진전과충분조건으로서의힘의분포변화가맞물리면서국제관계변화의동력으로작용하고있음. 이러한상황전개는기존질서를가급적유지하고자하는현상유지세력과변화된현실을반영하기위해기존질서의변경을요구하는현상변경세력간협력과갈등을초래하게됨. - 최근의국제환경변화, 특히 2008년미국발금융위기이후목도되고있는중국의급부상과미국의상대적쇠퇴에따른국제관계의전반적재조정양상들은이러한관찰을뒷받침하고있음. 137

146 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 더나아가힘의분포변화에따른국제관계의변화는비단 UN 안보리상임이사국들 (P5) 로대변되는강대국들간관계에만영향을미치는수준에머무르지않고, 국제현안들에대한다수국가들의의사도중요시될수밖에없는현실을초래하고있음. - 달리말하면국제적현안들에대한 P5의거부권 (major powers veto) 이기존강대국들의영향력을말해주는것이었다면, 점차신흥국과중견국들이지니게되는이해당사자들의거부권 (stakeholders veto) 도중시될수밖에없다는것임. 향후중견국외교는관련국들간체계적협의강화방안의구비와함께글로벌거버넌스의재편과정에서중견국들이가장효과적으로기여할수있는아이디어의창출등다수의과제들을안고있으며 상기한환경의변화는한국을포함하는소위중견국들에게 G20 을비롯한글로벌거버넌스의재편으로대변되는국제질서의변화과정에능동적으로참여할수있는기회를제공하고있는데, 중견국외교는다음과같은역사적사례를볼때, 충분한합리적필요성이인정될수있을것으로판단됨 년대초 중반석유무기화로국제적발언권이강화된제3세계국가들이소위 신 ( 新 ) 국제경제질서 (the New International Economic Order) 의채택을제1세계로불렸던선진권에요구하였으나, 당시중재적역할이기대되었던제2세계사회주의권이필요한개입을회피하여최소한의완충장치가부재하게됨에따라선 후진국간양보의여지가없는협상교착상태가이어지고, 결국형식적인선언으로귀결된바있음. 이러한국제질서의변경은적정한중재세력이있을때극단적인양자간대립을우회하여나름의바람직한결과를가지고올수있음을반증하고있다고하겠음. 새로이전개되는환경하에서가능해진소위 2세대중견국외교는냉전시대의 1세대중견국들이미국과소련이라는초강대국들사이에서핵무기의위협들로부터자국의안보를보호받는동시에평화와안전에능동적으로기여하기위해추동한중견국외교와는다른특징들을보여주고있는데, 이들은지식의공유에기초한협력, 네트워크에기반을둔협조및진화적과정 (evolutionary process) 으로요약될수있음. 향후국제적차원에서전개될중견국외교는관련국들간체계적협의강화방안의구비와함께글로벌거버넌스의재편과정 138

147 G20 의발전을위한중견국의역할 에서중견국들이가장효과적으로기여할수있는아이디어의창출등다수의과제들을안고있음. 이러한예상을근거로할때, 중견국외교는비록짧지않은시간이소요될수밖에없을것이나, 중 장기적으로국제질서의효율적관리라는당위론적측면에서는물론힘의전이과정에서유발되는현실적필요성의대두라는측면에서도그가능성이상당히높을것으로전망할수있을것임. 나. MIKTA 의출범 2013년중국제관계의변화에서주목되는점은소위중견국들이집단적으로위상을확보하고그영향력을확대하기위한체계적인노력을시작하였다는사실임. 즉, G20 내에서 G7 국가도아니고 BRICS 국가도아닌 5개국 ( 멕시코, 인도네시아, 한국, 터키, 호주 ) 이 9월 UN 총회를계기로외무장관회의를개최하여중견국협의체인 MIKTA를결성하는데합의하고, 매년최소두차례장관급회의를개최하여글로벌거버넌스의재편과정에서건설적인역할을해나가기로한것임. 이들중견국들은 MIKTA의기본원칙으로서비공식성 (informality), 개방성 (openness), 점진성 (gradualism) 등에합의하고, 지식의공유와네트워킹등전 ( 前 ) 세대의중견국들과는차별화되는협력방식을통해국제사회에공헌해나가기로함. G20 내에서 G7 국가도아니고 BRICS 국가도아닌 5 개국 ( 멕시코, 인도네시아, 한국, 터키, 호주 ) 이중견국협의체인 MIKTA 를결성하는데합의하고, 전 ( 前 ) 세대의중견국들과는차별화되는협력방식을통해국제사회에공헌해나가기로하였으며 이들중견국들이활동공간을확보하기위해서는기존세력인미국을중심으로하는 G7 국가들과중국으로대변되는신흥국들의모임인 BRICS 국가들의협조가우선적일것임. - 세계화가급속히진전되는가운데미국의참여가전제되지않고는 ( without US ) 어떠한국제현안의해결도불가능하지만, 또다른한편으로미국만의힘 ( US alone ) 으로해결할수없는글로벌이슈도급증하고있는실정임. 이에따라미국도점차다자주의의유용성을폭넓게수용해가는가운데, 그동조세력으로서대체적으로동맹국, 우호협력국들인중견국과의협력의폭도넓혀가게될것임. 139

148 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 향후 MIKTA 자체발전을위한제도적장치의마련, G20 등제반글로벌거버넌스의혁신을위한아이디어창출, 기존세력과신흥세력양측로부터협력대상자가될수있도록하는집단적외교노력이동시에진전되어갈것으로예상되며 - 중국등신흥국들은신흥국간남남협력 (South-South cooperation) 이희망과는달리답보상태를보이고있는데다지역협력을통한발언권의강화 (threat of regional exit) 또한미국이활용했던북미자유무역협정 (NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement) 의예에서와같은효과를기대하기는어려워결국글로벌차원에서의발언권확대를우선시할수밖에없을것임. 이경우과거의역사적경험을공유할수있고, 또한경제규모와발전수준에있어서도어느정도대등한중견국들과의협력이긴요해질것으로예측됨. 이렇게볼때, MIKTA로출발한중견국협의체는점진적으로발전되어갈것으로보이며, 그과정에서 - 첫째, MIKTA 자체발전을위한제도적장치의마련, - 둘째, 이를바탕으로하는 G20 등제반글로벌거버넌스의혁신을위한아이디어창출, - 셋째, 기존세력과신흥세력양측로부터협력대상자가될수있도록하는집단적외교노력이동시에진전되어갈것으로예상됨. 4 중견국의역할 : 글로벌거버넌스혁신자 (Global Governance Innovator) 중견국들의새로운활동공간이된글로벌거버넌스의재편과정에는다음과같은극복되어야할과제들이있음. 첫째, 제도에대한기본이해에있어서의상충 (system friction) 임. - 기존강대국들, 즉 G7 국가들이주도해왔던기존질서의토대는자유민주주의와신자유주의적경향이강화된자본주의의틀인데반해, 다수의신흥국들은권위적통치와국가자본주의적요소들을체제의특징으로지녀왔음. - 이에따라국제질서를보는시각또는그운용기제로서글로벌거버넌스를보는시각에서양자간차이가노정되고, 상이점들을둘러싸고논점이갈라지게되는데, 예를들어글로벌거버넌스의기본지향점을효율성에둘지또는균등성에둘지가달라지며, 또한행위의동력을시장균형에서찾을지또는국가행위에서찾을지가달라지게된다는것임. 140

149 G20 의발전을위한중견국의역할 둘째, 편익과비용의분배에서나타날수있는갈등 (distributional conflicts) 임. - 기존주도국들은비용과편익의분배에있어서공평한부담과이에근거한공정한이익배분을중시하는반면, 신흥국들은기존강대국들의역사적책임과자국의부담능력부족등을근거로최소한의비용부담과최대한의편익배분을요구하는경향을띄고있어소위무임승차 (free ride) 의논란이계속됨. 셋째, 조직의효율성과관련된논쟁 (institutional inefficiency) 임. - 기존질서의주도국들은국제협력에있어서비공식성을선호하는가운데글로벌거버넌스의구축에필요한사무국의설치등과같은제도화관련제안에일단회의적인입장을취하는반면, 현상변경을원하는신흥국들의입장에서는제도화를통해기존강대국들의영향력이가능한한통제되기를원하는경향이있음. - 선진국들이견지하는제도화에대한회의적시각의배경에는실질적으로과도한제도화가효율성을해치면서또다른국제적관료주의를비대화시켜온역사적경험이배경으로작용하고있는것으로보임. 이렇게볼때, 중견국들이이러한간극들을좁혀나가는데기여함으로써글로벌거버넌스의재편과정에서보다중요한역할을해나가기위해서는무엇보다소모적인논쟁을우회하여실질적결과를보여줄수있어야하는데, 이러한목적을성취하기위해서는비교적가치중립적인제도의투명성 (transparency), 책임성 (accountability), 평가성 (assessment) 등에있어서혁신적인아이디어를창출하여공급하는한편스스로이들분야에서모범 (best practice) 을보여주어야할것임. - 따라서중견국들이글로벌거버넌스의재편과정에서나타날수있는문제점들을극복하는데기여하기위해서는가능한여러가지역할들중에서무엇보다도지식의공유와네트워킹을통해창의적인아이디어를제공하는 글로벌거버넌스의혁신자 (global governance innovator) 역할에주목하는것이지름길이될것으로판단됨. 중견국들이글로벌거버넌스의재편과정에서나타날수있는문제점들을극복하는데기여하기위해서는지식의공유와네트워킹을통해창의적인아이디어를제공하는 글로벌거버넌스의혁신자 (global governance innovator) 역할에주목하는것이지름길이될것으로판단되며 141

150 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 이러한목적을달성하기위해 MIKTA는우선 G20 내에재무장관회의와병렬적으로외무장관회의 (Foreign Ministers Meeting) 를설치하는노력을경주하는한편, 조속한시간내중견국의장래활동을전체적으로조망해내기위한비전그룹 (MIKTA Vision Group) 을발족시키고, 이그룹과병렬적으로활동할수있는회원국내관련연구소간의연구공동체 (MIKTA Research Community) 를구상해볼수있을것임. - 비전그룹과연구공동체는중견국의개념, 협력원칙, 협력의주안점등을재점검하면서부족한부분을채워나가게되는데, 그과정에서우선적으로취급해야할이슈분야를무엇으로할것인가에대한검토가있게될것임. 특정이슈를선정하기보다는각국의실질적이해관계가직결되지않는이슈이면서도글로벌거버넌스의틀자체를혁신시킬수있는문제들을우선다루어야 이경우중견국들간존재할수있는이해관계의상이성이중견국협력초기에노정될위험성을우회하기위해서는특정이슈를선정하기보다는상기한대로투명성, 책임성, 평가등과같이각국의실질적이해관계가직결되지않는이슈이면서도글로벌거버넌스의틀자체를혁신 (governance innovation) 시킬수있는문제들을우선다루어야할것임. 5 한국의고려사항 향후한국이중견국외교를추진하는데있어우선적으로고려해야할사안은중 장기적인시각에서중견국외교를해나가기위해어떠한층위에서, 어떠한과정을통해추진해나갈것인가에대한로드맵으로서, 다음과같은전략적경로를상정해볼수있음. 가. 중견국간의연계형성시도여기에는두가지가능성이있는데, 하나는 MIKTA의발족에서보여지듯 G20 구성국들중 G7도아니고 BRICS도아닌국가들이우선국가간 (inter-governmental) 연대로서중견국협의체를추진해나가는것임. MIKTA의경우 G20의 7개중견국가들중아르헨티나와사우디아라비아가참여하지못한채발족되었 142

151 G20 의발전을위한중견국의역할 으나, 향후이들두국가의참여를추진해볼수있으며, 이렇게추진될중견국협의체는자연적으로우선 G20을토대 (platform) 로추진될것임. - 특히, 중견국들이입지강화를위해경주해나가는이러한노력은발전과정체의기로에선 G20의향후발전에있어서도중요한추동력 (push) 을제공할수있을것임. - 더욱이향후 G20 일정이 2014년호주, 2015년터키등으로 G7 국가들이아닌소위중견국들이연속적인정상회의개최국들로선정되어있어이들의새로운노력이 MIKTA를중심으로체계적으로집적되고 G20 과정에적절히투입될경우, G20의제도적발전을위한국제적논의가다시활성화될수있는계기 (turn around) 가마련될것으로전망됨. 또다른하나는 1세대중견국으로분류되는국가들, 예컨대캐나다와북구국가들과같이중견국으로서의활동경험과이를뒷받침하는지식이축적된국가들을상기한 MIKTA 또는회원국이확대된 MIKTA+ 와엮어서중견국의기여를확대해나갈수있는중견국지식공동체 (middle power s epistemic community) 를구축하는것임. - 이경우회의체의성격은정부뿐만아니라학자, 언론인등의사결정과정에영향력을행사할수있는민간의참여가바람직하므로소위반관반민의 1.5트랙 (track) 이될것임. - 이러한노력은이미시작되어 2011년이스탄불에서처음개최된후 2012년멕시코시티, 2013년토론토와서울에서각각열린중견국회의 (CPI: Constructive Powers Initiative Meeting) 가그경우에해당된다고하겠음. 중견국외교를위한전략적경로의시발점은정부간협의체로서의 MIKTA 와민간이참여하는형태의 CPI 등 1.5 트랙희의들을병렬적으로동시에추진함으로써공동의노력으로중견국외교의개념을정립하고향후기여방안을모색해나가는기반조성작업이라고할수있으며 이렇게볼때중견국외교를위한전략적경로의시발점은정부간협의체로서의 MIKTA 와민간이참여하는형태의 CPI 등 1.5 트랙희의들을병렬적으로동시에추진함으로써공동의노력으로중견국외교의개념을정립하고향후기여방안을모색해나가는기반조성작업이라고할수있을것임. 143

152 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 나. 글로벌차원과지역차원의연계형성개발최근다양한글로벌거버넌스의논의에서제기되고있는문제의식중하나는글로벌거버넌스의구축을위해서는글로벌차원의기제를고안하거나재편하는노력에덧붙여지역협력의기제를적절히활용할수있어야한다는점인데, 이러한지적을염두에두고한국의중견국외교추진경로를생각한다면우선글로벌차원에서는전술한바와같이 G20을토대로하는경로를설정할수있을것임. - 발전과정체의기로에직면하고있는 G20이향후글로벌거버넌스의주된기제로서의위상을구축해나가기위해서는전통적의미의경제뿐만아니라에너지, 환경, 개발등소위경제문제로서의성격과안보문제로서의성격이혼합된하이브리드이슈 (hybrid issues) 등새로운글로벌이슈를다루어나가는기제로탈바꿈해나감으로써정상들의모임으로서의위상과여건에맞는회의체로변환할수있을것임. 한국은중견국의입지를활용한외교적접근을통해각각의움직임을추동할수있을뿐만아니라, 그과정에서지역협력의동력을글로벌거버넌스의재편움직임과연동시키는연결고리의역할이가능할것으로보이며 다음으로지역차원을고려해본다면, 동아시아차원에서의동아시아정상회의 (EAS: East Asia Summit) 와동북아차원의동북아정상회의 (CJK Summit / 중국, 일본, 한국 ) 를생각해볼수있을것이나, 현재 EAS는아직태동기를벗어나지못한상태에서회원국간주도권을둘러싼경쟁으로, CJK는회원국내민족주의의분출로인한국제적갈등의심화로각각의진전이둔화되고있음. - 중견국으로서한국은 EAS 내에서는우선같은 MIKTA 참여국인호주, 인도네시아와함께 EAS의발전을위한창조적아이디어를공동으로개발해나갈수있을것이며, CJK에서는 G7인일본과 BRICS의회원국인중국사이에서교량적역할을해나갈수있을것임. 이러한중견국의입지를활용한외교적접근을통해각각의움직임을추동할수있을뿐만아니라, 그과정에서지역협력의동력을글로벌거버넌스의재편움직임과연동시키는연결고리의역할이가능할것으로보임. 144

153 G20 의발전을위한중견국의역할 다. 선별적다자주의와보편적다자주의간의연계형성모색 2세대중견국외교에대한필요성을제기하게된계기로서의금융위기와이를극복하기위한방편으로서의 G20은비록경제위기관리를위한기제로서의효율성은인정받고있으나, 회원국구성의배타성으로인해그정당성에대한문제제기가꾸준히이어져왔음. - 즉, 국제정치 경제적현실에비추어볼때, 선별적다자주의인 G-X로서의 G20이불가피하게글로벌거버넌스의주요기제역할을할수밖에없었으나, 보편적다자주의를추구하는시각에서볼때, 그대표성과관련된불만이표출될수밖에없다는점임. - 그예로 G20의초창기에 UN 내비 ( 非 )G20 국가들이소위 3G 모임을결성하고 G20의행보에비판적이었던점을들수있을것임. 중견국들은공동의노력을통해글로벌거버넌스의재편과정이 G-X 접근의효율성으로부터시작하되, 보편적다자주의가지니는정당성을점차확보해나가는 정직한매개자 (honest broker) 의역할을해야할것이며 이러한배경을감안할때, 중견국들은공동의노력을통해글로벌거버넌스의재편과정이 G-X 접근의효율성으로부터시작하되, 보편적다자주의가지니는정당성을점차확보해나가는 정직한매개자 (honest broker) 의역할을해야할것임. - 이러한노력은제반다자주의의장에서그역할이지속적으로확대되고있는한국은물론여타중견국들이 UN을비롯한보편적다자주의의장이나 G20 등선별적다자주의의장에서공통으로점하고있는비중으로비추어볼때그가능성도적지않다고하겠음. - 또한 CPI 등열린포럼을통해 1세대중견국들도포함하는더욱광범위한중견국연대를구축해낼수있다면이러한작업에매우큰도움이될것으로판단됨. 상기한세차원에서의전략경로는모두유의미하며또한서로연관되어있다고볼수있으나, 소요되는시간적요소들을감안하여우선순위를부여한다면, 1) 단기적으로, G20을토대로하는중견국간연대기반구축, 2) 중기적으로는, G20을중심으로하는글로벌차원의움직임과지역차원에서의동력의연결, 그리 145

154 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 고장기적으로, 3) UN을포함하는보편적다자주의의장에서중견국의역할을가능케하는광범위한중견국연대의실현이될것으로사료됨. 146

155 G20 의발전을위한중견국의역할 < 부록 1> 상트페테르부르크 G20 정상회의정상선언문의주요내용 세계경제와강하고지속가능한균형성장을위한거시정책공조 세계경제의도전과제들해결공조를위한 상트페테르부르크실천계획 (St. Petersburg Action Plan) ( 부속서 ) 채택 - 강하고지속가능한균형성장기반강화, 경제활동과일자리창출촉진, 경기회복지원, 단기위험요인해결 금융변동성확대에직면한신흥국들의성장지원및안정을위한필요조치 ( 경제펀더멘털제고, 외부충격에대한복원력및금융시스템강화등 ) 강구 선진국의통화정책정상화, 통화정책기조변화시신중한조정 (carefully calibrated) 및시장과의명확한소통 (clearly communicated) 추구 각국국내정책의세계경제성장과금융안정에의기여및여타국에대한파급효과관리공조 각국에지속가능균형성장을위한종합적인성장전략개발요청 양질의일자리를통한성장 포용적성장 (inclusive growth) 달성을위한더많은일자리와양질의일자리창출을위한국가별상황에맞는광범위한행동추구 G20 차원에서일자리창출여건을다각적측면에서발굴 검토및협력 공조방안모색 장기투자재원조성 지속가능한성장과고용창출을위한장기투자재원조성 국가별특수요인을고려한인프라, 중소기업등의장기투자재원조성촉진여건마련필요및국내투자환경개선조치이행 다자무역체계강화 무역자유화를위해보호주의동결서약 (standstill commitment) 을 2016 년까지연장 WTO, OECD 및 UNCTAD 의보호주의 ( 무역 투자제한 / 개방 ) 조치에관한모니터링작업지지 세원잠식과소득이전에대한대응, 조세회피방지, 조세투명성제고와정보의자동교환 OECD 의 BEPS( 세금잠식과소득이전 ) 대응실천계획 과 조세정보의자동교환모델개발계획 (2015 년말개시 ) 승인및차질없는이행합의 - 모든국가들에 다자간조세행정공조협약 (Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters) 가입을요청 OECD 의 국경없는세무조사관 (Tax Inspectors without Borders) 이니셔티브환영 국제금융체제 효율적인글로벌안전망 (global safety net) 의중요성인식을바탕으로 4,610 억불의 IMF 재원확충약속환영 기존글로벌안전망에서지역금융안전망 (RFAs: Regional Financing Agreements) 의중요한역할수행재확인 - IMF-RFAs 간및 RFAs 상호간경험 정보공유대화채널의중요성공감및협력발전 진전사항의이행 점검요청 147

156 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 금융규제 강하고지속가능한균형성장을지원하기위한금융안정위원회 (FSB) 의금융규제개혁지속 금융기관의복원력강화와 대마불사 (too-big-to-fail) 종결 투명하고연속적으로기능하는금융시장조성 그림자금융 (shadow banking) 의위험방지 자금세탁방지국제기구 (FATF: Financial Action Task Force) 를통한자금세탁과테러자금조달에대한대응 금융포용, 금융교육, 소비자보호 금융 ( 소외계층 ) 포용을위한글로벌파트너십 (GPFI: Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion) 의진전환영 여성 청소년대상금융이해력제고및금융교육확대 금융소비자보호를위한노력지지 모두를위한개발촉진 2010 년서울 다년간개발행동계획 (MYAP: Multi-Year Action Plan on Development) 이후의활동들에대한 상트페테르부르크이행성과평가보고서 ( 부속서 ) 와 2010 서울개발컨센서스를바탕으로한 상트페테르부르크신규행동계획 ( 부속서 ) 채택, 그리고더욱효과적인성과도출을위한논의방식 (working practices) 개선 G20 개발의제를통한새천년개발목표 (MDGs: Millennium Development Goals) 달성가속화및 UN 차원에서논의중인 Post-2015 개발의제구체화노력지지 년이후의 G20 활동들을새로운개발프레임워크와일치화 지속가능한에너지정책및글로벌상품시장회복 기후변화대응추구 녹색기후기금 (GCF: Green Climate Fund) 의운영개시지지및 GCF 재원의효과적조성방안마련촉구 부패척결강화 < 주 > 청와대 ( 뉴스, 2013 년상트페테르부르크 G20 정상회의개최결과 ( ) 및상트페테르부르크정상선언문 ( 참조 148

157 G20 의발전을위한중견국의역할 < 부록 2> 역대 G20 정상회의평가 (1) 위기극복기 ( 가 ) 1차워싱턴정상회의 (2008 년 11월 ) G20 정상회의는미국에서시작된금융위기가미국만의문제가아닌세계적차원의경제위기임을인식하고, 위기상황을국제적협력을통해극복하는동시에나아가위기발생배경요인의하나로지적되고있는국제화폐 금융체제에대한개혁방안을모색하고자긴급히회동하게되었음. 정상들이참석하는회의가단시간내개최될수있을정도로주요경제국들이위기의식을공유하고있음을보여주었다는점과 2009년 4월말이전제2차회의개최에합의함으로써회의의연속성이확보되었다는점을감안하면, 일단 불완전한성공 (incomplete success) 으로평가됨. ( 나 ) 2차런던정상회의 (2009 년 4월 ) 제1차정상회의에서의합의이행상황을점검하는한편, 좀더구체적인실천방안을도출해냄으로써전세계적으로확산된경제위기극복을위한수단을강구하는동시에이의재발방지를위한대비책을마련하는데그의의가있음. 동정상회의는금융규제 감독강화를중시하는유럽및여타국가들과재정지출확대를통한경기부양책마련에좀더큰비중을두는미국간의시각차로합의도달이어려울수도있다는우려를불식시키고, 의미있는합의안을도출해내었다는점에서 역사적합의 (historic decision) 라는상당히긍정적인평가를받고있음. 이렇듯큰기대와일부우려가공존했던이회의는향후회원국들이여하히효율적인후속조치들을다루어나가느냐에따라그성공여부가최종결정될것이라는점에서 유보된성공 (deferred success) 이라할수있을것임. (2) 전환모색기 ( 다 ) 3차피츠버그정상회의 (2009 년 9월 ) 세계경제가전반적인회복세를보임에따라 G20의지속필요성에대한 149

158 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 회의 ( 懷疑 ) 도일부대두되고있던시점에개최되었음. 그럼에도불구하고정상들이 G20을국제경제협력을위한최상위협의체로지정한것은 G20 이당면한위기해소라는단기적관점을넘어중 장기적관점에서의국제경제운용에착안했다는점을보여주고있음. 또한, 경기활성화를주목적으로하는경제정책공조위주에서기후변화대책등보다포괄적인경제관련이슈를다루게되었다는점, 그리고제도화와핵심적포럼화에대한정상간합의에도달하였다는점등을종합적으로감안해보면, 변환적성공 (transformational success) 으로평가해도지나치지않을것임. ( 라 ) 4차토론토정상회의 (2010 년 6월 ) 제4차정상회의는세계경제의회복세가일부나타나세계적차원에서의경제위기가어느정도극복되었다는일종의안도감이 G20 정상회의에서합의의시급성을감소시킬가능성이존재하는한편, 유럽발경제위기의가능성에대한우려가공존하는환경에서개최됨. 그러나, 이전회의에서도출된합의사항들의진전상황을점검하고, 이를바탕으로서울에서제5차정상회의준비를진행할수있는유용한토대를구축하였다는점에서볼때, 제4차토론토정상회의는 과도기적성공 (transitional success) 으로평가해볼수있을것임. ( 마 ) 5차서울정상회의 (2010 년 11월 ) 비록금융위기가종식되지는않았으나, 위기감이희석됨에따라 G20의유용성에대한회의 ( 懷疑 ) 가일부제기되고있던상황에서지난네차례의정상회의에서의논의된주요내용중상당부분이서울회의로그결정이넘어와있었고, 또새로운의제들이추가됨에따라서울정상회의의성공여부는 G20의지속적발전을가름할수있는분수령적인중요성을지니고있었음. G20의지속적발전이라는시각에서볼때, 비록무역불균형문제의해결을비롯하여정상회의의기존합의사안들에대한더욱구체적인실천방안들을마련해나가야하는향후과제들을안고있었으나, 서울정상회의는 G20의상설협의체로서의역할확대가능성을재확인시켰다는점에서 미완성의성공 (unfinished success) 으로평가해볼수있을것임. 150

159 G20 의발전을위한중견국의역할 (3) 답보정체기 ( 바 ) 6차깐느정상회의 (2011 년 11월 ) 그리스발재정위기가최우선의관심사로부각됨으로써 2008년의미국발금융위기극복에이어 G20의위기관리능력이재평가되는계기가되었으나, 위기에대한미흡한대처를두고 G20의유용성에대한우려가오히려점증하게되었음. 반면, 국제통화기금 (IMF: International Monetary Fund) 과금융안정위원회 (FSB: Financial Stability Board) 등을더욱강화시키거나그제도화의수준을높이는데합의하는한편, 트로이카체제를공식화 (formalizing) 한가운데 2015년까지의개최국을결정하고이후의개최지선정방식에합의하는등제도적발전과관련하여약간의진전은보여준바있음. 이렇게볼때, 깐느정상회의는지난수년간확대되어온 G20에대한기대가일정수준감소하였으나 G20의지속성을유지해나가는데는성공하였다는점에서 절반의성공 (half success) 으로평가하는것이합당할것임. ( 사 ) 7차로스까보스정상회의 (2012 년 6월 ) 2011년깐느정상회의의경우와같이유로존의재정위기가여전히최우선관심사로남아있어 G20의경제위기관리능력이다시부각되는계기가되었으나, 이에대한대응이유럽의자구적노력강화를촉구하는수준에머무는한계를드러내보였음. 이에따라 2010년서울정상회의를계기로 G20이위기관리기능으로부터더나아가국제경제현안해결을위한상설협의체 (steering committee) 가되어야한다는기대감이깐느회의에이어이번회의에서도또다시낮아지는결과를빚게됨. 이렇게볼때, 로스까보스정상회의는 G20의유용성을재확인하고지속성을유지하는데는성공하였으나, 2008년이후금융위기극복과정에서팽배했던 G20의장기적발전에대한기대는더욱위축되었다는점에서 불편한성공 (uncomfortable success) 으로평가하는것이합당할것임. ( 아 ) 8차상트페테르부르크정상회의 (2013 년 9월 ) 2013년 9월러시아상트페테르부르크에서열린정상회의는비록거시경제 151

160 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 정책공조, 국제금융체제강화, 금융규제와조세, 개발문제및무역등국제경제의핵심주요의제들과기타에너지 기후변화문제들을폭넓게다루었으나실질적진전은미약했던것으로보이며, 러시아의제안으로다루어진정치의제로서의시리아문제도회원국간의이견만을노정시키는결과를초래하였음. 이렇게볼때, 금번상트페테르부르크정상회의는 G20의지속성을유지하는데는기여하였으나, 2008년이후의금융위기극복과정에서팽배했던 G20의발전과바람직한역할에대한기대와는여전히일정수준의거리가상존하고있음을재확인시켰다는점에서볼때 실망적인성공 (disappointing success) 으로평가해볼수있을것임. < 주 > 여덟차례의정상회의에대한평가는매 G20 정상회의직후필자가작성한분석및평가보고서인 주요국제문제분석 에서발췌하여작성하였음. 152

161 Middle Powers Role for the Development of the G20 Middle Powers Role for the Development of the G20 LEE Dong Hwi Professor Department of International Economy and Trade Studies 1. Challenges for the Development of the G20 A s the U.S.-originated financial crisis in 2008 spread across the world, twenty of the world s major economies joined and created the Group of Twenty (G20) to strengthen cooperation in economic policy as part of the global efforts to overcome the crisis. Later, the G20 became the premier forum for international economic cooperation and came to be regarded as the core mechanism for global governance on the economic front. Furthermore, it has sought to make a transition from simply a crisis management body to a steering committee which facilitates sustainable and balanced development of the world economy. The eight summits convened since 2008 have proved the G20 to be a major vehicle for reorganization of global governance and consolidated its role as an important forum for dealing with pending global economic issues. It receives criticism, however, for having failed to fully realize the transition to steering committee. Meanwhile, as the international community s expectations for the G20 s role have dimmed after the worst phase of the global economic crisis ended, the financial crises in Europe and the U.S. led these countries to prioritize domestic economic operation, weakening the foundation of global financial cooperation. Thus, the G20, five years after its inception, came to face the choice between development and stagnation. A new driving force is deemed necessary for revitalization of the institution. The course of the G20 s development can largely be divided into three stages. 153

162 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 The first stage is the period of overcoming crisis. The early years of the G20 were dedicated to managing the imminent crisis; the first G20 summit in Washington and the second summit in London belong to this period. The next stage may be named the period of exploring transition. Efforts to transform the G20 from a body established for crisis management into a permanent forum started at this stage and the third, fourth, and fifth summits, held in Pittsburg, Toronto, and Seoul respectively, fall under this category. In later summits (sixth through eighth) held in Cannes, Los Cabos, and recently in Saint Petersburg, the G20 seemed to be adrift amidst unfavorable events one after another such as the Eurozone crisis and the U.S. fiscal deficit, until it eventually found itself in the period of stagnation, having to choose between progress and maintaining the status quo. Based on a brief assessment of the eight summits held over the past five years, the challenges revealed in the course of the G20 s development can be laid out as follows Absence of Leadership Who The biggest vulnerability revealed in the G20 s development course is the absence of leadership which can steer the development. The G20 was criticized for its failure to efficiently deal with the financial crisis which began in Greece as a result of conflicting interests among the EU member states. This has further increased the risks of allowing the distrustful views concerning the G20 s status as the premier forum for international economic cooperation to solidify. Another variable constraining the G20 leadership is related to the U.S. the combined challenges of continued quantitative easing policies and fiscal deficit have made it difficult for the U.S. to take the initiative in assuming the leadership role in the global economy. The lack of leadership is also partially attributable to the situation in emerging markets such as China and Brazil, where slow progress in political and economic reforms and increasing difficulties in their domestic economies have kept them too preoccupied to discuss economic support elsewhere. 154

163 Middle Powers Role for the Development of the G20 In this sense, the growing skepticism of the G20 s relevance and the absence of leadership offer implications regarding the development prospects of the G20 as to which countries (who) will fill the absence of leadership in case the major powers such as the U.S., China, and EU fail to take the leadership position either individually or collectively for various reasons Inadequacy of Agenda What While selection of agenda and preparations for discussions at the G20, which focuses on economic and financial issues, are still deeply influenced by the G7 countries, EU and the leading G7 countries such as the U.S. are primarily concerned with internal economic issues rather than the global economy, and thus, capacity to resolve the current problem is being undermined. On a separate note, the problem of rampantly persisting agenda creep needs to be reviewed for the future development of the G20. The expansion of agenda is reasonable in that it would help reach beyond the traditional macro-economic policy coordination among the G7 and further engage emerging markets and other developing countries. Also, dealing with the complex nature of the problems, the so-called hybrid issues which characterize the latest trend in international politics/economy, could help consolidate the G20 s raison d êre. However, the setting of the agenda, at times, heavily reflects the host countries interests, rather than being based on the common agreement of the G20 countries after sincere contemplation on the institution s future. Also, the host countries tend to be overly ambitious when selecting additional agenda items, in hopes of leaving their legacies in regards to the development of the G20. In this sense, yet another task for the G20 would be to carefully select the meaningful agenda (what) in addition to elevating the G20 s role as a permanent body aimed at restructuring global economic governance Lack of Efficiency How Some observers note that because of the main agenda items of the G20 being focused on technical issues within economy and finance, the efficiency of the 155

164 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 G20 as a summit gathering could be undermined. Also, the string of summits that have been held is resulting in summit fatigue in terms of international relations. The root cause of the development of such a complex situation derives from the fact that the G20 summit was created by expanding and upgrading the group s finance ministers meeting that had been held since 1999 in the efforts to quickly overcome the financial crisis in That said, if the fundamental nature of the G20 ought to be adjusted from being an economy-oriented technical consultative body for overcoming the financial crisis to a broader political structure as befits a summit gathering, a proposal can be made to establish the foreign ministers meeting in parallel with the finance ministers meeting as in the case of the G8. Meanwhile, these concerns are rising especially in the absence of leadership due to lack of a system which could effectively plan and manage discussions on the ever-growing agenda items in a systematic way. For example, the secretariat, or the current Troika system that is meant to take on the role of a permanent secretariat, is not functioning properly. Such weakness might leave the agenda insufficiently addressed, eventually leading to the G20 being treated as a so-called talk-shop or becoming a general store of agenda items, undermining its usefulness. Thus, additional tasks required for the G20 s development in the future would be to find out the ways (how) to enhance operational efficiency through efforts including introduction of the foreign ministers meeting and establishment of a secretariat, and to work on institutional innovation. 2. The Rise of Middle Powers The call to restructure global governance is providing the driving force behind the change in international relations as the ongoing waves of globalization a necessary condition have coincided with the change in distribution of power a sufficient condition. Such developments have led to cooperation as well as conflicts between the forces seeking to maintain the current international order and those initiating change in the existing order to reflect the new reality. 156

165 Middle Powers Role for the Development of the G20 In consideration of such circumstances, outlooks can be drawn based on three major changes as below, and it is likely that a large part of the diplomatic environment would be made up of rivalry and cooperation over the issue of establishment of global governance. First, distribution of power began to change as the result of a power shift. Second, with the change in power distribution, global governance as a mechanism responsible for maintaining the international order requires restructuring or reinvention. Third, conflict arising from this process between the major powers which have maintained the existing international order and the emerging countries seeking to change that order could generate a niche where middle powers could serve as mediators. Particularly, the third observation which forecasts opportunities for middle powers also implies that if the middle powers manage to build a suitable mechanism for cooperation, they will be able to assume constructive roles in building the key global governance led by the G20 countries, and thus, expand their sphere of international political/economic in-fluence. Such change of environment has opened up opportunities for the so-called middle power countries including Korea to proactively participate in the change of international order, epitomized by the reorganization of global governance such as the rise of the G20. Meanwhile, the need for middle power diplomacy may be justified in view of historical precedents as below. In the early to mid-1970s, the Third World countries whose oil weapon had granted them a greater say in the international arena called on the First World of Western states for the creation of the so-called New International Economic Order. However, as the Second World socialist states, from whom the mediating role was expected, avoided making the necessary intervention, the absence of the minimum buffer led to stalemate in negotiations between the developed and developing world without an inch of concession, and eventually the whole discussion ended with a ceremonial declaration. The case, as a counterexample, seems to prove that change in the international order, with the help of a suitable mediating force, can result in the circumvention of extreme conflicts between two parties and bring about a plausible outcome. 157

166 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 The second-generation middle power diplomacy made possible under the newly unfolded circumstances shows a different set of traits from those of the previous diplomatic efforts during the Cold War era, which was driven by the first generation middle power states that, caught in between the U.S. and the Soviet Union superpowers, sought to protect their national security from the threat of nuclear weapons while also contributing to peace and security. The traits of the second-generation middle power diplomacy can be summed up as cooperation rooted in sharing of knowledge, and the evolutionary process based on networking. The middle power diplomacy to be conducted globally has a number of tasks ahead, e.g., to identify ways to bolster systematic consultations among relevant countries, and to develop ideas to contribute to the restructuring of global governance. Based on such prospects, the feasibility of middle power diplomacy is high both in view of the efficient management of the international order in the midto long-term and in terms of the practical need arising from the power transition, though it will no doubt take a long time before taking root. What was noteworthy in the change of international relations in 2013 is that the middle power states have begun to make systematic efforts to collectively secure status and enhance influence. That is, five countries among the G20 economies Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, and Australia that are neither part of the G7 nor the BRICS initiated the middle power cooperation mechanism dubbed MIKTA on the occasion of the 68th session of the UN General Assembly. At least two ministerial meetings will be held yearly to work on assuming a constructive role in the reorganization of global governance. The five states agreed to pursue informality, openness, and gradualism as the basic ethos of MIKTA, and decided to contribute to international community through cooperation methods that differentiate them from the middle powers of the former generation, such as knowledge sharing and networking. 158

167 Middle Powers Role for the Development of the G20 3. Roles of Middle Powers In restructuring global governance, which has become the new sphere of activities for the middle powers, there are tasks to be tackled as follows. First is system friction. While the current global order led by existing major powers, the G7, was founded on a capitalist framework with strong liberal democratic and neo-liberal characteristics, most emerging countries regimes have been characterized by authoritarian rule and national capitalist factors. In this regard, the two sides would show differences of opinion in viewing the international order or global governance as a device for managing the international order, and the points of discussion would diverge over these differences. This would dictate, for example, whether to put the primary focus of global governance on efficiency or equality, and whether to find the engine behind activities in the market balance or the national behavior. The second obstacle is distributional conflict. In distributing costs and benefits, existing powers attach greater importance to equal sharing of responsibility and fair distribution of benefits, whereas the emerging countries insist on the minimum bearing of cost and maximum sharing of benefits, citing the historical responsibilities of existing powers and the emerging economies lack of capacity to bear the financial burden. This kind of discrepancy can easily trigger the continued debates about free ride. Third is institutional inefficiency. Countries leading the existing order prefer their club to remain informal and are not enthusiastic for the proposals to institutionalize meetings to establish global governance by, for example, creating the secretariat. Emerging countries wishing to change the status quo want to keep the existing powers influence under control through institutionalization. The reason behind the developed countries skeptical views on institutionalization seems to be based on their experiences in the historical past when excessive institutionalization undermined the organization s efficiency and fueled yet another international bureaucracy. Given the wide gap between the two sides as above, if middle powers are 159

168 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 to assume a vital part in the reorganization of global governance by narrowing the gaps, they will need to avoid wasteful debates and show substantive results. To achieve this goal, middle power states ought to offer innovative ideas for transparency, accountability, and assessment of a relatively value-neutral institution, while at the same time demonstrating their own best practice in these areas. Thus, the shortcut to achieving results in the middle powers quest to contribute to the reorganization of global governance would be to focus on becoming the Global Governance Innovator which provides creative ideas through sharing of knowledge and networking. 4. Policy Considerations As Korea pursues middle power diplomacy, what should be given the foremost consideration is to prepare a roadmap that shows on what levels and through which processes the diplomacy will be carried out from mid- to long-term perspectives. Three strategic paths can be suggested as below Concerted Efforts for Linkage Building The strategic paths for the middle power diplomacy could start from groundbreaking which constitutes establishing the definition of middle power diplomacy and jointly seeking ways to contribute by pushing forward cooperation through various sorts of meetings including the inter-governmental mechanism MIKTA and the private sector-oriented Constructive Powers Initiative (CPI) simultaneously and in parallel Linkage Building between the Global and Regional Level One of the issues being raised in various discussions concerning global governance is that the regional cooperative mechanisms should be sufficiently utilized for establishing global governance. While the G20 can be used to establish the strategic path. At the regional level, the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the China-Japan-Korea (CJK) summit may be utilized in East Asia and Northeast Asia respectively. Within the EAS, Korea as the middle power state will be able to jointly develop 160

169 Middle Powers Role for the Development of the G20 creative ideas for the development of the EAS along with other MIKTA participants Australia and Indonesia. In the CJK summit, Korea will be able to serve as a bridge between Japan as one of the G7 and BRICS country China. Such diplomatic approach utilizing the middle powers status would not only promote actions to be taken in each region, but would also activate a transmission belt linking regional cooperative momentum with the process of reorganizing global governance Linkage Building between Selective Multilateralism and Universal Multilateralism Although the G20, which is advocating the need for second-generation middle power diplomacy, has been recognized for its efficiency as the mechanism for economic crisis management, its legitimacy has often come into question as a result of the exclusiveness of its member cons-titution. In other words, in view of the international political/economic reality, it is inevitable that the G20, a representative of the selective multilateralism of G-x, plays the key role in global governance. However, from the perspectives of those wanting to pursue universal multilateralism, they are bound to voice their unhappiness about the representativeness of the G20. In consideration of such circumstances, middle powers should make joint efforts to ensure that the reorganization of global governance begins with efficiency of the G-x approach, while serving the role as of honest broker by gradually securing the legitimacy of universal multilateralism. 161

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171 주요국제문제분석 미국의군사적재균형의추이와전망 미국의군사적재균형의추이와전망 * 최우선 ** 1 문제제기오바마 (Barack Obama) 행정부는중국의부상에대응해 2011년부터재균형 (rebalancing) 전략을추진하면서아시아에자원과관심을집중하는국가안보전략의중대한전환을시도해왔음. 하지만중동지역의불안정지속과미국의국내정치적갈등과결합된예산상의어려움으로인해재균형전략의실효성과지속성에대한회의론이제기되어왔음. 이는중국에대한미국의상대적지위하락이라는인식과함께오랫동안아시아에서안정을유지해온미국이장기적으로강력한균형자역할을지속할수있을지에대한의문을야기해옴. - 특히, 급속하게지역접근저지 (A2/AD: Anti-Access/Area Denial) 능력을개발하고있는중국에대응해미국이실질적인군사적재균형을통해현재의확고한군사적우위를유지하고, 서태평양에서의자유로운군사력투사능력을유지해동맹국의안보를책임질수있는지에대한의문이제기되어옴. 목 차 1. 문제제기 2. 2기오바마행정부의재균형전략 3. 군사적재균형의추이 4. 평가 5. 한국에대한정책적함의 북한을억지하고지역안정을유지하기위해미국과의안보동맹을유지하고있는한국에있어미국의새로운전략의실효성, 이러한전략이지역안보와한반도에미칠영향, 그리고안정자로서의미국의장기적신뢰성을정확하게평가하는것은필수적임. 본보고서는군사적재균형에초점을맞춰미국의재균형전략 * 발표 ** 안보통일연구부교수 163

172 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 오바마행정부는 2011 년말부터본격적으로아시아로의재균형전략을추진하기시작하여 이는근본적으로중국의급부상에따른세력균형의변화에대응해중국에대한견제를강화하기위한전략 의추이를분석하고, 전략의실효성과지속성그리고지역안보에대한영향을평가하며정책적함의를제시하는것을목적으로함. 본보고서는먼저최근오바마행정부의전략적우선순위를평가하고, 2012년 방위전략지침 (Defense Strategic Guidance) 발표이후추진되어온군사적재균형의내용을설명하며이를평가할것임. 마지막으로, 이러한평가를기초로미국의군사적재균형의한국에대한정책적함의를제시할것임. 2 2 기오바마행정부의재균형전략 오바마행정부는 2011년말부터본격적으로아시아로의재균형전략을추진하기시작함. 이는근본적으로중국의급부상에따른세력균형의변화에대응해중국에대한견제를강화하기위한전략임. - 특히, 미국은최근실질적인결실을맺기시작한중국의비대칭적지역접근저지능력에본격적으로대응할필요성을느끼기시작함. 또한, 2009년이후보이기시작한중국의공세적인행동을자제시키고, 동맹국들에대한미국의신뢰성을유지할필요성이증대함. - 한편, 이라크 아프가니스탄전쟁의마무리는새로운세력균형에대응한미래지향적전략을추구할수있는전략적기회를제공했고, 재정적압박은보다분명한전략적우선순위를갖는전략의추구를강요하는조건으로작용하였음. 오바마대통령은 2012년 1월 방위전략지침 을발표해미국이아시아에분명한전략적우선순위를두고자원을집중하면서, 현재의전쟁이아니라미래의잠재적위협에대비한첨단전력개발에보다많은투자를할것이라는점을분명히함. 미국은아시아에서의자신의지도적지위를확인시키고지역질서재편을주도하기위해포괄적인재균형전략을추구함. - 동맹국및파트너국가들과의안보협력을강화함. 164

173 미국의군사적재균형의추이와전망 - 새로운작전개념의개발과군사력재배치그리고미래전력의개발을통해중국의지역접근저지전략을극복하고군사적우위를유지하려함. - 환태평양파트너십 (TPP: Trans-Pacific Partnership) 협상을통해지역경제통합을주도하고통합의새로운기준을확립하려함. - 동아시아정상회의 (EAS: East Asia Summit) 등지역다자기구에대한보다적극적인참여를통해중국의영향력확대를막고다자협력을주도하려함. 하지만오바마행정부의아시아의전략적중요성에대한강조에도불구하고, 재균형전략은예산삭감과중동지역의불안정이라는장애에부딪히면서그실효성에대한상당한의구심을유발해왔음. - 오바마대통령은국방예산삭감이절대로아 태지역에영향을미치지않을것이라고주장해왔지만, 미국의회는작년말까지예산안합의에실패하면서 2013년도국방예산에대한예산자동삭감 (sequestration) 이이루어지고 10월에는연방정부일시정지가발생함. - 이집트의정치적불안정과시리아내전그리고이란의핵개발은계속해서미국의외교적관심을중동으로돌리게만듦으로써, 오바마행정부의전략적우선순위의전환에대한회의론을지속시킴. 이러한논란에도불구하고, 오바마대통령과지도부는미국의국가안보전략에있어아시아의전략적중요성에대한강한합의를유지해왔음. 그리고최근 2기오바마행정부의새로운안보팀은중동정책에대한재검토를통해외교적노력을강조하고무력사용을최소화하려는현실주의적인정책을채택함. - 새로운정책의기조에대해, 수잔라이스 (Susan Rice) 국가안보보좌관은 대통령의목표는중동사태가그의외교정책의제들을삼켜버리는것을피하는것 이라고밝힘. 그녀는또한미국의무력개입기준에대해 미국과동맹국에대한공격이나석유공급방해, 테러네트워크나대량살상무기에대한대응이외에는무력사용을하지않을것 이라고언급함. 논란에도불구하고, 오바마대통령과지도부는미국의국가안보전략에있어아시아의전략적중요성에대한강한합의를유지해왔으며 165

174 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 - 정책검토이후오바마대통령이 UN연설에서언급한것처럼, 미국은최근이란과의외교협상에집중하고, 이스라엘- 팔레스타인간협상을중재하면서, 시리아내전을완화시키려는외교적노력을집중하고개입을최소화하려는정책을추진해옴. 중동정책결정이후, 라이스국가안보보좌관은아시아정책에대한조지타운대학연설에서미국의재균형전략이장기적이고근본적인전략적선택이라는점을강조함. - 그녀는 아시아 태평양으로의재균형은오바마행정부외교정책의초석으로남아있다. 다른지역에서아무리많은분쟁지역이등장하더라도우리는이중요한지역에대한우리의견고한공약을계속해서심화시킬것이다. 라고밝힘. 중동정책결정이후, 라이스국가안보보좌관은아시아정책에대한조지타운대학연설에서미국의재균형전략이장기적이고근본적인전략적선택이라는점을강조 이와함께, 미국의회는작년말양당합의를통해새로운 2개년예산안에합의함. 또한, 양당은합의를통해 2014년도국방예산에대한예산자동삭감의영향을상당정도완화시켰음. 3 군사적재균형의추이가. 새로운작전개념의개발 중국은 1990년대후반이후적극적방어전략에기초해점차정교해지는미사일능력, 잠수함, 대공방어체제, 우주 사이버공격능력등비대칭전력을발전시켜왔음. 미군이보유한해상과공중에서의우위와정보 정찰능력의장점을무력화하기위한이러한전력의개발을통해중국은미군이서태평양에서자유롭게군사력을투사하고사용할수있는능력을제약하는지역접근저지능력을강화해왔음. 점차현실화되는중국의지역접근저지능력에대응해, 미국은 2009년이후통합작전을통해적의핵심부를깊숙이공격하는공 해전투 (Air-Sea Battle) 작전개념을개발해옴 년후반국방장관이공 해전투개념을승인한후, 공 해전 166

175 미국의군사적재균형의추이와전망 투사무국을중심으로구체적인하위개념들을개발하고, 훈련과모의전쟁등을통해실효성을시험해왔음. 이에비판적인군사전략가들은공 해전투의지나치게공격적인작전개념이핵전쟁으로의확전가능성을높인다고주장하고, 적에대한종심공격보다는중국군의공격을격퇴하고, 중국의주변해역을장악하며, 해상봉쇄등을통해경제적인타격을입히는보다신중한전략을주장함. - 하지만이러한거부 (denial) 를위주로한대안적전략은중국이공격에대한강한동기를갖는경우충분한억지력을발휘하지못할가능성이높음. 한편, 종심공격을위주로한공 해전투작전개념은대규모전쟁발생시적용될것임. 공 해전투작전개념의존재로인해미 중간소규모무력충돌이자동으로확전으로연결되지는않을것임. 오히려대규모전쟁시예측되는비용과위험은확전을억지하는영향을가질가능성이큼. - 미국방부는전략적비판을거부하고초기에채택한적종심공격을위주로한적극적억지전략을발전시킴. 최근공 해전투사무국이발표한 공 해전투 에따르면, 새로운작전개념의핵심은해상, 공중, 지상, 사이버 우주공간에서의강력한통합작전을통해우위를강화하고, 동시에또는연속적으로적중심부의목표들을파괴할수있는능력을보유함으로써적을억지하고전쟁시적을패퇴시키는것임. 이러한공격작전과동시에미군은우군과기지를점차정교해지는적의공격으로부터보호함. 1) - 공 해전투작전개념은통합작전을위한명령 통제네트워크의발전과각군간맞춤형통합작전능력의개발을강조함. - 통합작전을통해한영역에서의우위를활용해다른영역의우위를만들어내면서, 우선적으로적의 지휘 통제 통신 컴퓨터 정보 감시및정찰 (C4ISR: Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) 체계를붕괴시켜판단능력의우위를확보하고, 적의지역접근 미국방부는전략적비판을거부하고초기에채택한적종심공격을위주로한적극적억지전략을발전시켜 1) Air-Sea Battle Office, Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenge (May 2013). 167

176 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 저지를위한무기체계를파괴해아군의행동의자유를확보한후, 지속적인공격작전을수행하며적의공격을막아냄으로써적을패퇴시키는것이기본작전개념임. 나. 군사력재배치미국은새로운전략을이행하면서아시아 태평양지역의군사력을점진적이지만지속적으로증강하고있음. 특히, 해 공군을중심으로첨단전력이우선적으로증강배치되고있고, 이라크 아프가니스탄전쟁의마무리와함께보다본격적으로중동지역의전력이아시아 태평양지역으로재배치되고있음. - 이는 2003년이후대테러전쟁수행과중국의잠재적위협에대응해추진된해외주둔미군재배치계획 (Global Posture Review) 의연장선에있지만, 재균형전략의추진과새로운작전개념의개발은재배치의내용과속도에중요한영향을미치고있음. 미국은새로운전략을이행하면서아시아 태평양지역의군사력을점진적이지만지속적으로증강하고있어 특히, 해 공군을중심으로첨단전력이우선적으로증강배치되고있고, 이라크 아프가니스탄전쟁의마무리와함께보다본격적으로중동지역의전력이아시아 태평양지역으로재배치되고있으며 2012년리온파네타 (Leon Panetta) 국방장관은 2020년까지미국의해군력의 60% 를태평양지역에배치하겠다고선언했고, 이미 57% 가량의해군력이태평양지역으로배치되었음. - 항공모함 1척, 구축함 7척, 연안전투함 (Littoral Combat Ship) 10척, 공격용핵잠수함 2척등의배치가전력증강의핵심이될것임. - 이중 4척의연안전투함은싱가포르에순환배치하기로결정함. 공군력도아프가니스탄전쟁의마무리와함께중동지역으로부터증강배치되고있고, 새로운첨단항공기들도아시아로우선배치되고있음. - F-22를포함한해외주둔공군력의 60% 가이미아 태지역에배치되어있고, 전쟁의종식에따라전술 전략전력이증강배치되고있음. -F-22 편대가이미작년일본에순환배치되기시작했고, F-35와 P-8 대잠초계기도최초로일본에해외배치될예정임. - 현재괌에순환배치되고있는 B-52 폭격기와함께, B-1, B-2 폭격기가중동지역으로부터증강배치될예정임. 168

177 미국의군사적재균형의추이와전망 - 북한및동중국해의감시를강화하기위해 2~3대의글로벌호크 (Global Hawk) 무인정찰기가내년일본에배치될예정임. 리퍼 (Reaper) 무인정찰기도아프가니스탄으로부터아 태지역으로재배치되고있음. -EP-3 전자정보수집정찰기가이미아프가니스탄으로부터아 태지역으로재배치되었고, P-3 대잠초계기와파이어스카우트 (Firescout) 무인정찰헬기도재배치될예정임. 이라크 아프가니스탄전쟁의마무리와함께본토로재배치되는육군 해병대병력의다수가아 태지역의군구조를강화할예정이며 미국은지상군병력을 2001년이전수준으로감축하고있고최근추가감축을결정하였지만, 이라크 아프가니스탄전쟁의마무리와함께본토로재배치되는육군 해병대병력의다수가아 태지역의군구조를강화할예정임. - 현재태평양사령부 (PACOM) 휘하에약 74,000명의해병대병력과약 60,000명의육군병력이배치되어있음. 60,000명정도의병력이중부사령부 (CENTCOM) 에서아 태광역으로재배치될예정임. - 오키나와주둔해병대재배치와연관해, 호주에는 2017년까지 2,500명의해병대가순환배치될예정임. - 최근오키나와에는 MV-22 오스프리 (Osprey) 와함께해병대 3개보병대대가추가로순환배치되었음. - 미국은필리핀정부와해병대증원에관한협약을협상중임. - 한국에는최근 OH-58D 카이오와 (kiowa) 무장정찰헬기 30대가 5년만에재배치됨. 미국은또한동북아지역에미사일방어체제를구축하면서, 일본 호주등과미사일방어를강화하기위한협력을추진하고있음. - 미국은일본과 SM-3 요격미사일공동개발을계속하고있고, 일본남부에 X-Band 레이더를추가설치하기로결정함. - 북한의 3차핵실험이후오바마행정부는지상발사요격미사일 (Ground Based Intercepter) 을 30대에서 44대로늘리고, 추가된 14대를알래스카에배치하기로결정함. - 최근 2대의이지스함이태평양지역으로추가배치됨. 169

178 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 다. 미래전력에대한투자 미국의회내부의복잡한갈등상황에도불구하고, 양당은증가하는잠재적위협에대응하기위해합의에따라자동예산삭감의영향을상당정도완화한 2014 년도국방예산안을통과시켰으며 미국의회내부의복잡한갈등상황에도불구하고, 양당은증가하는잠재적위협에대응하기위해합의에따라자동예산삭감의영향을상당정도완화한 2014년도국방예산안을통과시켰음 년도국방예산안은대단히복잡한정치과정을통해결정되었지만, 양당의다수가재정적어려움속에서도국방예산을합리적으로조정하는데동의함. 이는특히작년 9월예산안을둘러싼협상과정에서의료개혁법안과예산안을연계하면서양당간합의를가로막고연방정부의일시중지사태까지야기했던티파티 (Tea Party) 세력에대한공화당다수의반격의결과임. - 작년말패티머레이 (Patty Murray) 상원예산위원장과폴라이언 (Paul Ryan) 하원예산위원장간의합의를통해양당은향후 2년간의예산안의기본틀에합의함. 이합의안은 2014년도국방기본예산에대한예산자동삭감액을절반으로줄임. - 이후, 양당은국방수권법을통과시키면서다시 300억불을증액해, 행정부가요청했던예산과거의동일한 5,270억불의 2014년도국방예산을책정함. - 올해 1월의회를통과한예산지출법안은국방기본예산을 4,960억불로조정하였음. 결과적으로국방예산지출액은행정부가요청한액수에서 300억불정도가축소되었지만, 자동예산삭감이시행된경우보다는 200억불정도증액되었음. 한편, 의회는기본예산삭감을일정정도보충하기위해무기구매와훈련등에상당히자유롭게사용될수있는해외전비를행정부가요청한액수보다 58억불가량증액했음. 공화당지도부의결단으로티파티세력의영향력을극복하면서, 잠재되어있던민주 공화양당의합리적수준의국방예산에대한합의를이끌어냄. - 국방수권법의경우, 하원은 로, 상원은 84-15의압도적인찬성으로통과시킴. 이는합리적수준의국방예산의유지에대한강한초당적합의가존재함을보여줌. - 예산자동삭감이아직유효하기때문에 2016년이후국방예산 170

179 미국의군사적재균형의추이와전망 에대한불확실성이남아있고, 재정적으로일정한삭감이불가피함. 하지만티파티세력의약화와국방예산에대한양당의합의를고려하면, 어떤식으로든예산자동삭감의영향을완화할합의가이루어질가능성이상당히높아보임. 미국은재정적어려움속에서도여전히그다음 16개국이사용하는총국방예산보다많은국방예산을사용하고있음. 앞으로수년간현재수준의국방예산을사용한다고가정하더라도, 미국이중국의전력증강에대응해첨단전력을개발할충분한자원을가지고있음. 오바마행정부는 머레이- 라이언합의안 에따라 2015년도국방기본예산으로올해보다 4억불적은 4,956억불을제안하였음. 하지만부족한예산을보충하기위한 기회, 성장, 안보이니셔티브 를통해군의훈련과전력증강투자등에사용할수있는 260억불을추가로제안하였음. - 작년계획과비교해, 향후 5년간 1,130억불의국방기본예산을추가삭감하기로결정하였음. 하지만이러한예산안이실제집행된다면, 자동예산삭감이실행된경우보다 1,150억불의국방기본예산이증액될것임.( 표 1 참조 ) - 예산긴축이군의전투준비와현대화에일정한부정적영향을미칠수있지만, 전쟁의종식과함께현재실행하고있는군구조의축소와미래전력증강으로의재균형을통해이러한영향을상당정도극복할수있을것으로평가됨. < 표 1> 행정부 5개년국방예산계획 ( 십억불 ) 미국은재정적어려움속에서도여전히그다음 16 개국이사용하는총국방예산보다많은국방예산을사용하고있어 앞으로수년간현재수준의국방예산을사용한다고가정하더라도, 미국이중국의전력증강에대응해첨단전력을개발할충분한자원을가지고있으며 지난 10년간의대테러전쟁이마무리되면서, 미국은국방정책의기조를비정규전에대한대비로부터미래의잠재적적대국가에대한대비로전환했음. 방위전략지침 발표이후채택된 2013년과 2014년국방예산그리고최근제안된 2015년도국방예산은재정적인어려움에도불구하고장거리정밀타격능력, 핵잠수 171

180 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 최근미국의국방예산은중국의지역접근저지능력을극복하기위한공 해전투를수행하는데필요한미래첨단전력에대한투자에보다초점을맞춰 함전력, 미사일방어등미래전력에대한투자를최대한보호하려노력함. 최근미국의국방예산은중국의지역접근저지능력을극복하기위한공 해전투를수행하는데필요한미래첨단전력에대한투자에보다초점을맞춤 년도국방예산을보면, 기술개발에투자되는액수는 630 억불로, 주로응용연구분야에서전년에비해약 70억불이감소했음. 무기구입비는 930억불로전년에비해약 80억불감소했지만, 증가된해외전비중약 60억불의무기구입비가보완적으로사용될수있음. - 재정적어려움에도불구하고, 중국의반접근저지능력을극복하고군사력투사능력을유지하는데필수적인대잠작전능력, 장거리공격능력, 정찰 탐지능력, 사이버 우주능력, 미사일방어등에필요한첨단전력의개발에대한투자를유지하고있음. - 특히, 버지니아 (Virginia) 급공격용핵잠수함, P-8, 장거리순항미사일과첨단정밀유도탄들, 신형스텔스전략폭격기, F-35, KC-46 탱커, 장거리수송기, EA-18G 전자공격기, ISR, 미사일방어, 사이버 우주능력관련투자들은대체로현수준을유지함. - 행정부가최근제안한 2015년도국방예산은기술개발에 635 억불, 무기구입에 904억불을배정했고, 기회, 성장, 안보이니셔티브 를통한 260억불추가예산의상당부분을무기구입등에사용할예정임. 예산상의제약에도불구하고, 2015년예산역시미래전력개발에강한우선순위를둠. 4 평가 가. 지속성과실효성미국의재균형전략은중국의부상으로인한국제구조내부의중대한세력균형의변화를반영함. 중국과의경쟁, 특히점차현실화되는중국의지역접근저지능력강화를통한군사적도전은 172

181 미국의군사적재균형의추이와전망 미국지도자들에게현재의유리한세력균형을유지하기위한더큰노력을강요하는압력으로작용할것임. - 실제로오바마대통령은재균형전략에대한강한의지를가지고있음. 재균형전략을주도하던톰도닐런 (Tom Donilon) 국가안보보좌관과커트켐블 (Kurt Campbell) 국무부동아태담당차관보가떠났지만, 존케리 (John Kerry) 국무장관의유럽지향적인사고에도불구하고현재백악관과국방부, 국무부, 의회에는재균형의전략적필요성에대한강한합의가존재함. 최근의대단히신중한대중동정책에서보여주듯이, 미국지도부내에지난두차례전쟁의대가와개입정책의어려움에대한강한자기반성이존재함. 이와함께, 미래의가장큰잠재적적국인중국에대비해야하는구조적압력의증가는향후에도오바마행정부로하여금중동지역에대한개입, 특히지상군의사용을최대한피하게만들것임. - 현재아프가니스탄전쟁과같은대규모대테러전쟁의필요성이낮음. - 시리아사태의지속에도불구하고미국의개입가능성은낮고, 이란핵문제역시미국의외교적해결추구가능성이높음. - 지난해말결정된대중동정책은보다엄격한개입기준을명확히함으로써미국정책의장기적방향을제시함. 미국의재정적인어려움과불확실성은미국이재균형전략을추진하는데있어상당한장애로작용할것임. 그러나의회내의과격한보수세력이약화될가능성이높고, 양당이국방예산의지나친삭감에대한우려를공유하고있기때문에점진적인방법으로예산자동삭감의충격을완화할가능성이높음. - 첨단미래전력과특히지역저지능력에대항한전력의개발에필요한투자의우선순위는향후에도지속될가능성이높음. 미국은중국을지나치게자극하지않기위해아 태지역으로군사력을재배치하는속도와수준을조절하고있음. 이는중국에대한견제를한단계높이면서도, 중국의위협인식을제어하고국제사회로통합하기위한포용을추구하는미국의대중국전략에따른것임. 따라서미국이아 태지역에서중국의새로운전력을극복하는데있어군사력의지나친전진배치보다는적절한 미래의가장큰잠재적적국인중국에대비해야하는구조적압력의증가는향후에도오바마행정부로하여금중동지역에대한개입, 특히지상군의사용을최대한피하게만들것 173

182 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 중국은군사기술력의현대화와비대칭전력의개발을통해미국과의격차를줄이려하겠지만, 오랜기간막대한군사비사용과우월한기술력의활용을통해축적해온미국의확고한군사력우위는상당히오랜기간유지될가능성이높아 수준의전력을증강하면서, 지역접근저지를극복할수있는군사력투사능력을개발하는데집중할가능성이높음. - 이러한관점에서, 현재진행되고있는해상 대잠수함능력의강화, 첨단 ISR 장비들의증강, 미사일방어체제강화, 공중우위를유지하기위한스텔스전투기능력의강화, 신형스텔스폭격기등장거리정밀타격능력강화등은상당히실질적인전력강화를의미함. 특히, 최신무기체계의우선적배치와중동지역으로부터의점진적군사력재배치는장기적으로이러한추세를더욱강화할것임. - 더욱중요한것은미국국방예산의주요투자예산이아 태지역에서의해 공군작전을강화하기위한부문에집중되고있다는것임. 이는장기적으로미국의전반적군사력우위와군사력투사능력을유지하는가장중요한요인임. 나. 아시아안보에대한영향미국의재균형전략에대한비판자들은미국의지나치게강한대응이중국을자극해위협인식을강화하고, 중국이보다높은수준의군사력증강을추진하게함으로써미 중갈등을격화시킬것이라고주장함. 장기적으로미국의견제강화는중국의군사력현대화를위한노력을좀더가속화시키는영향을미칠것임. 그럼에도불구하고, 현재의미국의확고한힘의우위로인해중국은상당히오랜기간본격적으로미국에군사적인도전을하지는않을것임. - 중국의시진핑 (Xi Jinping) 정부는미국의견제가강화된이후미국과의관계를강화하기위한유화정책을보다적극적으로추진하고있음. - 현재중국은 1987년이후지속해온정도의속도로군사비지출을늘리고있고, 상당기간이러한추세는지속될가능성이높음. 중국은군사기술력의현대화와비대칭전력의개발을통해미국과의격차를줄이려하겠지만, 오랜기간막대한군사비사용과우월한기술력의활용을통해축적해온미국의확고한군사력우위는상당히오랜기간유지될가능성이높음. 174

183 미국의군사적재균형의추이와전망 - 중국의지역접근저지능력의증강, 특히미사일능력의증강은서태평양에서의미군의작전상의위험을서서히증가시키겠지만, 압도적우위를갖고있고새로운작전개념과전력을개발하고있는미국의해상 해저 공중지배와전력투사능력을오랜기간실질적으로변화시키지는못할것임. 미국의힘의우위하에미 중관계는경쟁의점진적증가속에서도협력의기조를유지할것임. - 미국은상당기간포용과견제를결합한전략을통해중국의군사력증강의동기를최소화하고현재의우월한지위를유지하려할것임. - 중국은자신의힘의열세를인식하고있고, 따라서군사적노력에도불구하고섣불리본격적인군비경쟁으로돌입하기보다는경제발전에초점을맞추고미국과의협력을추구할것임. 미국의압도적군사적우위와전력투사능력은아 태지역에서미국의동맹국으로서의신뢰성을유지시킬것임. 미국은재균형을통해미국의균형자로서의역할약화를우려하는동맹국들과파트너국가들을안심시키고, 역내국가들간군비경쟁의동기를완화하는역할을지속할것임. - 중국과영토분쟁을겪고있는일본등의경우미국의보호속에지나치게갈등적인정책을추구할가능성이있음. 그러나미국은안보보장자로서의지위를통해일본의지나친군비증강과갈등적인정책을일정한선에서제어하는역할을할것임. 미 중간의장기적경쟁은불가피함. 하지만비판자들의주장과는달리, 미국의재균형전략은아시아의세력균형을유지하고지역안정을유지하는데기여할것임. 미국의압도적군사적우위와전력투사능력은아 태지역에서미국의동맹국으로서의신뢰성을유지시킬것 미국은재균형을통해미국의균형자로서의역할약화를우려하는동맹국들과파트너국가들을안심시키고, 역내국가들간군비경쟁의동기를완화하는역할을지속할것 5 한국에대한정책적함의 중국의급부상과이에대응한미국의재균형전략은협력의기조속에도양국간경쟁을증대시킬수밖에없음. 한국은전략적이고경제적인이유로중국과의최선의호혜적관계를유지해야 175

184 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 하지만, 이러한노력은북한을억지하고지역안정을유지하는균형자로서의미국과의장기적협력을굳건히하는토대위에서이루어져야함. 미국과의동맹의유지 강화를위해지역과글로벌이슈에대한포괄적인협력을강화해야함. - 한국과미국의지도부는중국의급부상으로인한미래의안보불확실성속에미국의지역균형자로서의역할에대한깊은전략적인식을공유할필요가있음. - 하지만분명한대중국견제의의미를가질수있는형태의공 해전투에대한직접적참여나지역미사일방어체제로의통합에대해서는현재로서는신중하게접근해야함. 미국이중국을중심으로지역전략을추진하는과정에서, 현재한국에주둔하고있는미군의전략적유연성문제가제기될수있음. 특히, 센카쿠 ( 尖角列島 )/ 댜오위다오 ( 釣魚島 ) 영토분쟁과중첩된방공식별구역등으로인해소규모우발적무력충돌의위험이있고, 또한민족주의충돌의내적동력으로인해제한적으로확전될가능성도배제할수없음. 이경우, 한국에주둔하고있는미군이분쟁에개입할때한국의연루가능성이존재함. - 미국의전략적유연성에대한기본적인지지를유지해야함. 하지만현재의한 미간전략적유연성에대한모호한합의에대한추가적인절차의협의가필요한지에대한검토가필요함. 한국은전략적이고경제적인이유로중국과의최선의호혜적관계를유지해야하지만, 이러한노력은북한을억지하고지역안정을유지하는균형자로서의미국과의장기적협력을굳건히하는토대위에서이루어져야 미국의지상군축소에도불구하고, 이라크 아프가니스탄전쟁의종식은미국이동아시아에서사용할수있는지상군전력을증대시킬것임. 미국은 방위전략지침 발표이후하나의대규모지역전쟁에서승리하고동시에또다른지역전쟁에서해 공군력을사용해적의공격을격퇴하거나강력한보복을가할수있는전력유지를목표로하고있음. 만약미국이중동지역분쟁에지상군을투입하는경우, 한반도유사시대규모지상전을벌이는데어려움을겪을가능성이있음. 하지만미국의재균형전략의중요성과대중동정책의추세로볼때, 미국이중동지역에서지상군을사용한대규모전쟁을수행할가능성은대단히낮음. 따라서전반적인지상군축소에도불구하고, 재균형을추진하고 176

185 미국의군사적재균형의추이와전망 있는미국은한반도유사시미지상군을증원해대규모지역전쟁을수행할능력을유지하고있음. - 그럼에도불구하고, 지상군축소와함께해 공군위주의공 해전투작전개념의개발그리고이에따른국방비투자의추세가지속된다면, 한반도유사시증원될수있는미지상군의규모가일정정도축소될가능성이있음. 한국은충분한억지력을유지하고전시작전권이양시주도적작전능력을보유할수있도록군개혁과군현대화에대한노력을강화해야함. 177

186 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 The U.S. Rebalancing Strategy: Recent Trends and Future Prospects CHOI Wooseon Assistant Professor Dept. of National Security and Unification Studies In response to China s ever increasing military might, the Obama administration has adopted a rebalancing strategy in an attempt to shift American military focus and resources to Asia. This new policy, adopted in 2011, marked a critical turning point in national security strategy of the United States. However, the continuing instability abroad in the Middle East, combined with political conflict and economic difficulties at home, has caused many to become skeptical of the effectiveness and sustainability of the new rebalancing strategy. Moreover, as many have started to sense a decline in America s position relative to that of China, some are questioning whether the United States can continue to guarantee stability in Asia by acting as a powerful balancer in the region. In particular, many doubt whether the United States is able to maintain its military superiority, given China s recent rapid development of its Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities. It has also been questioned whether the United States can continue to effectively project its military power in the West Pacific and guarantee the security of its allies. This paper seeks to analyze the recent trends in U.S. military rebalancing. After evaluating its effectiveness, sustainability, and effects on regional security, it suggests what policy implications the rebalancing strategy may have for the Republic of Korea. Recent Trends in Military Rebalancing Development of a new operational concept Since the late 1990s, China has pursued an asymmetric military strategy, which includes enhancing its missiles, submarines, air defense system, and anti-space and cyber capabilities. This strategy, which was developed in order to overtake the United States in military superiority, heavily focuses on the expansion of China s 178

187 The U.S. Rebalancing Strategy: Recent Trends and Future Prospects A2/AD capabilities, which can inhibit the United States from freely projecting its military power in the West Pacific. In response to China s increased A2/AD capabilities, the United States then developed a new operational concept called the Air-Sea Battle (ASB), in which the United States, in the case of a major war, would launch an in-depth attack on the enemy s key strongholds through integrated operations. After the U.S. Secretary of Defense approved the concept of the Air-Sea Battle in late 2011, the United States established the Air-Sea Battle Office, testing the effectiveness of the strategy through exercises and simulations. According to the report Air-Sea Battle, recently published by the Air-Sea Battle Office, the aim of the new operational concept is to firmly establish military superiority through integrated operations across five domains air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace. It also purposes to disrupt and defeat the enemy in the event of war, by destroying its objectives either simultaneously or through consecutive attacks. Proponents of the strategy say that, through these offensive operations, the United States will be able to protect its allies and bases of operations from the enemy s increasingly precise attacks. The concept of the Air-Sea Battle emphasizes the development of a command and control network for conducting integrated operations, and the strengthening of integrated operations tailored to each domain. The strategy is centered on obtaining a dominance in one domain by utilizing the dominance in other domains, thereby disrupting the adversary s C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) networks and gaining intelligence. The next step involves defending the allies by destroying the adversary s A2/AD platforms and weapons system, and ultimately defeating the enemy through sustained operations. Redeployment of military forces Ever since the United States launched the strategy of rebalancing, it has slowly but surely raised its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Along with an increase in air force and navy presences, U.S. military forces in the Middle East have started to relocate to the Asia-Pacific, and their number will increase once they are no longer engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2012, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Panetta stated that the United States would deploy 60% of its navy to the Pacific area by Core military buildup will include the placement of one aircraft carrier, seven destroyers, ten Littoral Combat Ships, and two nuclear-powered attack submarines. An agreement has 179

188 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 already been reached that up to four out of the ten Littoral Combat Ships would rotate through Singapore. The air forces have also begun to relocate from the Middle East to Asia, while new state-of-the-art aircrafts are being deployed to Asia as well. 60% of the air forces stationed abroad, including the F-22, have already been placed in the Asia-Pacific region, and additional strategic air forces are also being newly deployed with the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. The F-22 formation began its rotation through Japan last year, and F-35 and P-8 antisubmarine aircraft are scheduled to be placed in Japan for the first time. The B-1 and B-2 bombers currently in the Middle East are soon to be redeployed, in addition to the B-52 Stratofortress currently rotating through Guam. In order to keep a close watch on North Korea and the East China Sea, two to three Global Hawk unmanned surveillance vehicles (USV) will be deployed to Japan next year. Reaper, another USV, will be relocated from Afghanistan to the Asia-Pacific. The EP-3 reconnaissance aircrafts that collect information electronically have already been transferred from Afghanistan to the Asia-Pacific. The P-3 antisubmarine aircraft and Firescout unmanned surveillance helicopters are also scheduled for relocation. Along with this relocation, the United States has also been reducing the size of its ground forces to pre-2001 status, and has recently decided to make additional reductions. However, a large portion of the Army and the Marines that have returned to the mainland from Iraq and Afghanistan are expected to be redeployed to strengthen the force structure in the Asia-Pacific. At present, approximately 74,000 Marines and 60,000 Army personnel are operating under the control of the United States Pacific Command (PACOM). 60,000 of the military troops are scheduled for relocation from the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to the Asia-Pacific. With reassignment of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa, 2,500 Marines will be rotated into Australia by Lately, MV-22 Osprey and three Marine Corps infantry battalions have been placed in Okinawa. The United States is currently negotiating an agreement with the government of the Philippines to expand Marine Corps presence in the area. 30 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior scout helicopters have been reassigned to the Republic of Korea for the first time in five years. Moreover, the United States is planning on strengthening the missile defense system of Northeast Asia, while simultaneously cooperating with countries such as Japan and Australia. The United States is continuing to jointly develop SM-3 interceptor missiles with Japan and has decided to install an additional X-Band radar in Japan. After North Korea conducted its third nuclear test, the Obama 180

189 The U.S. Rebalancing Strategy: Recent Trends and Future Prospects administration increased the number of Ground Based Interceptors from 30 to 44. The 14 additional interceptors are set to be placed in Alaska. Moreover, two additional Aegis ships have been recently assigned to the Asia-Pacific. Investment in future military strength Despite its financial difficulties, the United States has the largest national defense budget in the entire world, which is bigger than the next 16 countries combined. Even if the United States maintains the current level of national defense budget for the years ahead, it still has enough resources to develop advanced military capabilities to counterbalance China s rising military strength. In spite of the intense conflict inside the U.S. Congress, Democrats and Republicans came together to pass the 2014 defense bills, which provided a relief from automatic budget cuts. The 2014 Defense Appropriation Bill, which was authorized by Congress in January 2014, appropriated USD 496 billion for the base budget. In the end, the total amount granted was approximately USD 30 billion less than the original proposal, but is still USD 20 billion more than what would have been allotted had the sequestration gone into effect. In order to help make up for the curtailment of the base budget, Congress voted to increase war funds by USD 5.8 billion more than the amount originally proposed. These funds can be freely used for buying weapons, training, and a number of other purposes. With Republican leaders winning over the Tea Party faction, the Democrats and Republicans were able to reach an agreement on a reasonable defense budget. Since automatic budget cuts are still in effect, there is much uncertainty regarding the defense budget after 2016, and further budget cuts seem inevitable. However, as can be seen from the weakening of the Tea Party faction and the settlement between the two parties, a new agreement that will alleviate the effect of the automatic budget cuts might probably be reached in the near future. In the wake of the Murray-Ryan budget deal, the Obama administration proposed a defense base budget of USD billion for 2015, which is USD 400 million less than the budget for However, in order to compensate for this reduction, the administration requested an additional USD 26 billion to be used for military training and investment, through the Opportunity, Growth, and Security Initiative. It has been decided that the defense base budget will be further reduced by USD 113 billion over the next five years. However, if this budget plan comes to fruition, the defense base budget will still be USD 115 billion more than if the automatic budget cuts go into effect. It is possible that a reduction in budget could negatively 181

190 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 affect the military s preparedness and hinder its modernization. Nevertheless, these effects can be overcome to some extent by making reductions in military structure and rebalancing toward future military capabilities. With the end of the War on Terror that had lasted for the past ten years, the main direction of U.S. military policy has changed from preparing for unconventional warfare to planning for combat against potential future enemies. The defense budget bills for 2013 and 2014, passed by Congress after the announcement of the new Defense Strategic Guidance, as well as the recently proposed defense budget bill for 2015, all seek to protect investments in future military capabilities. Lately, the U.S. defense budget has shifted to investing in advanced military technologies that can be used in Air-Sea Battle, which can be used to overcome China s A2/AD capabilities. The research and development portion of the defense budget for 2014 was set to USD 63 billion, which is approximately USD 7 billion less than the R&D budget of last year. The amount allocated for arms procurement in 2014 was USD 93 billion, a reduction of USD 8 billion from last year. Despite this curtailment, there was a USD 6 billion increase in war funds that can be used to cover this loss. Although it is currently undergoing financial difficulties, the United States is continuing to invest in developing advanced technologies required for antisubmarine operations, long-range attacks, ISR capabilities, space and cyberspace capabilities, and missile defense system, which are essential in its power struggle with China. Funding has held steady for Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarines, P-8, long-range cruise missiles and precision-guided munitions (PGMs), new stealth strategic bombers, F-35 and KC-46 tankers, long-range transportation aircraft, EA-18G airborne electronic attack aircraft, ISR, missile defense, and space and cyberspace capabilities. The recently proposed defense budget plan for 2015 allocates USD 63.5 billion for research and development and USD 90.4 billion for arms procurement. A large portion of the remaining USD 26 billion, which was added with the launch of the Opportunity, Growth, and Security Initiative, will be used in part for arms procurement. Despite the cutbacks, the budget for 2015 still puts a heavy emphasis on investment in future military capabilities. Evaluation Sustainability and effectiveness The new rebalancing strategy reflects the significant power shift within the international system that has resulted from China s rise. Competition with China, 182

191 The U.S. Rebalancing Strategy: Recent Trends and Future Prospects especially with its ever-strengthening A2/AD capabilities, is likely to force American leaders to make greater efforts to maintain a favorable balance of power, which can be seen from President Obama s strong determination to carry out the rebalancing strategy. Although the former National Security Advisor, Tom Donilon, and former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Kurt Campbell, both left their positions, and the current Secretary of State, John Kerry, tends to show more interest in European affairs, a strong consensus on the strategic importance of rebalancing exists among the White House, Pentagon, Ministry of Defense, State Department, and Congress. The U.S. government has been carrying out a somewhat cautious Middle East policy over the recent years, which shows that it has been engaged in serious self-reflection regarding the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Due to the structural challenge posed by China, America s most probable future adversary, the United States will try its best to restrain from intervening in the Middle East region, especially from not using the ground forces. A major war on terrorism is unlikely to be waged at present, and despite the continuing conflict in Syria, the United States is unlikely to intervene in the region anytime soon. It will also attempt to solve the Iranian nuclear problem using diplomatic channels. The new Middle East policy, mapped out at the end of last year, sets strict guidelines for intervention in Middle Eastern affairs, providing a clear guidance for future American policies. Financial difficulties and other uncertainties may hinder the United States from carrying out the rebalancing strategy. However, right-wing extremists in Congress are likely to gradually lose power, giving more authority to Republicans and Democrats who are concerned about excessive defense budget cuts. This concern is so overwhelming that it is probable that both parties will work together to alleviate any negative effects of automatic budget cuts. Investment in advanced military capabilities, especially those that are necessary for fighting against China s A2/AD capabilities, is likely to be prioritized in the coming years as well. In order not to provoke China, the United States is carefully controlling the scale and speed of its military redeployment to the Asia-Pacific. This move falls in line with America s current strategy toward China, which focuses on minimizing China s perception of threat and assimilating it into the international community, while at the same time keeping its power in check. Toward this end, the United States plans to pursue a gradual military buildup, rather than engaging in excessive forward deployment of its armed forces, while focusing on developing power projection capabilities that can overcome China s new military power. Current 183

192 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 investment in military capabilities, including anti-submarine warfare capabilities, advanced ISR equipment, missile defense systems, stealth aircraft, new stealth bombers, and long-range precision strike capabilities, should lead to a significant increase in U.S. military power. In particular, preferential deployment of the latest weapons systems and gradual military relocation from the Middle East will considerably strengthen U.S. power projection in the long run. More importantly, the main investment budget of the Department of Defense has been focusing on strengthening naval and air force operations, the deciding factor that will help the United States maintain its military superiority and improve its power projection capabilities in the Asia-Pacific. Effects on security in Asia The ones who criticize the U.S. rebalancing strategy argue that America s overreaction can increase China s threat perceptions and accelerate its process of military buildup, thereby exacerbating the conflict between the two countries. Increased efforts by the United States to balance China s rise will indeed motivate China to make greater efforts in military modernization in the long run. However, because the United States currently has a clear military advantage over China, it will not be in the position to pose a serious military threat to the United States for a fairly long time. Ever since the United States has become more aware of China s rising power, the Xi Jinping administration has actively pursued an appeasement policy to improve relations with the United States. At present, China is increasing its military expenditures at the same speed that it has since 1987, which is likely to continue for a long term. Even though budget increases remain steady, China is seeking to match the military might of the United States by modernizing its military technology and developing its asymmetric capabilities. Nevertheless, U.S. military dominance, which has been achieved over the course of many years with enormous expenditures and the utilization of advanced technologies, is likely to remain unchallenged in the foreseeable future. Increase in China s A2/AD capabilities, especially its missile capabilities, will gradually start to threaten U.S. operations in the West Pacific. However, China will face difficulties in overcoming America s power projection capabilities and its dominance in naval, undersea and air warfare, especially since the United States is developing new military strategies and a new operational concept as well. Given the current state of American military superiority, Sino-American relations 184

193 The U.S. Rebalancing Strategy: Recent Trends and Future Prospects will be mainly cooperative, while competition between the two countries will also intensify gradually. The United States will continue to implement its policy of engaging and balancing China, in order to reduce China s motivation for military expansion and maintain its current position of military prominence. Because China is well aware of its inferior power position relative to the United States, despite its military efforts, it will focus more on achieving economic growth and cooperating with the United States, rather than engaging in an outright arms race. The United States will be able to maintain credibility among its allies in the Asia-Pacific, through its overwhelming military superiority and power projection capabilities. The rebalancing will help the United States relieve its allies and partner countries worries regarding the possible weakening of its role as a balancer, and prevent the arms race among countries in the region. Japan, which is in the midst of territorial dispute with China, may pursue a more confrontational foreign policy under protection from the United States. However, the United States will continue to perform its role as a regional stabilizer by controlling Japan s excessive military buildup and aggressive policies, thereby keeping stability in the Asia-Pacific. A long-term competition between the United States and China is inevitable. Nevertheless, in spite of what the critics say, the U.S. rebalancing strategy will play a key role in maintaining the current balance of power and stability in Asia. Policy Implications for the Republic of Korea Despite efforts toward cooperation, China s rise and the U.S. policy of rebalancing to Asia are bound to intensify the competition between the two countries over time. Due to strategic and economic reasons, Korea needs to do its best to maintain friendly relations with China. Nonetheless, these efforts should be made on the basis of pursuing long-term cooperation with the United States, which, as a balancer, can prevent provocations by North Korea and secure stability in the region. In order to maintain and strengthen its alliance with the United States, Korea should cooperate with the United States on a broader range of regional and global issues. The Korean and American leaders must share a deep strategic understanding of America s role as a regional balancer, especially when many are feeling concerned about regional security in the coming years. Nevertheless, for now, the Korean leaders should also be careful about being directly involved in the Air-Sea Battle or the development of an integrated missile defense system. 185

194 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 Despite America s overall reduction of its ground forces, U.S. withdrawal from wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will free up ground forces for deployment to East Asia. Since the promulgation of the Defense Strategic Guidance, the United States has been honing its military power to achieve decisive victories in regional wars using naval and air forces. If the United States intervenes in another conflict in the Middle East using its ground forces, it may face difficulty in waging major ground warfare on the Korean Peninsula. However, considering the importance of the rebalancing strategy and recent trends in America s Middle East policy, the United States is highly unlikely to be involved in such a large-scale conflict in the Middle East. Therefore, although the overall size of ground forces has been shrinking, the United States will still be able to engage in an extensive ground warfare in case of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula, as a part of its rebalancing effort. However, if the reduction of ground forces, development of the Air-Sea Battle concept, and the resulting investment patterns continue for a prolonged period of time, it is possible that the number of U.S. ground forces that can act as reinforcement in the event of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula may diminish. In order to foster deterrence capabilities, and play a leading role in operational combat following the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON), Korea should make serious efforts to reform and modernize its military. 186

195 주요국제문제분석 미국의셰일가스개발과국제에너지안보환경의변화 미국의셰일가스개발과국제에너지안보환경의변화 * 최원기 ** 1 서론미국과캐나다를중심으로한북미지역에서는최근셰일가스로대표되는비전통화석연료의상업화가성공함에따라, 가스와오일생산량이급격하게증가하는 셰일가스혁명 이진행되고있음. 미국은 2009년러시아를제치고세계최대가스생산국으로부상하였으며, 2011년미국은전세계천연가스생산량의 20.4% 를생산하였음. 목차 1. 서론 2. 천연가스생산및수출전망 3. 미국의 LNG 수출정책 4. 국제에너지안보환경의변화 5. 한국의고려사항 2000년에만하더라도셰일가스생산이전무했던미국은 2013년 2.5 tcf의셰일가스를생산하였는데, 이는전세계셰일가스생산량의 91% 를차지하고있음. 1) 셰일가스는향후 20년간미국가스생산량의절반을상회하고, 2040년에이르면현재생산량의 4배로증가할것으로전망되고있음. 셰일가스의생산에따라미국의순에너지수입량이급격히감소하는현재의추세가계속된다면미국은 2016년부터액화천연가스 (LNG: Liquefied Natural Gas) 순수출국이되고, 2020년경에는에너지순수출국으로전환될것으로전망되고있음. * 이글은발표이후최근변화를반영하여수정되었음. 1) tcf = trillion cubic feet. 1 tcf 는 1 조입방피트에해당하는단위로 LNG 로환산하면 2,400 만 t 규모임. * 발표 ** 경제통상연구부교수 187

196 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 미국이셰일가스의대규모생산에힘입어본격적인에너지수출국으로전환하게되면서국제에너지안보환경의근본적구조변화가불가피할가능성이높으며 지금까지미국의천연가스수출은파이프라인을통해인접한캐나다와멕시코, 그리고알래스카에서생산된천연가스를소규모 LNG 형태로일본에수출한것이전부였다고할수있음. 하지만, 미국에너지기업들은국내소비량을상회하는가스공급분을처분하기위해지금까지수입목적으로사용되던기존가스터미널을전환하여 LNG 수출용시설로개조하는대규모건설프로젝트를진행중이며, 2015년부터는미국본토 (lower 48 states) 에서생산된천연가스를액화시킨 LNG를본격적으로수출할것으로전망됨. 미국연방정부는 6개의 LNG 수출프로젝트를승인하였고, 20여개의추가적인 LNG 수출프로젝트가승인대기상태에있는바, 연방정부가모든수출프로젝트를승인하지않는다하더라도향후미국의 LNG 수출량은급격히증가할것으로전망됨. 미국은 2025년경에이르면 80 bcf/d (billion cubic feet per day) 규모의 LNG를수출할수있는설비능력을갖출것으로전망되고있어, 이러한예측이실현된다면미국은향후세계 LNG 시장에서새로운핵심수출국으로부상할전망임. 그동안국제에너지시장에서순수입국의지위에머물던미국이셰일가스의대규모생산에힘입어본격적인에너지수출국으로전환하게되면서국제에너지안보환경의근본적구조변화가불가피할가능성이높으며, 에너지순수입국인우리의에너지안보에도중대한영향을미칠것으로전망됨. 이글에서는셰일가스개발에따른미국국내현황및미국의 LNG 대외수출정책방향을분석하고, 이것이국제에너지안보환경에미칠영향을전망함으로써향후우리의정책적대응방향을모색해보고자함. 188

197 미국의셰일가스개발과국제에너지안보환경의변화 2 천연가스생산및수출전망 가. 천연가스생산현황 2000년도이전만하더라도미국에서는국내천연가스생산량의감소및수요의증가로향후천연가스수입량이증가할것이라는전망이우세하였음. 실례로, 미국에너지정보청 (EIA: Energy Information Administration) 은 1999년판연간에너지전망보고서 Annual Energy Outlook 1999 에서향후 2020년까지미국의천연가스수입량이 15% 이상증가할것으로전망하였음. 이에따라 2000년대후반에미국에너지기업들은천연가스수입수요의증가에대비하여 5개의새로운 LNG 수입터미널을건설하고, 기존의 LNG 수입설비를확장하기도하였음. < 그림 1> 미국천연가스생산추이 ( 단위 : tcf) ( 출처 : Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2013.) 하지만, 1980년대이래정부의지원아래셰일가스시추를위한연구와투자가지속적으로이루어진결과, 수평시추 (horizontal drilling) 및수압파쇄 (hydraulic fracturing) 기술의혁신적발전에따라 2005년이후셰일층으로부터비전통가스 ( 셰일가스 ) 의생산량이급격히증가하기시작하였고, 이에따라미국의천연가스수입량은감소하기시작하였음 년이후셰일층으로부터비전통가스 ( 셰일가스 ) 의생산량이급격히증가하기시작하였고, 이에따라미국의천연가스수입량이감소하기시작하였으며 189

198 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 최근발간된에너지전망보고서 Annual Energy Outlook 2014 에서 EIA는미국의천연가스생산량이 2040년경 2012년수준에서 56% 증가한 37.5 tcf에도달할것으로전망하고있음. 미국내가스생산증가는미국의국내소비증가량과대외수출량을모두만족시키고도남을수준으로전망되는데, 이는셰일가스의폭발적생산증가에기인하고있음. < 그림 1> 에서보는바와같이셰일가스생산량은 2012년전체가스생산량의 40% 수준에서증가하여 2014년경에는전체가스생산량의 53% 를차지할것으로예측되고있음. 아울러셰일가스와더불어타이트가스 (tight gas) 또한미국내가스생산에서중요한비중을차지할것으로전망되고있음. 특히셰일가스의공급이획기적으로증가하기시작한 2008 년이후미국내천연가스가격은급격히하락하여 셰일가스를비롯한비전통에너지 자원에대한탐사및개발기술이혁신적으로발전함에따라미국의가스매장량추정치는지속적으로확대되어왔음. 2010년을기준으로미국천연가스매장량은 10년전인 2000년보다 72% 증가하였으며, 2005년이후부터계산하더라도추정매장량이 49% 나증가하였음. 미국지질조사국 (USGS: United States Geological Survey) 에따르면미국의천연가스가채매장량 (UTTR: Undiscovered, Technically Recoverable Resources) 은현재 1,809 tcf로추정되고있으며, 이는 2011년미국내가스총생산량을기준으로향후 79년동안지속적으로채굴할수있는규모임. 이가채매장량추정치는 2006년제시된추정치보다 25% 증가한것인데, 향후에도천연가스탐사및개발기술이발전하면가채매장량의규모가더증가할수있을것으로평가되고있음. 현재미국내에서는셰일가스붐으로인해국내시장에공급되는천연가스의양이급속히증가하고있고, 이에따라미국내천연가스가격은지속적으로하락해왔음. < 그림 2> 에서보는바와같이미국내가격과국제천연가스가격의차이가지속적으로벌어져왔음. 특히셰일가스의공급이획기적으로증가하기시작한 2008년이후미국내천연가스가격은급격히하락하여일본등동아시아지역의 5분의 1, 유럽의 3분의 1 이하로국내도매가격이형성되었음. 190

199 미국의셰일가스개발과국제에너지안보환경의변화 < 그림 2> 지역별천연가스가격현황 ( 출처 : Congressional Research Service, US Natural Gas Exports: New Opportunities, Uncertain Outcomes, p.8.) 셰일가스의공급량확대에따라천연가스가격은 4달러이하로하락해최저점에서는 2달러에육박하였고, 최근에는 2달러에서 4달러사이에가격대가형성되어있음. 이에반해한국, 일본등동아시아지역천연가스수입국들의수입가격은 16달러에서 19 달러대에형성되어있어동아시아시장은미국의유력한천연가스수출시장으로부상하고있음. 동아시아시장은미국의유력한천연가스수출시장으로부상하고있으며 나. LNG 수출승인및전망 2013년말 31개의 LNG 수출프로젝트가미국에너지부 (DOE: Department of Energy) 의승인심사를신청한바있으며, DOE 는그중에서우선사빈패스 (Sabine Pass), 프리포트 (Freeport), 레이크찰스 (Lake Charles), 도미니언코브포인트 (Dominion Cove Point) 등 6개의수출프로젝트를승인하였음. 191

200 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 < 표 1> 미국 LNG 수출프로젝트현황 ( 기준 ) 수출승인신청회사 승인상태터미널용량 (Bcf/d) 위치 DOE DOE FTA Non-FTA FERC Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC Louisiana 2.2 승인 승인 승인 Freeport LNG Expansion, LP and FLNG Liquefaction, LLC Texas 1.4 승인 승인 검토중 Lake Charles Export, LLC Louisiana 2.0 승인 승인 검토중 Carib Energy (USA) LLC Dominion Cove Point LNG, LP n/a Maryland 0.03: FTA 0.01: non-fta 1.0: FTA 0.77: non-fta 승인검토중검토중 승인승인검토중 Jordan Cove Energy Project LP Oregon 1.2: FTA 0.8: non-fta 승인 검토중 검토중 Cameron LNG LLC Louisiana 1.7 승인 검토중 검토중 Freeport LNG Expansion LP and FLNG Liquefaction, LLC Texas 1.4: FTA 0.4: non-fta 승인승인검토중 Gulf Coast LNG Export, LLC Texas 2.8 승인 검토중 검토중 Gulf LNG Liquefaction Company LLC Mississippi 1.5 승인 검토중 검토중 LNG Development Company, LLC (d/b/a Oregon LNG) Oregon 1.25 승인 검토중 검토중 SB Power Solutions Inc n/a 0.07 승인 n/a 검토중 Southern LNG Company LLC Georgia 0.5 승인 검토중 검토중 Excelerate Liquefaction Solutions I LLC Texas 1.38 승인 검토중 검토중 Golden Pass Products LLC Texas 2.6 승인 검토증 검토중 Cheniere Marketing LLC Texas 2.1 승인 검토중 검토중 Main Pass Energy Hub LLC Offshore Louisiana 3.22 승인 n/a 검토중 CE FLNG LLC Louisiana 1.07 승인 검토중 검토중 Waller LNG Services LLC Louisiana 0.16: FTA 0.19: non-fta 승인 검토중 검토중 Pangea LNG (North America) Holdings LLC Texas 1.09 승인 검토중 검토중 Magnolia LNG LLC Louisiana 0.54 승인 n/a 검토중 Trunkline LNG Export LLC Louisiana 2.0 승인 검토중 검토중 Grasfin Development USA LLC Louisiana 0.2 승인 n/a Freeport-McMoRan Energy LLC Offshore Louisiana 3.22 승인 검토중 Sabine Pass Liquefaction LLC Louisiana 0.28 승인 검토중 Sabine Pass Liquefaction LLC Louisiana 0.24 승인 검토중 192

201 미국의셰일가스개발과국제에너지안보환경의변화 수출승인신청회사 승인상태터미널위치용량 (Bcf/d) DOE FTA DOE Non-FTA FERC Venture Global LNG LLC Louisiana 0.67 승인 검토중 Advanced Energy Solutions LLC Florida 0.02 승인 n/a Argent Marine Management Inc n/a 승인 n/a Eos LNG LLC Texas 1.6 승인 검토중 Barca LNG LLC Texas 1.6 승인 검토중 Sabine Pass Liquefaction LLC Louisiana 0.86 승인예정 검토중 Delfin LNG LLC 1.8 승인예정 검토중 Magnolia LNG LLC 0.54: FTA 1.08: non-fta 승인예정 검토중 Annova LNG LLC 0.94 승인예정 n/a 우리나라는한국가스공사를통해 2017 년부터연간 350 만톤의 LNG 를 20 년간사빈패스로부터수입하는계약을체결한바있으며 ( 출처 : _applications.pdf. ( 검색 )) 사빈패스는 2011년 5월최초로수출승인을받은프로젝트로, 프랑스, 인도및한국가스공사에대한 2.2 bcf/d 규모의 20년장기수출계약을포함하고있음. 사빈패스프로젝트는현재 LNG 압축 액화및선적설비공사를진행중이며, 수출시설이부분적으로완공되는 2015년부터 LNG 수출을시작할예정인것으로알려짐. 우리나라는한국가스공사를통해 2017년부터연간 350만톤의 LNG를 20년간사빈패스로부터수입하는계약을체결한바있음. 2012년 5월두번째로수출승인을받은프리포트프로젝트는향후 20년간 1.4 bcf/d 기준의 LNG 수출을포함하고있음. 일본의오사카가스 (Osaka Gas) 와중부발전 (Chubu Electric) 이프리포트 LNG 수출물량의절반을수입하는계약을체결하였음. 일본이 2017년부터 20년간프리포트에서수입하기로한물량은연간 440만톤규모임. 레이크찰스 (Lake Charles) 는 2013년 8월세번째로수출승인을받은프로젝트로서수출규모는향후 20년간 2 bcf/d임. 레이크찰스수출프로젝트를통해영국의 BG 그룹과텍사스기반의 Energy Transfer Equity, L.P. 의합작회사가향후 20년간비 ( 非 ) 자유무역협정 (FTA: Free Trade Agreement) 체결국가에 LNG를수출할수있게됨. 193

202 주요국제문제분석 2013 겨울 < 그림 3> 미국천연가스수 출입현황및향후전망 현재까지수출면허를받은프로젝트의경우입지조건, 기반시설, 수입업체와의계약및액화설비건설을위한대규모투자유치등이실현화되어 LNG 수출가능성이매우높다고할수있으며 ( 출처 : Energy Information Agency, Annual Energy Outlook 2014.) 도미니언코브포인트 (Dominion Cove Point) 는 2013년 9월승인된수출프로젝트로, 수출규모는향후 20년간 1.77 bcf/d 규모임. 2014년 LNG 수출기지건설을시작해 2017년부터수출을개시한다는계획이며, 액화시설건설에는 34억~38억달러가소요될것으로예상됨. 동프로젝트는일본스미모토 (Smimoto) 상사의미국자회사인 Pacific Summit Energy 및인도게일 (Gail) 사의미국자회사인 Gail Global USA와각각수출물량의 50% 인연간 300만톤등총 600만톤규모로 20년간장기 LNG 수출계약을체결한바있음. 미국이현재까지수출을승인한 LNG의총량은 40 bcf 규모이며, 이는현재세계최대 LNG 수출국인카타르의연간 LNG 수출량의 4배에이르는규모임. LNG 수출을위해필요한액화시설건설은최대 100억달러에이르는대규모투자가요구되기때문에 LNG 수출승인을신청한프로젝트가모두실제로수출을할수있게될가능성은매우낮음. 하지만, 현재까지수출면허를받은프로젝트의경우입지조건, 기반시설, 수입업체와의계약및액화설비건설을위한대규모투자유치등이실현화되어 LNG 수출가능성이매우높다고할수있음. 194