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1 최종보고서 KAERI/RR-2862/2007 다자간핵연료공급보장체제대응을위한우리나라의입장정립연구 Impact of Multilateral Approaches for Assurance of Nuclear Fuel Supply 연구기관 한국원자력연구원 과학기술부

2 제출문 과학기술부장관귀하 본보고서를 다자간핵연료공급보장체제대응을위한우리나라의입장정립연 구 의보고서로제출합니다 주관연구기관명 : 한국원자력연구원주관연구책임자 : 이한명연구원 : 이병욱고한석류재수양맹호오근배이광석

3 보고서초록 과제관리번호 해당단계연구기간 단계구분 (1 단계 )/(1 단계 ) 연구사업명중사업명원자력연구개발사업세부사업명원자력국제협력기반조성사업대과제명해당없음연구과제명다자간핵연료공급보장체제대응을위한우리나라의세부과제명 연구책임자 연구기관명및소속부서명 이한명 한국원자력연구원정책연구부 입장정립연구 해당단계 총 : 7 명 참여연구원 내부 : 7 명 수 외부 : 명 참여기업명 해당단계연구비 국제공동연구상대국명 : 상대국연구기관명 : 위탁연구연구기관명 : 연구책임자 : 요약 ( 연구결과를중심으로개조식 500 자이내 ) 정부 : 30,000천원 기업 : 천원 계 : 30,000천원 보고서면수 본연구보고서의내용과범위는다음과같음. 첫째최근의핵연료공급보장과관 련된제안의특징과추진경과분석, 둘째이러한제안에대한세계각국의반응 분석, 셋째이러한제안들이우리나라에미치는영향을분석및대응안수립 공급보장제안은핵비확산을위한보장이라는측면과함께이용국의신뢰를획득 할수있는명확한방안을제시할수있어야하는바, 원자력선진국들의기득권 확장이아니라핵투명성을강조하는방향이바람직함. 공급보장제안들이원자력 발전도입국들에게매력을갖기위해서는이러한민감시설도입권리의포기를요 구할것이아니라민감시설도입의정당성에대한객관적인기준을국제적인합의 로수립하여제안들과함께제시하는것이바람직함. 이러한기준으로는핵비확산 의무, 규모의경제, 에너지안보등을고려할수있음. 우리나라는장래에지역핵주기센터로서의위상확보를목표로설정하는것이바 람직하며, 이러한시기에대비하여핵비확산체제의강화에더욱기여하며, 핵비확 산성핵주기기술개발에대한지원을강화할필요가있음. 색인어 ( 각 5 개이상 ) 한글원자력, 핵연료, 공급, 보장, 비확산, 국제원자력기구 영어 nuclear, fuel, supply, assurance, non-proliferation, IAEA

4 요약문 Ⅰ. 제목 다자간핵연료공급보장체제대응을위한우리나라의입장정립연구 Ⅱ. 연구개발의목적및필요성 원자력의평화적이용을둘러싼기회와도전, 즉원자력의역할과필요성에대한인식이제고됨에따라많은국가들이자체적인핵주기시설개발을추구하게될것이나, 농축과재처리와같은민감기술의확산은핵무기제조에전용될수도있다는우려는, 원자력이용에대한다각적인대응방안을요구하고있다. 이러한상황인식에따라 2005년에는전세계평화적원자력활동에대한사찰을담당하고있는국제원자력기구에서는농축과같은민감핵주기기술을다국적으로관리하자는제안을한바있으며, 이후미국, 러시아는물론산업체, 비정부기구등에서도이러한목적을달성하기위한다양한방안을제안하고있다. 이와같은제안들은긍정적인측면에서는핵연료공급보장에대한신뢰도를제고하고핵확산에대한위험을경감시킨다는특징을가지고있으나, 다른한편으로는원자력의평화적이용권리의침해와공급국과이용국이라는차별의고착화에대한우려요소도지니고있다. 따라서이에대한대응은각국이처한상황과입장에따라다양하게표출될것이다. 특히우리나라와같이대규모로원자력발전을추진하면서도자체적인핵연료주기를자립하지못한국가에게는이와같은제안들의향후전개방향이국가에너지정책과원자력이용개발방향에적지않은영향을미치게될것이다. 따라서이러한국제적논의의흐름을적기에분석하여이들제안의특징을파악하고적절한대응방안을강구함으로써, 우리나라원자력의평화적이용권리의보전과국제사회의기여도를더욱진작시킬수있도록하여야할것이다. Ⅲ. 연구개발의내용및범위 본연구는첫째최근의핵연료공급보장과관련된제안의내용및특징과추진경과 를분석하고, 둘째이러한제안에대한세계각국의반응을분석한후, 셋째이러한 - i -

5 제안들이우리나라에미치는영향을분석하고대응방안을제시하였다. 이와관련하여 IAEA의 MNA, 미국의 GNEP, 러시아의국제핵연료주기센터, 농축서비스공급 6개국의제안, NTI의핵연료은행, 일본의핵연료공급등록시스템을분석하였다. 핵연료공급보장제안에대한반응분석의일환으로기존의핵연료공급관련양자 / 다자간핵주기협력을분석한후, 최근의제안에대한다자협의체에서의논의를분석하고, 주요공급국과이용국의입장을분석하였다. 우리나라에미치는영향분석과대응방안수립을위하여우선우리나라의핵주기능력및대외협력현황을분석하고, 핵연료공급보장제안의우리나라에의영향을분석한후우리나라의대응방안을제시하였다. Ⅳ. 연구개발결과 대부분의제안들이이미농축 / 재처리시설을운영하는국가이외의국가에대한신규시설도입을포기할것을요구하고있어, 핵주기운영에대한개별국가의주권을침해할소지가있다. 공급보장제안에대하여농축 / 재처리시설을보유한국가들은핵확산우려를저감할수있다는관점에서지지입장인반면에, 기술및시설미보유국은각국의평화적이용개발권리를침해할우려가있다는이유로소극적또는반대입장을견지하고있다. 즉이러한제한은원자력의평화적활동에관한각국의주권을보장한 NPT 정신과도상충되며, 몇몇공급자에의한민감핵주기서비스의독과점화를조장할수도있다는우려를낳고있다. 공급보장제안은핵비확산을위한보장이라는측면과함께이용국의신뢰를획득할수있는명확한방안을제시할수있어야한다. NPT 체제하에서도비밀리에핵무기기술을추구하는국가가있는점을감안할때, 공급보장제안은원자력선진국들의기득권확장이아니라원자력의평화적이용에서의핵투명성을강조하는방향이바람직하다. 공급보장제안의성공여부는참여에대한확실한매력존재여부, 각국가의자발적판단존중, 공평한기회제공, 그리고미래의문제점보완을위한점진적접근여부에영향을받을것이다. 공급보장제안들이원자력발전도입국들에게매력을갖기위해서는이러한민감시설도입권리의포기를요구할것이아니라, 민감시설도입의정당성과시설의투명성확보에대한객관적인기준을국제적인합의로수립하여제안들과함께제시하는것이바람직할것이다. 따라서우리나라로서는미 - ii -

6 래의원자력의평화적이용권리를포기하지않는다는원칙하에, 민감시설도입에대한정당성을판단할수있는기준의수립을강조할필요가있다. 이러한기준으로는핵비확산의무, 규모의경제, 에너지안보등을고려할수있다. 우리나라가가까운시일이내에농축 / 재처리를추진하지는않더라도, 장래에자체보유당위성이한층강화되고지정학적여건이성숙되는경우에는지역핵주기센터로서의위상확보를목표로설정하는것이바람직할것이다. 따라서우리나라는이러한시기에대비하여국제핵비확산체제의강화에더욱기여하며, 핵비확산성핵주기기술확립에대한지원을강화할필요가있다. 또한이러한위상에이르기까지의중간과정에서는핵연료의안정확보를위하여원광및농축공급원을다변화하고, 핵연료설계제작기술을고도화하여해외진출의장애요소를줄여나가야할것이다. 즉주요공급국과는첨단핵연료개발을위한공동연구를강화하고, 농축서비스공급원을다변화하며, 핵연료및부품수출대상국을확대하는이외에소위이용국과는각국의고유한권리인식에대한유대를강화하며, 우라늄자원보유국과의협력도강화하여야할것이다. Ⅴ. 연구개발결과의활용계획 핵연료공급보장제안은핵비확산측면에서의장점이있는반면에, 각국의고유한원자력의평화적이용권리를침해할우려가있다. 또한일부핵연료주기기술 / 시설의보유를제한하는것은우리나라의원자력수출경쟁력을저하시킬소지가있다. 따라서우리나라의입장을적극반영한국가입장을정립하여관련국제회의에대처함으로써우리나라의원자력산업에미칠부정적영향에적절하게대응하는것이중요하다. 본연구에서는핵연료공급제안에대한우리나라의기본입장을정립함으로써, 향후전개될핵연료공급보장관련국제회의에효과적으로대처할수있는기반을마련하였다. - iii -

7 Summary Ⅰ. Title Impact of Multilateral Approaches for Assurance of Nuclear Fuel Supply Ⅱ. Objectives and Importance of the Study The opportunities and threats in the utilization of nuclear energy, such as increased recognition for the role of nuclear energy as well as growing concerns for a misuse of sensitive fuel cycle technologies require a multi-tier solution. To address such a dilemma, various proposals from the IAEA, United States, Russia as well as the nuclear industry and NGOs have been introduced. These proposals contain both positive and negative aspects in their nature. As they can increase the stability of a fuel supply and also reduce the challenges on nuclear proliferation, they have positive aspects. However possible limitations on the rights for the development of a peaceful use of nuclear energy and concerns on the categorization for a supplier nation and a user nation are negative aspects of the proposals. Thus it is necessary to analyze the characteristics of the proposals and find measures to strengthen international cooperation in a timely manner to contribute to the international efforts to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Ⅲ. Scope and Contents of the Study This study consists of 3 parts : analysis of the characteristics of the recent proposals for a nuclear fuel supply and the progress of them, responses from various sectors in the world, and counter measures for them. At first, various proposals including the MNA proposed by the IAEA, the GNEP by US, the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centers by Russia, a suggestion from 6 nations operating enrichment facilities, the fuel bank by NTI and a standby - iv -

8 arrangement system by Japan are analyzed. Secondly, current international cooperations related to a nuclear fuel supply are surveyed. Also discussions on this subject through a multilateral body, such as IAEA and NPT are analyzed. Thirdly, current status of the domestic nuclear fuel industry is surveyed and the measures to strengthen international endeavors for a stable nuclear fuel supply are analyzed. Ⅳ. Results In response to recent proposals, majority of countries possessing sensitive nuclear fuel facilities are supportive in general. In contrast, many countries not possessing such facilities are reluctant about the proposals due to the concerns about limiting the inalienable right of each country for a peaceful use of nuclear energy. To satisfy both parties, an ideal proposal could suggest measures to assure non-proliferation as well as measures to acquire confidence from the so-called user nations. To achieve this goal, the proposal should stress how to strengthen a nuclear transparency and not to try to reinforce the vested rights of countries possessing sensitive nuclear fuel facilities. Ⅴ. Proposal for Application of the Results To get strong support from all countries concerned, the proposal should contain some critical elements such as clear attractiveness for a participation, equal opportunities for the participating countries, voluntarity in decision on a participation, and a gradual approach to remove any future obstacles encountered. The criteria to judge a legitimate need of a country for the introduction of nuclear fuel facilities should be prepared by a consensus. Compliance of a nonproliferation obligation, scale of an economy, and an energy security can be proposed as such criteria. - v -

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10 목 차 제 1 장서론 1 제2장핵연료공급보장을위한최근제안 3 제1절 IAEA의 MNA 3 제2절미국의 GNEP 8 제3절러시아의국제핵연료주기센터 20 제4절농축서비스공급 6개국의제안 25 제5절 NTI의핵연료은행 31 제6절일본의핵연료공급등록시스템 34 제7절 IAEA의국제핵주기센터제안 36 제3장핵연료공급보장제안에대한반응 40 제1절양자 / 다자간핵주기협력분석 40 제2절다자협의체에서의논의분석 43 제3절주요공급국의입장분석 52 제4절이용국의입장분석 56 제4장우리나라의입장분석 59 제1절우리나라의핵주기능력및대외협력현황분석 59 제2절핵연료공급보장제안의우리나라에의영향분석 74 제3절아국대응방안 77 제 5 장결론및건의사항 80 첨부 : 핵연료공급보장논의를위한 IAEA 의작업문서 87 - vii -

11 표목차 표 2-1 MNA 추진방안 4 표 2-2 UREX+ 공정별추출원소표 10 표 2-3 미 일원자력공동행동계획주요내용 16 표 2-4 미국과러시아의공동선언주요내용 17 표 2-5 GNEP 실무그룹에대한위임사항 18 표 2-6 핵연료공급보장관련추가고려사항 36 표 4-1 국가별우라늄매장량 59 표 4-2 국가별우라늄생산량 60 표 4-3 세계우라늄정광수급전망 61 표 4-4 세계변환시설현황 62 표 4-5 세계농축시설현황 64 표 4-6 세계농축수요전망 65 표 4-7 성형가공설비현황 67 표 4-8 NSG 회원국현황 69 표 4-9 유연탄및우라늄가격변동비교 70 표 4-10 주요광종별자주개발목표 71 표 4-11 주요광종별개발전략 73 표 4-12 공급보장제안의특징비교 74 - viii -

12 그림목차 그림 2-1 GNEP의핵연료재순환및연소로활용개념 12 그림 2-2 GNEP의 2 track 기술개발전략 13 그림 2-3 GNEP 관련주요시설의건설계획 13 그림 2-4 IUEC 의구성및법적구조 21 그림 2-5 앙가르스크위치도 24 그림 2-6 다층구조및다국가에의한공급보장개념 27 그림 2-7 저농축우라늄과핵연료집합체의공급보장을위한 3단계체제 38 그림 4-1 우라늄농축방법비교 64 그림 4-2 농축우라늄수요공급전망 66 - ix -

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14 제 1 장서론 원자력의평화적이용역사가반세기가흐른지금원자력발전은전세계적으로 16% 의전력을공급하고있으며주요에너지공급원으로자리잡고있다. 최근에는지구온난화현상과같은기후변화에대처할수있고, 환경보존은물론후손에게보다다양한선택권을제공하는지속가능발전을위한에너지원으로서원자력발전의역할이더욱증대할것으로전망된다. 이에따라전세계적으로우라늄원광수요증가는물론, 우라늄농축이나사용후핵연료관리에대한관심도더욱증대하게될것이다. 이러한원자력의역할증대에대응하여향후 20-30년이후에배치될소위제4세대원자력시스템은더욱향상된안전성, 경제성, 핵비확산성및지속가능성을기술개발목표로설정하고있다. 그동안전세계는원자력의전용가능성을억제하기위하여핵무기비확산조약을태동시키고, 국제원자력기구의안전조치, 원자력수출통제와같은제도적장치를마련하여핵개발에의전용을통제하여왔다. 이러한국제적노력에따라새로운핵무기보유국의출현도억제하는성과를거두어왔다. 즉 1960년대초반에는핵무기보유국이기존의 5개핵무기보유국이외에 10년이내에 개국이추가될것이라는우려섞인전망도있었으나, 현실은이보다낙관적인상태, 즉인디아, 파키스탄및이스라엘 3개국이추가로핵무기를보유하는상태로억제되어왔다. 그러나최근에는기존핵비확산체제의허점을이용하여민수용원자력기술을군사용으로불법전용코자하는시도가세계곳곳에서감지되고, 또한테러리스트와같은비국가단체로의민감핵물질의유출위험성도노출되는등추가적인핵확산에대한우려도제기되고있다. 즉 2003년리비아가비밀리에추진하던핵무기개발프로그램을포기한다고선언한바있으며, 이란과북한의핵프로그램은여전히국제사회에규명되어야할난제이다. 또한 2001년미국의 9.11 사건이후에는핵테러위협에대한경각심마저일깨우고있다. 원자력이용을둘러싼이러한기회와도전, 즉원자력의역할과필요성에대한인식이제고됨에따라많은국가들이자체적인핵주기시설개발을추구하게될것이나농축이나재처리와같은소위민감시설의확산은핵개발에전용될수도있다는우려는, 원자력이용에대한다각적인해결방안을요청하고있다. 이러한상황인식에따라 2005년에는전세계평화적원자력활동에대한사찰을담당하고있는국제 - 1 -

15 원자력기구에서는농축과같은민감핵주기기술을다국적으로관리하자는제안을한바있으며, 연이어미국, 러시아는물론산업체, 비정부기구등에서도이러한목적을달성하기위한다양한방안을제안하기에이르렀다. 즉 IAEA의사무총장이다자간핵주기협력방안으로 MNA(Multilateral Nuclear Approaches) 를제안하였고, 러시아푸틴대통령은국제핵연료주기센터설립의일환으로 IUEC (International Uranium Enrichment Center) 를, 미국의부시대통령은자국내원자력이용개발과전세계의원자력이용을망라한 GNEP (Global Nuclear Energy Initiative) 에서핵연료의대여및회수방안을제안하였다. 또한전세계원자력산업체의민간모임인 WNA (World Nuclear Association) 에서는다단계로이루어진농축서비스공급보장강화방안을제안하였고, 농축시설을보유한 6개국은이개념을더욱구체화시킨방안을제안하고있다. 미국의비정부기구인 NTI (Nuclear Threat Initiative) 에서는저농축우라늄을비축할수있도록핵연료은행설립에필요한자금제공을제안하고있으며, 일본도상시공급체제의설립을제안하기에이르렀다. 상기의제안들은긍정적인측면에서는핵연료공급안정에대한신뢰도를제고하고핵확산에대한위험을경감시킨다는요소를가지고있으나, 다른한편으로는원자력의평화적이용개발권리의침해와, 공급국과이용국이라는차별의고착화도우려되고있다. 즉이와같은제안들에대한대응은각국이처한상황과입장에따라다양하게표출될것이다. 특히우리나라와같이대규모로원자력발전을추진하면서도자체적인핵연료주기를자립하지못한국가에게는이들제안의향후전개방향이국가에너지정책과원자력이용개발방향에적지않은영향을미치게될것이다. 따라서이러한국제적논의의흐름을적기에분석하여이들제안의특징을파악하고적절한대응방안을강구함으로써, 우리나라원자력의평화적이용권리의보전과국제사회의기여도를더욱진작시킬수있도록하여야할것이다

16 제 2 장핵연료공급보장을위한최근제안 제 1 절 IAEA 의 MNA 1. 배경 최근기존핵비확산체제의허점을이용하여민수용원자력기술을군사용으로불법전용코자하는시도가세계곳곳에서감지되고있다. 또한테러리스트와같은비국가단체로의민감핵물질의유출위험성도더욱경각심을일깨우고있다. 이에따라원자력안보를강화하기위한국제적노력도더욱강화되고있다. 다른한편으로는온실가스저감을위한원자력의역할과필요성에대한인식이제고됨에따라향후원자력이활성화될경우도예상할수있으며, 이에따라많은국가들이자체적인핵주기시설개발을고려하거나핵물질공급보장을추구할가능성도전망할수있다 1). 지난수년간, IAEA 사무총장은안전조치제도의적절성에대한우려와의문이지난 50여년간지속되어왔으며, 이에따라추출된 Pu, 사용후핵연료및방사성폐기물의처분과관련된방안의검토필요성에대한인식이증가하고있음을강조하여왔다. 이러한우려를해소하기위하여 IAEA 사무총장은농축, 재처리, 사용후핵연료및방사성폐기물에대한다국적관리방안을제안하기에이르렀다 2). 이러한다국적관리방안은 2가지목표, 즉비확산에대한보증과공급보증을동시에만족시킬수있어야할것이다. IAEA 사무총장은그의제안을구체화하기위하여전문가그룹을결성하였으며, 이들은 2005년 3월검토내용및권고안을수록한보고서를사무총장에게제출하게되었다. 이들의보고서는향후회원국들의다자간핵주기방안에관한논의의출발점이될것으로전망된다. 2. 단계별 MNA 이행방안 IAEA 사무총장이선임한전문가그룹은 MNA 를위한선택방안으로크게 3 가지 옵션을고려하였다 ( 표 2-1 참조 ). 이는첫째시설소유권없이핵주기서비스공급 1) Atoms for Peace and the Nuclear Fuel Cycle : Is it Time for a Multilateral Approach, Tariq Rauf, Atoms for Peace A Future after Fifty Years, Woodrow Wilson Center Press (2007) 2) Mohamed Elbaradei, Towards a Safer World, The Economist, 16 October

17 을보장하는방안, 둘째기존의국별소유시설을다자간시설로전환하는방안, 셋 째새로운공동시설을건설하여운영하는방안이다. < 표 2-1> MNA 추진방안 구분 기본개념 실행방안 세부방안 공급자들이추가적인공급을보증 공급국정부가핵물질을 보유 (Fuel Bank 모델 ) 관련국정부들이국제콘 소시움을형성시설을참가국들이 공급회사가핵물질을보 type 1 소유하지않고핵유하고콘소시움이배분물질공급에관한을담당 국제적보증 IAEA가물리적으로시설 IAEA 주도방안 을소유 IAEA가공급중간매개 자로활동 type 2 Urenco 모델기존개별국가시 3) 설을 MNA에서활용 Eurodif 모델 4) Urenco 모델 개발기술을참여국들이공유하고시설도공동으로운영기술과운영은참여국들이공유할수없고시설소유권만공유 type 3 새로운시설건설 Eurodif 모델 Urenco export 모델 블랙박스수출모델 ( 제3 국에농축시설을건설하나핵심기술에의접근은허용하지않음 ) 또한전문가그룹은농축, 재처리및사용후핵연료처분에대한현황과주요이슈 를분석하고, 포괄적인이슈로써 NPT 상의권리와의무, 안전조치와수출통제, 자 3) URENCO (Uranium Enrichment Company) : 영국, 독일, 네덜란드 3 국이각자농축시설을보유하고있으며, 세계농축수요의 18% 를공급하고있다. 4) EURODIF (European Gaseous Diffusion Enrichment Consortium) : 프랑스, 이태리, 스페인, 벨기에, 이란이참여하고있다. 농축시설은프랑스만보유하고있으며참가국의내수용농축서비스만공급하며수출은하지않고있다

18 발적참여와구속적규범, 핵무기보유국과 NPT 비당사국, 강제성등을검토하였다. 우라늄농축서비스공급과관련된전문가그룹의분석은다음과같이정리할수있다. 공급자의추가적인공급보장방안은그장점으로농축기술의확산을피할수있으며, 시장기능에의존할수있으며, 실행이용이하다는점을들수있다. 그러나단점으로는예비시설을유지하여야한다는점과공급자의다양화가결여된다는점을지적하고있다. URENCO의경우, 기술및직원에대한철저한감독과효과적안전조치로핵확산위험을감소하고일방적인위반행위를극도로어렵게만들었다는과거의경험이인정되고있다. EURODIF의경우는, 1개국만농축시설을보유하여동업자에게농축서비스를제공함으로써모든핵확산위협과일방적인위반행위를차단하고있다는점이부각되고있다. 재처리와관련해서는전문가그룹은향후 20년간전세계의재처리공급용량은충분한것으로분석하고있다. 현재재처리에대한서비스공급자의보증은정부의명시적이거나최소한묵시적인동의하에이루어지고있다. 재처리시설을 MNA로전환하는것에대해서는전문가들도찬반양론으로나누어지고있으며, 찬성하는입장에서는국제적인전문성을활용할수있다는점을강조하고있으며, 반대하는입장에서는관련지식의확산및플루토늄의반환에따른핵확산위험을우려하고있다. 전문가그룹은추가시설건설을위해서는수급분석이필요하며, 재처리와핵연료가공시설을동일부지에위치시키는방안도제안하고있다. 현재사용후핵연료처분을위한국제시장은존재하지않는다. 전문가그룹은대규모원전보유국은자체처분장을최우선할것이나, 소규모원전보유국은자국시설을이용하는방안이외에국제시설을이용하는이원적접근법을고려할수있을것으로본다. 사용후핵연료저장시설은일부국가에서만운영중이며, 러시아만이자국이외국에게공급한핵연료에서생성된사용후핵연료를회수할수있는준비가되어있다. 전문가그룹은제한된안전한시설에서의사용후핵연료저장은안전조치와물리적방호를강화할수있다는점을강조하고있다. NPT 4조는평화목적의원자력연구, 생산및사용을위한모든조약당사국의불가양의권리에영향을주지않아야하며, 조약당사국은원자력의평화적이용을위한장비, 물질및과학기술적정보의가능한최대한의교환을용이하게하기로약속하고있다 5). 그러나핵무기보유국이나일부원자력선진국들이 NPT 4조의보증을저버리고있다는불만이제기되고있으며, 핵비보유국은 NPT 6조에따른핵군 5) INFCIRC/140, Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 22 April 1970, IAEA - 5 -

19 축의이행은불만족스러운것으로평가하고있다는점을전문가그룹은지적하고있다. 안전조치및수출통제측면과관련하여, 전문가그룹은 MNA의목적이단지핵비확산이라면, 추가의정서와같은기존체제에집중하는것이더효과적이라는의견도제시하고있다. NPT 3조에서언급한핵물질등의이전을통제하기위하여수출통제를시행하고있으며, 이는 UN 안보리결의안 1540에따라더욱강화되고있다. 핵비확산에대한장애는전면안전조치협정및추가의정서에따른 IAEA의전면안전조치와수출통제의이행에달려있으며, MNA는기존의핵비확산체제를강화하기위한보충수단으로써고려될수있다는점을지적하고있다. MNA에대한참여여부와관련하여각국은경제적 / 정책적인센티브를고려하여자발적으로결정하게될것이다. 그러나국가의자체적민감핵주기활동을금지하고오직 MNA하에서만다루자는규범은원자력의평화적활동에관한각국의주권을보장한 NPT 정신과상충될우려가있다. 따라서핵비보유국이이를수용하기위해서는핵보유국의군축이선행되고또한이규범이모든국가에게보편적으로적용될수있어야한다는점을전문가그룹은지적하고있다. 이와관련하여핵무기용핵물질생산금지조약 (FMCT) 도선결조건의하나로, 이를통해핵보유국및 NPT 비당사국의핵폭발목적의농축및재처리시설운영을중단시켜야한다는의견이제시되고있다. 의무준수위반시의처리방안과관련하여서는, 의무위반에대한정의와의무위반의판정자가결정되어야한다. 궁극적으로의무위반대응에는국제사회가모두동참하여야효과적이며, 사례에따라 4단계대응책, 즉 MNA 파트너국가, IAEA, NPT 당사국, UN 안보리의대응이라는 4단계대응방안이논의되어야한다. 과거다자간핵주기협력에대한논의가실패한요인을분석하면, 핵확산우려에대한인식차이, 경제적유인부족, 공급보장우려, 국가자존심, 원자력파급효과기대등이영향을미친것으로분석된다. 이러한관점에서 MNA 방안이민감핵주기기술의남용우려불식에대한신뢰를제고하고공급보장에대한비용효과적인혜택을제공할수있으나, 상황이서로다른국가들이모두동일한결론에도달하기는용이하지않을것이라는의견도개진되고있다. 결론적으로전문가그룹은시설의소유권, 기존시설활용또는신규시설건설이라는옵션을고려하여다음과같은 5가지다자간핵연료주기협력방안을제시하고있다 6)

20 1단계 : 기존시장체제를강화하는방안으로써장기계약에의하여공급에대한신뢰성을제고하고또한정부차원에서핵연료산업체의공급에대하여추가적인보장을하는방식이며, 구체적으로는연료대여및회수, 상용핵연료은행운영등이포함된다. 2단계 : IAEA가참여하여국제적공급을보장하는방안으로써, 예를들면 IAEA 가공급보증인의역할을담당하여핵연료은행을관리하는방안이다. 3단계 : 핵무기보유국, 비보유국및 NPT 비회원국이모두참여하여기존시설을 MNA로자발적으로전환하여신뢰구축수단으로활용하는방안이다. 4단계 : 자발적협정을체결하여새로운시설을위한다국적, 지역간 MNA를창설하여공동소유, 공동운영하는방안으로써, 새로운재처리시설이필요할경우이를처음부터다자간협력에의하여건설하고운영하는방안이다. 5단계 : 향후원자력이더욱활성화되는시대가도래하면지역간 / 대륙간국제협력을보다강화하여핵연료주기기술과시설을공동으로개발하고운영하는방안이다. 3. 추진경과 IAEA 사무국은 MNA에대한보고서를완성한후, 이를회원국들에게배포하였으며주요내용을 2005년 5월뉴욕에서개최된 NPT 평가회의에소개하고각국의반응을타진하였다. 이후에도 IAEA 사무국은관련국제회의에 MNA의개념을소개하여왔으며, 2006년 9월개최된 IAEA 정기총회특별포럼에서도동개념을발표하고이에대한회원국들의관심을촉구하여왔다. MNA가핵비확산을추구하면서안정적인공급방안이되기위해서는 MNA 가입국의의무위반에대한대응방안도검토되어야한다. 즉의무준수위반의처리방안, 의무위반에대한정의, 의무위반의판정자, MNA 참여자의직접대응방안및기타정책적수단등이사전에고려되어야한다. 의무위반에대한조치에는국제사회가모두동참하여야효과적이며, 단계별로대응방안을강구하여야할것이다. 즉 MNA 참여국가, IAEA, NPT 당사국, UN 안보리와같은단계적제재조치의이행이검토되어야한다. 과거다자간논의의실패요인을보면핵확산우려에대한인식차이, 경제적유인 6) INFCIRC/640, Multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle, Expert Group Report, 22 February 2005, IAEA - 7 -

21 부족, 공급보장우려, 국가자존심, 원자력파급효과에대한기대감등을열거할수있다. MNA 방안이민감핵주기기술의남용우려를불식할수있다는신뢰감을제고하고공급보장에대한비용효과적인혜택을제공할수있으나, 상황이서로다른국가들이동일한결론에도달하기위해서는향후 IAEA 회원국이모두참여하는다각적인토론및검토가이루어져야할것이다. 제 2 절미국의 GNEP 1. 배경 미국부시대통령은 2004년 2월 11일미국국방대학원에서행한연설에서핵비확산조약 (NPT) 의허점을봉쇄할수단을제안한바있다. NPT가핵무기비보유국으로의핵무기확산을방지하기위한수단으로가동된지 30여년이지났으나, 북한이나이란의사례에서보는바와같이민수용원자력프로그램이라는미명하에핵무기용으로전용될수있는핵물질의생산을가능케하였다는것이다. 이러한시각하에부시대통령은농축및재처리를포기하는국가에대해서는민수용원자력발전소의핵연료를합리적인가격으로신뢰성있게이용할수있다는점을주요원자력수출국들이보장해줄것을제안하였다. 즉부시대통령은원자력을평화적목적으로만이용하고자하는국가에게는농축이나재처리가필요하지않다는입장이다. 구체적인방안으로부시대통령은이미실물크기의가동중인농축또는재처리시설을보유하지못한국가에대해서는원자력공급국그룹 (NSG) 이농축이나재처리관련장비나기술의판매를거부할것을제안하고있다. 즉부시대통령은이러한조치를시행하면또다른나라들이핵무기용핵물질생산수단을추구하는것을막을수있다고판단한것이다. 핵비확산위협에의대응이외에도미국내사용후핵연료관리문제해결과원자력발전의진흥방안등에직면해온부시행정부는 2006년 2월새로운원자력정책구상인 GNEP (Global Nuclear Energy Partnership) 을발표하게되었다 7). 7) The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, Greater Energy Security in a Safer, Cleaner World, February 6,

22 2. GNEP 의 7 대시책 GNEP의실천전략은 7가지주요과제로구성되어있다. 첫째미국내원자력이용을진작시킨다. 이를위하여미국정부는기존의 Nuclear Power 2010을적극활용하는이외에 Standby Support Program을새로이입안중이다. Nuclear Power 2010 은산업체가다음 10년간새로운원자력발전소를건설하는것을지원하기위한것으로, 정부와산업체가공동으로비용을분담하여, 신규부지조사, 신형원자력발전소의설계 / 건설, 일관된인허가절차를구현하도록노력하고있으며, 이의일환으로 2007년까지 3개의원자력발전소에대한조기부지인허가를발급할예정이다. 이를위하여미국 DOE는 2곳의상업용부지와 3곳의연방부지에대한조사를완료하였으며, 미국원자력규제위원회 (NRC : Nuclear Regulatory Commission) 의새로운설계인허가절차를적용하기위하여산업체와협력하고있다. 이에따라버지니아, 일리노이, 미시시피 3곳에서조기부지승인 (ESP : Early Site Permit) 을신청하였으며, 다음단계로건설및운영의동시인허가절차를적용할것으로기대되고있다 8). Standby Support Program은사업자의면책사유에의한공기지연시, 정부에서손실보상금을지급한다는구상이다 에너지정책법은원전인허가지연으로인한산업체의재정적손실을보상하기위한지원책 (stand-by support) 을명시하고있다. 지연사유로는 NRC의검토및검사승인일정준수실패, 공청회일정지연과전출력운전을지연시킨법정소송을포함하나, 사업자가법에규정된조치를취하지않아서발생한비용이나사업자가관리하는행위의이행실패에대해서는보상하지않는다. 동보상은총 5억불의범위내에서지연에따른원금또는부채이자, 구매한전력의적정시장가격차이보상, 발전소와의계약체결비용을지원하게된다. DOE 장관은복합인허가 ( 건설및운영허가 ) 를받고건설에착수한원전중최초 2기에대해서는 100% 손실을보상하게되며, 다음 4기에대해서는총 2억5 8) 2003 년가을에제출된조기부지허가 (ESP: Early Site Permit) 신청은 Exelon Generation 의 Cliton 지역, Dominion 의 North Anna 지역, Entergy 의자회사 System Energy Resources 의 Grand Gulf 지역의 3 건이다 년 12 월 28 일 NRC 의원자력안전성및인허가위원회 (ASLB: Atomic Safety and Licensing Board) 는조기부지허가를클린톤지역에부여하는것이적절하다고결정하였다. ASLB 의이런결정에따라엑스론이미국에서첫번째로조기부지허가를취득하여앞으로클린톤지역에서원자로를하나또는두개정도 20 년동안건설할기본자격을얻게되었다. NRC 의일정에따르면클린톤지역의최종허가결정은 2007 년 5 월이면완결될것으로전망된다. 엑스론은복합인허가건설허가를취득할때까지실제로는신규원자력발전소를건설하지는못하지만조기부지허가를이용하여예비및준비건설작업은가능하게되었다. 조기부지허가는법적으로원전부지와이에따른환경적문제를해소시켜주는효력이있다. 엑스론은허가난부지에어떤원자로노형을채택할것인지는신청서에적시하지않았다. 단지노형은 NRC 가지금검토하고있는 7 개의상업적원자로에서하나를선정할것이며최대노심열출력은 2,400 MW 에서 6,800 MW 범위라는윤곽만나와있다. 아마도복합건설인허가신청서 (COL) 에적절한노형을선정하여이를 NRC 에제시할것으로예상된다

23 천달러의범위내에서개개지연비용의 50% 를지원할수있다. 둘째핵확산저항성이강화된핵연료주기를실증한다. 이를위해 PUREX 기술보다핵확산저항성이큰 UREX+ 기술을개발하여, U과 Pu만을분리하는것이아니라초우라늄원소 (Np, Pu, Am, Cm 등 ) 를혼합된상태로추출한다 ( 표 2-2 참조 ). 이에필요한시설은핵확산위험을줄이기위하여소위 핵연료공급국 에만설치하며, 다목적핵주기연구시설인 AFCF (Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility) 를 2016년에 1단계준공한다. < 표 2-2> UREX+ 공정별추출원소 셋째방사성폐기물발생을최소화한다. 이를위해초우라늄원소를핵종변환시킴으로써사용후핵연료의관리능력을향상시킨다. 즉재처리를통하여, 방사성폐기물발생량감축, 폐기물에서발생하는열의관리능력강화, 최종처분하여야할장수명핵종의양을감축코자한다. 이에따라금세기내에는 Yucca 처분장 1개만으로현재미국내발생한사용후핵연료누적량은물론향후발생할사용후핵연료까지도수용할수있을것으로기대하고있다. 네째개량형연소로인 ABR (Advanced Burner Reactor) 을개발한다. ABR은사용후핵연료속에함유된초우라늄원소를반감기가짧은핵종으로변화시키고, 이를연소하여소멸시키며이과정에서발생하는열을이용하게된다. 즉경수로는초우라늄원소를생성하는반면, ABR은초우라늄원소를소멸시키는역할을한다 ( 그림

24 2-1 참조 ). 미국정부는 GNEP에참여하는국가와공동으로 ABR 개발코자하며, 2006년 8월에는당초구상한 1/10 규모의시험로건설없이바로상업규모시설을건설하는것으로건설계획을가속화하였다. 다섯째신뢰성있는핵연료공급체계를구축한다. 이를위하여 GNEP은참여국을소위 핵연료공급국 (fuel supplier nation) 과이용국 (user nation)" 으로구분하고있디 9). 이용국은농축, 재처리와같은민감핵주기시설을보유하지않겠다고선언한국가이며, 이들국가들은원자력발전소만을소유하고운영하기만할뿐핵연료주기시설은보유하지않는다. 핵연료공급국은농축, 재처리시설을보유하고이용국에게핵연료를공급하며, 사용후핵연료를회수하고재처리하여 ABR에서연소한다는요람에서무덤까지 (cradle to grave fuel leasing) 개념을구상하고있다. 여섯째소형원자로를실증한다. 이는개발도상국의소규모전력시장에부합하는안전하고운전하기쉬우며핵확산저항성이증대된원자로이다. 이러한원자로는발전용량이 50에서 350 MWe 규모로써, 수명기간중핵연료교체가필요없는초장주기핵연료를사용하며, 지역난방이나식수생산의가능성도고려하고있다. 일곱째첨단안전조치를개발한다. 이를위하여 IAEA와협력하여안전조치적용이용이해질수있도록한다. 이는강화된안전조치프로그램및기술을개발하여민간원자력시설이비평화적목적으로전용되는것을방지하기위한것으로, 핵물질 전용및계통변경시즉각탐지할수있도록하며, 재순환시설, ABR 의설계에반 영될수있도록국제협력을통하여추진코자한다. 9) 2007 년 3 월미국의관리는한국관리와의회동에서 GNEP 의정치적요소 ( 공급국과수령국구분문제 ) 에대한검토가계속되고있으며, 상당한수준의기술을갖춘캐나다, 호주, 한국, 아르헨티나, 브라질, 화란, 독일등은공급국 / 수령국의이분법을적용할수없는국가들이라는입장을전하였다. 또한 6 개국이 2006 년 IAEA 이사회에회람한공급보장방안이향후승인을얻으면, 개도국들에게동방안에따라핵연료공급을보장해주면서, 대신농축 / 재처리포기선언을요구할것이며, 이를통해 GNEP 의 7 개요소중한가지 ( 수령국의농축 / 재처리포기 ) 를달성코자한다는견해를전하였다. 미국관리는핵연료공급보장방안이이사회에서승인을얻은후에는이를수용치않는개도국들에게는핵연료공급을금지하게될것으로본다는개인적견해를밝혔다

25 < 그림 2-1> GNEP 의핵연료재순환및연소로활용개념 3. 기술개발전략 DOE는 2006년 8월에, 당초전략을대폭수정하여 2 track approach 개념으로추진전략을재정립하였다. 이에따라 UREX+ 기술의공학규모실증시설 (ESD : Engineering Sclae Demonstration) 과 ABR의시험로 (ABTR : Advanced Burner Test Reactor) 건설은취소되었다. Two track approach는단기간에달성가능한 Track 1과장기적으로추진하는 Track 2로이루어진다. Track 1은미국산업체의축적된경험과연방정부의 R&D를우선적으로활용코자한다. 이를위하여 CFTC (Consolidated Fuel Treatment Center) 를건설하여경수로사용후핵연료의유효성분 (U, Pu, MA) 을추출하며 10), 이중에서 U, Pu은이용하고, MA는 Track 2 이행시까지보관한다. 이기간중에는 ABR (Advanced Burner Reactor) 원형로건설도추진한다 ( 그림 2-2 참조 ). Track 2에서는외국의파트너와협력하여미해결기술을개발하는것에중점을두고있다. 이기간에는 AFCF (Advanced Fuel Cycle Research Facility) 를건설하여 Fast Reactor에서인출한 S/F의 Minor Actinides (Np, Am, Cm 등 ) 분리하고, 이를사용하여 Fast Reactor용핵연료를제조 (U, Pu + MA) 하게된다 ( 그림 2-3 참조 ). 10) P, Notice of Request for Expressions of Interest in a Consolidated Fuel Treatment Center to Support the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, USDOE, August

26 Track 1 Track 2 < 그림 2-2> GNEP 의 2 track 기술개발전략 < 그림 2-3> GNEP 관련주요시설의건설계획 4. 추진경과

27 미국 DOE는 GNEP에참여코자하는산업체의의향과기술을평가하기위하여시설건설에대한참여의향서와부지활용계획서를접수하였다. 미국 DOE는 2006년 8월 3일 CFTC와 ABR 건설에대한국내외산업체의향타진을위하여 EOI (Expression of Interest) 을접수하여 2006년 9월 8일마감하였다 11). 그결과 General Atomics, General Electric, EPRI, AECL, AREVA, JAEA 등으로부 터 18개의향서가접수되었으며, AREVA가제안한 COEX 기술을 UREX+ 가상용화되기이전에사용하기로결정하였다. EOI의평가결과는향후 CFTC와 ABR 건설을위한 RFP (Request for Proposal) 작성시참고하게된다 12). 2006년 8월 3일미국 DOE는 GNEP 실증에필요한부지조사연구를위하여총2천만불을투자할것임을발표하였다. 각후보부지별로 5백만불까지지원하게되며, 9월 7일응모를마감하였다. DOE는 10월말까지부지조사기관을선정하게되며, 선정된기관은 90일동안부지평가연구를수행한다. 부지평가연구결과는 2008년 6월 DOE가보고하는 GNEP의환경영향평가연구 (EIS : Environmental Impact Study) 에사용하게된다 13). 양시설은동일부지에건설을추진하는바, 환경평가연구의결론에는 CFTC와 ABR의추진여부와이를위한부지가명시된다. GNEP 이행을위한국제협력에있어미국정부는농축및핵연료재순환 (Recycling) 기술개발에는이미상용시설을보유한영국, 프랑스, 러시아및일본과협력한다는방침이다. 그러나네덜란드, 독일, 아르헨티나, 브라질 ( 농축시설보유국 ) 등은 핵연료공급국에포함되지않고있어, 이들 4 개국과한국, 캐나다등원자력 이용이활발한국가와의협의에상당한시일이걸릴것으로예상된다. 미국은우리 나라의농축 / 재처리시설보유포기, 핵확산저항성핵연료주기추구공약이한 미 원자력협력에있어매우중요한 2 가지원칙임을강조하고있으며, 진행중인 11) REQUEST FOR EXPRESSIONS OF INTEREST GLOBAL NUCLEAR ENERGY PARTNERSHIP (GNEP) TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM, USDOE, August ) 2007 년 3 월 29 일일본원연은프랑스원자력대형회사인아레바사와제휴하여미국내의재처리와핵연료제조프로젝트에참여하기로하였다. 아레바사는미국의원자력기업 2 개사, 즉원자력시설의엔지니어링등을취급하는 워싱턴그룹인터내셔널 및국방관련시설에운영실적이있는 BWX 테크놀로지즈 와핵연료사이클에관한팀을구성하고있는데일본원연은이팀에대등한파트너로서참여하게되었다. 프랑스, 미국, 일본등 3 개국의 4 개기업이서로제휴해미국 GNEP 참여를위한검토를수행하여 DOE 로의제안서를작성했다. 상업용재처리및안전운전실적을보유한아레바사와보장조치등핵비확산성면에서독자적시스템을가진일본원연이서로제휴하여미국정부가추진중인선진핵연료사이클실현을지원할계획이다. 아레바사는 GNEP 의양대기술축의하나인 CFTC 프로젝트에참여하기위해워싱턴그룹인터내셔널및 BWX 테크놀로지즈등미국 2 개사와핵연료사이클에관한검토팀을구성한후 DOE 에참여의향서 (EOI) 를제출한바있다. 일본원연도 2006 년 9 월에일본원자력연구개발기구와일본내중진메이커들과같이참여의향서를제출하였다. 일본원연은아레바사와서로제휴함으로써쌍방의장점을발휘할수있다고판단한것으로분석된다. 또한일본원연의롯카쇼무라재처리공장에서채택한유리고화체제조프로세스등일본기술의일부를 CFTC 에활용하기위해 IAEA 와기술협력협정을체결할방침이다. ( 자료원 : 일본전기신문 2007 년 3 월 30 일 ) 13) Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 55 / Wednesday, March 22, 2006 / Notices, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, Advance Notice of Intent To Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership Technology Demonstration Program

28 Pyroprocessing 관련한 미협력은이런원칙에부합되는한영향이없을것이라는입장을밝힌바있다. 미국은 GNEP에참여할파트너국가를물색하여왔으며 14), 2007년에는 GNEP 참여국장관회담을개최하였으며, 일본및러시아와는협력을위한공동선언을하였다. 장관회담 : 2007년 5월워싱톤에서개최된 GNEP 참여국장관급회의에는미국과러시아, 프랑스, 중국및일본이참석하였다. 참가국들은공동성명을통하여폐기물발생량감축, 사용후핵연료재활용기술, 고속로개발등에협력한다는의지를표명하였다 미 일공동선언 : 2007년 4월미국과일본은원자력공동행동계획을발표하고 GNEP과관련된분야의협력에즉시착수하기위하여고속로기술, 핵확산저항성이있는핵연료분리기술, 중소형로, 안전조치및물리적방호, 폐기물관리등의분야에대한작업반을설치하기로하였다 ( 표 2-3 참조 ) 15). 미 러공동선언 : 2007년 7월양국대통령은공동성명을통하여러시아의 GNPI 와미국의 GNEP이원자력이용확대에기여할것임을언급하면서, 개도국들의원전도입을위하여재정지원, 인프라구축, 핵연료대여및사용후핵연료저장등의분야에대한지원을선언하였다 ( 표 2-4 참조 ) 16). 추진원칙서명 : 2007년 9월 16일미국은 GNEP의추진원칙을명시한 SOP (Statement of Principle) 를작성하여이에동조하는국가들의서명을받음으로써, GNEP의추진체제를보다공고히하였다 ( 표 2-5 참조 ). 당초 SOP에서명한국가는미국이외에호주, 불가리아, 중국, 프랑스, 가나, 헝가리, 일본, 요르단, 카자흐스탄, 리투아니아, 폴란드, 루마니아, 러시아, 슬로베니아, 우크라이나 16개국이었으며, 이후이탈리아와캐나다가 SOP에서명하고, 우리나라는 2007년 12월 10일에 SOP에서명하였다. 14) KINAC/RR-015/2007, GNEP 동향파악및예측을통한대응전략수립에관한연구, 한국원자력통제기술원, 과학기술부, ) United States-Japan Joint Nuclear Energy Action Plan, April 2007, US DOE 16) Declaration on Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation Joint Actions, Washington, Moscow, July 3,

29 < 표 2-3> 미 일원자력공동행동계획주요내용 GNEP에근거해 GNEP 파트너간의협력양식에관해긴밀히협의원자력연구 - 민간핵연료주기기술을가진파트너들간의상업적기술협력지원개발협력 6개실무그룹 (Working Group) 구성 - 고속로기술, 핵연료주기기술, 시뮬레이션및모델링, 중소형원자로, 안전조치및물리적방호, 폐기물관리 신규원전건설에관련된정책에대한정보및견해교환신규원전 공동실무그룹을구성하여다음분야에대해협의건설지원을 - NRC의원자로설계인증, 산업체간기술협력에대한정부지원, 채위한협력무보증등원자력확대지원책, 원자력확대를지향하는측면에서의국제원자력손해배상현안등 핵연료공급보장에관한 IAEA에서의토의지원을위한기술적분핵연료공급석제공하고, 필요시적극참여보장메커니 이와관련한 6개국제안 ( 핵연료공급보장 ), 일본제안 (IAEA 핵연료공즘구축급등록체제 ) 등을고려해핵연료공급보장에관한정보교환핵비확산이 신규원전도입국가의핵비확산, 안전규제및보안을위한인프라보장되는원구축과관련한정책협의자력확대를 원전도입에관심있는국가에미국과일본산업체가공히관련된지원하기위경우인력및제도개발, 수출통제등에대한정책협의한공동협력 추진일정 3단계일정으로추진 - 1단계 (2007~2008.6) : 2008년 4월까지보고서완료 즉각영향을줄수있는단기간협력을조속히착수 - 2단계 (2008.7~2011.6) : 1단계결과에따라협력범위확대 - 3단계 ( 이후 ) : 핵연료주기관련현안을해결할시스템실증기획및통합에중점

30 < 표 2-4> 미국과러시아의공동선언주요내용 개요 성명제목 : Declaration on Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation Joint Actions 발표자 : 미국의부시대통령 ( 워싱톤 ) 및러시아의푸틴대통령 ( 모스크바 ) 발표일자 : 2007년 7월 3일 주요내용 전세계의다양한에너지수요에부응하기위하여최신의안전하고핵비확산성이높은원자로공급을촉진함 원자로요건개발을위한국가또는다자간협력프로그램에관심있는국가들이참여할수있도록주선함 원자력발전소건설에필요한자금을국제금융기관이나국가금융체제등을통하여조달할수있도록지원함 개도국들이원자력에필요한인프라를구축할수있도록규제, 안전성및보안체제등의확립을지원함 사용후핵연료및방사성폐기물관리에대처하기위한해결책을강구하며, 핵연료대여, 사용후핵연료저장및궁극적으로는사용후핵연료재활용방안을개발함 전세계적원자력발전확대에부응하여 IAEA가사찰에필요한자원을확보할수있도록보장함 개도국들이원자력발전에필요한인프라를구축할수있도록 IAEA 의기술협력사업확대를지원함 원자력발전소가없는국가들이전력을공유할수있도록인근지역간전력망연결확대를지원함 상업핵연료시장은안정시키면서도원자로수명기간동안핵연료가신뢰성있게조달된다는확신을줄수있는조치를강구하여핵연료서비스를공급함 (IAEA 감독하에국제핵주기센터를설립하는방안도포함됨 ) 핵연료의확실한보장, 사용후핵연료관리, 원자로에대한장기적계약을위한협상을지원함

31 < 표 2-5> GNEP 실무그룹에대한위임사항실무그룹목적및활동계획 설치목적 - 민감핵연료주기기술획득에대한대안으로국제적인핵연료공급체계를수립할수있도록지원 활동범위 - 신뢰성있는핵연료공급 ( 사용후핵연료관리방안포함 ) 을위한실제적방안을개발하며, 다음의접근법을추구신뢰성있는 상업적으로실행가능한해결책강구핵연료서비스 특정국가나지역의이해와는무관한해결책모색 산업체, 정부, IAEA 및다자간체제의역할과보완기능인식 - 공급자 / 이용자가직면할수있는법적 정치적 상업적제약요인을고찰 활동일정 년 1/4분기에실무그룹을확정하여향후일정을결정 설치목적 - 지속가능발전을위한전세계원자력발전의확대를위해서필요한인프라개발지원 활동범위 - 인프라개발을위한다음과같은분야와관련된활동수행 발전옵션평가, 전원관리, 개발기술의활용, 인적자원개발, 비확산및안전조치, 법체제, 안전규제요건, 재정및시장여건, 사업관리, 환경영향, 비상대응, 방사선방호, 품질보증, 코드및표준, 운전경험, 물리적방호및보안, 방사성인프라개발폐기물관리및운송 - 상업적으로이용가능한분야는대상에서제외 활동내역 - 참여국의기술능력과경험활용방안을강구 - 인턴십 / 대학프로그램과같은 GNEP 외부의가용자원도이용 후속조치 - 기존인프라개선방향도출및활용가능한다자간, 양자간체제분석 - 관련국제기구의참여유도러시아의 GNPI 제안이나미국의 GNEP 제안은공급국의입장에서일방적인공급

32 보장논리만을앞세워소위이용국들로부터적극적인호응을얻지못하여왔다. 핵연료공급보장제안을한국가들로써는핵연료이용국들의자발적참여를유도하기위해서참여에따른확실한이점을보여주어야할필요성이있는바, 미국과러시아의공동선언은이용국들이누릴수있는혜택을열거한점이특징이라할수있다. 특히원자력발전소도입을위한재정지원까지보장한다면, 그동안재정부족으로원전도입을못하였던국가들의참여를유도할가능성이높아질것으로분석된다. 또한상기제안들은사용후핵연료를공급국으로회수하는가능성까지열거하고있으므로, 단순히원자력발전소만을운영하고사용후핵연료관리등은하지않겠다는국가들로부터의지지도예상할수있다. GNEP은핵확산저항성이있는핵연료수급체제와이를지원할수있는원자로개발실현과정에서우리나라의장래원자력이용개발에상당한영향을미칠수있을것으로예상된다. GNEP에서추진하는핵연료공급체제가실현될경우, 이는장기적으로세계의핵연료공급시장뿐아니라원자력발전소수출시장에도영향을미치게될것이다. 우리나라는핵연료공급국과이용국의중간위치에서기술선진국으로의위상확보노력과투자확대가필요하다. 우리나라가접근할수있는기술은핵확산저항성이강화된기술로제한될수밖에없으며, 우리나라가개발중인 DUPIC이나 pyroprocessing은 UREX+ 에대한좋은대안이라할것이다 17). 또한 GNEP의 ABR은 GIF의 SFR (Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor) 과설계개념이유사하므로, GIF 참여를통하여 ABR의원천기술확보는물론향후이들노형의국내건설 운영에대한당위성을제고하여야할것이다. 17) 2007 년 3 월미국무부의관리는한국관리와의회동에서 GNEP 구상은기본적으로대형 R&D 계획이며, 최근에는동구상과관련된산업계의실행측면으로관심이옮아가고있으며, 개량연소로개발및효율적인안전조치개발등 GNEP 이구상하는여러 R&D 활동이계속진행되고있음을전하였다. 한국에대해서는 2006 년중반부터한국측연구원들이 INL 에서 pyroprocessing 연구활동에동참토록허용한바있으며, 이는 GNEP 구상실현을위한양국간실질협력의의미도있음을언급하였다. 또한 pyroprocessing 기술은상용수준으로개발하는데시일이많이소요되기때문에 GNEP 에포함되는기술이라고도또는아니라고도할수없는애매한상태로써, 진전동향을좀더지켜보아야할것이라는입장을전한바있다

33 제 3 절러시아의국제핵연료주기센터 1. 배경 러시아푸틴대통령은 2006년 1월유라시아공동체회의에서원자력발전을위한전세계적인프라 (GNPI : Global Nuclear Power Infrastructure) 개발의일환으로국제핵연료주기센터 (INFCC : International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centers) 로구성된네트웍을구축할것을제안하였다. 푸틴대통령의제안은원자력발전을개발하고있으나민감기술을추구하지않는국가에게핵연료주기를차별없이신뢰성있게이용할수있도록하자는것이주요논리이다. 러시아는 INFCC 설립첫단계로국제우라늄농축센터 (IUEC : International Uranium Enrichment Center) 를 IAEA의감독하에러시아영토내에설립하는구상을추진하고있다. 2. IUEC 운영방안 IUEC의전체적인계층구조는다자간협정, 정부차원의집행기구, 기업차원의 IUEC 라는 3개의계층으로이루어진다 ( 그림 2-4 참조 ). 계층 1 : IUEC 구축을위한최초요건은러시아연방과 IUEC에참여하는국가들간에양자간또는 IAEA를포함한다자간협정을체결하는것이다. 러시아는다자간협정을통하여 IUEC의운영에대한신뢰성과투명성을높일수있다는점을강조하고있다. 계층 2 : 이러한협정의틀아래에서참여국들은정부기구에준하는집행기구를설립하여 IUEC의운영에대한제반지침마련과감독을수행하게된다. 계층 3 : 마지막계층이라할수있는 IUEC는참여국가의기업들로구성된합자회사형태로이루어지며, 참여회사들은 IUEC의운영과주주들의경영참여방안, 시장전략, 이익배분등을결정하게된다

34 < 그림 2-4> IUEC 의구성및법적구조 IUEC는 IAEA의사찰을받음으로써핵비확산에대한투명성을제고하게된다. IUEC 참여에있어서고려해야할주요요소는농축기술의공유여부이다. 이에대하여러시아는참여국은경영에는참여하나러시아의농축기술을공유하는것은아니라는입장을분명히하고있다 18). 러시아는 IUEC의국제핵연료공급센터로서의신뢰성을제고하기위하여다음과같은사항에역점을두고있다. 첫째 IUEC를 IAEA가참여하는다자간협력체제로운영함으로써양자간협력방식의한계를보완하고자한다. 둘째, 원자로 1-2기의노심에장전할수있는농축우라늄을 IUEC내에비축하여공급신뢰성을제고할수있도록한다 19). 셋째, 회원국과 IAEA가참여하는자문위원회를설치하여문제점발생시협의하도록한다. 즉러시아는핵비확산의무를준수하는국가에게는어떠한국제환경의변화에도불구하고당초보장된농축서비스를받을수있다는확신을줄수있는체제의수립을강조하고있다. 18) 2007 년 6 월 8 일러시아가 IAEA 회원국에게회람한 IUEC 운영방안에대한문서 (INFCIRC 708) 에는 IUEC 참여대상국과기술전파에대한러시아의입장이다음과같이기술되어있다 The Center is oriented chiefly to States not developing uranium enrichment capabilities on their territory. In so doing, the Russian side will not transfer to IUEC participants the uranium enrichment technology or information that constitutes a State secret. 19) 러시아의세르게이이바노프총리는시베리아이르쿠츠크 (Irkutsk) 지역의앙가르스크 (Angarsk) 에조성중인 IUEC 설립을위한회의에서동센터는 IAEA 를통해핵비확산조약을준수하면서해외의원전에연료를공급할것이며, 농축서비스의실시는물론 IAEA 의통제하에서 1,000 MW 급원자로의노심을 2 회장전할수있는분량의농축우라늄의저장을가능하게할것이라고언급하였다. 이바노프총리는동센터의정관은저농축우라늄을받는데관심이있는어떤국가도동프로젝트에참여할수있도록규정하고있다고강조하였다 ( 자료원 : KISTI 글로벌동향브리핑 (GTB) )

35 러시아의제안은해외의농축서비스지분을확보할수있다는측면에서는우리나라의핵연료주기서비스안정성강화에긍정적요소를지니고있다고평가할수있다. 또한경영에직접참여함으로써 IUEC 운영의투명성을제고할수있으며, 이윤발생시참여국에게배당을함으로써재정측면에서도긍정적요소를지니고있다. 그러나러시아의농축기술을공유하는것은당초부터기대할수없으나, 참여대상을농축능력을개발하지않는국가위주로한다는정책은참여에대한유인을저하시키는요소이다 20). 3. 추진경과 IUEC 설립을위하여러시아는 IAEA와접촉하여 IAEA의역할과참여방안을협의하고있다. 2007년 3월 IAEA와러시아는실무작업단을결성하여 IUEC 운영에대한세부적인원칙을개발하기로합의하였다. 러시아는 IUEC에참여할국가를물색중이며특히우리나라를비롯한원자력발전소를운영중이면서자체적인농축시설이없는국가들의참여를유도하기위하여노력하고있다. 2006년 10월카자흐스탄은러시아와의정상회담에서 IUEC에대한참여의사를전달하였으며, 양국은 IUEC의설립과공동출자원칙에입각한상업모델에관한러시아-카자흐스탄정부간협정초안을조율하여왔다. 이정부간협정은 2007년 5월푸틴대통령의카자흐스탄방문기간중에서명 날인되었다 21) 22). IUEC는합작기업 (Joint Stock Company) 으로설립되었으며, 양국은협정을통하여카자흐스탄이 10% 의지분을소유하고, 나머지 90% 는러시아가소유하기로하였다 20) 러시아의제안은소규모원전이용국의농축시설건설에대한부담을경감시켜주고아울러핵확산에대한우려를줄일수있는긍정적요소를지니고있다. 우리나라는세계 6 위의원전이용국이며향후에도원전건설을지속적으로추진할것인바, 핵연료주기의안정확보는국가에너지정책의핵심요소의하나이다. 농축 / 재처리시설을보유하지않는다는한반도비핵화선언에의하면우리나라도농축능력을개발하지않는국가의범주에속한다고할것이나, 이러한선언이영구적으로고착될것으로예단할수는없을것이다. 우리나라로서는어떠한평화적이용개발권리에도제약을가하지않는합의점을추구하여야할것이다. 21) 러시아와카자흐스탄이 IUEC 설립협정을체결함으로써동농축센터는향후원전을운영하는국가들이핵확산우려가있는우라늄을직접농축하지않아도되도록국제핵연료 은행 으로서또한국제핵연료주기센터로서출범하기위한첫발을내딛게되었다. 러시아는세계우라늄농축설비용량의거의반을보유하고있고, 카자흐스탄은세계우라늄매장량의약 20% 를보유하고있다. 카자흐스탄은 2010 년까지우라늄생산량을현재의세배인약 15,000 톤까지증가시켜나간다는야심적계획을가지고있지만, 우라늄농축시설을가지고있지않다 ( 자료원 : KISTI, 글로벌동향브리핑, ) 22) 러시아는 IUEC 의주요참여대상국으로카자흐스탄이외에, 일본, 이란, 한국을고려하고있다. 장기적으로는인도의참여가능성도예상하고있으며, 미국도오하이오와뉴멕시코의농축시설이조업을중단하게되면 IUEC 에관심을가질것이라는예상도하고있다. 또한처음으로원자력발전소를도입하고자하는국가들도 IUEC 에관심을가질것이라고예상하고있는데, 이러한부류에속하는국가들로는베트남, 이집트, 인도네시아, 터키를주목하고있다. 그외원자력발전소를도입할가능성이있는국가들로모로코, 사우디아라비아, 나이지리아, 태국, 칠레등의참여도기대하고있다. 아울러이미우라늄광산을개발하고있는국가들의참여도기대하고있는바, 이러한국가로는호주, 캐나다, 우즈베키스탄이있다 ( 자료원 : 러시아 PIR (Center for Policy Studies) 의 Angarsk Project 분석문,

36 23). 러시아는자체보유한 90% 의지분을향후 IUEC에참여하는국가들이매입하기를기대하고있으며, 우크라이나가 10% 의지분구매에관심을보이고있는것으로알려져있다. 그외러시아와적극적인원자력협력을추구하고있는일본도 IUEC 에관심을표명하고있다 24) 25). 러시아는동부시베리아의앙가르스크지역에서 1954년부터운영중인농축시설을 IUEC로전환하고자한다 ( 그림 2-5 참조 ). 이를위하여러시아정부는국가가아닌기업이핵물질과시설을소유할수있도록하는법안을 2006년 11월의회에제출한바있으며, 동법은 2007년 2월가결되었다 26). 현재앙가르스크단지에서 IUEC 용도로공급할수있는농축능력은 260만 SWU 이며, 2013년에는 420만 SWU로확장될것으로전망하고있다. 2007년 12월 17일러시아외무성은이란의부쉘 (Busher) 원자력발전소에대한핵연료공급을개시하였다고발표했다. 이란의핵개발의혹으로동원자력발전소의건설은지연되어왔으나연료의공급개시로 2008년이후에가동할수있게되었다. 러시아는이란이핵연료를핵무기개발에전용하지않고부쉘원자력발전소에만사용한다는추가적확약문서를얻었다고설명하고있다. 러시아와이란은 2007년 9월에가동개시에합의하였으나이란의건설비지불연기로인해건설작업이늦어지고있었다. 러시아가핵연료공급을개시한배경에는원자력의평화이용에대해이란에서확약을얻은것에추가하여, 최근미국정보기관이이란은 2003년에핵무기개발을중단했다고발표한것에도영향을받은것으로추정된다. 러시아는외국에서의원자력발전소건설을통해영향력을확대하고, 사용후핵연료의재처리를하는 국제원자력센터 의지위를노리고있고, 부쉘원자력발전소계획도그일환으로평가된다. 러시아과학아카데미 에너지연구소의시모니아소장은이란이합의에위반하면러시아는언제라도연료의공급을정지가능하며, 미국 / 유럽과의관계는이미악화 23) 러시아와카자흐스탄의 IUEC 설립합의에대하여미국은지지입장을표명하고있는바, 2007 년 6 월카자흐스탄에서개최된핵테러대응회의 (Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Conference) 에참석한미국국무부의 John Rood 차관은 the United States supports Russia's initiative with Kazakhstan government support on the Angarsk International Uranium Enrichment Centre which will be open for many countries" 라고미국의입장을표명하였다. ( 자료원 : BELLONA 보도 ) 24) PIR (Russian Center for Policy Studies) press on IUEC ( ) 25) 2007 년 3 월미국에너지부의클레이셀부장관은러시아를방문하여추가국가들이고농축우라늄을생산하기위한시설을갖지못하도록러시아와핵연료판매를협의한바있다. 셀부장관은 우리는매우매력적인상업기준, 아마도할인조건 (discount term) 으로농축서비스를제공하는핵연료공급국그룹을구성하기를희망한다 고밝혔다. 이구상에관련된핵연료공급국들은중국, 프랑스, 독일, 일본, 러시아, 영국및미국이포함될수있다. 그는동사업이 바라건대그들자신의우라늄농축권리를빼앗는것이아니라욕구를빼앗는것 이라고밝혔다 ( 자료원 : NTI, 보도자료 ) 26) 2007 년 8 월 15 일러시아 Rosatom 의 Sergey Ruchkin 은한국에서개최된세미나에서핵물질의민간소유를허용하는러시아원자력법의개정이이루어졌음을다음과같이서술하였다. February 2007 : Russian nuclear legislation was amended to allow ownership of nuclear materials by (foreign) legal persons (entities)

37 되어있으므로이문제가영향을준것은아니라고지적하고있다 27). < 그림 2-5> 앙가르스크위치도 27) 일본산경신문, 보도

38 제 4 절농축서비스공급 6 개국의제안 1. 배경 IAEA의 MNA 보고서발간에부응하여 WNA (World Nuclear Association) 는 2006 년 5월핵연료공급신뢰제고를위한산업계의의견을수록한보고서를발간하였다 28). 동보고서에서는농축우라늄의공급신뢰도를제고하기위하여공급업자이외에 IAEA와해당정부가참여하는 3단계로구성된심층보장 (guarantee in depth) 개념을제안하고있다. WNA가보고서를발간하자농축시설을운영하고있는미국, 영국, 프랑스, 러시아, 독일, 네덜란드 6개국은다중보장개념을수용한핵연료의공급보장에대한제안서 (RANF : Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel) 를작성하여 2006 년 6월개최된 IAEA 이사회에회람하였다. 2. WNA 의농축우라늄공급신뢰제고방안 WNA 보고서는세계의우라늄공급시장은상당한공급신뢰아래운영되고있으며현재까지원자력발전에지장을초래한특별한공급실패사례는없었다는점을인정하면서도, IAEA가개입하는다자간협정에의하여공급신뢰도를향상시킬수있다는결론을유도하고있다. 동보고서에서는전세계의핵연료공급에대하여고객의관점에서본측면과선행핵주기측면및후행핵주기측면을구분하여주요이슈들을분석하고있다. WNA의전문가그룹은핵연료산업체의모든측면에서현재운영되는시장약정들은높은신뢰도의공급안정을구현하고있는것으로평가하고있다. 즉과거경험에비추어보면전력손실을초래할수있는공급지장사태는발생하지않았으며, 최근몇몇공급중단사례들은통상적인시장체제에서해결되었음을인식하고있다. 아울러시장체제의효과성은전력회사들이재고를확충하고, 공급을다양화하고유연한계약등을통하여강화해왔으며, 바로이들전략들이공급중단의경우에활용될수있음을강조하고있다. WNA의전문가그룹은현재 IAEA와 EURATOM의안전조치체제는효과적이고높 28) "Ensuring Security of Supply in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle", World Nuclear Association, May

39 은수준의이행기록을갖고있으며, 원자력시장에서고객이안전조치를완전히준수하고안전조치의미준수에대하여정부차원에서국제적으로동등한수준으로강력한제재조치를취하는것이반드시필요하다고제안하고있다. 또한공급안정성강화를위한해결방안은현재의경쟁시장을지속적으로효과적인운영을할수있는한도내에서추진되어야하며, 더욱이긴급, 백업 (backup) 또는보장용어떠한공급약정도현재시장약정이실패하고시장의공급자를대체할수없는경우에만이용되어야하는마지막수단이어야함을강조하고있다. 이외에도일반시장으로부터공급가격차별이없어야하고그결과긴급, 백업또는보장용 공급약정을위한가격보조금도있어서는않될것이라는입장이다. 긴급, 백업또 는보장용공급약정들의실제적용은핵비확산이외의다른이유로인하여정상시장의정치적붕괴의경우에만작동되어야하며, 이러한기동은기술적이거나경제적원인에의하여작동되어서는않된다는것이 WNA 전문가들의주장이다. 즉과거의경험을살펴볼때, 어떠한기술적또는경제적공급실패도기존시장의정상운영을통해서해결될수있고이러한사실은향후에도유지되어야한다는입장이다. 또한기존의핵무기용고농축우라늄을재고량으로간주하는것이마지막백업으로서가용성을높일수있을것이며, 공급보장을강화하기위하여어떠한재고물질도 IAEA와같은국제기구에의해관리될필요가있음을강조하고있다. WNA 전문가들은선행핵연료주기측면에서는기존의농축서비스시장방식이외에 IAEA와회원국정부의지원을통한우라늄농축업자간공동보증체제를구축함으로써우라늄농축서비스의공급안정을보다강화할수있다는입장이다. 이러한공급보장개념은원자력발전의심층방호 (defence in depth) 개념과유사한방식으로, 농축우라늄공급에대한 3단계의심층보장개념이다 ( 그림 2-6 참조 ). 1단계 : 기존의세계시장이제공하고있는기본적공급보장 2단계 : 공급업자들이 IAEA와정부의보장하에운영하는집단적인공급보장이며, 공급국과수령국간의정치적인사유로공급이중단될경우에발동함. IAEA는공급중단사태가발생할경우, 그원인을사전에마련된판단기준에의거하여평가하며, 수령국의잘못이없는경우에는다른공급자에게협조를요청함 3단계 : 정부가비축한우라늄재고를활용하며, 2단계가발생하였으나농축업자어느누구도공급할수없는경우에대비하기위한최후의수단

40 < 그림 2-6> 다층구조및다국가에의한공급보장개념 다차원보장체제의핵심요소는이러한체제가정치적인이유로계약이중단된경우 에가동된다는점이다. 관련된농축업자또는고객이계약이중단되었음을통보하 면, IAEA 는안전조치의무위배여부와계약중단을초래한사례에대해사전정 의된기준에따라고객의정당성을판정한다. IAEA 는의무이행을위해다른농축 업자에게이를통보한다. 2단계백업공급이원활히이루어질수있도록다른농축업자는당초의공급자를대신하여농축우라늄을공급하기로보장하고있다. 즉단일공급업자가백업공급을위한책임을전적으로부담하게되는경우에대비하기위하여다른농축업자들은사전에 IAEA와농축업자들간합의된사항에따라서동일한몫을공급하게된다. 이를위하여백업이가능하도록농축업자와소비자간상업계약을포함하는표준백업공급문안이마련될필요가있다. 한편선행핵주기중핵연료집합체공급을위한체제는보다복잡해진다. 이는핵연료설계가개별노형설계에따라달라지기때문에다른핵연료형태와설계에대한재고비축이필요하기때문이다. WNA 전문가들은, 기존의세계각국의핵연료재순환전략에의거하여볼때단기적으로는경수로로부터핵연료를재처리하기위한새로운시설을필요로하지않을것으로판단한다. 따라서현재재처리및재순환능력은향후수요를충족하기에

41 충분하며, 어느국가가자국의재처리및재순환시설을가동하기에충분한사용후핵연료를발생하지못한다면, 그국가는기존의우라늄시장을통한공급보장을얻어야한다는입장이다. 그러나많은국가들은향후원자력발전의확대를기대하면서자국의자원들을지속가능하게장기관리할수있도록재순환전략을선택하는상황이발생할수있으며이는현재시설의용량확대또는새로운시설건설을요구할가능성도배제할수없다. 따라서현재많은국가들이고려하고있는원자력에대한적극적인계획을고려하면국제재처리및재순환센터의개념을발전시켜보다구체화할필요가있다고전문가들은제안하고있다. 또한이개념을지역차원에서효율적으로이행하기위해서, 자국의핵연료주기를갖고자하는국가들을대상으로재순환서비스에대한안정적이용을보장할수있다고본다. 전세계적으로민감기술확산을제한하기위하여민감기술보유국가들은위와같은수요를충족하기위해자신들의서비스를제공하도록장려되어야하며, 후행핵주기시설이없는국가들은적정한가격에동분야에경험과산업개발을갖는국가들에있는후행핵주기시설을이용하여사용후핵연료의재처리와 MOX 핵연료제조를할수있도록다국적협정의협상이필요함을 WNA 전문가들은제안하고있다. 3. 농축시설운영 6 개국의제안내용 농축시설 6개국이제안한 RANF는 WNA의심층보장개념을그대로수용하고, 이에 IAEA의개입과공급판단기준에대한세부내용을수록하고있다. 이들 6개국은상업적인문제나기술적인원인으로인하여발생한농축서비스공급상의문제는상업적으로해결하는것이바람직하다는점을인정하면서, 자신들이제안하는백업체제는최후의수단으로써, 문제의원인이핵비확산의무위반에대한의문에서비롯된것이아니며, 아울러정상적인상업계약으로해결될수없는경우에적용할수있는수단임을강조하고있다. 이들 6개국은자신들의제안이원자력발전소를건설을추진하는다른국가들의민감기술개발을위한투자의욕을감퇴시키는유인이될수있을것이라고기대하고있다. 이들 6개국이제안하는다단계공급보장체제는기본적인보장체제와농축우라늄비축방식으로구성되며, 이중전자는 3가지요소즉, IAEA 내의다자간상설위원회설치, 공급국과수령국의참여강화, 상업적인백업계약이라는세부요소로구성된다. IAEA 상설다자간위원회설치

42 IAEA 이사회의심의를거쳐 IAEA산하에상설위원회를설치한다. 동위원회는 IAEA 헌장에부합되어야하며 IAEA 총회에서승인되어야하며, 농축서비스의공급국들이위원회에대한공식적인지지를표명하도록한다. 공급계약이이행되지않을경우, 그원인이비확산의무위반이아니며정상적인상거래에의하여해결될수도없을경우, 농축서비스의수령국또는경우에따라서는공급국이이를 IAEA 에이를통보함으로써백업체제가작동될수있도록한다. IAEA는수령국이백업체제의가동조건을만족시키는지몇가지조건을검토하게된다. 첫째, 수령국은전면안전조치및추가의정서를발효하고있어야하며, IAEA에서미해결중인안전조치현안이없어야한다. 둘째, 수령국은국제적인안전조치기준과핵물질과핵시설의물리적방호협약에가입하고있어야한다. 셋째, 수령국은국제시장에서농축서비스를공급받아야하며민감핵주기활동을추구하지않아야한다. 공급국과수령국의참여강화우라늄농축서비스나농축우라늄을공급하는산업체를보유한국가는문제해결을위한다자간협의체제에적극적으로참여할것을 RANF 제안국들은기대하고있다. 이러한체제의이행과정에서공급국정부는그들이영토에서농축우라늄의수출이허가될수있도록하여야하며, 원칙적으로다른나라들이수출하는것또한반대하지않아야한다. 이용국은이러한백업체제의혜택을누리기위해서는국제시장에서농축서비스를조달하여야하며, 자체적인민감핵주기활동을추구하지않아야한다. 계약을파기한공급국이나다른공급국들은 IAEA의판단을존중하여야하며, 다른공급국들이나자국의공급업자가백업공급을위하여내린결정을존중하여야한다. 상업적백업계약의체결공급국들은민간공급업체들이서로를보완하는백업체제를구축할수있도록지원할필요가있으며필요하다면 IAEA의지원을받아야한다. 즉민간업체들은백업체제가작동되어야할때 IAEA와협력하며, 상업계약서에백업체제에대한조문을포함시키는방안도고려해볼수있다. 농축시설 6 개국은백업체제가제대로작동하지않을경우에대비하여농축우라늄을 비축할것을제안하고있다. 즉백업공급체제가가동됨에도불구하고적시에필요

43 한농축우라늄을공급되지못할경우에는비축된농축우라늄을인출하여사용토록한다는것이다. 미국은이미고농축우라늄 17톤을저농축우라늄으로희석하여비축함으로써핵연료공급보장에기여할것임을선언한바있다 29). 이러한재고는국가가보관할수도있으며, 이에대한사용권한을 IAEA로양도할수도있다. 재고규모, 저장위치, 관리방안, 방출기준및재고보충방안등은논의를통하여계속보완되어야할것이다. 농축시설 6개국은이러한백업체제에가입하지않는수령국이라할지라도기존의시장을이용하기위한조건에는영향을주지말아야할것임을명시하고있다. 영국은농축시설보유 6개국의제안 (RANF) 을더욱공고히하기위한방안으로공급업체의정부와이용업체의정부가체결하는농축채권 (enrichment bond) 의발행을제안하고있다 30). 즉이용국이국제법과핵비확산의무를위반하지않는한농축업체의정부는업체가농축서비스를공급하는것을금지하지않는다는보증을 IAEA를개입시켜보증하도록한다는방안이다. 또한독일은농축시설 6개국의제안이이미시설과기술을보유한국가만으로제한된다는불만을해소하기위한방안으로이들이외의국가에농축시설을건설하여 IAEA가관리하는방안을제안하고있다 31). 구체적으로는농축시설을유치하고자하는국가는영토의일정부분에대한사법권을포기하고 IAEA가시설을관리하도록하되, 이에필요한기술은 black-box 방식으로노출되지않도록하자는방안이다. 29) 2007 년 6 월 29 일, 미국 NNSA 는 Wesdyne International, LLC 사및 Nuclear Fuel Service 사와미국의고농축우라늄 17.4 톤을재혼합하고그결과로나오는저농축우라늄을저장하는계약을체결하였다고밝혔다. 이계약하에서 Nuclear Fuel Service 사는 17.4 톤의고농축우라늄을테네시주어윈에있는자체설비에서저농축우라늄으로희석되는작업을하게된다. 이작업은 2007 년도에시작되어 2010 년도에끝난다. 이는약 290 톤의저농축우라늄을생산하게된다. Wesdyne International 사는주계약자로서이저농축우라늄을사우스캐롤라이나주콜럼비아의웨스팅하우스연료제조설비에저장하게된다. 이프로젝트의비용을감당하기위하여 Wesdyne International 사는변환된저농축우라늄의일부를 3 년또는 5 년동안시장에판매할예정이다. 30) Enrichment Bond (United Kingdom, September 2006 ; INFCIRC/707) 31) Multilateralizing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (Germany, INFCIRC/704, May 2007)

44 제 5 절 NTI 의핵연료은행 1. 배경 CNN 설립자 Ted Turner와미국상원의원을역임한 Sam Nunn이공동의장을맡고있는 NTI (Nuclear Threat Initiative) 는 2001년설립되어대량살상무기에의한전세계적위협을감축하기위한활동을전개하고, 필요한자금을제공하고있다. NTI는 2001년 IAEA가 Nuclear Security Fund를조성할수있도록특별기여금을제공한바있다. NTI는원자력발전에필요한핵연료를구하는방법은자체적인시설을건설하는방법과외국에서수입하는방법으로대별할수있는바, 전자는비용이많이들고핵확산위험도증가시키는반면에, 후자를택하는것이전세계공동의안보에부합된다는시각을가지고있다. 어느국가가핵연료를수입에의존한다는결정을위해서는국제적으로핵연료공급을보장하는체제가있어야하며, NTI는이러한체제가실현될수있으며, 또한이에필요한조치에시급히착수하여야한다는판단을하게되었다. 2. 제안내용 2006년 9월 NTI는 IAEA가저농축우라늄을비축하고관리할수있도록 5천만불을제공하겠다는의사를밝혔다. NTI는비축된농축우라늄이자체적인농축시설을가지지않고외국에서수입하기로결정한국가에대한최후의수단으로서의재고 (last resort fuel reserve) 로이용될수있으리라는전망이다 32). NTI는이러한제안이국제시장에서의핵연료공급을더욱안정되게할것이라고본다. 즉공급중단사태가발생할경우, 핵비확산의무를충실히준수하고있는이용국에게는 IAEA의 32) 미국연방상원에서군사위원장을지낸바있는 Sam Nunn 전상원의원은핵확산방지차원에서최근활발히논의되고있는 국제핵연료은행 과북한은별관련이없다고말했다. 미하원외교위원회청문회에증인으로출석한 Nunn 전의원은 2007 년 5 월 10 일자유아시아방송 (Radio Free Asia) 과회견에서북한은평화적인핵이용보다는핵무기를개발하려는의도가명백하기때문이라고그이유를설명했다. 북한은핵연료은행과직접적인연관이없다고본다. 북한은핵무기보유를원하는것이너무나자명하기때문이다. 핵연료은행은핵무기는원하지않지만원자력발전소용원료를자체생산하길원하는나라를위한것이다. 이런나라들이핵연료은행에참여하게되면핵무기확산방지에큰도움이될것으로본다. Nunn 전의원은원자력발전용으로우라늄을농축하려는나라들이조금만더농축수준을높이면핵무기의원료를생산할수있기때문에이들이핵연료은행에참여해직접우라늄을농축하지않으면많은핵무기보유국의출현을막을수있다고설명했다. 또이렇게되면핵무기가테러리스트등제 3 자에게유출될가능성도낮아진다는것이다

45 공정한관리를통하여핵연료재고이용에대한신뢰를제고한다는것이다. NTI는자신의제안에대한다른국가의참여의지와 IAEA의역할을제고하기위하여자금제공에대한아래 2가지조건이 2년이내에충족될것을요구하고있다. NTI는핵연료은행의조직구조나장소또는인출조건등에대한기타사항은전적으로 IAEA와회원국의결정에맡긴다는입장이다. IAEA는재고비축을위해필요한조치에착수할것 다른국가들도추가로 1억불또는이에상응하는저농축우라늄을제공할것 NTI는기존의고객과미래의고객이공급중단사태시에도안정적으로핵연료이용이가능하다고확신을가질만큼충분한양이핵연료은행에비축되기를희망하고있다. 그러나현재까지효과적이며효율적으로작동해온시장에부정적영향을줄만큼재고량이크지는않아야한다는입장도아울러가지고있다. 이에상응하는저농축우라늄비축량은공급국과이용국그리고 IAEA의협의를통하여결정하기를 NTI는제안하고있다. NTI는다른나라의지원액을합한 1억5천만불로조성한재고비축량이초기재고로써충분하기를바라면서그비축량이원자력발전의확대와함께증대할것을기대하고있다. NTI는핵연료은행에대한논의가새로운것은아니며, 어떤형태로던지난수십년간논의되어왔으며, IAEA의헌장에도명시되어있음을강조하고있다. NTI는자신들의자금제공약속이이러한논의를행동으로옮기는계기가되기를바라고있다. NTI는자신들의제안이다른제안과는별개로독립적이며아울러다른제안과일관성이있음을평가하고, 다른제안의채택여부와상관없이자신들의제안이필수적임을강조하고있다. 3. 추진경과 2007년 6월미국하원은평화적이용을위한핵연료의안정공급을위한국제적체제의수립과핵연료은행의설립을지원하기위한법안을가결하였다 33). 동법안의도입부에서미국의회는핵무기보유국의증대가핵무기사용에대한위험성을증대시키며, 세계적인군비경쟁을촉발시킬수있음에우려를표명하고있다. 따라서핵무기보유국의수는최소한으로유지되어야하며, 궁극적으로줄어들어야한다는입장을명시하고있다. 또한농축과재처리에대해서이들기술이평화적목 33)HR 885 EH, "International Nuclear Fuel for Peace and Nonproliferation Act of 2007", June 18,

46 적과핵무기제조용두가지다사용될수있음을우려하고, 이러한시설을운영하고있는국가들도최소한으로유지되어야한다는입장을보이고있다. 미국의회는이러한우려에대처하여미국의 GNEP, 농축시설 6개국의제안 (RANF), 러시아의 GNPI 등이제안되고있음을언급하고, 핵연료공급의신뢰를제고할수있는국제적체제의수립필요성을강조하고있다. 이러한맥락에서미국의회는 NTI의핵연료은행설립제안을환영하고, IAEA 회원국들이 NTI의제안을충족시키기위하여추가로 1억불의재원지원을공약할것을제안하고있다. 이러한맥락에서미국하원은 IAEA가저농축우라늄을비축하기위한자금을마련할수있도록대통령이 5천만불을집행할수있다는법안을 2007년 6월가결하고상원에상정하였다 34). 하원은대통령의자금집행조건으로 2가지전제를부가하였다. 첫째로, IAEA는 fuel bank 설립을위해최소 1억불의서약을받고, 이금액중 7 천5백만불을수령하여야하며, 둘째로, 핵연료은행은 IAEA 감독하에핵무기비보유국에설치하도록하여야한다는조건을부가하고있다. 2007년 12월미국의부시대통령은 5천만불을 fuel bank를위하여사용할수있도록하는예산항목이포함된 2008년예산안에서명하였으며, 이에따라추가의국가들이 5천만불을지원하면 NTI의자원제공공약은조건을충족시킬수있게된다. 34) 하원외교위원장인 Tom Lantos 의원은 2007 년 5 월 10 일미하원외교위원회청문회모두발언에서현재국제핵연료은행관련법안 (H.R.885, International Nuclear Fuel for Peace and Nonproliferation Act of 2007) 을하원에제출해놓은상태라고소개했다. 그러면서지금이란이원자력발전용으로우라늄을농축하고있다고주장하고있는데만약이란이이은행에별관심을보이지않는다면그들의핵무기개발야욕이만천하에드러나게될것이라고말했다. Lantos 위원장은또핵무기기술확산을막아야하는곳은이란뿐아니라북한도있다고지적했다. " 북한은여전히핵무기확산의주요위협국으로남아있다. 북한은핵폐기약속이행에시간을끌면서애매한입장을보이고있다. 미국은중국의도움을받아 6 자회담안에서북한의완전한핵폐기를이뤄내야만한다. Lantos 위원장은북한의완전한핵폐기에조금이라도못미치는결과가나오면이는북핵문제해결의실패로여겨질것이라고지적했다 ( 자료원 : 자유라디오방송 )

47 제 6 절일본의핵연료공급등록시스템 1. 배경 일본은농축시설을보유하고있으나내수에만충당하여왔다. 향후농축우라늄수출도고려하고있는일본으로서는 6개국제안개념에자국이공급국으로포함되지못할경우를우려하게되었다. 이에일본은 2006년 9월각국이능력에따라참여하는핵연료공급등록시스템 (Standby Arrangement System) 을제안하고 IAEA 회원국에게회람하였다 35). 일본은농축시설 6개국제안의목적을지지한다는입장표명과함께동제안에대한보완적인제안이유용할것이라는취지를밝히고있다. 이러한맥락에서일본은농축서비스뿐아니라선행핵주기와관련된모든활동, 즉우라늄공급, 우라늄저장, 변환, 농축, 핵연료가공에이르기까지관심을가질것을촉구하고있다. 아울러핵연료공급시장의실패시의대응에만한정할것이아니라, 이러한시장실패의발생을예방하기위한활동도전개하자는것이다. 즉원자력발전을위한다양한활동과관련된각국의능력에대한최신현황을 IAEA에통보함으로써, 시장의투명성을향상시키고시장에이상이감지될경우이에대한경보를울릴수있다는것이다. 2. 제안내용 일본이제안한공급등록시스템은크게 2가지원칙으로구성된다 36). 첫째, 이러한시스템에참여하고자하는국가는그의사를자발적으로 IAEA에통보하며, 이때자신들의핵연료주기능력에대한재고현황과공급능력을원광, 변환, 농축, 가공항목별로 IAEA에등록한다. 이러한체제에는 IAEA 이사회에서핵비확산의무준수 35) 일본전기신문 2006 년 9 월 19 일기사에는일본정부가핵연료공급등록시스템을제안하게된배경을다음과같이기술하고있다. 핵연료공급보증을둘러싸고금년 6 월 IAEA 이사회에서농축우라늄수출국인 6 개국 ( 미국, 프랑스, 독일, 네덜란드, 러시아, 영국 ) 은구상의개념을제안했다. 이 6 개국의제안은단순하게공급국과수요국으로구분하는기준인데도많은국가들은여러가지우려를나타내고있다. 특히일본은농축우라늄을생산하고있으며현시점에서수출은하지않지만장래수출을대비하여검토하고있다. 이때문에일본정부는각국의실태를반영하여보다많은국가가자주적으로참여할수있는기준에대해제안한것이다. 핵연료공급보증체제에대한 6 개국제안은앞으로논의가활발하게진행될가능성이높다. 이를위해일본정부는 6 개국제안을개선한독자안을표명하였다. 그리하여일본은적극적으로논의에참여할자세를국제사회에명확히나타낸것이다. 36) INFCIRC/683, Communication received on 12 September 2006 from the Permanent Mission of Japan to the Agency concerning arrangements for the assurance of nuclear fuel supply Japan 's Proposal: IAEA Standby Arrangements System for the Assurance of Nuclear Fuel Supply, September 1,

48 위반이없다고판정된회원국은모두참여할자격을가질수있다. 둘째참여국들은주기적으로이러한능력의이용현황을 3단계로구분하여 IAEA로통보한다. 1단계 : 상업활동에이미착수하여핵연료제품이나서비스를국내에조달하고있으나, 해외수출은없는단계. 따라서공급지장과같은비상시지원의향이있어도재고가부족하며, 이를제조하기위해서도상당한시간이소요됨 2단계 : 상업차원의수출실적이있으며, 비상시지원요청을받으면가용한시설능력안에서신속히참여가능 3단계 : 단기간내에수출가능한재고보유 IAEA 는다음과같은역할을할것이기대되고있다. 첫째참여하고자하는국가로 부터의향서를접수하고양자간협정을체결한다. 둘째기탁기관 (depository) 으로 써주기적으로제공되는정보를관리하며, 또한세계핵연료공급시장에관한연차 보고서를발간함으로써시장의투명성 향상에기여한다. 셋째핵연료공급중단이 발생할경우중개자의기능을수행한다. IAEA 는참여국이주기적으로제공하는통보내용을분석하여공급중단사태가발 생하기전에해결방안을모색할수있다. 따라서일본의제안은비상시의대응책 뿐아니라사전예방기능을가미한것이특징이며, 6개국의공급보장제안에대한보완적인내용으로평가받고있다. 또한실제시설은참여국이소유하고있으므로 IAEA는시설이나재고를보유할필요가없다. 일본은농축시설 6개국의제안이양분법적시각에기반하고있으나, 자체농축시설은있으나수출여력은없는일본은이러한양분법적분류어느것에도해당되지않는다는입장이다. 또한핵연료공급보장체제는어떤나라가핵연료시장으로부터고립되는것을방지하기위한것이므로가능한나라는모두능력껏참여하는것이바람직하다는입장이다. 일본은자국이제안한공급보장체제는참여하는국가에게경제적이득을제공할수있을뿐만아니라, 어느국가가경쟁력도없는소규모의농축 / 재처리시설을자국내에건설코자하는유인을줄여나갈수있을것으로기대하고있다

49 제 7 절 IAEA 의국제핵주기센터제안 1. 배경 2006년 9월 19-21일에 IAEA는 50주년특별행사의일환으로핵연료공급보장및비확산보장 (Assurances of Supply and Non-proliferation) 에대한회의를개최하였다. 동회의에서는핵연료공급보장에대한최근의제안들이소개되었으며, 공급보장에관한제도적, 기술적, 법적측면의논의가진행되었다. Curtis 회장은동회의의개최목적은최근제안들의장단점과기회를도출하기위한것이었으며, 향후표 2-6 에서보는바와같은이슈들을더욱보완할것을제안하였다. < 표 2-6 > 핵연료공급보장관련추가고려사항 분야공급보장필요성공급보장대상공급보장형태판단기준 IAEA의역할산업체의역할기타 세부고려요소기존시장의대체가아닌보완수단으로인식, 각국의평화적이용권리인정천연우라늄, 농축우라늄, 핵연료집합체, 원자로기술등다양한대상실제재고또는가상재고, 계약의구속력강화비차별적이용원칙, 비정치적이며객관적기준우라늄의관리자또는소유자, 가상재고의운영자필수적참여자로서인식, 기존시장에의영향을최소화가진자와못가진자라는양분법해소, 국가의주권침해방지 동회의는민감핵연료주기를공급할수있는국가들을중심으로이들의제안을발표하고의견을교환하는기회가되었으나, 소위 이용국 들의참여는거의전무하였다. 논의에참가한소위 공급국 들은대체로민감핵주기의확산을제한하자는취지에동조하는한편, 자국이공급국으로서의역할을수행할수있다는자신의역

50 할을부각시키는기회로활용한것으로평가된다. 이후 IAEA 사무국은관련제안 들을종합적으로분석하여공급보장체제, 적용기준및실행체제에대한보고서를 준비하여 2007 년 6 월이사회에서보고하게되었다 37). 2. 핵연료공급보장체제 IAEA 사무국은농축우라늄공급보장을위한 3단계보장방안을다음과같이제시하고있으며, 핵연료집합체도유사한개념으로공급보장을할수있을것으로제안하고있다 ( 그림 2-7 참조 ). 1단계 : 핵연료공급을위한기존의세계시장 2단계 : 공급업체가자국정부의보증을얻어더욱강화시킨유사시의보완 (back-up) 공급을보증하는체제. 유사시의 Back-up 공급은이러한사유가발생한경우, 사전에설정한판정기준을심의하여공급이이루어지게된다 3단계 : IAEA 관리하에저농축우라늄 (LEU) 을세계의여러분산된위치에보관. LEU는 UF6 또는 UO2의형태로저장하거나, 이를공급하는정부의보증을받아가상적인재고의형태로저장할수도있다. 이러한재고는 2단계조치가충족될수없을경우, 사전에적용한기준을만족하면이용할수있다. level 2에의한공급요청이발생할경우, IAEA는사전에설정된판단기준의충족여부를판단하게되며, 이때적용할수있는기준으로다음을열거하고있다. 공급요청은정치적이유로제기되어야함. 공급중단사유가정치적원인인지또는다른원인인지판단하기는쉽지않을것이나표면상의이유가나타나면요청을지지하는방향으로받아들임 공급요청국은수령할핵물질에적용할수있는안전조치협정이발효중이어야함 공급요청국은가장최근의안전조치이행보고서상에신고된핵물질의전용사례가없었다는판정을받아야하며, 이사회에계류중인미해결안전조치현안이없어야함 공급요청국은향후이사회가추가할수있는기준, 예로써추가의정서를수용하여야하며, 보안이나안전성기준이요청될경우이를수용하여야함 37)GOV/INF/2007/11, "Possible New Framework for the utilization of Nuclear Energy : Options for Assurance of Supply of Nuclear Fuel, 13 June

51 < 그림 2-7> 저농축우라늄과핵연료집합체의공급보장을위한 3 단계체제 3. 국제핵주기센터의설립을위한고려요소 IAEA는이상의핵연료공급보장체제를위하여 INFC (International Nuclear Fuel Centers) 를제안하며, INFC가공급보장에기여하기위해서는다음과같은사항들이해결되어야할것으로제시하고있다. 최후의수단으로써필요한경우, 저농축우라늄공급에대한 IAEA의확실한요청 공급중단시다른공급자또는수출허가보증또는원래의공급자가방해를하지않겠다는공약을받아서 back-up 공급이이루어질수있도록하겠다는 INFC의공약 명확한법적근거 LEU를저장하기위한다수의분산된장소 ( 공급을하겠다는국가이외의장소도

52 확보 ) IAEA 의개입범위 INFC의설치는아래 2가지방안이제시되고있다. 러시아 Angarsk와같은국가시설을이용하는방안으로이경우 IAEA의역할은 back-up 공급여부의적절성을판단하는기능중심으로축소된다. IAEA가 INFC를직접건설, 운영, 감독하는확대된방안 4. 회원국의반응 공급국의위치에있는 EU, 미국, 일본등은본보고서를작성한사무국의노력을치하하고자국의제안이공급보장에기여할수있음을강조하였다. 이용국들은공급보장제안이공급국으로부터만나왔으며, 이용국으로부터의의견이반영되지않았다는문제점을지적하고, 원자력의평화적이용에대한각국의불가양의권리를강조하였다. 이용국들은본보고서가법적, 기술적, 정치적측면등에대한보완이필요하며, 공급보장제안에대한철저한검토를위한시간이필요한바, 본보고서를공개하지말것을요청하였다. 5. IAEA사무국의입장 IAEA 사무총장은본보고서가 IAEA 사무국의공식입장이아닌추가적논의를위한단순한문서이며, 구체적인결의는이사회에서결정할사항이라는입장을밝혔다. 또한사무총장은공급보장에대한제안을가진자와못가진자를구분하는시각으로보지말고, 핵연료의경제적인공급과핵확산우려를다자간협력으로해결하자는노력으로이해할것을요청하였다. IAEA 사무국은준비한보고서가논의의출발점이며, 향후회원국, 산업체및이해당사자들과접촉하여상기제안을보완할예정인바회원국의참여와제안을기대한다는입장을표명하였다

53 제 3 장핵연료공급보장제안에대한반응 제 1 절양자 다자간핵주기협력분석 양자간핵주기협력의대표적인사례는미국과러시아의잉여핵물질처분사업이있으며, 다자간핵주기협력을통한대표적인사례는 URENCO와 EURODIF를들수있다. URENCO는참여국이각자농축시설을운영하고있으며, 상호기술교류를통하여새로운시설건설에협력하고있다. 이에비하여 EURODIF는참여국가중 1개국만이농축시설을운영하며나머지국가는생산물에대한지분만을가질뿐농축기술에대한접근은하지못한다. 1. 미 러의잉여핵물질처분협력 미국정부는에너지문제를해결하기위하여원자력에너지의안전한이용을강구하고있다. 미국정부가우려하는것은핵물질이테러리스트의손에들어가는것이다. 미국이원자력의안전한이용을위한사업의일환으로고농축우라늄의저농축우라늄으로의전환사업을시행하고있다. 고농축우라늄의상당수가국가적인군사적목적으로서미국과구소련에의해만들어졌다. 구소련은 1950년이후약 1,050톤의고농축우라늄을생산했으며, 미국은 1945년부터 1992년사이에약 750톤을생산했다. 고농축우라늄의대부분이군사적목적으로생산되었다. 현재군사, 민간용고농축우라늄이잠재적으로핵확산의위협을야기할수있다는데국제적인공감대가형성되어있다. 구소련과미국이체결한전략무기감축협상에따라수천기의핵무기들이해제되었고, 이로부터상당한양의고농축우라늄이축적되었다. 미국과러시아는고농축우라늄으로인한핵확산의위협을줄이기위하여협약을체결하고미국이러시아의고농축우라늄으로부터제조된저농축우라늄 500톤을구입하기로하였다. 양국은잉여플루토늄처리를위하여 2000년 9월플루토늄처분에관한협정을체결하였으며그주요내용은다음과같다. 미국과러시아양국은각각최소한 34톤의핵무기급플루토늄을처분하며, 향후잉여로선언되는추가의핵물질은본협정에따라처리

54 잉여플루토늄의처분은 MOX로전환하여연소시키거나유리고정화하여처분하되, 러시아는전량을 MOX 핵연료로제조하여 BN-600, VVER-1000에사용하며, 미국은 25.57톤을 MOX 핵연료로제조하고나머지는고정화하여처분 미국은러시아의처분활동을지원하기위하여 2억불을제공하여, 관련시설의개보수및연구개발에사용토록함 MOX 공장은잉여플루토늄만을사용하고잉여플루토늄이모두사용되었을시 MOX 공장은폐쇄 양국은플루토늄을 MOX로제조하기위하여산업규모의전환및성형가공공장을건설하며, 이는플루토늄처분을위한연구개발, 실증및실험, 성형가공시설의설계및인허가, 원자로의개조및개선활동으로이루어진다. 양국은각각연간 2톤의플루토늄을처리하기로하나, MOX를연소할수있는원자로의여유가생기면연간 5톤까지연소할계획이다. 2. 유렌코 1971년발효된알멜로조약 (Treaty of Almelo) 에따라설립된유렌코 (URENCO : Uranium Enrichment Company) 는영국, 독일, 네덜란드가참여하고있으며, 3국이각자농축시설을보유하고있다. 이들은새로운농축시설건설을위하여상호기술을교류하고있으며, 이를위해기술및인력에대한엄격한통제를실시하고효율적인안전조치를시행하고있다. 과거파키스탄 A.Q.Khan 박사는네덜란드 Almelo 농축공장에서농축기술을비밀리에입수하여자국에서농축프로그램을추진하였다. URENCO는내수조달이외에다른국가로의수출을하고있으며, 3국전체의연간조업능력은 7,300 톤 SWU으로세계농축수요의 18% 를공급하고있다. 최근에는미국 LES (Louisiana Enrichment Service) 와제휴하여미국내에농축시설건설을 2008년말가동을목표로추진하고있다. URENCO는 1980년대까지는 3국이각자의농축시설을운영하고, 독립적인설계, 건설, 운영능력을보유하여왔으나, 1993년 URENCO 그룹의재편에따라영국에본부를둔국제적인체제하에, 공장의설계는영국이, 농축장비제조는네덜란드가, 연구개발은독일이관장하는형태로운영되고있다. URENCO는정치적인측면과관련된결정은상업적운영과는별개로이루어진다

55 즉정치적인결정은알멜로조약에따라정부간공동위원회에서결정된다. 공동위원회는국제적인분야에대한결정을하는바, 이에는안전조치, 기밀의분류, 고객에대한농축서비스지속여부, 제3자에대한기술정보의이전, 주요시설의입지등에대한사항이포함된다. 예로, LES와제휴한미국내농축시설건설의경우에도미국정부와 URENCO에참여하는 3국정부가모여 4자간협정을체결하였다. 4자협정에따라미국내공장의건설및운영을위한인허가와관련된 URENCO의기밀정보가미국으로이전되었다. 그러나 4자간협정에는상업적측면에대해서는전혀언급하지않았는바, 이는전적으로 URENCO의관리자와주주들의관장사항이기때문이다. 알멜로조약은조약발효 10년이후에는희망국은탈퇴할수있도록하고있으나현실적으로그가능성은매우낮은것으로평가되고있다. 즉국가간의역할분담이이루어짐에따라탈퇴후독자적인농축시설제작능력과연구개발능력을수립하는것은어려운과제이기때문이다. 이러한측면을고려하면 URENCO는다자간협력의좋은모델로간주되며, 정치적결정과사업상의결정을분리한성공적인사례로평가된다. 3. 유로디프 EURODIF (European Gaseous Diffusion Enrichment Consortium) 에는프랑스, 이태리, 스페인, 벨기에, 이란이참여하고있다. 참가국은시설의소유권및생산품에대한지분을가지나, 기술보유국은다른국가의기술에대한접근을허용하지않고시설운영에도참여시키지않는다. 농축시설은프랑스만보유하고있으며, AREVA가운영하고있다. 즉참여국중 1개국만시설을보유하여다른참여국에게서비스를제공함으로써기술의누설위험을차단하고핵비확산을도모하는것으로평가된다. EURODIF는참가국의내수용농축서비스만공급하고있으며수출은하지않고있다. 연간조업능력은 10,800 톤 SWU로농축장비를외부에공급한바없다. 가스확산법에의한농축우라늄을생산하고있으나, 원심분리법에비하여경쟁력이떨어지고있으므로, URENCO의기술을도입하여새로운시설을 2015년에가동할예정이다. URENCO와비교하면 EURODIF의운영체제는농축시설의관리, 운영및기술을프랑스 1국만이관장하는상대적으로단순한방식이며, 핵비확산상의모델로서지

56 니는가치는 EURODIF가더크다고평가된다. 따라서 1개회원국에만시설의관리, 운영및기술이제한되어있다는점은이체제가가지는매력이제한적이며, 이러한체제에참여코자하는국가는, 시설의관리나첨단기술에의접근에는관심이없는국가로써오직적시에, 예측가능하며경제적으로농축서비스를확보하고자하는국가로제한될것으로평가된다. 유로디프는민감기술을이전하지않으나, 참여국에게는확실한공급안정을제공하여왔다. 그러나기술과관련하여전략적인수정이필요할경우에는단점이지적되고있으며, 예로써적용기술을가스확산법에서원심분리법으로전환하고자하는경우가이에해당된다. 즉새로운기술로완전히변경코자하는전반적인결정이나기존기술의부분적변경결정에대해서는 EURODIF의다른회원국도관여하나, 이들회원국은세부적인기술위험도평가에는접근하지못한다. 즉다른회원국은시설유치국인프랑스단독의내부적이고기밀로분류된평가의세부내용은알지못한다. 대규모투자를단행한다른회원국들은이러한위험을감수해야하는것에만족하지못할것이며, 상대적으로 URENCO 방식이더나은것으로평가된다. 제 2 절다자협의체에서의논의분석 핵비확산에관한대처를둘러싸고핵연료공급보장에관한국제적인논의는정체되고있다. 2006년 9월 IAEA 설립 50주년총회특별행사개최이후핵연료공급보장제안을정밀검토하여그결과를 2007년도에 IAEA의이사회에서최종적으로발표하기로하였으나, 제도의구체적인설계에시간이소요되며또이용국의반발이큰장애가되어결정이어려운것으로관측되고있다 38). 상기행사에서는검토해야할항목을단기와중장기단계로분류하고검토항목을표시해 2007년도중에 IAEA 이사회에서최종결정하도록사무국이과제를정리하기로한바있다. 이에 따라 IAEA 사무국은 2007년 6월에는정리결과를관계국에통지하였으나, 이사회에서는아직논의하지못하고있는상황이다. 이와관련하여실제시스템의설계는그렇게간단한것은아니라는견해가확대되고있으며, 공식장소에서충분히논의되지않을가능성도예견되고있다. 또한일부제안에는농축과재처리의포기를 38) 일본전기신문 2007 년 9 월 11 일

57 전제로하는등원자력연구개발에관한고유의권리를박탈하는요소가있기때문 에이용국의반발이큰것으로관측되고있다. IAEA 에의한논의집약작업에서도 이러한반발로인하여의견수렴은신속히추진되지는못하고있다. 1. 핵비확산준비회의에서의논의 2005 년 NPT 평가회의에서다자간핵주기협력에대하여의견을표명한국가들의주 요입장은다음과같다. 가. 우리나라 민감핵연료주기기술및시설에의한핵확산위험을감안할때, 우리나라는핵확산우려국이나경제적타당성이나에너지안보에관한정당한필요성도없이이를추구하는국가에대한통제의필요성에공감한다는입장을밝혔다. 이에따라자발적으로민감핵주기시설의보유를포기한국가에대해서는합리적인가격으로확실한핵연료공급보장이이루어져야한다는입장을개진하였다. 39) 나. 일본 일본은 IAEA에서수행한다자간핵주기협력에대한추가적인논의가이루어질경우, 다음과같은세가지측면에대한보완이필요한것으로제안하고있다. 40) 첫째, MNA가전세계의핵비확산체제강화에어떻게기여할수있는지에대한점검이필요하다. 특히 MNA가이미핵비확산의무를위반한국가나향후핵비확산의무를위반할우려가있는국가들에대한문제를해결하는데기여할수있는지, 기여한다면어떤방식으로기여할수있는지에대한검토가필요하다는입장이다. 둘째, 핵비확산의무를충실히이행하고또한원자력활동에투명성을유지하고있는핵무기비보유국의평화적인원자력이용에 MNA가부당한영향을미치지않는가에대한검토도중요하게고려하고있다. 즉전면안전조치협정및추가의정서를체결하고, 이에따라 IAEA로부터핵물질확산에대한징조가없으며신고되지않 39) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.42, "Views on substantive issues of the 2005 Review Conference / Working paper submitted by the Republic of Korea / Non-proliferation" (May 2005) 40)NPT/CONF.2005/WP.22, "Working Paper of Japan" (May 2005)

58 은핵물질이나활동도없다고판단을받은핵무기비보유국의평화적인원자력이용에 MNA가영향을미쳐서는안된다는입장이다. 셋째, 핵연료서비스공급은국제적인정치상황에따라손쉽게영향을받으며이에따라본질적으로예측불가능한측면이있는바, MNA가어떻게핵연료서비스공급을실제적으로보증할수있을지에대한추가적인연구가필요한것으로제안하고있다. 다. 아르헨티나 아르헨티나는 MNA 방안을검토하기위하여소집된전문가그룹에게제공된일부제안내용들이민감핵연료주기분야에대한기술개발을추구하는국가들의권리를제한하는경향을보이고있다고판단하고있다. 이러한제안들의개념에따를경우, 민감핵주기개발에대한권리가장차일부국가들에게만유보되거나, 이러한활동이다자간협력을통해서만이루어질것이라는것이아르헨티나의입장이다. 즉이러한기준은핵심기술분야에대한개별국가의주권과소유권에제한을가하게될것이며, 결국이러한활동과기술로인한상업적이익을제한된일부국가들만누릴것이라는것이아르헨티나의관점이다. 41) 아르헨티나는전문가보고서가, 핵무기제조를목적으로하지않으며 NPT 1조및 2조를준수하는한모든 NPT 당사국이기술개발을할권리가있다는 NPT 4조의중요성을강조하고있다고지적하고있다. 또한아르헨티나는 NPT 4조에서언급한권리는동조약의전제가되는권리로서, 당사국간이합의에의해서만개정되거나제한될수있다는입장을보이고있다. 아르헨티나는핵비확산체제를강화하기위한수단으로 MNA를전세계적으로시행하는것의적합성에의문을제기하고있으며, MNA의보편적적용의적합성에대한판단을내리기위해서는정치적인측면을중요하게고려하여야한다는견해를보이고있다. 전문가보고서에서참고한기존의다자간체제 (EURATOM) 의사례는경제성및상업성측면에서성공한사례이기는하나, 이에참여한국가들이동일한경제및정치기구에속하고, 국제안보에대한동일한정책을공유하고있다는점을지적하면서, 아르헨티나는 MNA의비확산측면상의가치에대해서의문을제기하고있다. 41)NPT/CONF.2005/WP.33, "Multilateral nuclear fuel cycle arrangements - Working document submitted by Argentina" (May 2005)

59 결론적으로아르헨티나는핵연료주기활동이오직 MNA를통해서만이루어져야한다는방식은현실적이지못한것으로평가하고있다. 즉모든국가는국제법과핵비확산을위한규정을준수하는한, 자국의정책목표와우선순위에따라원자력의평화적이용에따른이익을누릴권리가있다는것이아르헨티나의시각이다. 아르헨티나는 NPT 의무들간의미묘한균형을새로이정립하려는어떠한시도에대해서도주목할것이며, 평화적목적의기술개발을위한각국의권리에의문을제기하는어떠한시도도주목하겠다는입장이다. 아르헨티나는핵비확산목표는이를위하여마련된기존의국제체제를효과적, 효율적으로이행함으로써보다잘달성될수있다는입장이다. 아르헨티나는이러한국제체제의예로안전조치이행, 추가의정서의보편성확보와신중한이행, 비용효과적인안전조치이행, 의무위반자에대한제재조치강구등을제시하고있다. 라. 호주, 캐나다, 스웨덴등의그룹 호주, 오스트리아, 캐나다, 덴마크, 헝가리, 아일랜드, 네덜란드, 뉴질랜드, 노르웨이및스웨덴으로구성된그룹은핵물질과기술의군사적전용위험을감소하고, 핵무기에직접사용될수있는핵물질의재고를제한하기위한다자간핵주기협력방안을신중하게검토할것을제안하고있다. 이러한협력방안은모든지역, 군소국가및자원이제한된국가들모두를위한비용효과성과규모의경제를충족시켜야함을제안하고있다. 이러한관점에서평화적목적의핵연료및핵물질의공급을보장하기위한방안은비차별적이어야하며, 농축및재처리에대한전세계의수요를충족시키며, 또한이들시설의상업적경쟁력을보장하는것을목표로할것을주 장하고있다. 또한이러한방안을강구하기위해서는 NPT 4 조에명시된바와같 은평화적이용을위한각국가의양도할수없는권리와 1-3조에서명시된비확산규정을고려할것을요구하고있다. 이러한맥락에서이들그룹은핵비확산보증과핵연료서비스공급보장을위한방안을강구하기위하여, IAEA 전문가그룹이제시한 5가지방안을단계적으로검토하는것과같이, 관련된이슈와해결방안등을추가적으로검토할것을제안하고있다. 42) 42) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.35, "Working paper submitted by Belgium, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Poland and Turkey for consideration at the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (May 2005)

60 마. 비동맹그룹 (NAM) 비동맹그룹은 2005 NPT 평가회의에서다자간핵주기협력방안에대한직접적인언급은하지않고 NPT 4조에서명시한평화적이용개발에대한각국의고유한권리를강조하고있다. 비동맹그룹은개발도상국에대하여평화목적의물질, 장비, 기술의수출에부당한제한이상존함에우려를표명하고있다. 이들은핵확산에대한우려는다자간협상과, 보편적이고, 포괄적이며차별성이없는합의에의할때최선의방안을강구할수있다는입장이다. 핵확산을저지하기위한방안들은투명하며모든국가에게공개되어있어야하며, 개발도상국이지속적인발전을위하여필요로하는평화적이용을위한물질, 장비, 기술의접근에제한을가하지말아야한다는입장이다. 43) 2. IAEA 공급보장세미나 가. 제도적측면 다자간핵연료공급보장및핵비확산과관련하여각국정부와관련원자력산업체의입장은다양하게표출되고있다. 2006년 9월개최된 IAEA 특별포럼에서는이러한문제에접근하기위하여제도적측면과기술적측면에대한다양한의견이교환되었다. 제도적측면에서는핵비확산제도와같은정치적측면과공급안정과같은시장측면이논의되었다. 정치적측면에서볼때, 공급보장체제로의참여에제약을두는것은기존핵비확산체제의파산을초래할우려가있으며, 이를고려할때기술적측면의공급보장뿐아니라정치적안정을위한고려가필요하다는점이강조되고있다. 에너지안보와국가발전을위하여에너지원다원화가필요함은기지의사실이며, 공급제안에대한선택은각국의주권적사항으로평화적이용을추구하는국가가대상에서배제되지않아야할것이다. 개도국의입장에서는최근의제안이또다른카르텔을형성하여 NPT 4조에서보장하는권리를침해하여 NPT 정신에위배된다는인식이 43) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Working paper presented by the members of the Group of Non-Aligned Movement States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (May 2005)

61 존재하고있다. 즉최근의제안들이개도국의민감기술에의접근을차단하는또하나의수출통제로서의차별적수단이될것이라는우려가대두되고있다. NPT는핵비확산을위한필수요소로서중요성을가지나, NPT 4조와일관성유지, 가진자와못가진자의구도에서탈피하여흑백논리가아닌유연한접근이필요하다. 다자간핵주기협력을위한제안들이공급중단시의 IAEA의중재역할에비중을두고있으나, 정치적사유로인한공급중단은 IAEA의결정에부정적영향을미칠만큼강력하리라는점도예상할수있다. 이러한관점에서볼때, 핵연료공급보장방안은잠재적인이용국에게최후의수단 (supply of last resort) 으로서인정받을수있어야할것이며, 아울러민감기술을포기한국가에대한일종의보상조치도고려되어야할것이다. 시장측면에서는장기적인공급보장을위하여수송, 인적자원, 제작능력등을고려하여야한다. 특히공급보장과핵비확산을만족시키기위해서는다수의이용을보장하는국가들만의시설을이용하는것이중요하다. 이러한관점에서볼때, NPT 서명국만으로다자간협약을체결하고, 차별없이경제성있는가격으로공급하는방안에대한참여국간의신뢰가조성되어야할것이다. 현실적으로제조원을바꾸는것이쉽지않을것이라는점을인식하여야하며, 공급보장을위한성공요인으로는예측성, 투명성, 기존시장과의경쟁력을고려할수있다. 아울러시장메카니즘이정부의개입보다는더욱효율적이라는점을간과하지말아야할것이다. 즉공급보장은최후의수단으로사용되어야하며기존상업시장에의영향을최소화하는것이바람직하다. 나. 기술적측면 재고비축측면과관련하여볼때핵연료은행에어떠한형태의생산물을비축하여야할지를고려하여야한다. 원광수급은품질과수량면에서어려움이없으며, 농축은핵연료은행에서몇가지표준을비축하면해결이가능하리라는점을예상할수있다. 그러나핵연료가공분야에서는전세계적으로다양한핵연료집합체가존재하며, 매 4-5년마다연료설계를개선하고있으며, 또한설계가변경되면인허가를새로이취득하여야하는점을감안하면, 집합체를핵연료은행에저장한다는것은거의불가능함을알수있다. 핵연료집합체분야는시장경쟁이치열하며, 대부분의국가가국산화를시도하고있으므로가공된핵연료집합체를연료은행에적용하는것은많

62 은문제를내포하게될것이다. 재고비축에관한기술적타당성분석이외에, 방사성물질의수송이점점어려워지고있는점과구매자가수송과안전에대한책임을지도록요청되고있다는점을인식할필요가있다. 이를고려할때핵주기산업체이외에수송업계와협의하여방사성물질수송제약을완화할수있는방안을강화되어야할것이며, 이과정에 IAEA의적극적지원이필요하다. 아울러법적인측면에서는물리적방호, 안전조치, 사전동의권을고려한공급국, 이용국및 IAEA 3자간의협정체결을위한표준문안작성도마련되어야할것이다. 이와관련하여 IAEA는자신의역할에대하여공급국과는 Supply agreement 체결이필요하며, 수령국과는 Project Agreement 체결이필요하다는분석을하고있다. 또한안전조치, 안전성, 손해보상, 인접국가와의국경통과문제등이해결되어야할것으로보고있다. 다. 협력방향 핵비확산규범하에서원자력이용자모두에게평등하게수용가능한다자간체제의수립을위해서는단계적접근이필요하다. 이를단기와장기로구분하면단기적으로는핵연료공급보장체제수립에우선순위를두어야할것이다. 이러한체제로는 NTI가제안한핵연료은행, 6개국제안, 러시아의핵연료주기센터제안들이있으며, 영국과일본의제안은이들을보완하는것으로볼수있다. 중장기적으로는공급의적절성과폐기물관리및처리를보장할수있는, 시장체제와통합된진정한의미의다자간체제의수립을도모하여야한다. 동력로부품과기술에대한접근보장, 미래의농축및재처리는다자간체제로운영하며궁극적으로기존의농축과재처리시설을국가소유에서다자간운영체제로전환하는방안을강구할필요가있다. 따라서향후다음과같은이슈들이더욱세부적으로검토될필요가있다 44). 첫째, 왜공급보장체제가필요한지에대한검토가필요하다. 핵연료의공급보장을위한보완체제의수립은 2가지목적을가지고있는바, 정치적사유로인한핵연료공급중단사태에대처하는것과, 국가적으로새로운농축및재처리시설을건설코자하는유인을제공하는취약점에대처하기위한목적을들수있다. 즉공급보장체제는상업적시장에대한보완체제로인식되어야하며, 기존시장을대체하자는 44) 특별포럼의장은 IAEA 사무국, 회원국, 산업체및전문가들의공동작업후, 그결과를 2007 년이사회에서검토할수있도록할것을제안하고있으며, 이러한조치들이단기및중기적조치를위한의제로발전될수있을것으로전망하고있다

63 것이아님이인식되어야한다. 또한어느국가가이러한체제를이용한다고하여, NPT 4조에명시된원자력의평화적이용에대한권리상실을요구하거나박탈하자는것이아이며, 앞으로나아갈행보는농축과기타핵주기능력의확산에서기인하는핵확산위협에대한조화된판단을통하여이득을보게될것임을인식하여야한다. 둘째, 무엇을보장할것인지검토되어야한다. 최근의제안들은서로보완적으로, 일부제안들은천연우라늄이나저농축우라늄의공급보장에초점을두고있으나, 핵연료자체의공급에초점을두는제안도있다. 이러한제안중일부는우라늄시장의투명성증진을요구하기도하며, 발전사업자에게는원자로기술에대한접근이더중요하다는인식도있다. 따라서완전히성숙된공급보장체제는이러한여러아이디어들을포괄할수있어야할것이다. 셋째, 공급보장체제의양태 (modalities) 에대한검토가필요하다. 가능한형태로는공급자와의구속력있는계약을통하여천연우라늄및저농축우라늄의가상재고를수립하는것으로, 이에추가하여핵연료제작서비스를보증하는방안을고려할수있다. 이와관련하여, 우라늄의실제재고설치는가능하지만, 핵연료집합체의실제재고설치는실용적이지못한것으로평가된다. 넷째, 객관적기준이필요하다. 공급보장체제의혜택을받기위하여필요한조건은제안별로차이가있으나, IAEA가운영하는보장체제는비차별적인방식으로모든회원국에게이용가능하여야한다. 또한모든제안은방출기준이확정되고 IAEA 이사회나공급자콘소시움에의하여동의를받아야할것이다. 아울러명백히비 정치적이고객관적기준에따라방출체제를운용하기위한평가가필요하다. 다섯째, IAEA의역할에대한검토가필요하다. IAEA 역할로는우라늄의관리자또는소유자로서의역할에서부터가상재고의운영까지다양하게고려할수있다. IAEA 헌장에의하면 IAEA는자체적인핵연료재고를설치하여회원국에게공급할수있으며, 대상물질을 IAEA의소유권하에이전할것인지또는공급국이직접공급할것인지에따라다양한법적절차가필요하다. IAEA가실제핵연료은행을설치할경우에는안전조치, 보안, 안전, 손해배상및인접국가와의국경통과협정도필요하다. 여섯째, 산업체의역할에대한검토가필요하다. 핵연료공급보장이던원자로기술에대한접근보장이던간에산업체는필수적인파트너로인식되어야하며, 기존핵연료시장의다원화와안정성에는부정적영향이없어야할것이다

64 일곱째, 기타고려요인으로지속가능한재정, 핵연료 / 원자로기술을가진자와못가진자라는양분법이되지않도록보장체제를구성하는방안, 기존의다자간의조약에의한핵비확산규범과국가의주권을저해하지않도록보장체제를구성하는방안등이검토되어야한다. 3. IAEA 이사회 2007년 11월개최된 IAEA 이사회에서는핵연료공급보장과관련하여다음과같은논의가있었다. 미국은핵연료공급보장체제설립을위해서는보다점진적이고단계적인접근이필요함을강조하고 2008년 6월까지는동체제설립관련초기조치에대한합의가이루어지기를희망하고, 이를위한사무국의주도적역할수행을장려하였다. 아울러미국은 GNEP 관련운영위원회개최및실무그룹의운영계획과, 공급보장을위해 2007년 6월부터약 17.4 톤의고농축우라늄의희석 (down blending) 을시작하였음을소개하였다. EU, 오스트리아, 독일등서방국가들은핵연료공급보장체제설립의중요성과이를위한사무국의노력을평가하고, 2008년 3월차기이사회에서보다실질적이고결과중심적인토의가진행될수있기를기대한다는의견을피력하였다. EU를대표한포르투갈은핵연료공급보장체제의중요성에대한인식제고뿐아니라회원국들로부터의합의 (consensus) 확보가중요하다고강조하고, 보다구체화된제안을기초로한토의진행과회원국들의합의확보노력을지지하였다. 독일은 2008년에네덜란드, 영국과공동주관으로공급보장관련회의를개최할예정임을통지하고, 많은관심국가들이 동회의에참석할것을요청하였다. 일본은러시아의제안과 관련된모델협정은향후여타협정의기준이될수있음을지적하고, 회원국들이광범한토론을통해러시아의모델협정이채택될수있기를희망하였다. 이에대해, 77그룹을대표한파키스탄및중남미국가들은공급보장방안의기술적, 법적, 재정적함의에대한보다면밀한검토가필요하다고하면서, 이문제가해결되기전에이사회에서공급보장문제를토의하는것은시기상조임을강조하였다. GRULAC (Group of Latin America and Caribbean Countries) 을대표한도미니카공화국은여전히핵연료공급보장방안에대한보다면밀한분석이필요하다고하면서, 공급보장방안이 NPT상평화적핵이용권리를재규정하거나저해하여서는

65 안된다고강조하였다. 특히, 아르헨티나는지금까지이사국간핵연료공급보장체제설립필요성에대한합의가이루어지지않았음을강조하고, 사무총장이공급보장체제설립필요성에대한합의가이루어진것처럼언급해서는안된다고지적하였다. 엘바라데이사무총장은이사국들의발언과관련하여 IAEA의핵연료비축을위한노력과다른한편으로다자핵연료서비스공급간의개념구분이필요할것으로본다고하고, 핵연료공급서비스다자화에대해서는회원국의합의가필요하다고보나, 핵연료비축문제는연료공급과관련 IAEA가핵연료물질을비축할수있도록규정한헌장 9조에따라 IAEA에권한이부여된사안이라고강조하였다. 특히사무총장은그간핵연료비축과다자핵연료서비스공급관련많은제안이제시된바, 현재어떠한제안도회원국의권리포기를요구하고있지않으며, 더나은연료공급서비스를제공하기위한방안으로검토되고있다는입장을피력하였다. 제 3 절주요공급국의입장분석 1. 핵비확산과학기술포럼 일본은핵비확산과공급보장을둘러싼국제동향에비추어, 최근핵비확산문제의동향에대한이해를깊이하고, 일본의핵비확산과평화이용의양립에의대응을표명하는것과함께, 핵비확산기술개발분야에서국제적인파트너쉽을강화하는것을목적으로, 핵비확산과학기술국제포럼 을 2006년 5월도쿄에서개최하였다. 동포럼은일본원자력연구개발기구 (JAEA) 가주최하였으며, IAEA, 미국, 일본, 러시아, 프랑스등의전문가가참석하였다. 가. IAEA 사무국의입장 IAEA 사무국은기조연설에서핵확산의위험을최소한으로줄이는견고한핵비확산체제구축의필요성을강조하면서, 핵연료재활용에대한입장을다음과같이제안하였다. 즉 NPT체제하에서는, 농축과재처리기술의보유는위법은아니지만, 해당기술을가지고있는나라가 NPT로부터탈퇴할경우비교적단기간에핵무기를제

66 조할수있으며이에대한대응으로 IAEA는농축과재처리사업등의운전을다국적관리하에두는추진방안을 4단계로모색하고있다는것이다. 제1단계 : 선량한원자력평화이용국에원자로기술과핵연료의 공급보증 을제공하는메카니즘의구축제2단계 : 농축이나재처리기술을보유하지않은나라에대해서는이들시설을도입하는것을정지 (5년또는 10년의시한설정 ) 제3단계 : 핵연료재활용을위한후행핵주기 ( 사용후핵연료재처리와폐기물처분 ) 의다국적관리를위한체제설립제4단계 : 선행핵주기 ( 즉, 농축과연료제조 ) 를관리하기위해서상기 3단계와같은체제설립 나. 미국의입장 미국 NNSA의담당관 45) 은기조연설에서 GNEP은배타적인것은아니며이러한국제협력을지지하는모든나라에대해포괄적인기회를제공하며, 핵연료재활용을구축하고핵확산을억제하여새로운약정을창설하는기회를제공하게된다는미국의입장을전하고있다. 또한 GNEP이공급국, 이용국양측에게평등한거래라 는것을실증하는것이필요하며, 무기제조능력을 포기하는대신에이용국은농 축과처분장에투자하는것없이원자력의이용이가능하게된다는입장을밝히고있다. 또한 GNEP은위대한목적을위한도전이며, 아이젠하워대통령이 1953년국제연합의 평화를위한원자력 (Atoms for Peace) 의연설중에서, 군비구축이아닌, 먼저인류의향상심에관심을가져야만한다 고말했듯이, GNEP은이정신을구체화하는것이며, 미국은다른나라의참여 (partnership) 를구하고있음을강조하고있다. 다. 일본의입장 일본의경제단체연합회자원 에너지대책위원회위원장은기조연설에서원자력의 평화이용과핵비확산에관한일본의시각을전하고있다. 첫째 IAEA 가제안한 45) DOE 산하의 NNSA (National Nuclear Security Administration) 의 Deputy Administrator 인 Jerry Paul 이 GNEP 의장래전망이라는주제로발표

67 MNA나미국의 GNEP 구상은원자력발전을도입 확대하려는개발도상국이나소규모의원자력계획을가진나라로의민감기술의확산을방지하며원자력평화이용을촉진한다는의미에있어서중요한대응으로인식하고있으나다음과같은문제점들이내포되어있다는입장을밝히고있다. 즉이란과북한의핵개발의혹을생각하면해당국은핵연료의안정공급보다핵연료재활용기술의취득이목적이고, 이와같은체제를구축해도해당국에의압력은되지만우라늄농축등을단념시키기까지는이르지못하며, 문제해결은되지않는다는입장을밝히고있다. 또, 우라늄농축, 재처리시설의신규건설중단은국제적인핵비확산규범을성실히준수하고있는나라의원자력평화이용의권리에불필요한제약을만들염려가있다는입장을전하고있다. 둘째, GNEP에서배려해야할사항으로다음을지적하고있다. 우선원자력평화이용권리의평등성문제를지적하는바, NPT는세계의국가를핵무기국과비핵무기국으로구분 고정화한불평등조약이지만, 조약에따라핵비확산의의무가준수되는한핵무기국인가아닌가를불문하고원자력의평화이용은모든협약국의빼앗을수없는권리이다. 하지만, GNEP는 핵연료공급국 과 단순한원자력이용국 으로이분화하는구상이고, 이새로운차별화가 NPT가규정하는원자력평화이용의권리와평등성과의관련으로국제사회에받아들여질것인지불확실하다는것이다. 아울러, 핵비확산시스템의강화를위하여차별화의도입은필요하지만그것을오래고착화하여서는아니되며, 시간과상황의변화와함께진화하는유연한시스템을구축하는편이바람직하다는입장이다. 이러한분위기가조성되면비핵무기국으로서핵연료재활용을시행하는일본의경험을활용하는것이바람직하다는입장을전하고있다. 아울러핵무기국의민간시설에도안전조치를적용하는평등성의확보가바람직하다는입장을개진하고있다. 라. 종합의견 핵비확산과원자력평화이용의장래전망이라는주제로진행된종합토의에는주제발표자이외에미국국무부, 일본외무성, 프랑스원자력청등의관련자가참석하여다음과같은의견을교환하였다. 우선 공급국 ( 사이클국 ) 과 수령국( 연료수령 / 발전국 ) 의구분화와해당구분이 NPT의불평등성을확대한다는우려에대해서는지금까지원자력에접근할수없었던나라의접근이가능하게되었고오히려차별이적어지는것으로볼수있으며, 또한나라의문제가아닌전세계전인류에이

68 익을가져온다고생각해야한다는의견이개진되었다. 한편, 구분화는차별을고정하게되므로이에대한반대가강할것이므로일정의조건을만족하면 수령국 에서 공급국 으로바꿀수있다는유동성의확보가중요하며, 불평등성의완화책으로써핵무기국의민간용원자력시설에안전조치를적용하는방안도제시되었다. 그외에핵군축으로얻어지는핵물질을연료공급보증으로활용한다는핵군축과의관련노력이공급보증시스템에대한이해를확보하기위하여중요하다는의견이개진되었다. 2. G-8 정상회의 2007년 6월 Heiligendamm에서개최된 G-8 정상회의에서는핵비확산에관한결의문이채택되었다 46). G-8 정상들은원자력의평화적이용을위한 NPT 당사국의불가양의권리를재확인하였다. 농축 재처리와관련된물자및기술의확산위험감소를위해 NSG에서농축및재처리의이전에대한통제를강화하는체제에대하여토의를지속하기로한것을환영하였다. 이와관련하여, 2007년개최된 NSG 총회에서동건에대한합의에도달하지못한데유감을표명하고, NSG가작업을가속, 신속히콘센서스에이를것을촉구하였다. NSG가 2008년적절한기준에합의하지못하면, G-8은농축및재처리이전과관련된확산위험을경감시키는대체전략을진지하게검토할것이라는양해하에서이미합의된조치 47) 들을계속취해나가기로합의하였다. G-8 정상들은각국의농축 재처리활동추구에대한대안으로, 핵연료주기에대한다자적접근메카니즘을개발하고, 이행하는것이중요함을강조하였다. 2006년 9월개최된 IAEA 특별행사의후속조치로 IAEA 사무총장이그동안의분석결과를정 리한제안을 2007 년 6 월이사회에제출할것을촉구하였다. G-8 정상들은동제안 의검토기준으로, 비확산체제에대한부가가치, 공급보장의신뢰성, NPT 4조와의양립가능성, 상업시장기능에불필요한간섭회피필요성등을제시하였다. 모든다자적접근메카니즘에대한참여는자발적이어야하며, 어떤국가에대해서도기존시장에서핵연료주기서비스구매를배제해서는안된다는점을강조하였다. 46) G8 Summit 2007, HEILIGENDAMM STATEMENT ON NON-PROLIFERATION (2007) 47) 이미합의된조치한농축재처리기술을이전하지않는다는신중한정책 (startegy of prudence) 이라는기존의 G-8 합의를그대로유지하는내용으로판단됨. 단, 미국을제외한 G-7 이농축재처리이전에대한객관적인기준없이이러한임시적문안으로과거개최된 G-8 정상회의에서타협을해온데불만을가진점을고려, strategy of prudence 라는표현을삭제하게된것으로보임

69 제 4 절이용국의입장분석 1. 원자력도입국의입장 2006 년 12 월 IAEA 에서개최된 원자력프로그램의도입과관련된문제들 에대한 워크숍에는 44 개국이참여하였다 48). 이중에 28 개국은원자력에너지프로그램이 아직국내에없는나라들로써, 대부분이아프리카, 동남아시아, 중동지역에속한국가들이다. 이들나라중에서도원자력을앞으로준비해야겠다고구상하는나라도있었고, 아직원자력이무엇인지모르는국가도포함되었다. 원자력초보국가들은재정문제, 국가의전력구성망을짜는기반체계다지기, 지식데이터베이스구축하기, 공공수용성, 안전및안전보장, 법률, 안전성과규제, 폐기물관리등의광범위한도전문제에직면에있음이드러났다. 개발도상국이가장관심을보인원자력문제는핵연료의공급이지속적, 안정적으로공급되는가의논의였으며미국 DOE의 GNEP 정책에따라원자로기술의수출정책이얼마큼신축적으로펼쳐지는가에있었다. 12개국의아프리카나라들은남아프리카공화국을제외하고원자력에너지가국내에없다. 가나공화국은 2020년에원자력을도입하려는계획으로정부단위의원자력위원회를구성하려는방침을갖고있다. 가나공화국은우선정책적으로문제를풀고그다음에원자력국제기구 IAEA의도움을요청할계획을세웠다. 나이지리아는현재의전력생산량과맞먹는 4,000 MWe 용량의전력을앞으로 15년에서 20 년이내에모두원자력으로생산한다는야망을갖고있다. 수력발전의전력생산에기대를하고있지만수력생산이차츰고비용화됨에따라어쩔수없이원자력에기대는마음이크다. 카메룬은현재원자력에너지타당성조사를하고있는나라로서회의기간중에 IAEA에 4가지문제를지원해달라고요청하였다. 원자력기술전수, 원자력인력개발, 법제화및표준문제, 재정지원을받는방안등의분야에서국제기구의도움을필요로하고있다. 케냐도경제개발차원에서국제기구의지원을촉구하였고탄자니아는아직에너지공급위기를맞고있지는않지만차츰수력발전소댐의수량이고갈되어가고있고, 천연가스와석유에의존해보 48) 한국원자력국제협력재단뉴스레터제 47 호

70 려고하여도가격이해마다높아져큰어려움에놓여있다고하소연하였다. 탄자니아는시험용원자로도없기때문에원자력관련인력이전무한상태이다. 그래서남아프리카공화국의도움을절대적으로필요로할지도모른다. 하지만프랑스와미국은원자력시설물의안전성과보호에대한책임이절대적으로국가에있기때문에보다신중해야함을강조하였다. 시리아는자국의전력요구량에서 6% 정도를원자력에너지로생산하기를희망하고있으며이를 2020년까지갖추고자한다. 중동과북아프리카국가의대부분나라들은원자력교역에관한금지가정치적으로원자력개발프로그램에장해가되고있다고생각한다. 이들나라의정치지도자들은핵연료공급의안정적확보를최우선으로여기고있다. 따라서핵연료공급은국제기구가관장해야한다는의견을내었다. 2. 기타우라늄원광수출국 가. 카자흐스탄 카자흐스탄의우라늄매장량 (1kg당 80달러이하 ) 은약 37만8천톤으로, 호주에이어세계 2위이다. 현재생산량도국가별로캐나다, 호주에이어 3위이며기업별로는캐나다의카메코, 프랑스의아레바, 영국의리오틴트에이어세계 4위이다. 카자흐스탄원자력공사 (Kazatomprom) 는천연우라늄을 2005년시점에서연 4,350톤을생산 하였으며, 2010 년에는이를연 1 만 5 천톤으로약 4 배규모로끌어올려세계에서 유수한우라늄공급자가된다는계획을수립하고있다 49). 카자흐스탄국내에는재전환과펠릿제조시설은있지만농축시설은없으며, 향후에는우라늄공급형태를고도화하여앞으로는연료집합체로제공할방침이다. 구체적으로는 2010년에는연료집합체로제공하며 2012년경부터는본격적으로판매할계획이며, 연료집합체로의본격적인공급을위해서는원자로의종류에따라인증을취득하는방안을고려하고있다. 나. 호주 호주는세계우라늄매장량의 40% 를점유하고있다. 수출을위한우라늄광산은 3 곳 49) 일본전기신문 2007 년 4 월 13 일

71 으로한정하고있으나, 소위 3광산정책 을 2007년 4월에철폐하는등우라늄을전략수출상품으로자리매김할움직임이연방정부차원에서추진되고있다 50) 51). 세계최대의우라늄매장량을가진호주정부는중국에이어인도에대해서도우라늄수출금지를해제하기로하였다. 즉호주정부는핵확산금지의관점에서중국과인도에대한수출을신중하게검토해왔으나, 원자력발전의대규모증설계획을가진중국과인도에대하여민생이용에한정한다는조건으로수출금지를해제하게되었다. 호주에의한중국과인도의수출은평화적이용을담보하기위해양국간의협정체결을전제로하여중국과는체결을완료하였으며, 핵확산금지조약에가입하지않은인도와의사이에도양국간의협정으로군사적이용에대한제동을걸것으로전망된다. 50) 일본전기신문 2007 년 8 월 29 일 51) 2007 년 6 월 2 일, 자유당의연방의회는해외방사성폐기물을호주에하치하는것을승인했다. 또한존하워드 (John Howard) 수상은호주내에서의우라늄농축, 원자력발전및사용후핵연료의재처리를금지한연방법안을철회하려고하는것으로보도된바있다 ( 자료원 : KISTI 글로벌동향브리핑 (GTB) )

72 제 4 장우리나라의입장분석 제 1 절우리나라의핵주기능력및대외협력현황분석 1. 우리나라의핵주기능력분석 가. 우라늄정광 세계우라늄확인매장량은약 459만톤U으로세계연간소요량이약 6.5만톤U 임을고려할때이는향후약 70년간사용가능한양으로평가되고있다. 호주는세계최대의우라늄자원보유국으로전세계확인매장량의 24% 를점유하고있으며, 그뒤를카자흐스탄 17%, 캐나다 9% 를보유하고있으며, 미국, 남아공, 나미비아, 브라질등이 6-7% 수준을보유하고있다 ( 표 4-1 참조 ). < 표 4-1> 국가별우라늄매장량 국가 tonnes U 점유율 호주 1,143,000 24% 카자흐스탄 816,000 17% 캐나다 444,000 9% 미국 342,000 7% 남아공 341,000 7% 나미비아 282,000 6% 브라질 279,000 6% 니제르 225,000 5% 러시아 172,000 4% 우즈베키스탄 116,000 2% 우크라이나 90,000 2% 요르단 79,000 2% 인도 67,000 1% 중국 60,000 1% 기타 287,000 6% 세계합계 4,743,000 < 자료 > WNA, Supply of Uranium ( )

73 또한확인매장량과는별개로전세계원전사용량의약 150년분에해당되는 979만톤U의추정매장량이있는것으로평가되고있다. 우리나라는충청도일대에서우라늄광석의매장이확인되었으나, 평균품위가 0.03% 이하인저품위우라늄광석으로경제성이없어현재는국내우라늄정광소요량의전량을해외에서수입하고있는실정이다 52). 전세계최대의우라늄생산국은캐나다이며, 그뒤를호주, 카자흐스탄, 니제르, 러시아, 나미비아등이따르고있다 ( 표 4-2 참조 ). < 표 4-2> 국가별우라늄생산량 (tonnes U) 국가 캐나다 호주 카자흐스탄 니제르 러시아 ( 추정 ) 나미비아 우즈베키스탄 미국 우크라이나 ( 추정 ) 중국 ( 추정 ) 남아공 체코 인도 ( 추정 ) 브라질 루마니아 ( 추정 ) 독일 파키스탄 ( 추정 ) 프랑스 세계총계 tonnes U3O < 자료 > WNA : World Uranium Mining (2007) 2005 년전세계연간우라늄정광소요량은약 6.5 만톤 U 이었으나생산량은전세 52) 2007 년 11 월산업자원부와광업진흥공사 ( 광진공 ) 는국내최대우라늄광상이충북옥천 ~ 충남금산일대에대략북동 ~ 남서방향으로약 120 km구간에걸쳐 1 억톤정도가분포돼있다고밝혔다. 이들지역에매장돼있는우라늄원광은평균품위가 0.035% 정도로, 1 억톤의우라늄원광을개발할경우, 정련과정을거쳐원전에쓰이는우라늄약 2 만 4000 톤을만들수있다. 이는한해국내우라늄소비량의약 6 배에해당하는양이며, 수입액을기준으로하면 2 조원이넘는액수다 ( 자료원 : 조선일보, 2007 년 11 월 9 일 )

74 계소요량의약 60% 인 3.7만톤으로약 3만톤정도가부족하게생산되었지만우라늄광산생산량외에도각국정부, 전력사또는원전연료주기시설운영사들이보유하고있는우라늄재고등으로충당한것으로보고있다 ( 표 4-3 참조 ). 또한냉전종식후미국및러시아의핵무기해체에따른고농축우라늄 (HEU) 의희석사용및사용후연료를재처리하여회수한우라늄, 플루토늄의사용등이또다른우라늄제2공급원 (Secondary Supplies) 의역할을수행하고있어수요량대비부족한생산량을보충하여수급균형을유지하고있다. < 표 4-3> 세계우라늄정광수급전망 구 분 2003년 2005년 2010년 2015년 2020년 원자력시설용량 (GWe) 수요량 ( 만톤U) 생산량 ( 만톤U) < 자료 > 2005 WNA-The Global Nuclear Fuel Market(Reference Scenario) 2006년 5월현재국내에는경수로 16기, 중수로 4기 ( 총설비용량 1만7716MWe) 가운전되고있으며, 이에소요되는정광 ( 연간약 4000톤U 3 O 8 ) 전량을외국에서도입하고있다. 한국수력원자력 ( 주 ) 는우라늄의안정적인확보를위해공급원을다원화하여미국, 영국, 캐나다, 호주, 프랑스, 러시아, 남아공및카자흐스탄등으로부터정광을구매하고있으며장기계약과현물시장조달물량을적정배분하여경제적이고안정적인확보방안을강구하고있다 53). 나. 우라늄변환 경수로변환역무는미국영국프랑스캐나다및러시아의 5 개상용시설에서공급하 고있으며, 2005 년도전세계연간생산량은약 5 만 2 천톤 U 으로수요량인 6 만 1 천톤 53) 한전은 2007 년 5 월캐나다와우라늄공동탐사를위한양해각서를체결한데이어, 6 월몽골과도우라늄개발양해각서를체결, 공동탐사광산을선정하기위한협의를진행하고있으며, 6 월우크라이나와도원전및우라늄개발을위한양해각서를체결하였다. 한전은 우라늄의경우현재 100% 수입에의존하고있지만 2008 년부터자주개발을본격추진해 2010 년 5%( 연 290 톤 ), 2013 년 10%( 연 580 톤 ), 2016 년 15%( 연 870 톤 ) 의우라늄자주개발률을달성할것 이라는목표를세우고있다 ( 자료원 : 한국일보 )

75 U에못미치나부족분은각전력사들이보유하고있는재고량과핵무기해체에따른고농축우라늄 (HEU) 의희석공급등의 2차공급원으로충당하고있다 ( 표 4-4 참조 ). WNA는향후경수로변환역무수요량은원전에소요되는우라늄양을근거로 2005 년 6만1천톤U에서점차증가하여 2020년에는현재보다약 30% 증가한 8만U톤이될것으로예측하였다. < 표 4-4> 세계변환시설현황 ( 단위 : 톤U/ 년 ) 구분 국명 변환회사 설비용량 미 국 CONVERDYN 14,000 영 국 BNFL 6,000 경 불란서 COMURHEX 14,000 수 캐나다 CAMECO 12,500 로 러시아 TENEX 15,000 용 브라질 IPEN 90 중 국 CNNC 1,000 합계 62,590 중 캐나다 CAMECO 2,800 수 알젠틴 CNEA 62 로 인 도 DAE 600 용 루마니아 Romania 100 합계 3,562 < 자료 > 2005 WNA-The Global Nuclear Fuel Market 우리나라는 1988년중수로원전연료제조를위한변환과정을한국원자력연구소에서국산화하여국내소요량 (100톤U/ 년 ) 전량을공급하였으나, 1992년말경제성문제로인해가동을중지함에따라 1993년부터는캐나다 CAMECO 사로부터중수로용변환역무전량을공급받고있다. 경수로용변환역무의경우도국내소요량전량을해외에서도입하고있다. 다만중수로용변환역무와는달리도입선을미국, 캐나다, 영국, 프랑스및러시아등으로다원화하고있으며, 국제경쟁입찰을통해소요량을확보하고있다. 경수로용변환시설의국산화는변환우라늄의농축시설까지의수송비문제등경제성을고려하여농축시설국산화이전까지는추진하지않을방침이

76 다. 다. 우라늄농축 미국은 1969년상업용경수로에대하여최초의우라늄농축역무공급이후 1970년대까지도전세계의우라늄농축역무시장을독점하였다. 그러나 1974년석유파동이후세계각국이원자력개발및원자력발전소건설계획을활성화함에따라농축수요가급증하게되어영국의 URENCO, 프랑스의 EURODIF 등농축을전담하는새로운회사가등장하게되었다. 최근에는원자력발전의부활에대한기대에따라, 캐나다, 호주, 남아공과같은우라늄생산국가들도농축계획을구상하고있으며, 아르헨티나와브라질은핵연료의공급보장을위하여자국에서농축을시작할예정이다. 세계의농축시장은미국의 USEC, 프랑스의 AREVA가운영하는 EURODIF, 영국 독일 네덜란드의 URENCO 및러시아의 TENEX의 4개주요공급자가독점하고있다 ( 표 4-5 참조 ). 농축에사용되는기술은가스확산법과가스원심분리방법이상용화되어있으며, 미국과프랑스는초기에가스확산법을사용하였으나, 비용이비싸고전력소모가많은문제점으로인하여, 가스원심분리법으로전환중에있다. 러시아는초기에가스확산법을사용하였으나현재는원심분리법으로전환하였다 ( 그림 4-1 참조 ). 세계우라늄매장량의 40% 이상을보유하고있는호주는, 원자력의부흥과이산화탄소감소의필요성에부응하여자국내의원자력발전소건설과우라늄농축사업에대하여조사를수행하였다. 2006년말에발표된 Switkowski 위원회보고서에서는농축사업이호주의수출우라늄에부가가치를크게증대시킬수있다는점을강조하고있다 54). 그러나기술 재정적인면에서많은투자가필요할것이라는위원회의판단과야당인노동당이농축사업에반대입장을표명함은농축사업추진에장애요소가되고있다. 54) 강창무, 우라늄농축의현황및전망, 한국과학기술정보연구원,

77 < 표 4-5> 세계농축시설현황 ( 단위 : 톤 SWU/ 년 ) 국 명 회사명 농축방법 용량 상업운전 미 국 USEC 기체확산법 11, 프랑스, 이태리, 스페인, 벨기에, EURODIF 기체확산법 10, 이란 영국, 독일, 네덜란드 URENCO 원심분리법 7, 러시아 TENEX 원심분리법 20, 중 국 CNNC 원심분리법 1,300 - 기타 ( 브라질, 인디아등 ) 원심분리법 300 합계 51,750 < 자료 > 2005 WNA-The Global Nuclear Fuel Market 가스확산법 가스원심분리법 < 그림 4-1> 우라늄농축방법비교 세계최대의우라늄공급국인캐나다도우라늄의농축을통한부가가치에대하여

78 호주와유사한입장으로 Saskatchewan에위치한세계최대우라늄공급회사인 Cameco 사는최근농축사업에관심을표시하고있다. 남아공은독일의기술을이용하여 2기의농축시설을운영한경험이있으나, 핵무기개발을포기하면서이들시설을모두해체하였다. 아르헨티나는 2006년에대규모원자력확장계획을발표하였다. 이중에는건설이중단된 Atucha 2 중수로의완성, 중수로생산시설건설및가동을정지한 Pilcaniyeu 가스확산농축시설의재가동을포함한다. 농축시설의재가동은국제핵연료공급보장체제가작동하기전에농축기술을확보하기위한방안으로평가된다. 세계 6위의우라늄매장량을보유하고있는브라질은 2006년 5월에 Resende에위치한농축시설의조업을개시하였다. 이시설은현재브라질핵연료수요의 60% 를담당하며, 장기적으로농축우라늄수출을목적으로하고있다. 향후세계의농축소요량은 2010년 5만톤SWU, 2020년 6만1천톤SWU까지증가할것으로전망된다 ( 표 4-6, 그림 4-2 참조 ). 그러나러시아핵무기해체에따른고농축우라늄 (HEU) 의희석공급, 재처리회수우라늄, 플루토늄의사용등의우라늄제2공급원시장진입과미국원전사업자들이영국 URENCO사의 LES 원심분리농축공장미국내건설추진, USEC사의미국원심분리농축기술을이용한신규공장의건설추진, 프랑스 COGEMA사의원심분리공장건설을위한영국 URENCO사와의합작, 그리고이에따른가스확산법을사용하는구형공장의점진적인폐쇄등은수요와공급에상당한영향을미칠것으로전망된다. 이러한불확실한시장환경을제외한현재의농축시장은공급물량과잉상태로서중 장기적인농축역무가격의안정추세를유지할것으로전망된다. < 표 4-6> 세계농축수요전망 ( 단위 : 만톤SWU) 구 분 2005년 2010년 2015년 2020년 상한 표준 하한 < 자료 > 2005 WNA-The Global Nuclear Fuel Market

79 < 그림 4-2> 농축우라늄수요공급전망국내원전에소요되는농축역무역시전량해외에의존하고있으며, 5~10년단위의계약기간으로국제경쟁입찰을통해미국영국프랑스및러시아등으로부터소요량을확보하고있다. 한국수력원자력 ( 주 ) 는경수로연료를제조하기위해우라늄농축역무계약과더불어농축우라늄의구매도병행하여추진하고있다. 현재세계적인농축시설의공급과잉에따른경제성문제및국제핵무기비확산정책등을고려하여농축시설의국산화계획은당분간고려하지않고있다. 라. 성형가공 현재전세계의성형가공소요량은경수로원전연료의경우약 7300톤U, 중수로원전연료는 2000~3000톤U 수준이며, 대부분의원전보유국들은원전연료주기기술확보를위해성형가공부문의국산화를추진하여자국내소요량을공급하고있다. 현재전세계성형가공소요량은고연소연료개발및노심설계기술향상에따라연간소요량이감소하고있는추세이며, 전세계생산용량 ( 경수로 9199톤U/ 년, 중수로 4250톤U/ 년 ) 은소요량

80 을훨씬상회하고있다. 이러한시장여건하에서기존의대규모연료공급사들 ( 영국 BNFL/WESTINGHOUSE, 프랑스 FRAMATOME-ANP 등 ) 은자사시장점유율확보를위해신제품개발에주력하고있으며상호기업합병 (M&A) 등을통해경쟁력을확보하고있다 ( 표 4-7 참조 ). < 표 4-7> 성형가공시설현황 ( 단위 : 톤 U/ 년 ) 구 분 국 명 회사명 생산능력 미 국 WH 등 3,000 영 국 BNFL 330 독 일 R.B.U 등 550 프랑스 벨지움 Framatom ANP FBFC 1, 경수로용 일 본 JNFC 등 924 스페인 브라질 ENUSA INB 한 국 KNFC 400 러시아 SCUA 1,270 스웨덴 ABB-ATOM 600 소계 9,199 캐나다 CGE, ZPI 3,250 중수로용 알젠틴 인 도 CNEA DAE 한국 KNFC 400 소계 4,250 < 자료 > Nuclear Engineering International(2004) 우리나라는중수로용원전연료는한국원자력연구소에서연간 100톤U 규모로 1987 년부터, 경수로용원전연료는한전원자력연료 ( 주 ) 에서연간 200톤U 규모로 1989년부터국내생산을시작하여 1993년까지국내소요분전량을공급하였다. 그러나 1994년및 1995년에는영광원전 3 4호기초기노심연료공급을위한일시적소요량증가로국내경수로용원전연료공급용량부족분을미국 WH사로부터도입한바있으며, 1997년에는

81 울진원전 3 4호기초기노심용연료공급에따른부족분을미국 ABB- CE사로부터도입하기도하였다. 또한중수로용원전연료는한국원자력연구소가 1987년부터월성원전 1호기소요량을공급하고있었으나, 월성원전 2 3 4호기의건설방침이확정됨에따라중수로원전연료생산설비용량이부족하게되었고, 중수로연료제조사업의경제성이저하됨에따라한국원자력연구소는중수로연료제조사업중단을고려하게되었고, 또한 1996년 6월정부의원자력사업추진체제개편에따른원자력사업의일원화방침에따라한전원자력연료 ( 주 ) 에서중수로용원전연료제조사업을시작하게되었다. 이로써원전연료제조사업은한전원자력연료 ( 주 ) 로일원화되었다. 이에따라중수로용원전연료의경우도 1996년부터 1998년까지월성원전 2 3 4호기의신규원전건설에따른추가소요량등으로인한국내공급용량부족량을캐나다 CGE 및 ZPI사로부터도입하기도하였다. 한편원전건설에따른성형가공수요증가에대비하여한전원자력연료 ( 주 ) 가 1998년 1월경수로용연간 200톤U, 중수로용연간 400톤U 규모의원전연료성형가공공장증설을완료함에따라국내경 중수로성형가공연간공급용량은각각 400톤U으로확충되었고, 이에따라 1999년부터국내경 중수로용원전연료소요량전량을공급할수있게되었다. 또한 2008년말경수로성형가공시설증설계획이완료될경우 2020년까지는국내소요량전량을공급할수있게될것이다. 2. 주요공급국과아국의핵주기협력방향분석 원자력품목의핵무기전용우려에대처하여주요원자력공급국들이설립한원자력공급국그룹 (Nuclear Suppliers Group) 은수출통제규범의이행과이와관련된주요현안을점검하는체제이다. 2007년 12월현재 NSG 회원국은 45개국이며, 그외멕시코와말레이시아도회원국가입이검토된바있다 ( 표 4-8 참조 ). NSG는매년총회를개최하여현안사항에대한회원국의의견을교환하고있으며, 특히자문그룹회의 (Consultative Group Meeting) 을통하여주요정책을검토하고있다. 2006년이후주요정책현안으로는민감기술통제강화지침과추가의정서의공급조건화가논의되고있다. 민감기술이전기준을정하기위한지침개정논의는한국가이상으로부터수출거부통보대상으로등록된국가로의수출을금지하는기준을지침 6항의서두에명시하자는러시아및프랑스가제안하였다. 이에대하여미국은민감기술의이전금지를요구하는기본입장을견지한반면, 러시아는합의에도달하지못하면본의제의토의를종결하고현행 6항의유지를요구하여합

82 의에이르지못하였다. < 표 4-8> NSG 회원국현황 지역서유럽북유럽미주아시아동유럽기타 국가명영국, 프랑스, 독일, 이탈리아, 스페인, 덴마크, 네덜란드, 벨기에, 룩셈부르크, 그리스, 포르투갈, 오스트리아, 아일랜드, 스위스, 사이프러스, 슬로베니아, 몰타스웨덴, 노르웨이, 핀란드미국, 캐나다, 아르헨티나, 브라질일본, 한국, 터키, 중국러시아, 체코, 슬로바키아, 헝가리, 루마니아, 불가리아, 폴란드, 우크라이나, 라트비아, 벨라루스, 카자흐스탄, 리투아니아, 에스토니아, 크로아티아호주, 뉴질랜드, 남아공화국 추가의정서가입을원자력전용품목의공급조건으로도입하는문제와관련하여, NSG 회원국들의추가의정서가입상황을보아가면서 NSG 회원국들이모두발효시킬경우지침6항을개정하자는방안이영국과오스트리아가제안하였다. 이에대해한국, 일본, 캐나다, 호주등이찬성하였으나, 아르헨티나, 브라질, 남아공은 NPT 에서추가의정서의공급조건화가먼저이루어져야하고, 상기영국 / 오스트리아제안이합의안을만들지못하였고, NSG 전회원국이추가의정서에가입한것은아니라는반대의견이제시되합의에이르지못하였다. 또한미국과인도의원자력협력에대하여대부분의회원국들은인도가핵비확산공약이행에성의를보이지않고있다고언급한반면, 미국, 영국, 프랑스등인도와의원자력협력을추진하려는국가들은인도가핵비확산공약에대해협력하고있다고언급하고있으며, 미국은인도를 NPT 상의핵보유국으로인정하지않으며, NSG 를개정하려는것이아니고단지 NSG에서의예외를제안하는것이라는입장을강조하고있다즉미국과인도의원자력협력은인도원자력시설의민간및군사시설로의분리, 민간시설에대한안전조치적용, NSG 지침준수등을통해 NSG 목표를진전시킬것이라는것이미국의입장이다. 중국은인도와의협력이이란및북한핵문제해결에부정적영향을미칠수있다고언급하고, 인도의확고한핵비확산공약을요구하였으며, 캐나다는안전조치협정의범위, 성격등에대한자세한

83 정보를요구하였다. 오스트리아, 스위스, 노르웨이, 브라질등은인도의핵비확산공약이행에진전이없다고언급하고, 인도와의협력에우려의입장을표명하였다. 국제핵비확산체제가소위원자력이용국들의민감기술확보기회는제한하고원자력선진국들의이익을추구하는도구로이용되고있는바, 다음의두가지특징으로나타나고있다. 첫째, 북한, 이란의핵개발이유를들어 NSG 차원에서민감기술및시설의이전조건을강화시키고, 시설비보유국들의진입장벽을강화하고있다. 둘째, NPT, NSG 지침등을초월하여강대국들의이익에부합되는예외적적용의추진으로국제핵비확산체제의신뢰성에대한우려가제기되고있다. 우리나라는 NSG에서의핵비확산체제강화가우리나라의선진기술개발에미치는영향을최소화할수있도록 NSG 내의우리와입장을같이하는이해그룹과의유대를강화하고, 주요의사결정에있어서 NSG의운영방식인전원합의방식도전략적으로활용하여야할것이다. 3. 비공급국과아국의핵주기협력방향분석 전세계적기축에너지원인석유는 1980년대중반이후 2000년대초반까지바렐당 20불의안정세를유지하여왔으나, 2004년이후급격한상승세를보이고있다. 이러한현상은개도국중심의가파른수요증가와같은수급상의구조적인요인과이란의핵개발과같은지정학적불안정성으로인하여장기화될것으로전망되고있다. 우라늄, 유연탄등비석유에너지광물자원의경우도세계적수요증가에따른수급불균형으로 2003년이후가격이급등하였다 ( 표 4-9 참조 ). < 표 4-9> 유연탄및우라늄가격변동비교 광종 기준단위 2003(A) (B) 가격변동 (B/A) 유연탄 (CIF Japan, US$/t) 배 우라늄 U3O8기준 (US $/lb) 배 이러한에너지자원수급불안정에대비하여미국과 EU는자금력 정보력 기술력 이월등한세계적인석유메이저회사를통해주요전략지역의유전을선점하고있 으며, 중국도급속한경제성장에따른에너지수요급등및자국유전생산감소로 해외자원개발에국력을집중하여, 특히아프리카에대한무상원조, 차관제공, 부채

84 탕감등의결과로대규모에너지 자원확보에노력하고있다. 에너지 자원은이해관계자가전략적목적으로공급과가격을조절하는전략적상품으로서자원무기화경향을보이는특징이있다. 이러한자원무기화경향은제1-2차석유파동을겪으면서나타난오래된현상이다. 그러나우리나라는에너지의해외의존도가높아국제에너지정세에매우취약해자원무기화와자원민족주의에그대로노출되어있다. 따라서안정적인에너지 자원공급을위해비축과같은단기적대책과함께해외자원개발이라는중장기적대책의병행필요성이대두된다. 우리나라의주요광종자주개발현황을보면유연탄은 30% 수준의자주개발율을보이고있으나, 우라늄자원은 2007년현재자주개발이전무하며 2016년에자주개발 15% 를목표로하고있다 55) ( 표 4-10 참조 ). < 표 4-10> 주요광종별자주개발목표 ( 단위 : %) 광종 2006 년 2009 년 2012 년 2016 년 석유 2.8% 6% 13 20% 천연가스 4.5% 13% 23% 30% 유연탄 38.8% 40% 44% 50% 우라늄 % 우리나라는국내수요가많고해외의존도가높은주요광물자원 (6대전략광종 ) 의경우광종별로특화된개발전략을추진하고있다. 이중우라늄자원은중앙아시아지역을집중공략하고있으며, 카자흐스탄, 우즈베키스탄, 니제르, 나미비아, 남아공, 칠레, 페루등을중점투자국으로선정하였으며이외에도미래에대비한전략투자국 55) 산업자원부, 제 3 차해외자원개발기본계획 (2007~2016)( 안 ),

85 으로미얀마, 아르헨티나, 몽골, 잠비아, 콩고, 러시아등을선정하고있다 ( 표 4-11 참조 ). 특히자원보유국이필요한경제발전경험, 에너지인프라및사회간접자본건설을지원하고우리가필요한자원을확보하는패키지형자원개발을통하여자원보유국과 win-win 전략을통한효과적인진출전략을구사하여야할것이다. 아시아지역은원자력발전소의건설및운영이전세계적으로활발하고향후에도원자력발전을도입코자하는국가는지속적으로증가할것으로예상되나, 지역내원자력활동의투명성관련된체계적인협력은미흡한상태이다. 이는지역내국가들의정치적, 문화적, 기술적배경이서로상이하고, 각국의원자력상황이서로상이한것에도기인한다 56). 이러한상황에대처하여, 1990년대중반이후아시아지역의원자력협력에대한제안이다수제안되고있는바, 제시된협력분야로는안전성, 산업체협력, 사용후핵연료 / 방사성폐기물관리, Pu 관리, 지역내안전조치, 수출통제, 군축등다양한주제를포괄하고있다. 특히사용후핵연료관리는제안들이공통적으로포함시키고있는우선적협력가능분야이다 57). 이분야의협력에따른장점으로는규모의경제성, 소규모원전이용국에대한보다넓은선택의기회제공, 투명성증진, 기술교류등이제시되고있으며, 단점으로는협상과정이매우복잡할것이며국내계획에부정적영향을미칠수있다는점등이지적되고있다. 이와관련된정책적이슈로는소유권과책임배상문제, 시설의유치국선정기준, 수익의배분등을예상할수있다. 지역협력체제구축은장기간에걸친상호신뢰가축적되어야할것인바, 인력및정보교류를선행한후점진적으로지역협력체제를제도화하며, 초기에는원자력이용이활발한국가를중심으로구심점을모색하고이후참여국을확대하는방안을고려할수있다 58). 56) 아시아지역의원자력협력체로는 ASIATOM (Asian Atomic Energy Community), PACATOM (Pacific Atomic Energy Community), PACIFICATOM (Pacific Atomic Energy Community), EARC (East Asian Regional Compact for the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy), APOPUNE (Asia-Pacific Organization for the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy), ENTNEA (Enhancing Nuclear Transparency for Concept Building in Northeast Asia), ANREC (Asia Nonproliferation Research Center), TECATOM (Technical Atomic Energy Community in East Asia and the Pacific) 등이제안된바있다 ( 자료원 : Young-Myung Choi, Improving Safeguards Efficiency and Transparency in East Asia, International Security Conference, October 22, 2007) 57) Tatsujiro Suzuki, Regional Cooperation on Nuclear Fuel Cycle in Northeast Asia : Proposals and Prospects/ SNL 14th International Security Conference, April )Young-Myung Choi and Hosik Yoo, Safeguards Developments and Challenges in the ROK during the last 50 years, July

86 < 표 4-11> 주요광종별개발전략 광종현황개발전략 우라늄 / 동철 / 니켈유연탄 / 아연 ㅇ적극적자원외교 ( 투자조사단등 ) 로신규사업발굴ㅇ광진공등정부투자기관선도투자유도ㅇ중앙아시아 ( 우라늄 ), 남미및아프리카 ( 동 ) 지역원전 산업원료로서집중공략중요하나자주개발ㅇ중점투자국 : 카자흐, 캐나다, 호주, 우즈벡, 니저조제르, 남아공, 나미비아, 칠레, 페루ㅇ미래대비전략투자국 : 미얀마, 아르헨, 몽골, 잠비아, 콩고, 러시아ㅇ발전소건설등과연계하는패키지형자원개발중국 인도등의제ㅇ인도 ( 철 ) 마다가스카르 ( 니켈 ) 프로젝트집중관리철수요증가로투자ㅇ중점투자국 : 호주, 인도, 브라질, 인니, 필리핀유망ㅇ미래대비전략투자국 : 남아공등아프리카국ㅇ실수요자 유통업체 자원기업등의컨소시엄구성진출한전 고려아연등ㅇ원가경쟁력과성장가능성의선택과집중국내수요의안정적ㅇ호주 인니등과의자원협력위채널활용공급필요ㅇ중점투자국 : 호주, 캐나다, 인니, 중국, 페루ㅇ미래대비전략투자국 : 남아공, 러시아, 몽골, 모잠비크, 콩고

87 제 2 절핵연료공급보장제안의우리나라에의영향분석 1. 제안의평가 최근에발표된대부분의제안들은이미농축 / 재처리시설을운영하는국가이외의 국가에대한신규시설도입을사실상포기할것을요구하고있어, 핵주기운영에 대한개별국가의주권에영향을미칠여지가크다 ( 표 4-12 참조 ). 제안명 IAEA MNA 미국 GNEP 러시아 IUEC 6개국농축서비스 (RANF) 일본등록제 NTI Fuel Bank IAEA INFC < 표 4-12> 공급보장제안의특징비교 형태민감시설을다자간협력체로운영공급국이이용국에게핵연료공급농축시설의공동투자및운영공동연대를통하여농축우라늄공급보장농축 / 재처리외에원광 / 성형가공도능력별로참여 IAEA가농축우라늄재고를비축하고관리다자간집단보증으로공급보장 이용국의보장내용민감시설소유독자추진제한농축 / 재처리제공포기요구핵연료대여및회수농축 U 공급및묵시적포기요구이윤배분공급중단시다른포기요구참여국이농축 U 공급보장 언급없음 사전예방으로공급신뢰도강화 포기요구 공급중단시비축된농축 U을인출 공급 언급없음 농축서비스및핵연료집합체공급 공급보장제안에대하여농축 / 재처리시설을보유한국가들은핵확산우려를저감할수있다는관점에서지지입장인반면에, 기술및시설미보유국은각국의평화적이용개발권리를침해할우려가있다는이유로소극적또는반대입장을견지하고있다. 즉이러한제한은원자력의평화적활동에관한각국의주권을보장한 NPT 정신과도상충되며, 몇몇공급자에의한민감핵주기서비스의카르텔화를조

88 장할수도있다는우려를낳고있다 59). 공급보장제안은민감핵주기를포기하는국가에게는공급을보장한다는점을강조하고있는바, 이에동조하지않는국가는상업시장을통하여필요한핵주기서비스를기존의방식대로이용하게될것이다. 그러나이에불만을가지고독자적인시설을포기하지않는국가에게공급상의불이익을준다면, 각국가의독자적시설확보에대한당위성만증대시키는결과를초래하게될것이다 60). 민감시설을자체보유하고자하는국가의유형은다양하게분류할수있다. 첫째, 핵보유국과같이기존의독점적권리를계속유지하기를원하는국가로써미국, 러시아, 영국, 프랑스, 러시아이외에실제적핵보유국인인도, 파키스탄및이스라엘등이이에속한다고할수있다. 둘째핵무기보유의사는없으나, 농축시설을부가가치증대차원에서상업적으로소유하고자하는국가로써, 기존에시설을보유한독일, 네덜란드, 일본이외에캐나다, 호주등도이러한목적을추구하는부류에속한다. 셋째핵무기보유를암묵적으로추구하여규모의경제성도없이시설을건설코자하는국가로써이란을대표적인사례로꼽을수있다 61). 넷째핵연료주기자립을추구하며규모의경제에도달하면이를건설하여핵연료안보를추구하는국가로써우리나라는이에속한다고할수있다. 이들국가이외에도복합적목적을추구하여부가가치창출, 핵연료안보향상, 핵잠재력보유등을동시에추구하는국가들도예상할수있다. 이용국이장래의핵주기개발가능성을상실하는것에대한반대급부로써핵연료나핵주기서비스의안정적공급을제시한다면이는미흡한보상책이라할수있다. 핵연료의안정적공급은최근의제안이나오기전에이미상업적계약방식에서도보장되어왔던사항이다. 안정적공급보장이없는상태라면, 소위이용국은독자적 59) 최근의공급보장제안들은혁신적인기술개발을수반한제안도있으나, 대부분기술적측면의언급없이관리적측면의접근을추구하고있다. 이러한제안들은공급능력을이미갖춘국가들로부터제안되고있는바, 전자는특히기술측면의리더십이주요한구동력으로작용한다고볼수있으나후자는핵비확산을명분으로자신의제안에대하여당위성을주장하고있다. 후자에해당하는관리적측면에서비롯되는우려는다음을들수있을것이다. 첫째, 농축 / 재처리시설의독자소유를포기하여야하는가? 이러한문제는핵주기기술자립을통하여자국의에너지 security 를강화코자하는일국의에너지정책에도영향을미치게된다. 둘째, 향후어느시점에서인가공급국또는어떤시각하에서는카르텔이라고도볼수있는대열에합류할기회는있을것인가? 즉현재의차별적상태가영구히고착될수도있다는우려가존재한다. 셋째, 부가가치창출에대한보상은어떻게이루어질수있을것인가? 즉소위이용국이미래시장에서창출할수있는기회비용의상실은누가어떤방식으로보상할수있을지에대한의문이다. 60) 규모의경제에도달하지못한소규모국가가독자적인시설보유를추구한다면, 이는단순히상업적인수익평가를초월하는또다른유인이존재하는것임간과하지않아야할것이다. 한가지예는핵능력보유에의한국가위상의비약적도약이다. 비록핵무기를추구하지않는국가라할지라도소규모이용단계에서는시설보유필요성이크지않을것이나, 미래에필요할지도모를권리를스스로포기하기는쉽지않을것이다. 61) 이란의농축시설에대한외부의의혹에도불구하고이란은자국의핵주기활동에대한당위성을강조하고있다 년 3 월개최된 IAEA 이사회에서이란은핵개발의도가없으며이란의핵프로그램은원전용핵연료생산을위한것이며핵무기용핵물질생산능력을갖고있지않음을주장하고있다. 또한이란은 NPT 에따른의무를계속해나갈것이나원자력의평화적이용에관한불가양의권리는결코포기하지않을것임을강조하고있다

89 개발을추구할권리가있다는것을인정하여야할것이다. 따라서수령국이포기하는권리에상응할수있는또다른특권을소위공급국도포기하던지또는실제적인반대급부를제공하여야공급국과이용국모두에게평등한제안이라할수있을것이다 2. 공급보장제안의영향분석 당초공급보장제안은핵비확산에대한우려에서비롯되었으므로, 이의근본적원인이라할수있는민감핵주기기술, 즉농축과재처리의공급보장에서출발하였으나, 이후논의가전개되면서민감기술에속하지않는원광이나성형가공과같은다른핵주기서비스까지로공급보장의범위가확장되고있다. 그러나민감기술과비민감기술의공급보장에대한논거는서로다르다고볼수있다. 즉전자는핵비확산우려의해소이며, 후자는이용진작을위한부가적인급부로볼수있다. 따라서향후논의에서후자에대한비차별적급부를조건으로전자를관철시키고자하는움직임이생겨나지않는지를주시하여야할것이다. 또하나의측면은공급보장을공급중단사태가발생하는유사시에대비한보완 (back-up) 체제로보는시각과평상시 (BAU : Business as Usual) 에도공급신뢰를더욱강화하자는시각이병존한다는것이다. 이러한 2가지시각이논의대상에공히포함된다면, 일단 back-up 체제를정착시킨후, 궁극적으로 BAU에서의공급보장체제로이행될가능성을예상할수있다. 즉공급중단사태발생에대응한다는명분이퇴색되고, 민감핵주기기술의확산방지만을추구하는체제로정착될가능성도주시하여야할것이다. 만일민감핵주기를기존의일부국가만으로제한하는체제가정착될경우, 우리나라에미칠영향은다음과같이예상할수있다 62). 첫째, 민감핵주기기술이없으면해외시장개척이더욱불리해질것이다. 즉원자력을신규로도입하고자하는국가로써는농축서비스공급및사용후핵연료회수를조건으로제시하는국가를더선호하게될것이다. 이러한서비스를공급하지못하는국가는애초공급대상국에서제외되거나또는이를해결하기위하여능력을갖춘국가와불리한계약관계로합작수출을모색하게될것이다. 둘째, 공급보장체제를구축하자는방향으로논의가무르익을수록, 기존에이러한능력을갖지못한국가의민감핵주기의자체보유에대한정당성은더욱지지기반을잃게될것이다. 즉자신의정당한요구를 62) 이한명, 핵연료공급보장제안과영향분석, 원자력산업 27 권 10 호,

90 인정받지못함으로써장래의민감핵주기기술의자립은매우어려워질것이다 63). 우리나라는원자력발전규모나국가에너지안보차원에서향후핵비확산성이확보된독립적인핵주기시설확보당위성은충분하다고볼수있다. 그러나공급보장방안들이실현될경우장래의우리나라의핵주기기술자립에상당한영향을미칠여지도있다. 모든국가에게원자력의평화적이용에대한균등한기회를보장하기위해서는공급보장제안은기존의상업시장운영에는영향이없어야할것이다. 즉현재논의되고있는정부주도의공급보장제안에의참여는자발적으로이루어져야할것이며, 민감시설의포기여부에대한결정이조속히이루어지지않고, 제안에참여하지않는국가라할지라도기존시장체제의이용에불이익이없어야할것이다. 제 3 절아국대응방안 1. 민감시설의도입기준 공급보장제안은핵비확산을위한보장이라는측면과함께이용국의신뢰를획득할수있는명확한방안을제시할수있어야한다. NPT 체제하에서도비밀리에핵무기기술을추구하는국가가있는점을감안할때, 공급보장제안은원자력선진국들의기득권확장이아니라핵투명성을강조하는방향이바람직하다. 공급보장제안의성공여부는참여에대한확실한매력존재여부, 각국가의자발적판단존중, 공평한기회제공, 그리고미래의문제점보완을위한점진적접근여부에영향을받을것이다. 공급보장제안들이원자력발전도입국들에게매력을갖기위해서는이러한민감시설도입권리의포기를요구할것이아니라민감시설도입의정당성에대한객관적인기준을국제적인합의로수립하여제안들과함께제시하는것이바람직할것이다. 따라서우리나라로서는미래의농축 / 재처리시설의보유권리를포기하지않는다는원칙하에, 민감시설도입에대한정당성을판단할수있는기준의수립을강조할필요가있다. 이러한기준으로는핵비확산의무, 63) 기술개발측면에서는미래의새로운민감기술개발기회가매우제한될것으로예상된다. 즉이미민감기술을보유한국가들로만기술개발주체가제한될가능성이크며, 이러한움직임은일부가시화되고있다

91 규모의경제, 에너지안보등을고려할수있다. 첫째, 전면안전조치및추가의정서의발효와이의성실한이행및원자력수출통제의이행을통한핵투명성확보여부는어느국가의민감시설도입에대한불필요한오해를해소하기위해시위되어야할요소이다. 둘째, 규모의경제에따른경쟁력확보여부도주요한요소의하나로고려되어야한다. 즉원자력발전소의도입초기단계에있는국가가막대한시설투자가요구되는민감핵주기시설을운영코자하는것은외부의부정적시각을설득할수있는당위성이부족하다. 그러나수십기의원전을가동하는국가가경제적인경쟁력을갖출수있는핵주기시설을자체적으로도입하고자할경우에는그당위성을존중하여야할것이다 64). 셋째, 자국내부존자원의절대적부족에대처한에너지안보측면도고려되어야할요소의하나이다. 원자력발전은기술집약적인에너지원이므로연료비의비중이크지않고, 기술자립을통하여이에필요한기자재의대부분을국산화할수있는특징이있다. 따라서부존에너지자원이빈약한국가가에너지안보측면에서핵주기자립을추구할경우에는그정당성이존중되어야할것이다. 2. 지역핵주기협력체 한편핵연료공급제안에대한국가적대응방안을수립하기위해서는선후행핵주기정책에대한정부의정책결정이우선되어야하며, 이에의거하여관련기관이대응책을정립하는과정도고려할필요가있다. 즉국내관련기관간역할분담체제를정립하고, 이에따라필요한기술개발, 지분투자, 자원조달등이체계적으로이루어질수있을것이다. 에너지안보측면에서는우리나라가영향력을행사할수있고지속적으로안정확보를보장받을수있는체제를관철하는것이더욱바람직하다. 따라서향후호주, 캐나다등새로운국가에서농축우라늄서비스가이루어질경우, 이들의농축서비스공급능력과우리나라의성형가공능력을연대하여참여국들이상호결합된핵연료공급체제를수립하는방안도바람직하다. 또한이러한협력방식을확장하여지역핵주기센터설립을추진할수도있다. 일례로지역핵주기센터를비핵국에위치시키고, 그운영을위한이사회를핵보유국과비핵보유국간에배분하여평화적공급을정치적으로활용하지못하도록하는방안도예시할 64) 농축시설이경쟁력을가지기위해서는 3 백만 kgswu 규모는되어야하는것으로알려지고있다 MWe 발전소는연간 120,000kg SWU 정도가필요하므로 1000 MWe 발전소 25 기를운영하면독자적인농축시설의경제규모에도달한다고볼수있다

92 수있다. 즉우리나라의일정지역을국제기구에조차하고이지역에핵주기센터를설치하는방안을고려할수있다. 지역핵주기센터설치를위해서는사전정비작업이필요하며, 이를위하여지역협력체구성을통한신뢰구축이선행되어야할것이다. 즉지역협력체를통하여세미나, 전문가교환등상호신뢰를구축한이후에, 다음단계로물리적인시설을건설 운영하는방안을상호협의할수있을것이다. 이의일환으로지역내국가들과역할을분담하여선행핵주기를담당하는국가들과지역내후행핵주기를담당하는국가로역할을구분하여상호의존도를제고하는방안도고려할수있다

93 제 5 장결론및건의사항 핵연료공급보장제안국들이강조하는제안에내포되어있는근원적인논리로는다음과같은것들이있다. 첫째경제성이없는소규모의민감핵주기시설을국가별로개별적으로건설운영하는방안의대안으로써핵주기서비스를국제시장체제아래에서확보토록한다는의사결정을내릴수있는유인을제공한다. 둘째전세계에분포하는핵주기시설의개수를축소함으로써개별국가의잠재적인핵확산위험을줄여나간다. 셋째최소한의핵주기시설만으로전세계원자력발전의체계적확대를도모한다. 넷째상업적핵연료공급계약의신뢰를제고한다. 그러나다른한편으로는여전히핵연료공급보장제안의필요성에대한의문이제기된다. 첫째핵연료공급보장제안을수락할국가는핵확산우려국이아니며, 오히려핵확산우려국은이러한제안을수용하지않을것이라는시각이있다. 둘째원자력발전이가장활발히전개될국가는러시아, 중국, 인도로전망되는바, 중국과러시아는핵무기보유국이므로핵확산우려대상국이아니며, NPT 미가입국인인도의핵확산우려도미국과인도의원자력협력에의하여부분적으로해소될것으로전망된다. 셋째핵연료공급보장체제는소비국의희생아래공급국의독과점을더욱강화시킬것이라는우려또한간과할수없다. 핵연료공급보장제안의정책적측면에서는공급대상범위를어디까지포함시킬것인지와정치적인영향력을어떻게감소시킬수있을것인가라는문제를검토하여야한다. 공급대상범위로는우라늄공급, 농축서비스, 성형가공서비스는물론재정적보증까지도포함하는것으로확장하여고려할수있다. 정치적인영향력을최소화하기위해서는이사회와같은다단계의사결정구조를설치하고, 사전에설정한기준에의거하여판단하는방안을고려할수있다. 민감시설을포기하고제안에자발적으로참여코자하는국가에게는공급보장이강화되어야함은자명하다. 그러나민감시설의포기여부에대한결정이조속히이루어지지않고, 제안에참여하지않는국가라할지라도기존시장체제의이용에불이익이없어야할것이다. 독자적으로민감시설을도입코자하는국가에대해서는, 합리적인국제기준을도입하여그당위성과투명성을엄격히판단하여야할것이며, 당위성이판명된국가에게는다자간협력체제로시설건설과운영을허용토록하는것이바람직할것이다. 전면안전조치와추가의정서가입및이의성실한이행여부는국제적인판단기준의하나가

94 될수있을것이다. 한편으로민감시설보유당위성이부족하다고판정된국가는관련활동을즉시중단하여야할것이며, 이를이행하지않는국가에대해서는 UN 차원의법적구속력을가진조치를시행하여야할것이다. 공급보장제안에대하여농축 / 재처리시설을보유한국가들은핵확산우려를저감할수있다는관점에서지지입장인반면에, 기술및시설미보유국은각국의평화적이용개발권리를침해할우려가있다는이유로소극적또는반대입장을견지하고있다. 즉일부제안들이기존의농축 / 재처리시설보유국가이외에추가적인국가의시설도입을포기할것을요구하고있어, 핵주기운영에대한개별국가의주권을침해할소지가있으며, 이는원자력의평화적활동에관한각국의주권을보장한 NPT 정신과도상충되는측면이있다. 결국공급보장제안의성공여부는참여에대한확실한매력존재여부, 각국가의자발적판단의존중, 공평한기회제공, 그리고미래의문제점보완을위한점진적접근여부에영향을받을것이다. 우리나라는세계6위의원전이용국으로써, 원자력발전소건설, 운영분야는기술자립단계에이르렀으나, 핵연료주기는외국에의존하는바가크다. 즉핵연료성형가공기술은자립하였으나, 원광및농축서비스는수입에의존하고있다. 우리나라는남북비핵화공동선언에따라농축, 재처리시설을보유하지않고있다. 그러나기저부하로서의원자력발전의지속적인성장을고려할때향후핵주기자립필요성은더욱절실해질것이다. 이러한점을고려하면우리나라가가까운시일이내에농축 / 재처리를추진하지는않더라도, 장래에자체보유당위성이한층강화되고지정학적여건이호전될경우에는지역핵주기센터로서의위상확보를목표로설정하는것이바람직할것이다. 따라서우리나라는이러한시기에대비하여핵비확산체제의강화에더욱기여하며, 핵확산저항성핵주기기술개발에대한지원을강화할필요가있다. 또한이러한위상에이르기까지의중간과정에서는핵연료의안정확보를위하여원광및농축서비스공급원을다변화하고, 핵연료설계제작기술을고도화하여해외진출의장애요소를줄여나가야할것이다. 즉원자력선진국과는핵확산저항성핵연료주기와첨단핵연료개발을위한공동연구를강화하고, 농축서비스공급원을다변화하며, 핵연료및부품수출대상국을확대하는이외에소위이용국과는각국의고유한권리인식에대한유대를강화하며, 우라늄자원보유국과의협력을강화하여야할것이다

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96 참고문헌 Atoms for Peace/A future after Fiftyt Years, Edited by Joseph Pilat, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington,D.C. (2007) Mohamed Elbaradei, Towards a Safer World, The Economist, 16 October 2003 NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Working paper presented by the members of the Group of Non-Aligned Movement States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (May 2005) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.22, "Working Paper of Japan" (May 2005) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.33, "Multilateral nuclear fuel cycle arrangements - Working document submitted by Argentina" (May 2005) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.35, "Working paper submitted by Belgium, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Poland and Turkey for consideration at the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (May 2005) NPT/CONF.2005/WP.42, "Views on substantive issues of the 2005 Review Conference / Working paper submitted by the Republic of Korea / Non-proliferation" (May 2005) INFCIRC/140, Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 22 April 1970, IAEA INFCIRC/640, Multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle, Expert Group Report, 22 February 2005, IAEA IAEA/INFCIRC/708, "Communication received from the Resident Representative of the Russian Federation to the IAEA on the Establishment, Structure and Operation of the International Uranium Enrichment Centre", 8 June 2007 S.V.Ruchkin, "Securing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle " What Next?", IAEA Bulletin 48/1, September 2006 Sergey Ruchkin, "Status of Russian International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centers (INFCC) Initiatives" presented in Nuclear Nonproliferation Workshop at KAERI, August

97 PIR (Russian Center for Policy Studies) press on IUEC ( ) HR 885 EH, "International Nuclear Fuel for Peace and Nonproliferation Act of 2007", June 18, 2007 The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, Greater Energy Security in a Safer, Cleaner World, February 6, 2006 Paul Lisowski, Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, Program Overview/University Program (March ) P, Notice of Request for Expressions of Interest in a Consolidated Fuel Treatment Center to Support the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, USDOE, August 2006 Request for Expressions of Interest Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) Technology Demonstration Program, USDOE, August 2006 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 55 / Wednesday, March 22, 2006 / Notices, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, Advance Notice of Intent To Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership Technology Demonstration Program James J. Laidler, GNEP Spent Fuel Processing ; Waste Streams And Disposition Options (May ) United States-Japan Joint Nuclear Energy Action Plan, April 2007, US DOE Declaration on Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation Joint Actions, Washington, Moscow, July 3, 2007 "Ensuring Security of Supply in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle", World Nuclear Association, May 2006 INFCIRC/683, Communication received on 12 September 2006 from the Permanent Mission of Japan to the Agency concerning arrangements for the assurance of nuclear fuel supply Japan 's Proposal: IAEA Standby Arrangements System for the Assurance of Nuclear Fuel Supply, September 1, 2006 GOV/INF/2007/11, "Possible New Framework for the utilization of Nuclear Energy : Options for Assurance of Supply of Nuclear Fuel, 13 June 2007 G8 Summit 2007, HEILIGENDAMM STATEMENT ON NON-PROLIFERATION (2007)

98 Young-Myung Choi, Improving Safeguards Efficiency and Transparency in East Asia, International Security Conference, October 22, 2007 Tatsujiro Suzuki, "Regional Cooperation on Nuclear Fuel Cycle in Northeast Asia : Proposals and Prospects", SNL 14th International Security Conference, April 2005 Young-Myung Choi and Hosik Yoo, Safeguards Developments and Challenges in the ROK during the last 50 years, July 2007 Thomas Wood, Heidi Mahy, "Options for Creating a Nuclear Fuel Stockpile for Assured Nuclear Fuel Supply", Proceddings of 47th INMM Annual Meeting, July 2006 KINAC/RR-015/2007, GNEP 동향파악및예측을통한대응전략수립에관한연구, 한국원자력통제기술원, 과학기술부, 2007 산업자원부, 제3차해외자원개발기본계획 (2007~2016)( 안 ), 강창무, 우라늄농축의현황및전망, 한국과학기술정보연구원, 2007 이한명, 핵연료공급보장제안과영향분석, 원자력산업 27권 10호,

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100 첨 부 핵연료공급보장논의를위한 IAEA 의작업문서발췌 년 6 월 IAEA 이사회자료 (GOV/INF/2007/11)

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102 Board of Governors GOV/INF/2007/11 Date: 13 June 2007 Restricted Distribution Original: English For official use only Possible New Framework for the Utilization of Nuclear Energy: Options for Assurance of Supply of Nuclear Fuel Report by the Director General 1. Following the September 2006 Special Event on Assurances of Supply and Assurances of Non- Proliferation, held during the 50th regular session of the General Conference, the Director General indicated at the November 2006 meeting of the Board of Governors that the Secretariat would prepare a report for the information of Member States outlining possible approaches for assurance of supply of nuclear fuel. 2. This report provides background information including the evolution of proposals received by the Secretariat to date concerning assurance of supply and international nuclear fuel centres, and describes some common themes for assurance of supply of nuclear fuel and fuel fabrication services and lists possible criteria for assurance of supply. In addition, the report provides a commentary concerning possible international nuclear fuel centres and suggests ideas for further work. The annexes to the report contain an outline of the relevant provisions of the IAEA Statute, describe the current international nuclear fuel market, provide an analysis of some common themes within the proposals that have been received and reproduce copies of these proposals for ease of reference. A. Introduction 3. There has been considerable interest shown recently in the development of a possible new framework for the utilization of nuclear energy based on multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle. An important consideration is that States need to have confidence that they would be able to obtain their nuclear fuel in a predictable, stable and cost effective manner over the long term. They need to have confidence in a well functioning market but also to have back-up mechanisms with the objective of

103 GOV/INF/2007/11 Page 2 protecting against political disruptions. 1 The risk of such disruptions might dissuade countries from initiating or expanding nuclear power programmes and/or create vulnerabilities in the security of supply of nuclear fuel that might drive States to build their own national enrichment capabilities with possible additional proliferation risks. 4. A multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle, in general, has the potential to facilitate the continued and expected increased use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Such approaches also hold the potential to provide the benefits of cost-effectiveness and economies of scale in the use of nuclear technologies for countries. They would also provide additional assurance to the international community that the sensitive parts of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle are less vulnerable to misuse for non-peaceful purposes. Thus, non-proliferation and economic considerations can coincide and be mutually reinforcing, while providing security of supply of nuclear fuel to consumer States Different States may well develop different policies and solutions to improve their fuel supply security based on geography, resources, technical abilities, historical links, regional economic integration, and other strategic factors. Hence, flexibility would be desirable by taking into account a variety of views of consumer and supplier States. Several States and other stakeholders over the past two years have taken initiatives to propose a variety of possible schemes for assurance of supply 3. These proposals address the issues in differing, but complementary ways. In this connection, it may be noted that the Secretariat thus far has not received formal proposals from consumer States. 6. Given the proliferation risk associated with uranium enrichment technology, the initial focus of the Secretariat has been on identifying common themes for the assured supply of low enriched uranium (LEU). 4 Assurance of supply of LEU should provide assurance not only of the supply of uranium enrichment services and the LEU itself, but also of manufactured fuel assemblies, which involve a high degree of technology-specific design, licensing and manufacturing know-how. However, only initial consideration has been given to fuel manufacturing in this report. 7. Consideration of LEU assurances should be seen as part of a broader, longer term development of a new multilateral framework for nuclear energy that over time would include converting enrichment and reprocessing facilities from national to multilateral operations, and limiting future such facilities to exclusively multilateral operations. An incremental approach would be the way to move forward. Further work therefore will be needed to take all sensitive steps of the nuclear fuel cycle into account, including spent fuel management 5, so as to limit the proliferation risk of such technologies. As some States will not be able to benefit from assurances developed for the fuel cycle without access to reactor technology, it will be necessary to consider how access for all States to such technology might also be assured. 1 Political disruptions, as used in this report, refer to disruptions unrelated to technical or commercial considerations. 2 As used in this report the term consumer State means any State which obtains enrichment services or fabrication of fuel assemblies through assurance of supply mechanisms. The term supplier State means any State which provides or has providers of enrichment or fuel fabrication services through assurance of supply mechanisms. These are not fixed designations, i.e. it could be possible for a consumer State to become a supplier State. In addition there are some States that are or could become both consumer and supplier States. 3 Annexes 5 16 include the texts of all proposals to date. 4 Notwithstanding that assurance of supply of LEU would need to address the assurance of supply of natural uranium, it will be necessary also to examine in greater detail the assurance of supply of natural uranium required for heavy water power reactors. 5 Issues concerning fuel leasing and fuel take-back also remain to be considered in the context of assurance of supply

104 GOV/INF/2007/11 Page 3 8. As the Director General stated in the Board meeting in November 2006, any effective assurance of supply framework needs to be equitable and accessible to all current and future users of nuclear energy. A key starting point is the right of each State to decide on all matters concerning the development of its own national fuel cycle capabilities. It is up to States to decide whether they would want to participate in the further development and implementation of the ideas outlined in this report and indeed any of the proposals that have been made. 9. Under its Statute, the Agency has the authority to provide fuel cycle related services, and has been regularly providing such services upon request through a variety of Agency programmes. The Agency can therefore act as the facilitator of assurance of supply through, for example, virtual or actual nuclear fuel banks; and participate in, or operate its own, international nuclear fuel centres, which could also serve as suppliers of last resort. (See Annex 1: Relevant Provisions of the IAEA Statute.) B. Evolution of Proposals 10. Addressing the theme of international cooperation on the nuclear fuel cycle in his introductory statement at the 47th regular session of the General Conference in 2003, the Director General stated that such considerations should include the merits of limiting the use of weapon usable material (plutonium and high enriched uranium) in civilian nuclear programmes, by permitting it only under multilateral control. Similarly, we should also consider limiting the processing of such material and the production of new material through reprocessing and enrichment to international centres. These limitations would need to be accompanied by appropriate rules of transparency, control and above all assurance of supply. 11. In mid-2004, an international Expert Group on Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle was established by the Director General. The expert group examined the nuclear fuel cycle and possible multinational approaches, and issued its report in February 2005 (INFCIRC/640). The report inter alia outlined five approaches including: Developing and implementing international supply guarantees with IAEA participation. 12. Over the past few years a number of proposals have been made regarding assurance of supply and regarding the establishment of international fuel cycle centres 6, 7 : a) Reserve of nuclear fuel: United States of America (INFCIRC/659, September 2005, Annex 5). The USA announced in Vienna in September 2005, at the 49th regular session of the General Conference, that it would commit up to 17 metric tonnes of high enriched uranium (HEU) to be down-blended to LEU to support assurance of reliable fuel supplies for states that forego enrichment and reprocessing. 6 The proposals are listed in chronological order. They are reproduced in Annexes Other proposals that have been received include (1) Harvard University (John F. Kennedy School of Government) and The Wharton School (University of Pennsylvania), A New Energy Paradigm: Ensuring Nuclear Fuel Supply and Nonproliferation through International Collaboration with Insurance and Financial Markets, available on-line at: and at: edu/risk/library/07-06.pdf; and (2), A Concept for Nuclear Fuel Leasing from the Nuclear Fuel Leasing Group, available on-line at:

105 GOV/INF/2007/11 Page 4 b) Statement on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy: Russian Federation (INFCIRC/667, February 2006, Annex 6). Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, outlined a proposal that included the creation of a system of international centres providing uranium enrichment services, including enrichment, on a non-discriminatory basis and under the control of the IAEA. c) Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP): United States of America (February 2006, Annex 7). One of the elements of GNEP is a proposed fuel services programme to enable nations to acquire nuclear energy economically while limiting proliferation risks. Under GNEP, a consortium of nations with advanced nuclear technologies would ensure that countries who agree to forgo their own investment in enrichment and reprocessing technologies will have reliable access to nuclear fuel. d) Ensuring Security of Supply in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle: World Nuclear Association (May 2006, Annex 8). A working group, including representatives of the four principal enrichment companies, proposed a three-level mechanism to assure enrichment services: (1) basic supply security provided by the existing world market; (2) collective guarantees by enrichers supported by governmental and IAEA commitments; and (3) government stocks of enriched uranium product. e) Concept for a Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel: France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States of America (GOV/INF/2006/10, June 2006, Annex 9). The six enrichment services supplier States proposed essentially two levels of enrichment assurance beyond the normally operating market. At the basic assurances level suppliers of enriched uranium would agree to substitute for each other to cover certain supply interruptions to customers in States that had chosen to obtain supplies on the international market and not to pursue sensitive fuel cycle activities. At the reserves level, participating governments could provide physical or virtual reserves of LEU that would be made available if the basic assurances were to fail. f) IAEA Standby Arrangements System for the Assurance of Nuclear Fuel Supply: Japan (INFCIRC/683, September 2006, Annex 10). Japan proposed an information system to help prevent interruptions in nuclear fuel supplies. The system, to be managed by the Agency, would disseminate information contributed voluntarily by Member States on their national capacities for uranium ore, uranium reserves, uranium conversion, uranium enrichment and fuel fabrication. The proposal is described by Japan as complementary to the concept of reliable access to nuclear fuel as proposed by the six countries and described under paragraph (e) above. g) Nuclear Threat Initiative (September 2006, Annex 11). The Nuclear Threat Initiative offered to contribute $50 million to the Agency to help create an LEU stockpile owned and managed by the Agency that could be made available should other supply arrangements be disrupted. The offer is contingent on the following two conditions being met within two years from when the offer was made: (1) that the Agency takes the necessary actions to approve establishment of the reserve; and (2) that one or more Member States contribute an additional $100 million in funding or an equivalent value of LEU. Every other element of the

106 GOV/INF/2007/11 Page 5 arrangement the structure, its location, the conditions for access would be up to the Agency and the Member States to decide. 8 h) Enrichment Bonds: United Kingdom (September 2006; INFCIRC/707, June 2007, Annex 12). The UK proposed a bonding principle that would, in the event that the Agency determines that specified conditions have been met: (1) guarantee that national enrichment providers would not be prevented from supplying enrichment services; and (2) provide prior consent for export assurances. Germany and the Netherlands are cooperating with the UK in the development of the enrichment bonds concept. i) International Uranium Enrichment Centre at Angarsk: Russian Federation (January and May 2007; INFCIRC/708, June 2007, Annex 13). Following adoption of the necessary enabling legislation in January 2007, the Russian Federation will establish an International Uranium Enrichment Centre (IUEC) at the Angarsk Electrolysis Chemical Combine to provide guaranteed access to uranium enrichment capabilities to the Centre s participating organizations. On 10 May 2007 the first agreement in the framework of the IUEC was signed by the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan. A mechanism is being developed to set aside a stockpile of LEU which might contribute to a broader assurance of supply mechanism, and a regulatory basis will be developed in the sphere of export control such that the shipment of material out of the country at the request of the Agency is guaranteed. j) Multilateralizing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Germany (INFCIRC/704, May 2007, Annex 14). Germany proposed the creation of a multilateral uranium enrichment centre with extraterritorial status, operating on a commercial basis as a new supplier in the market, under Agency control, providing enrichment services. From there, potential users could then obtain nuclear fuel for civilian use under strict supervision. Such a plant could also help assure the supply of enriched uranium to qualifying States. k) Multilateralisation of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Austria (INFCIRC/706, May 2007, Annex 15). Austria proposed a two-track multilateral mechanism. The first track would optimiz[e] international transparency going beyond current IAEA safeguards obligations. The second track would place all nuclear fuel transactions under the auspices of a nuclear fuel bank to enable equal access to and control of most sensitive nuclear technologies, particularly enrichment and reprocessing. l) Nuclear Fuel Cycle: European Union (EU) non-paper (June 2007, Annex 16). The EU nonpaper noted that flexibility would be appropriate in considering an approach to fuel supply options and proposed criteria for assessment of a multilateral mechanism for reliability of fuel supply. These criteria included, inter alia: a) proliferation resistance minimization of the risk of unintended transfer of sensitive nuclear technology; b) assurance of supply reliability of long term supply arrangements; c) consistency with equal rights and obligations obligations of suppliers, companies, consumer States and the IAEA; and d) market neutrality avoiding any unnecessary disturbance or interference in the functioning of the existing market. 8 On 1 June 2007, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US Congress approved a bill that supports the creation of an international nuclear fuel bank, under the supervision of the Agency, and also provides for a $50 million contribution from the USA to the Agency to match $50 million offered to the Agency by the Nuclear Threat Initiative in September 2006 to set up such a nuclear fuel bank

107 GOV/INF/2007/11 Page A Special Event was held during the 2006 regular session of the IAEA General Conference, which focused specifically on aspects of a potential new framework that would facilitate the future utilization of nuclear energy. The Chairman s report from this event 9, presented to the General Conference, indicated possible ways forward to assure supply of nuclear fuel, while minimizing proliferation risks. The discussions showed inter alia that: a) existing proposals dealt with assurance of supply in different but complementary ways; b) establishing a fully-developed, multilateral framework that is equitable and accessible to all users of nuclear energy, acting in accordance with agreed nuclear non-proliferation norms, will be a complex endeavour that would likely require a progressively phased approach; c) assurance of supply frameworks are not intended to alter the right of any State to take its own decision regarding fuel cycle choices; and d) there were some concerns about implied or intended conditions as may be applied to fuel assurance frameworks. C. Common Themes for Assurance of Supply of Nuclear Fuel C.1. Possible Framework 14. All of the proposals received to date, in one way or another, seek to provide an assurance of supply of LEU. These proposals do not adopt a common approach and present different options, which is helpful as their diversity enables consumer States to choose options according to their interests and needs, which in turn potentially could increase the overall level of assurance provided to them. The Secretariat considers that there are some common themes running through the proposals that could provide the basis for a framework. In the following discussion the Secretariat draws on its understanding of these common themes. The discussion does not constitute a formal proposal by the Secretariat but is an attempt to structure a framework within which the existing and possible future proposals can be placed for consideration. Of course, assurance of supply should provide assurance not only of the supply of uranium enrichment services and LEU itself, but also of manufactured fuel assemblies. Thus the framework addresses both LEU and fuel fabrication. 15. For LEU a suggested possible framework might have three levels: a) Level 1: existing global market arrangements for nuclear fuel supply; b) Level 2: back-up commitments provided by suppliers of enrichment services underpinned by commitments from their respective governments to allow such supply. The back-up commitments could be utilized when pre-determined criteria are met following a political disruption; and c) Level 3: a physical LEU reserve under IAEA control, stored in one or several separate locations in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ) or uranium oxide (UO 2 ), or a virtual LEU reserve based on commitments by governments to make LEU available to the Agency. 9 Report of the Chairman of the Special Event, see

108 GOV/INF/2007/11 Page 7 Such a reserve, either physical or virtual, could be utilized when Level 2 commitments cannot be fulfilled and the same pre-determined criteria are met. 16. A possible framework for fuel fabrication might also have three levels. Level 1 would be the same as for LEU, i.e. the global market. For Level 2, the existing market mechanism would also be used. In addition, commitments by the governments of fuel manufacturers would be required to allow the supply. Level 2 would be invoked on the same conditions as for LEU. For Level 3 a framework based on agreements between fuel manufacturers and owners of relevant intellectual property rights that could create additional fuel assembly supply possibilities might be envisaged. 17. All three levels are described in more detail below and the application of the three levels is illustrated schematically in Figure 1. In addition Annex 3 includes a description of the links between the proposals that have been made and the aforementioned three levels. LEU Fuel assembly fabrication Level 1 Normal market Normal market Level 1 If supply disruption, then the Director General assesses if criteria are met If supply disruption, then the Director General assesses if criteria are met Level 2 If so, the remaining enrichers cover the contract in equal shares and government commitments apply If so, government commitments apply, and the customer seeks alternative acceptable bid Level 2 If any enricher or government fails to honour its Level 2 commitments If no acceptable bid is received Level 3 LEU is provided from a physical reserve controlled by the Agency, and possibly other physical reserves and/or Contingent clauses take effect to expand fabrication alternatives Level 3 LEU is provided by governments according to prior supply commitments Customer seeks acceptable bid from expanded pool of alternatives FIG 1: Schematic representation of the three levels of assurance of supply for LEU and fuel fabrication

109 GOV/INF/2007/11 Page 8 C.1.1. Level 1: Reliance on the International Market in Nuclear Fuel Level 1 the initial basis for assured supply would be provided by the existing global market arrangements. It is understood that there is currently a working balance between supply capacity and demand in the uranium enrichment market, as well as in the conversion and fuel fabrication markets, and there is competition among the major market participants. The market is expected to make additional investments to provide sufficient capacity to meet demand, including the possibility of new suppliers, for example those operating on a multilateral basis. 19. Traditionally, nuclear operators are involved in purchasing directly each step in the production chain (natural uranium, conversion, enrichment and fuel manufacturing). Although spot markets exist for uranium ore, conversion and enrichment, the vast majority of services are purchased under long term contracts. To protect against the disruption of deliveries in any of the market segments, operators normally diversify suppliers, having two or more suppliers in each segment, when possible. For the steps leading up to enriched uranium the suppliers are effectively interchangeable as the product is a commodity. 20. The situation is different for fuel assembly manufacturing as the fuel assembly is a highly technologically specific product with significant intellectual property rights attached to it. The fuel assemblies are also adapted to the specific characteristics of each reactor. As the fuel is a very important safety-related component, each specific fuel type requires extensive licensing which takes into account the fuel assemblies that are already in the reactor. Fuel assemblies from different suppliers are thus not easily interchangeable. Nevertheless, changing of fuel suppliers is common practice. Most operators do it at regular intervals in order to maintain competition, thereby ensuring the best technology and price, as well as increasing the security of their own supply. C.1.2. Level 2: Back-up Assurances Level 2 consists of (1) back-up commitments provided by suppliers of enrichment services, (2) commitments by the governments of those enrichers and (3) similar commitments by governments of fuel manufacturers. It is not foreseen that the Agency would necessarily be a party to any of these agreements, but it could act as depositary or registry for such agreements and contracts. The Director General would have the responsibility and authority to decide when the criteria to invoke Level 2 have been met. Such criteria would be established in advance by the Board of Governors (see Section D). 22. LEU: In the event that supplies from one of the participating enrichers 12 were disrupted such that Level 2 were triggered, pre-negotiated commercial agreements would commit all other participating enrichers to provide the originally contracted supplies in equal shares. The price would be set by a pre-negotiated formula based on standard commercial indices. Furthermore, pre-negotiated 10 More details about the international nuclear fuel market are given in Annex As discussed in Annex 3 a number of existing proposals link to the Level 2 ideas described in this section. Level 2 draws from the concept of basic assurances described in the Concept for a Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel GOV/INF/2006/10 (Annex 9). It is also consistent with Level II of the WNA s report on Ensuring the Security of Supply in the International Fuel Cycle (Annex 8). The enrichment bonds proposed by the UK (Annex 12), together with the proposal recently made by the Russian Federation (Annex 13), are the most significant initiatives by governments towards realization of the Level 2 commitments outlined here. Both of these proposals envisage guaranteed export licences triggered by the invocation of Level 2 by the Agency. 12 Enrichment enterprises that would enter into the back-up commitments described in this section are referred to as participating enrichers

110 GOV/INF/2007/11 Page 9 agreements would commit all governments with participating enrichers to guarantee all necessary export and transit licences. Additional pre-negotiated agreements would also commit the government that interrupted the original contract not to retaliate against substitute enrichers. That is, each participating government would agree that, in the event that it cut off supplies by participating enrichers and Level 2 were triggered, it would not initiate retaliation measures (e.g. commercial or financial) against alternative enrichment suppliers. It is envisaged that the number of enrichers and participating governments could increase over time provided they are willing to enter into the commitments described above. 23. Fuel manufacturing: While there would be no back-up commitments required from fuel manufacturers at Level 2, there would be a role for government commitments. In the event that supplies from a manufacturer were disrupted, there would be no automatic coverage from other manufacturers. The consumer could seek a substitute supplier in States which have concluded agreements committing themselves to guarantee the export and transport licences in the event that Level 2 is triggered. Additional pre-negotiated agreements would also commit the government that interrupted the original supply not to retaliate against substitute manufacturers. As above, it is envisaged that the number of manufacturers could increase provided their governments are willing to enter into the commitments described above. C.1.3. Level 3: Low Enriched Uranium Last Resort Reserves and Fuel Fabrication Agreements 24. Level 3 would provide last resort reserves, which could be in the form of physical reserves, virtual reserves or a combination of the two, under Agency control. Physical reserves would comprise LEU stored in one or several separate locations, with agreements in place to assure its availability when pre-determined criteria are met (see Section D). A virtual reserve would be based solely on commitments by governments to produce, or otherwise make available, LEU when pre-determined criteria are met. Unlike Level 2 back-up commitments, Level 3 last resort LEU reserves do not foresee commitments by suppliers. 25. Level 3 would be triggered if any enricher or government participating in Level 2 fails to honour its commitments 13. It is envisaged that the Director General would have the responsibility and authority to decide when Level 3 is invoked. Either the material in the fuel bank, whether physical or virtual, could be owned by the Agency, or the Agency could have the full right to utilize it for the purpose of the fuel bank. 26. In the context of Level 3, a number of legal arrangements would be needed, with variations depending on whether the Agency has title to the material supplied or whether the title passes directly from the supplier State to the consumer State. These include: a) an arrangement between the supplier State and the Agency, to include inter alia consent rights by the supplier State to export the fuel, licensing and transport requirements as well as the corresponding privileges and immunities; b) an arrangement between the consumer State and the Agency, as foreseen in Article XI of the Statute, to include inter alia the criteria linked to the release of the assured supply; 13 This might be the most direct way of assuring supply in a timely manner. Clearly other alternatives could also be considered

111 GOV/INF/2007/11 Page 10 c) the underlying commercial contracts with nuclear fuel providers, transporters, storage providers, etc.; d) in the event the Agency establishes an actual physical reserve, agreements with the State(s) where the reserve is located, as well as transit agreements with neighbouring States, covering the international status of the reserve, safeguards, security, safety and liability for nuclear damage; and e) arrangements with the operator concerning the day-to-day management of the LEU reserve. 27. Government commitments associated with Level 3 would include non-retaliation commitments similar to those in Level 2. C Physical Reserves 28. It is envisaged that the physical version of Level 3 LEU reserves under Agency control would be located in one or several countries and that the reserves could initially include LEU sufficient for one complete core, the minimum amount of material that would be suitable for the establishment of a workable Level 3 assurance of supply. 14 Such an amount would meet requirements resulting from supply interruptions that may occur in countries with small nuclear programmes. In addition, such a modest amount of material would not disrupt the existing international nuclear fuel market; this amount would be easier to obtain and could easily be replaced if used. 15 It also corresponds to the proposal made by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) While the startup costs and initial LEU costs of the physical version of Level 3 reserves could be covered as a one time contribution, funding for the continuing operating costs would need to be determined. When material in the reserve is transferred to a consumer State, the costs would be paid for by that State in accordance with the pricing mechanism, and the payments used to replenish the reserve. 30. The international status of an Agency nuclear material store would increase the level of assurance provided. In addition, exemption of the Agency from the need to obtain licences from the hosting State for importing and exporting LEU would also give potential consumers greater confidence in obtaining the release of nuclear material from an Agency fuel bank on a timely basis. 31. At the same time, the transfer of the nuclear material should not require the consent of the original supplier. This may be accomplished through prior agreements between the Agency and the relevant supplier States under which the latter would give the Agency advance consent to the export of 14 The LEU required for one complete core of a 1000 MW(e) LWR currently costs approximately $ million. 15 Technical specifications would have to be established for the material such that the reserves could meet their objective, i.e. providing the assurance that, if Level 2 fails, the customer whose supply interruption triggered the invocation of Level 2 could get LEU from the Level 3 reserves that would meet its specifications. 16 The Nuclear Threat Initiative has offered to make a contribution to the Agency of $50 million to help create a LEU stockpile owned and managed by the Agency. NTI has stated that this stockpile would be available as a last resort fuel reserve for States that have made the choice to develop their nuclear energy based on foreign sources of fuel supply services and therefore have no indigenous enrichment facilities. The goal of this proposed initiative is to help make fuel supplies from the international market more secure by offering customer States that are in full compliance with their non-proliferation obligations, reliable access to a nuclear fuel reserve under impartial Agency control should their supply arrangements be disrupted. In so doing, NTI s objective is to make a State s voluntary choice to rely on this market more secure (see Annex 11)

112 GOV/INF/2007/11 Page 11 the material based on the operation of mutually acceptable release criteria (see Section D). This is an important issue that will require further consideration. C Virtual Reserves 32. The virtual version of a Level 3 reserve would consist, first, of commitments by governments of supplier States to provide unconditionally and promptly, in the event that the Director General determines that the criteria to trigger Level 3 are met, LEU up to specified limits that total at least the amount of LEU envisaged for a physical version of the Level 3 reserves. The virtual version of a Level 3 reserve would also require advance commitments by the same governments to provide all necessary export, transport and other approvals. The price for LEU provided to a customer through a virtual Level 3 reserve would be established using the same formula as for physical reserves. Governments with commitments contributing to a virtual Level 3 reserve could, in principle, meet them either by: (1) earmarking material for this purpose; (2) maintaining sufficient enrichment capacities and procedures to assure timely delivery of LEU if Level 3 is triggered; or (3) combinations of the two. C Fuel Fabrication 33. Given the diversity and continuing evolution of fuel assembly designs, a physical bank of finished fuel assemblies is not realistic. However, there exist a number of ways that nuclear power plant operators and countries can and do protect against interruption risks. These include assuring that there are several fuel assembly suppliers licensed to supply fuel for each reactor; requiring that a specific amount of fresh fuel always be available at the reactor site; and building new fuel assembly fabrication capacity within a country. The fact that these approaches have already been implemented suggests that they may provide more cost effective insurance against existing fabrication interruption risks than would an international fabrication assurance mechanism arranged through the Agency. 34. Nonetheless, an international framework could provide additional assurance, beyond current practices, in connection with the three-level framework outlined above for LEU. This will require exploring possible arrangements between fuel assembly suppliers and owners of fuel intellectual property rights that could create additional fuel assembly supply possibilities. One possible idea is that under certain conditions, similar to those required to trigger Level 3 of the LEU assurance framework outlined above, special arrangements could take effect. They would effectively temporarily relax intellectual property rights or other contractual restrictions such that the customer whose supply had been interrupted would have a broadened range of possible alternative suppliers. Although the level of assurance would be lower in this case than for LEU, such arrangements might still be worth implementing. They would need to be based on fully voluntary agreements by the parties involved, and complemented by governmental commitments as for Level 2. C.2. Physical versus Virtual Reserves 35. One potential advantage of physical reserves relative to virtual reserves is that some countries may be more reassured by the permanent availability of identifiable physical material than by commitments made by countries to produce or make available such material upon the triggering of Level 3. Perception of assurance will likely depend on the country or countries in which physical reserves are located, with States likely to be holding differing viewpoints on appropriate locations. A second possible advantage of physical reserves would be that they could be hosted by a broader range

113 GOV/INF/2007/11 Page 12 of countries than those which could offer virtual reserves, which can, in the first instance, only be provided by countries with enrichment industries (although a country without an enrichment industry might conceivably build a national reserve of LEU and earmark part of it for the Agency s virtual reserve). Thus, physical reserves could incorporate greater diversity than virtual reserves, and thereby could be perceived by some countries as providing a greater level of assurance. 36. A principal potential advantage of virtual reserves over physical reserves is that they would likely be less expensive and easier to operate. Virtual reserves would not tie up capital for material that may never be used. They create none of the safety or security costs that might be associated with physical reserves, and they do not require the Agency developing new expertise to manage physical reserves, or to oversee the outsourced management of such reserves. D. Criteria Relating to Assurance of Supply 37. Criteria would need to be applied for the release of material under any framework for the assured supply of nuclear fuel, established under the auspices of the Agency. It is also possible that a State or group of States, which have established their own assurance of supply mechanism, may wish to use the good offices of the Agency s Director General to apply the Agency s criteria for the release of material under such a framework. 38. All assurance of supply frameworks under the Agency s auspices should be open to participation by all Member States of the Agency. Any criteria would need to be the same for all States and applied in a consistent manner without prejudice to any State s future options regarding its fuel cycle in the context of multilateral approaches. This may best be achieved through a procedure whereby the Board of Governors establishes the criteria in advance, thereby ensuring that they are consistent for all States wishing to make use of the framework. 39. Once a request for supply is received by the Agency, it is envisaged that the Director General would consider the request and decide whether it meets the criteria set by the Board of Governors. In the case of an assurance of supply framework under the auspices of the Agency, it is envisaged that the Director General would trigger the supply framework if the criteria are met. In the case of an assurance of supply framework of a State or group of States, it is envisaged that the Director General would inform that State or States whether the application meets the set criteria. 40. The criteria listed below are not meant to be definitive or exhaustive, but outline some necessary considerations, that could be considered by the Board, for a workable assurance of supply framework: a) The disruption must be for a political reason. Whether a disruption is for a political reason or not might not always be clear. In practice, a claim of disruption would be considered if there is prima facie evidence in support of the claim and there is no clear information to the contrary, particularly since supply under an assurance of supply framework would not be more favourable than commercial supply. b) A State requesting supply under an assurance of supply framework should have in force a safeguards agreement that applies to the material that will be supplied through such a framework

114 GOV/INF/2007/11 Page 13 c) A conclusion must have been drawn in respect of the requesting State on the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in the most recent Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR), and there must be no safeguards issues under current consideration by the Board of Governors. d) A State must comply with other criteria that might be prescribed by the Board, such as for example, an Additional Protocol in force, and satisfying certain nuclear security and nuclear safety requirements. E. International Nuclear Fuel Centres (INFC) 41. The establishment of new international nuclear fuel centres (INFCs) has been suggested as a possible framework to promote access to nuclear power and to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation. In the first instance, such centres are likely to focus on the provision of uranium enrichment services and the assured supply of LEU. They will thus provide additional sources of supply of enrichment services and/or LEU and may contribute to a physical fuel bank. This section addresses some of the factors considered relevant to international nuclear fuel centres and their contribution to assured supply of nuclear fuel together with two proposals that have been put forward. 42. Factors that could be relevant to assuring confidence in the contribution of INFCs to assurance of supply include: A clear, indisputable Agency claim on LEU, if needed for a last resort reserve (virtual or physical) or enrichment services; A commitment from INFCs for provision of back-up enrichment services and/or LEU, i.e. a commitment to covering a LEU supply contract in the event of a non-commercial cut-off by another supplier, guaranteed export licences, and non-retaliation commitments; A clearly defined legal basis; Multiple locations for storing physical reserves of LEU, including outside of the host State; and The extent of Agency involvement. 43. The proposals that have been made to date concerning the possible establishment of INFCs have been based either on the use of a national facility (e.g. as proposed at Angarsk 17 ) with the Agency s role being focused on decisions regarding the release of nuclear material, or on the concept of an IAEA centre where the Agency s role would be extended to cover the construction, running and monitoring of a uranium enrichment plant. A brief commentary on these ideas is provided in Annex 4, and copies of the relevant underlying proposals provided in Annexes 13 and 14 respectively. 17 New INFC proposals could also be based on other existing enrichment enterprises

115 GOV/INF/2007/11 Page 14 F. Next Steps 44. In taking this work forward, it will be necessary for the Secretariat, with the concurrence of the Board, to consult broadly with interested Member States, industry and other stakeholders on the possible framework outlined in this report. Such consultations would enable the Secretariat to further: a) develop implementation procedures, criteria and model agreements to further elaborate the framework for assurance of supply outlined in this report; and b) explore with interested Member States the possible establishment of fuel reserves and international nuclear fuel centres. 45. The Secretariat also stands ready to work with interested Member States in further developing existing and other proposals relevant to multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle including assurance of supply of nuclear fuel and reactor technology, spent fuel management/disposition and reprocessing/recycling

116 GOV/INF/2007/11 Annex 1 Page 1 Annex 1: Relevant Provisions of the IAEA Statute 1. The original concept for the establishment of an international atomic energy organization foresaw the receipt, custody and supply of nuclear fuel and also the acquisition and establishment of facilities, plants and equipment for the enrichment or fabrication of nuclear fuel as some of the principal functions of such an organization and embodied these principles in the Statute of the Agency. 2. The provisions of the Statute are sufficiently broad to allow the Agency: to establish its own stock of nuclear fuel purchased from or donated by Member States for supply to another Member State against payment of charges determined by the Board of Governors; to facilitate the supply of nuclear fuel from one Member State to another; and also to facilitate, inter alia, enrichment and fuel fabrication services by one Member State to another or to the Agency: a) Under Article III of the Statute, the Agency is authorized to perform any operation, including acquiring nuclear fuel, services and equipment and establishing its own facilities and plants, in order to facilitate the practical application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. b) Article IX of the Statute provides for Members States to make nuclear fuel available to the Agency, in quantities and on conditions to be agreed with the Agency. If the fuel is actually made available to the Agency, it could be stored either by the Member State concerned or in Agency depots and has to be used as determined by the Board of Governors. Accordingly, the use of the material cannot be tied to a specific project at the request of the supplier State. In storing materials in its possession, the Agency shall not allow concentration of large amounts of such materials in any one country or region of the world. c) Article IX.I, in particular, requires the Agency to establish or acquire, as may be necessary, equipment and facilities for the receipt, storage and issue of materials. In this case, the Agency would be responsible for storing and protecting these materials, including safeguarding them and applying the adequate health and safety measures. d) Article X provides that Members States may make services, equipment and facilities available to the Agency. No conditions as in Article IX are attached. Article XIII, however, foresees that the supplier State has to be reimbursed for the items furnished. e) In establishing an assurance of supply framework under the auspices of the Agency (e.g. nuclear fuel supplied by or through the Agency) the Board of Governors should establish it as a project in terms of Article XI. If the framework involves fuel made available to the Agency, the Board of Governors must also determine in accordance with Article IX.J how such fuel is to be used. f) In terms of Article XI.E, a number of criteria are prescribed for the establishment of a project, which are in addition to those additional non-proliferation criteria that the Board of Governors may deem relevant. They relate to: the usefulness of the project; the adequacy of plans, funds and technical personnel to assure the effective execution of the project; the adequacy of the health and safety standards for handling and storing the materials and for operating facilities; the equitable distribution of materials and resources available to the Agency; the inability of the requesting State to secure the necessary finances, materials, facilities, equipment and services (in this case specifically the ability of the requesting State to secure supply of LEU from elsewhere) and the special need of the under-developed areas of the world. These criteria are applied routinely in respect of Agency projects and there seems to be no need to add or modify them

117 GOV/INF/2007/11 Annex 1 Page 2 g) According to Articles XIV.E and XIV.F of the Statute, charges for nuclear fuel, services, equipment and facilities furnished have to be levied on a scale such that the revenues for the Agency are adequate to meet the expenses and costs incurred. These charges shall be placed in a general fund for use as determined by the Board and the General Conference, which would allow the replenishment of the fuel reserve. 3. The project approach for the assurance of supply framework can best be dealt with by considering the whole framework of assurance of supply as one single project with each request for the release of material being one element thereunder

118 GOV/INF/2007/11 Annex 2 Page 1 Annex 2: The International Nuclear Fuel Market 1. The production of nuclear fuel includes several steps: purchase of natural uranium as U 3 O 8 ; conversion to UF 6 ; enrichment (except for heavy water reactors); reconversion to UO 2; and manufacturing of fuel elements ready to be inserted in the reactors. The product of each step, up to and including reconversion, is a commodity that is essentially the same irrespective of supplier and that is thus interchangeable. Fuel manufacturing is highly technology-specific and is specially adapted to each reactor. 2. Traditionally, utilities have been involved in purchasing directly each step in the production chain. There are thus separate markets for natural uranium, conversion, enrichment and fuel manufacturing. Only in a few cases does the utility buy just the finished product, i.e. the manufactured fuel elements, including their content of enriched uranium, as a single final product. To hedge against the disruption of deliveries in any of the market segments, utilities normally diversify their choice of suppliers, having two or more suppliers in each segment, when possible. In addition, the manufacturers tend to assist each other in the event of a disruption, in order to ensure the smooth functioning of the deliveries of fuel. 3. In 2004, 18 uranium was produced in 19 different countries, although just seven countries (Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, Namibia, Niger and Uzbekistan) accounted for approximately 90% of the world production, with Australia and Canada together accounting for 45%. The total production in 2004 was tonnes, which was about 60% of the 2004 requirement for civilian reactors. The remaining 40% was met by secondary sources including civilian and military stockpiles, reprocessed uranium, and re-enriched depleted uranium. There are some uncertainties related to the uranium market in the medium term, due to limited information on available secondary supplies and on new uranium production centres. In the longer term, the production is expected to match demand. Uranium reserves are not expected to be the limiting factor for new production. Increasing exploration is expected to increase reserves substantially and to increase the number of countries in which uranium can be mined. Market uncertainty, improved global prospects for nuclear energy and the lingering effects of low mining investments have, in the recent past, led to a substantial rise in spot market prices. Most of the uranium, however, is purchased under long term contracts. 4. The uranium enrichment market is dependent on the demand for uranium as a fuel for nuclear power reactors. Enrichment services are sold as separative work units (SWU). The annual demand is roughly 40 million SWU, while the total world capacity is approximately 53 million SWU. There are four principal enrichment suppliers in the world (Areva, Tenex, Urenco and USEC) with enrichment facilities in France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. In addition, China and Japan have large enrichment facilities, which are used to satisfy domestic demand, while Argentina and Brazil have small-scale facilities. While enrichment services are normally supplied with the customer providing the natural uranium feed material, the enricher in some cases provides the feed material. The uranium enrichment industry is closely monitored by national governments and international agencies as a means to control the use of enriched uranium and its technology. The relative market shares of the enrichment companies have traditionally been closely linked to the domestic nuclear power market. With the deregulation of the electricity sector in many countries, the utilities have become more sensitive to the costs of enrichment and the security of supply. This has created an increasingly commercial approach in the enrichment 18 The latest available data is drawn from the Uranium 2005: Resources, Production and Demand. A Joint Report by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Publication NEA No. 6098, OECD 2005, ISBN ("Red Book" 2005)

119 GOV/INF/2007/11 Annex 2 Page 2 market. Although, as with uranium, a spot market exist for enrichment (and enriched uranium), more than 95% of the services are provided by primary suppliers selling directly to utilities under multi-year contracts (typically 10 years in length). Two types of contracts can be distinguished: requirements and fixed commitments. In the requirements contracts, which are the most common, customers take delivery according to their need. In the fixed commitments contracts, the annual quantities are fixed from the start. In addition, secondary supplies in the enrichment market exist from liquidation of national or utility stockpiles and from the disposal of surplus military high enriched uranium (HEU) that is down blended to enrichment levels suitable for power reactors. In particular, the latter has strongly affected the market since the mid-1990s as material corresponding to approximately 6 million SWU/year has been down blended from Russian and US weapons material. This will continue through There are several plans for new enrichment capacity at the existing facilities to replace old facilities and provide additional capacity to match increasing demands. 5. As enrichment is carried out on uranium in the form of a gas (UF 6 ), it is necessary first to convert U 3 O 8 to UF 6. There are five main conversion companies: Cameco (Canada); COMURHEX (France); Rosatom (Russian Federation); Springfields (UK); and ConverDyn (USA). In addition, smaller conversion facilities operate in Argentina, Brazil, China, India and Romania. Conversion facilities are connected either to the uranium producer or to the enrichment company. The world capacity for conversion matches the demand and could be adapted to increasing demands. Conversion is also needed after enrichment from UF 6 to the UO 2 powder used for fuel manufacturing. This may be carried out at enrichment facilities or, alternatively, the fuel manufacturer may have its own conversion capacity for this step. 6. Fuel assembly manufacturing is the last step in the chain. The fuel assembly to be inserted in the reactor is a highly technologically specific product with significant intellectual property rights invested in and attached to it. A fuel assembly is also adapted not only to the specific reactor, but to the specific characteristics of the reactor; its design takes into account the fuel assemblies that are already in the reactor and its operating history. Moreover, as the fuel assembly in itself is a very important safetyrelated component that provides the first barrier to release of radioactivity from a reactor, each fuel type requires extensive licensing. 7. Fuel assemblies from different suppliers are thus not easily interchangeable. Nevertheless, a change of fuel suppliers is a common procedure. Most utilities change suppliers at regular intervals (perhaps every 5 years) in order to maintain competition, thereby ensuring that the best technology development and price are achieved, and to increase their security of supply by maintaining several possible suppliers. A change of supplier is, however, connected with an extensive licensing effort, sometimes requiring the insertion of lead test assemblies. Such a changeover will typically take between 2 and 5 years, depending on the preparedness of both the utility and the supplier. These changes would also presuppose the market availability of several manufacturers for the particular type of fuel required. This is the case for most, but not all fuel types. The main fuel manufacturers are also the main suppliers of nuclear power plants or closely connected to them. The largest fuel manufacturing capacity can be found in France, Germany, the Russian Federation and the USA, but fuel manufacturing is carried out in at least seven other countries, often under licence from one of the main suppliers. 8. Because the different steps in producing nuclear fuel take place at different locations, there is a need for transport between them. Each transport step requires approval by the national authorities concerned, export licences and in many cases also prior approval by the uranium supplier country. 9. Any expansion of nuclear power will require an expansion of other fuel cycle activities, including possibly bringing on line additional uranium enrichment and fuel fabrication capacity

120 GOV/INF/2007/11 Annex 2 Page 3 preferably under multilateral auspices. Furthermore, the availability of fuel for nuclear power plants depends on the viability and access to the international market in nuclear fuel. However, the degree of expansion at any particular step in the fuel cycle will depend on national policy choices, for example between open and closed fuel cycle options. 10. As fuel supply is essential for the countries and utilities involved, several actions are normally undertaken to provide increased assurance at each link in the chain and to hedge against disruptions. The most straightforward action is to ensure a diversity of suppliers, as much as economically and technically possible. Additionally, a good balance is generally sought between long term and spot market contracts. Other approaches include the building up of national or utility strategic stockpiles of enriched as well as natural uranium and ensuring that a certain amount of surplus fabricated fuel elements are available at reactor sites. Storage of natural or enriched uranium in licensed transport containers is reasonably straightforward. The high energy content of enriched uranium makes the necessary storage volumes relatively small. Some countries have built their own fuel manufacturing capacity, often based on licences from the main fuel suppliers, to ensure deliveries to the national utilities. The spare capacity of these facilities has also been made available on the international market to the extent allowed by the licence providers. 11. The application of different hedging mechanisms differs from country to country and from time to time. The build-up of national or utility strategic stockpiles was rather common from the early days of nuclear power until the 1980s. With the development of a more open and competitive market in the different segments, and with the lowering of prices for uranium and enrichment in the 1990s, the size of the strategic stockpiles has been reduced in many countries. This is also true for the amount of surplus fabricated fuel stored at reactors. With current concerns about medium term supplies of uranium there is again a tendency to increase the stockpiles

121 GOV/INF/2007/11 Annex 3 Page 1 Annex 3: Existing Proposals Common Themes 1. Below are a range of ideas, all of which contribute to the discussion on developing assurance of supply and which contain common themes that form the basis for Section C. However, each of the existing proposals requires further development, and each is discussed below in order of follow-up developments since the proposals were made. International Uranium Enrichment Centre (IUEC) Angarsk: Russian Federation 2. The IUEC may relate to the levels of assurance of supply outlined in Section C in three ways. At Level 1, the IUEC is to provide guaranteed access to uranium enrichment capabilities to the IUEC s participating organizations based on intergovernmental agreements and, in addition, will diversify the roster of suppliers and the number of options available to consumer States. Participation at Level 2 could further strengthen supply assurance by providing for the release of enrichment services/leu by the IUEC to States fulfilling agreed IAEA non-proliferation criteria. The IUEC could also help assure the supply of enriched uranium to qualifying States through the Level 2 aspect of the mechanism described in Section C namely, the centre could help fill the gap if another supplier defaulted on supply for reasons not connected with non-proliferation or commercial reasons. Most importantly, if the IUEC were also to facilitate the establishment of an independent IAEA fuel bank (Level 3) this would help build a significant layer of confidence in assured supply addressing the needs of both the States participating in the centre and any other States that meet the Agency s non-proliferation criteria. A mechanism is being developed for the allocation by the Russian Federation of a defined quantity of enriched uranium product (EUP) as a deposit for a guaranteed stockpile at the IUEC. A regulatory basis will be developed in the sphere of export controls such that the shipment of material out of Russia at the request of the IAEA is guaranteed. Enrichment Bonds: United Kingdom 3. Features of the enrichment bonds concept are incorporated in the government commitments called for in Levels 2 and 3 to provide guaranteed export licences and all other necessary approvals. In effect, the enrichment bond would see the States involved undertaking to provide enrichment services, and those States would waive their national export controls, and transfer the implementation of the full set of non-proliferation criteria to the IAEA. The virtual version of a Level 3 reserve would extend the commitments in the enrichment bonds concept further to provide LEU unconditionally, up to specified limits, in the event that the Director General invokes Level 3. Nuclear Threat Initiative 4. In September 2006, the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) offered a conditional grant of $50 million to the IAEA to help create a low enriched uranium stockpile owned and managed by the IAEA (GOV/INF/2006/14). Should the Agency be able to meet the conditions of the NTI grant, the resulting $150 million could be used to finance the establishment of a Level 3 reserve in conformance with the mechanism outlined in Section C and with the provisions of the NTI offer. As noted above in footnote 8, on 1 June 2007, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US Congress approved a bill that supports the creation of an international nuclear fuel bank, under the supervision of the Agency, and also provides for a $50 million contribution from the USA to the Agency to match $50 million offered by the Nuclear Threat Initiative in September 2006 to set up such a nuclear fuel bank. The bill requires

122 GOV/INF/2007/11 Annex 3 Page 2 that another $50 million, for a total of $100 million, be already available to the Agency before the US contribution of $50 million can be transferred. Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel 5. This proposal envisages two levels of assurances beyond the normal market: basic assurances and reserve. As in Level 2 of the mechanism outlined in Section C, basic assurances envisage, in the event of a political cut-off, alternative commercial suppliers substituting for the supplier that was cut off. Reserves is similar to the Level 3 reserves. Reserves could be held nationally, or rights regarding their use could formally be transferred to the IAEA, if so desired by the State providing the reserve. In addition, releases of LEU from national reserves under the Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel could be tied to a decision by the Director General to invoke Level 3 of the IAEA mechanism. World Nuclear Association 6. The World Nuclear Association (WNA) proposal emphasizes the importance of any proposed assurance of supply mechanism not disrupting the operation of the normal market for enrichment services. In keeping with that emphasis, the mechanism outlined in Section C incorporates some of the features identified as important in the WNA s report. In particular, Level 2 of the framework outlined in Section C is consistent with Level II of Ensuring the Security of Supply in the International Fuel Cycle, including its provisions for pre-negotiated commercial agreements and contractual clauses requiring all other participating enrichers to share equally in covering the supply obligation of an enricher that is politically cut off. With regard to a physical reserve of LEU in connection with Level 3 of the framework, the WNA report s Level III calls for government stocks of LEU, in the event the enrichment companies are unable to meet their backup supply commitments. US Reserve Proposal 7. In September 2005, the United States announced that the US Department of Energy (DoE) would reserve 17.4 metric tonnes of HEU to be down blended to LEU for an IAEA verifiable assured supply arrangement. The US proposal to make available the down blended HEU allows for reserves whose use would involve the Agency, and the downblending would be performed at a facility that is eligible for Agency verification. Such reserves could serve as one version of Level 3 of the mechanism described in Section C. International Enrichment Centre: Proposal by Germany 8. An international enrichment centre as proposed by Germany could also help assure the supply of enriched uranium to qualifying States through Level 2 of the mechanism described in Section C. Such a centre could complement or be part of a Level 3 mechanism. IAEA Nuclear Fuel Bank: Proposal by Austria 9. Austria has proposed a mechanism for the Multilateralisation of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle based on optimizing international transparency and enabling equal access to and control of the most sensitive nuclear technologies through an international nuclear fuel bank, and all States would declare to the Agency and to each other all their existing nuclear programmes and future development plans. Were such a fuel bank to be established, all transactions regarding nuclear fuel would be under its auspices, and the fuel bank would ensure, monitor and verify safe, secure and fair distribution. Existing civilian enrichment and reprocessing facilities eventually would operate exclusively through such a nuclear fuel bank

123 GOV/INF/2007/11 Annex 3 Page 3 IAEA Standby Arrangements System for the Assurance of Nuclear Fuel Supply 10. Japan has proposed to establish a system under Agency auspices which incorporates both an information system to contribute to the prevention of the occurrence of market failure and the backup feature for supply assurance proposed in the Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel. However, the six-nation proposal is based upon a dichotomy between supplier States and user States: a country like Japan, which is producing enriched uranium for domestic uses but not exporting it currently, though planning to export it in the future, cannot be categorized under the dichotomy INFCIRC/707 (15 September 2006), paragraph 3 (2), page

124 GOV/INF/2007/11 Annex 4 Page 1 Angarsk IUEC Annex 4: International Nuclear Fuel Centres 1. In January 2007, the Russian Federation established an IUEC at Angarsk (see details in Annex 13). The Angarsk IUEC would provide LEU and enrichment services to all its Member States subject to the conditions outlined in the government to government founding agreement. The operations of the IUEC would be governed by an agreement at the commercial level between the commercial operators. It is envisaged that the LEU stores of the IUEC would be placed under Agency safeguards. Active consideration is currently being given by the Russian Federation to set aside a specific quantity of LEU which might contribute to a broader assurance of supply mechanism. It has also stated that a regulatory basis will be developed in the sphere of export control such that the shipment of material out of the country at the request of the Agency is guaranteed. 2. The main function of the Angarsk IUEC would be to provide guaranteed access to uranium enrichment capabilities to the Centre s participating organizations, based on intergovernmental agreements, preferably (but not exclusively) from States not developing on their territory uranium enrichment capabilities. Importantly, no political conditions are being set regarding the potential participating countries of the IUEC. The Russian Federation would not transfer to IUEC participants the uranium enrichment technology. The first intergovernmental agreement for the IUEC was signed on 10 May 2007 between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan. 3. States participating in the Angarsk IUEC would have the opportunity to purchase enriched uranium (or enrichment services) from a company that they partly own. In addition they would benefit from the sales of uranium to other customers. A stated intention of the initiative is to provide an economic incentive for potential IUEC participants to refrain from developing their own enrichment capabilities (Annex 13). Based on the information provided to the Secretariat and an initial assessment the Angarsk IUEC would appear to be a promising approach for further consideration. IAEA International Enrichment Centre (IIEC) 4. In addition to the assurance of supply framework outlined in Section C, it has been suggested by Germany (see Annex 14) as a concept that an enrichment plant under sole Agency control, and located outside the current provider States could help diversify enrichment sites and strengthen security of supply. The establishment of such an IAEA international enrichment centre (IIEC) could complement the framework on assurance of supply outlined above. 5. In the case of an IIEC, a host country 20 would have to be willing to cede administration and sovereign rights over a certain area on its territory where an IIEC would be located. One or more commercial enrichment plants could then be constructed on the basis of arrangements that would not offer comparative advantages to an IIEC. 6. An IIEC would not involve any transfer of technology to the Agency. The enrichment plant would be built as a black box and would be accessed and maintained solely by the technology supplier. 7. An IIEC would not be owned or subsidized by the Agency, but financed on a commercial basis or, alternatively, by interested Member States. Operation of the centre would be on a commercial basis 20 A possible host country for such a centre remains to be identified

125 GOV/INF/2007/11 Annex 4 Page 2 by management independent of the Agency, and under the control and responsibility of its owners. The criteria for siting the centre would include: reliable infrastructure, good accessibility, and a politically stable host country that does not operate an enrichment capacity. 8. Further consideration of this proposal will require additional consultations with Germany and other interested countries

126 Annex 8: Ensuring Security of Supply in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle (World Nuclear Association, May 2006) WNA Report Ensuring Security of Supply in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle

127 Introduction In 2004 the IAEA Director General established an Expert Group on Multilateral Approaches for the Nuclear Fuel Cycle. The Expert Group report, issued in early 2005, outlined the elements of a potential strategy aimed at increasing non-proliferation assurances concerning the civilian nuclear fuel cycles, while preserving assurances of supply and services around the world. A key element of such a strategy would be to limit the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies by providing additional assurances of supply to countries that volunteer to forego the development of indigenous capabilities. To contribute an industry response to the IAEA s important initiative, in August 2005 the World Nuclear Association established a Working Group on Security of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle. Membership and Terms of Reference of the Working Group are given in Appendix 1. This Working Group met formally on three occasions (in September 2005 and in January and April 2006). At the first meeting, it was agreed to establish three Sub-Groups (on the Front-End, on the Back-End, and on Customer Perspectives). The three Sub-Groups reported to the main Working Group at the January 2006 meeting, and this final report was agreed in April The reports from the Sub-Groups are contained in Appendices 2, 3 and 4. The WNA Working Group will continue to act as an industry sounding board as international deliberation on this topic evolves. General Findings The Working Group recognized and welcomed the objective of avoiding the spread of sensitive technologies and facilities through a credible assurance of access to enrichment and reprocessing/recycling services and, in the longer term, through the establishment of multilateral nuclear fuel cycle centres. Achieving this objective means ensuring that any State embarking on a programme of building nuclear power plants should be able to obtain a reliable guarantee of attractively affordable supply through existing market players. Any action in fulfillment of such a guarantee would, of course, depend on the State being in full compliance with all international safeguards requirements, as determined and verified by the IAEA

128 Customer Perspectives The Sub-Group on Customer Perspectives brought together views from within the WNA membership as to how existing customers perceive the security of current supply arrangements, and considered how these might be strengthened. The Sub-Group noted from the outset that existing world market arrangements offer a very high standard of security of supply in all aspects of the nuclear fuel industry. Indeed, in the history of the industry, there has never been a disruption of supply that has led to a loss of electricity generation. Several instances of major discontinuities in recent years have all been resolved with conventional market mechanisms. The effectiveness of market mechanisms is enhanced by the common practice of utilities in following strategies that incorporate inventory, diversity of supply and contractual flexibilities. These strategies would be exercisable in the event of supply disruptions. The current IAEA and Euratom safeguards regimes are effective and deserve a higher public profile. It is essential to nuclear commerce that customers be in full compliance with these safeguards regimes, and a more clear-cut penalty system for non-compliance should be agreed internationally at inter-governmental level. Any approach to strengthening security of supply should be consistent with the continued effective operation of the competitive world market. Moreover, any arrangements for emergency or backup or guarantee supply arrangements should be used only as a last resort if existing market arrangements have failed, and not as a substitute for market supplies. Similarly, there should be no price discrimination against supplies from the normal market, and hence no price subsidies for the emergency or backup or guarantee supply arrangements. The triggering of emergency or backup or guarantee supply arrangements should occur only in the event of a political disruption of the normal market for a reason other than a non-proliferation issue. Such triggering should not result from a technical or economic disruption. Experience has shown that any technical or economic disruption can be dealt with by normal operation of the existing world market, and this should continue to hold true. As a final backup, the availability of former weapons HEU held as a stockpile would be helpful, as this would not remove material from the normal supply process. To be seen as adding significantly to security of supply, any such stockpile material would, of course, need to be controlled by a widely accepted international body, presumably the IAEA

129 Front-end Views To supplement existing market mechanisms in enrichment services, a reinforced guarantee of supply for enrichment services should be established through a joint commitment by existing uranium enrichment companies ( enrichers ) supported by the IAEA and national governments. This proposed supply assurance concept would be a guarantee-in-depth analogous to defencein-depth in reactor safety. It would consist of three layers of guarantees: Level I: Basic supply security provided by the existing world market Level II: Collective guarantees by enrichers supported by governmental and IAEA commitments Level III: Government stocks of enriched uranium product (EUP) The initial level of guarantee, from the existing world enrichment market (Level I), is based on the strong multi-year performance record of the international SWU market. The second level of guarantee (Level II) would be invoked in the event of a disruption of normal commercial supplies for bilateral political reasons between an enricher and a customer State. Level III Government EUP Stocks would be used as a last resort in the unlikely event that enrichers could not meet their backup supply commitments as embodied in Level II. FIGURE 1: Multi-Layered and Multi-Lateral Guarantee of Supply (see Appendix 3) This multi-level guarantee mechanism would operate in case of a contract suspension for political reasons. Upon notification by the concerned enricher or customer, the IAEA would determine the legitimacy of the customer s claim in light of pre-defined criteria pertaining to its compliance with safeguards requirements and the events leading to the contract suspension. The Agency would thereupon notify the other (remaining) enrichers to implement their obligations. Under the Level II backup supply arrangements, the other enrichers would at this point be committed to supply. To ensure that no single enricher is unfairly burdened with the responsibility of providing backup supply, the other enrichers would supply the contracted enrichment in equal shares under terms previously specified between the IAEA and the enrichers. (A standard backup supply clause would be included in commercial contracts between enrichers and customers eligible for such backup.)

130 Designing a similar mechanism for fuel fabrication would be more complex. Because fuel design is specific to each reactor design, an effective mechansim would require stockpiling of different fuel types/designs. The cost of such a mechanism could thus be substantial. It should be noted, however, that uranium fuel fabrication per se does not present a proliferation risk. Back-end Views Current declared recycling strategies do not, in the short term, necessitate new reprocessing facilities for fuel from light water reactors. Thus, existing reprocessing/recycling capacities are sufficient to meet foreseeable demand. Any State that does not produce an annual used fuel discharge sufficient to justify its own national reprocessing/recycling facility should be able to obtain adequate guarantees of supply through existing market players. In future, however, a situation might arise in which a significant number of States, anticipating a large expansion in their use of nuclear power, choose a recycling strategy to ensure the sustainable longterm management of their resources. This could lead to a call for increased capacities in existing facilities or new builds. In light of the robust nuclear energy initiatives now under way in many countries, concepts of international reprocessing/recycling centres are worth pursuing and deserve further, more detailed review. Effectively implemented, probably on a regional basis, such a concept could enhance guaranteed access to recycling services for countries wishing to close their fuel cycle. To limit the spread of such technologies worldwide, countries already possessing these technologies should be encouraged to offer their services to meet such demand. The goal should be to achieve a situation in which countries without back-end fuel cycle facilities have a clear-cut option of having their spent fuel reprocessed and MOX fuel manufactured, at affordable prices, at national or multinational back-end facilities located in countries with expertise and a high level of industrial development in this area. Establishing such arrangements would require the negotiation of intergovernmental agreements

131 Conclusions The current world market provides a considerable degree of security of supply, and has never to date failed to ensure continued operation of nuclear energy generation worldwide. Starting from this premise, the industry recognizes that there are ways to strengthen security of supply through the provision of explicit guarantees that would be implemented by the IAEA under provisions established by multilateral agreement. The nuclear industry recognizes and accepts the responsibility to work with governments and the IAEA to achieve the aim of increased security of supply on the foundation of a well-established and successfully functioning world market. APPENDICES: 1. Working Group Membership and Terms of Reference 2. Views of the Customer Perspectives Sub-group 3. The Concept of Security of Enrichment Supply 4. Back-End Multilateral Nuclear Approaches: The Industry s Non-Proliferation Viewpoint May

132 Annex 9: Concept for a Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel (France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States of America, GOV/INF/2006/10, June 2006) International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors GOV/INF/2006/10 Date: 1 June 2006 Restricted Distribution Original: English For official use only Communication dated 31 May 2006 received from the Permanent Missions of France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America The Secretariat has received a communication dated 31 May 2006 addressed to the Director General and the Chairman of the Board of Governors from the Permanent Missions of France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, forwarding a Concept for a Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel. This communication and, as requested by the signatories, the document attached thereto, are herewith circulated

133 Concept for a Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel By providing reliable access to reactors and fuel at competitive market prices, we remove the incentive or justification for countries to develop indigenous fuel cycle capabilities. In doing so, we could go a long way towards addressing current concerns about the dissemination of sensitive fuel cycle technologies. The key feature of such an arrangement is not simply availability, but reliability. For this assurance of supply mechanism to be credible, it must be based on apolitical, objective non-proliferation criteria. Under the IAEA Statute, the Agency is authorized to serve as the guarantor of two fuel cycle related services: the supply of fissile material for fuel, and the reprocessing of spent fuel. The IAEA could therefore act as the facilitator and guarantor of a virtual or actual fuel bank, as a supplier of last resort. Dr. ElBaradei, November 7, 2005, address to the Carnegie Conference The possible misuse of sensitive fuel cycle technologies is a serious challenge to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Assurances of reliable supply of nuclear fuel services are an important element of the solution to this problem. Specifically, a reliable supply mechanism, backed up by reserves of enriched uranium, would support expansion of nuclear energy, taking due account of the needs of developing States, while obviating need for investment in expensive and sensitive nuclear fuel cycle infrastructure and fostering international cooperation in promoting safe and reliable peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with NPT Article IV while minimizing proliferation risks. This subject has been studied intensively for more than three decades. Most recently, in February 2005, the Director General s Expert Group on Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle provided its assessment of a wide range of potential elements of a fuel supply assurance regime. An important conclusion of the Expert Group, as well as earlier studies, is that the existing commercial market for nuclear fuel is functioning well. Operators of civil nuclear power reactors can choose among multiple suppliers in a competitive market. The objective is not to solve an existing supply problem, but to establish a mechanism to address supply problems that might arise in the future, so there would be no need to hedge with large financial investment in indigenous enrichment and reprocessing capabilities

134 Such a backup (or last resort safety net) mechanism would be established in a manner that would not disrupt the existing commercial market. The report of the Expert Group makes clear that cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy constitutes one of the founding pillars of the IAEA and is an essential element of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The report observes that the development of international cooperation on a voluntary basis could help promote the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy while providing cost benefits and minimizing potential risks. This paper focuses on assurances for reliable supply of enrichment services or enriched uranium. The same rationale could apply in due course to reprocessing services at the back end of the fuel cycle. Options in this field could be explored at a later stage. Background information Because the global nuclear fuel market is functioning well, particularly with respect to uranium enrichment, a receiving State can develop an initial assurance of supply of enrichment services or enriched uranium through long-term contracts with suppliers, bilateral cooperation agreements with supplier States, and provision of buffer stores of enriched uranium. Problems that might arise for commercial or technical reasons would generally be resolved commercially. The backup mechanism would be a last resort, to be invoked in the event of a problem that is not due to questions about nonproliferation obligations and cannot be resolved through normal commercial processes. A credible backup mechanism would provide an incentive for States building nuclear power reactors not to invest in the development of sensitive technologies or the construction and operation of related facilities. At this point, the mechanism is focused on enrichment activities. Assurances would be provided through a multi-tiered set of measures: 1. Establish basic assurances 1.1 Formally establish a standing multilateral mechanism at the IAEA. The mechanism would be adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors in accordance with the Agency s statute, and could be endorsed by the General Conference and

135 formally supported by States which are suppliers of enrichment services or enriched uranium. If commercial supply arrangements are interrupted for reasons other than nonproliferation obligations and cannot be restored through normal commercial processes, the mechanism could be triggered by the receiving State or the supplier State, by approaching the IAEA. Neither receiving State nor supplier State could invoke the mechanism for commercial or technical reasons, to avoid distorting the normal operation of the commercial market. The IAEA would determine whether the receiving State meets the conditions for use of the backup mechanism. A receiving State would be eligible provided it: has brought into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol, and has no exceptional safeguards implementation issues outstanding with the Agency, and has adhered to accepted international nuclear safety standards and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, and has chosen to obtain supplies on the international market and not to pursue sensitive fuel cycle activities. Such a backup mechanism could facilitate new arrangements with one or more new alternative suppliers, with the support of the IAEA if necessary. Commercial contractual information would not be released to the IAEA or third parties. 1.2 Involve supplier and recipient States. States hosting companies supplying enrichment services and enriched uranium would participate actively in the consultations conducted under the multilateral framework to help find a solution. In the implementation of this mechanism and consistent with their national legal and regulatory requirements, supplier States should endeavor to allow export from their territories of enriched uranium and commit, in principle, to avoid opposing such exports from other States. Receiving States would continue to obtain their enriched uranium supplies from the international market and not to pursue nationally sensitive fuel cycle activities, in order to take advantage of the backup mechanism. The supplier state interrupting a commercial supply arrangement and other supplier states should respect IAEA decisions on implementing the mechanism and

136 decisions made accordingly by other supplier states and their commercial suppliers. 1.3 Establish commercial backup arrangements. Supplier States would welcome and facilitate arrangements for commercial suppliers of enriched uranium to establish a mutual back-up system, with the support of the IAEA if necessary, whereby they would substitute for each other. Commercial suppliers would cooperate with the IAEA if and when the backup mechanism is triggered. In support of these assurances, commercial contracts could include a standard backup provision referring to the mechanism. 2. Establish reserves of enriched uranium. In addition, the mechanism could be supported by reserves of low enriched uranium. Such reserves could be drawn upon in case the above mechanism fails to find an alternative supplier in a timely manner. The United States has announced it will convert up to 17 tons of HEU excess to national security needs to LEU and hold it as a reserve to support fuel supply assurances. Others can be encouraged to create similar reserves. Reserves could be held nationally, or rights regarding their use could formally be transferred to the IAEA, if so desired by the State providing the reserve. There would be advantages to diversity in reserves. The size, location, control, and conditions for release and transfer, as well as replenishment of the reserves are issues for further discussion and development. 3. Other considerations. The Board of Governors could request the Secretariat to prepare costing models for future consideration. Conditions of access to the commercial market for enriched uranium will not be affected for Recipient States that do not participate in this mechanism. 4. Possible future steps The mechanism outlined above would provide a significant alternative to costly enrichment capabilities. Additional steps that raise more complex questions could be developed over time, including:

137 Spent fuel management options: Reliable access to existing reprocessing capabilities could be an alternative to national reprocessing capabilities. Multilateral approaches: The Director General s Expert Group report identifies a number of possibilities for multilateral cooperation in production of fresh fuel and management of spent fuel. International centers: The Russian Federation has proposed to implement, under IAEA control, a joint project on its territory involving establishment of an international center for the provision of uranium enrichment services based on one of its existing enrichment plants. Such a center would supplement the mechanism outlined above in providing assurance of supply of enrichment services and enriched uranium. New fuel cycle technologies: Fuel supply assurances could be an integral part of future fuel cycles based on advanced technology

138 Annex 10: IAEA Standby Arrangements System for the Assurance of Nuclear Fuel Supply (Japan, INFCIRC/683, September 2006) Information Circular INFCIRC/683 Date: 15 September 2006 General Distribution Original: English Communication received on 12 September 2006 from the Permanent Mission of Japan to the Agency concerning arrangements for the assurance of nuclear fuel supply Summary The Secretariat has received on 12 September 2006 a communication from the Permanent Mission of Japan attaching a document entitled Japan s Proposal: IAEA Standby Arrangements System for the Assurance of Nuclear Fuel Supply. As requested by the Permanent Mission, the text of the attachment is herewith reproduced for the information of Member States

139 INFCIRC/683 Attachment Page 1 Japan s Proposal: IAEA Standby Arrangements System for the Assurance of Nuclear Fuel Supply 1 September 1, Introduction Japan supports the objective put forward in the Concept for a Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel proposed by France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States in relation to international discussions on assured access to nuclear fuels. However, bearing in mind the concerns and questions expressed by the Board Members of the IAEA at the IAEA Board of Governors Meeting in June 2006, Japan feels it useful to make a proposal complementary to the above-mentioned six-nation proposal. In this consideration, we deem it proper; To take care of not only uranium enrichment service but also all important activities of the frontend of nuclear fuel cycle, namely, uranium supply, uranium storage, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication as market failure might occur at various junctures: To focus not only on remedial responses to market failure for uranium fuel supply, but also on the prevention of the occurrence of such failure by reporting to the IAEA up-to-date information about the market, that is, each State s capacity in various activities related to fuel supply to nuclear power generation, so as to improve the transparency of the market and to alert the degradation of its adequacy if it is recognized. 2. Proposal We propose to establish a system called as the IAEA Standby Arrangements System for the Assurance of Nuclear Fuel Supply under the auspices of the IAEA, which incorporates both an information system to contribute to the prevention of the occurrence of market failure and the backup feature for supply assurance proposed in the six-nation proposal. The working principles of the system are as follows; (1) Member States voluntarily notify the IAEA as the depository organization, of their intentions to participate in the system by registering their nuclear fuel supply capacity in terms of current stock and supply capacity in the following areas; uranium ore supply capacity uranium reserve supply capacity, including recovered uranium uranium conversion capacity uranium enrichment capacity fuel fabrication capacity. Any member State is eligible to participate in the system, provided that the IAEA Board of Governors finds no non-compliance of the IAEA safeguards agreement by that State. 1 To be circulated at the occasion of the 50 th IAEA General Conference Special Event, New Framework for the Utilization of Nuclear Energy: Assurance of Supply and Nonproliferation, September

140 INFCIRC/683 Attachment Page 2 (2) A participating State periodically (annually) notifies the level of availability of such capacity at the following three levels: Level 1: It has already started commercial activities and is providing products/services domestically, but not providing products/services to foreign countries on a commercial basis. Therefore although it has the willingness to cooperate the emergency request to supply, the quantity may be limited and considerable time might be required to start the supply. Level 2: It has already started exporting products/services to foreign countries on commercial basis. Therefore in case of receiving the emergency request to supply, it has the willingness to do so as soon as possible within the range of available capacities. Level 3: It has reserves that can be exported at a short-term notice. (3) The IAEA is expected to play the following roles: a) to conclude bilateral standby arrangements with respective participating States by receiving Letters Of Intent and to administer the overall system; b) to administer, as the depository, the data-base utilizing information periodically provided by participating States on their commitment areas as well as levels of availability and information routinely gathered by the Agency such as potential demands for the system, e.g. programs of future nuclear power generation in member States and the situation of the international uranium market. To prepare an annual report on the situation (adequacy) of world nuclear fuel supply market based on the data-base will be one of the ways to contribute to the improvement of the transparency of the market. c) to play an intermediary function should actual disruption of fuel supply occur in a State. A State is eligible for enjoying the function of the system if the State has satisfied an international nonproliferation norm, which the IAEA Board of Governors Meeting should adopt after careful consideration at the start of the system. This system is a virtual arrangement: as participating States are supposed to continue to possess and control nuclear fuel supply capacity, the IAEA does not need to actually possess or store them. 3. Discussion (1) The proposed system covers not only uranium enrichment service but also all important activities of the front-end of nuclear fuel cycle, namely, uranium supply, uranium storage, conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication, taking into consideration the concern of some countries that market failure might occur at various junctures. Furthermore the system is intended to prevent the occurrence of the market failure in the first place by asking the IAEA to gather data and information about each State s supply capacity, analyze them and report the market situation from the viewpoint of the susceptibility to the market failure. Therefore it can be said that these functions are complementary to the six-nation proposal. (2) Whereas the six-nation proposal is based upon a dichotomy between supplier States and recipient States, a country like Japan, which is producing enriched uranium for domestic uses but not exporting it currently, though planning to export it in the future, cannot be categorized under the dichotomy. As establishing a system for supply assurance is an expression of the will of the

141 INFCIRC/683 Attachment Page 3 international community to prevent the occurrence of isolation of a member state from the international nuclear fuel supply market, it is desirable to make it possible for as many States as practicable to participate in and contribute to the system on a voluntary basis based on their diverse state of the capacity and situation as proposed in this paper. (3) It is clear that the success of the proposed system will depend on the cooperation of the industries. Although it is known that the last thing the industries want to cooperate is something that would interfere in the market, it is hoped that the industries will find a win-win situation in the cooperation to the system we propose as the establishment of it should be useful for the sound expansion of the nuclear power production and nuclear fuel supply business, in particular. (4) The introduction of the proposed system will not pose any new international obligation to member States other than the international norm of nuclear nonproliferation to be used as the condition for eligibility. The norm, we expect, should be a universal one any members should observe. What we do expect by the introduction of the system is the effectiveness of such an arrangement in encouraging States to enjoy the benefit of economy in terms of fuel cost and the start-up costs as well as reliability provided by a diverse well-functioning market for uranium and fuel supply services and thus reduce the incentive to develop uncompetitive, small-scale enrichment and/or reprocessing capabilities within their national borders

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145 Annex 12: Enrichment Bonds (United Kingdom, September 2006; INFCIRC/707, June 2007) Information Circular INFCIRC/707 Date: 4 June 2007 General Distribution Original: English Communication dated 30 May 2007 from the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the IAEA concerning Enrichment Bonds - A Voluntary Scheme for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel 1. The Secretariat has received a letter dated 30 May 2007 from the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the IAEA attaching a UK Non-paper entitled Food for Thought: Enrichment Bonds A Voluntary Scheme for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel. 2. As requested in that letter, the letter and the attachment is now being circulated for the information of all Member States

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148 Annex 13: International Uranium Enrichment Centre at Angarsk (Russian Federation, January and May 2007; INFCIRC/708, June 2007) Information Circular INFCIRC/708 Date: 8 June 2007 General Distribution Original: Russian Communication received from the Resident Representative of the Russian Federation to the IAEA on the Establishment, Structure and Operation of the International Uranium Enrichment Centre 1. The Director General has received a communication dated 7 June 2007 from the Resident Representative of the Russian Federation, with an attachment entitled Establishment, Structure and Operation of the International Uranium Enrichment Centre. 2. As requested in that communication, the letter and its attachment are circulated for the information of Member States

149 Establishment, structure and operation of the International Uranium Enrichment Centre At the EurAsEC summit in St. Petersburg on 25 January 2006, the President of the Russian Federation, V.V. Putin, made a statement on the peaceful use of atomic energy, in which he noted the need for the establishment of a global nuclear power infrastructure, ensuring equal access to nuclear power for all interested parties and, at the same time, reliable compliance with the requirements of the non-proliferation regime. A key element of such an infrastructure should be the creation of a system of international centres providing nuclear fuel cycle services, including enrichment, under the control of the IAEA. The main assurance that the initiative should provide is that a country complying with its non-proliferation commitments must be sure that, whatever the turn of events, whatever changes take place in the international situation, it will receive the services guaranteed to it. To achieve this goal, a decision was taken to launch a pilot project to establish on the territory of the Russian Federation the International Uranium Enrichment Centre (IUEC) on the site of the Angarsk Electrolysis Chemical Complex (hereinafter the AECC). The main function of the IUEC is to provide IUEC participating organizations with guaranteed access to uranium enrichment capabilities. The Centre is oriented chiefly to States not developing uranium enrichment capabilities on their territory. In so doing, the Russian side will not transfer to IUEC participants the uranium enrichment technology or information that constitutes a State secret. The Government of the Russian Federation has taken the decision to include the AECC in the list of nuclear fuel cycle facilities to which IAEA safeguards may be applied, about which the IAEA was officially informed in a letter from the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the international organizations in Vienna. In the framework of a meeting held in Uralsk on 3 October 2006, the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, N.A. Nazarbaev, supported the Russian initiative to establish the IUEC on Russian territory and on 10 May 2007 the corresponding agreement was signed. The IUEC will be established as an open joint-stock company, which will ensure the IUEC s financial independence from the State budgets of the participatory countries to the agreement to establish the IUEC. Currently, a mechanism is being developed for Russia to set aside a specific quantity of enriched uranium product (EUP) as a deposit for a guaranteed stockpile at the IUEC in a quantity of up to 1-2 full reactor loads. The means for establishing such a stockpile was provided for in the agreement to establish the IUEC. Russia maintains national control over the material, in line with the Russian Federation s obligations in the non-proliferation field. In addition, a regulatory basis will be developed in the sphere of export control such that the shipment of material out of the country at the request of the Agency is guaranteed. To consider all issues that arise, the agreement provides for the establishment of a joint advisory committee, whose composition is determined by the executive bodies of the parties. It is presumed that the IAEA will also be represented in the joint advisory committee

150 A suitably expedient form of accession to the IUEC by interested organizations in third countries, based on individual intergovernmental agreements, is envisaged. The specific accession procedure is determined in the IUEC statute. The IUEC will be founded as a commercial organization, whose participants under Russian legislation are entitled to receive dividends from the results of its activity. This ensures that the Russian initiative has an additional advantage: an economic incentive for potential IUEC participants

151 Annex 14: Multilateralizing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (Germany, INFCIRC/704, May 2007) Information Circular INFCIRC/704 Date: 4 May 2007 General Distribution Original: English Communication received from the Resident Representative of Germany to the IAEA with regard to the German proposal on the Multilateralization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle 1. The Agency has received a communication dated 26 April 2007 from the Resident Representative of Germany, attaching the German proposal on the Multilateralization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle. 2. As requested in that communication, the proposal is herewith circulated for the information of Member States

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156 Annex 15: Multilateralisation of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (Austria, INFCIRC/706, May 2007) Information Circular INFCIRC/706 Date: 31 May 2007 General Distribution Original: English Communication received from the Federal Minister for European and International Affairs of Austria with regard to the Austrian proposal on the Multilateralization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle 1. The Agency has received a communication dated 10 May 2007 from the Federal Minister for European and International Affairs of the Republic of Austria, attaching a paper on the Multilateralization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle. 2. As requested in that communication, the paper is herewith circulated for the information of Member States

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159 Annex 16: European Union non-paper on the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (June 2007)

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