* FA. FA FA. (2013) FA. (separating equilibrium),. (pooling equilibrium)..,. (Free agency, FA). (Reserve clause) : 2015 9 16, : 2015 11 13, : 2015 12 7 *. ** Department of Economics, University of Texas (c.yang@utexas.edu) *** () (ghwang@sogang.ac.kr)
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abstract Free Agent(FA) system allows a professional player to make a salary contract with the other clubs as well as the incumbent one after the player has played in one club for a fixed periods. Sometimes compared with the salary FA players performs very poorly, which leads to a debate about FA busts. We extend the model of Yang and Wang(2013) to the one with incomplete information about the productivity of the player to explain the possibility of FA busts. FA busts do not arise in the separating equilibrium where the private information is fully revealed. The FA busts do occur in the pooling equilibrium We show that the separating equilibrium does not exist. We also show that under some conditions, in particular with strong compensation rule, the unique pooling equilibrium exists. Keywords: Compensation Rule, FA busts, FA system, Incomplete information, Signalling model