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사물관념 ( 사유속성의양태 ) 미지의속성미지의속성어떤관념을사유속성의연장속성 (E) 양태 ; Y의양태 N의양태양태, 즉사물 Pa라할때 Ea Yα Nβ Pa I(Pa))... I(Ea) I(Yα) I(Nβ) I(Pa)) I(I(Pa))... - 18 -

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관념대상 I{af( 인간신체의본성외부물체의본성 )} af( 신체의본성외부물체의본성 ) - 68 -

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Abstract The Parallelism of Spinoza and The Problem of Imaginative Knowledge Park Minjoo Department of Philosophy The graduate School Seoul National University Spinoza denies the causal interaction between the human mind and the human body. For Spinoza, the human mind and the human body are dual aspects of the same individual. This mind-body identity is called the parallelism, which relies on the proposition: The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things. (proposition7 of partⅡ of Ethics) In this proposition, the order and connection of ideas is the causal series of singular ideas within the attribute of thought and the order and connection of things contains the causal series of singular bodies within the attribute of extension. This proposition implies that there is a structural homology between two series, which yet appertain to two different attributes. Therefore, the parallelism implies not merely that the body X, for instance, corresponds only with the idea of body X which is causally parallel to body X, but also that X and the idea of X are even ontologically identical. - 116 -

This correspondence founded on the parallelism should be applicable to the imagination theory of Spinoza. For Spinoza, when we perceive external thing, the only object of our mind s idea is a bodily state or the affection of the body. However, this account for the external perception is questionable. How could our perception which is intent to external thing be the external perception, although our perception s only object is the affection of our body? This question is main problem to be solved in this paper. Regarding this question, objections to Spinoza s theory of imagination are raised as follows. A number of commentators (Barker, Taylor, etc.) assert that in Spinoza s theory of imagination, there are two distinct relations between the idea and object. One relation is the relation between the idea and the affection of our body. Another relation is the relation between the idea and the external thing. The commentators regard the former as ontological correspondence relation and the latter as epistemological representation relation. However, in the perspective of them, the ontological correspondence between the affection of body, which is a mere physiological state, and the idea of this affection is irrelevant to our external representation. They, therefore, regard Spinoza s theory of imagination as insufficient to elucidate the external perception which is one of important themes of normal epistemology. To answer to these commentators, I analyze Spinoza s argument which he draws from proposition 16 of part 2 of the Ethics to corollary of the proposition. From this analysis my main arguments about the imagination theory of Spinoza follow as. First, there are two causes of the affection of the body which is - 117 -

the only object of the idea of mind. Our body and the external body are two causes of the affection of body. The affection of body is ontologically distinct entity from two causes. Secondly, even in imagination related to external body, the only object of the idea in the human mind is the affection of the human body. That is to say the imagination concerned with external body has to be explained by correspondence between the object and the idea of the object which is causally parallel to the object. Lastly, the affection of the human body which is the only object of the idea is a complex which is comprised of the nature of the human body and the nature of the external body, which are two parts of this complex. The complexity of object, being the focus of my argument, improves our understanding of the imagination theory of Spinoza. Spinoza, while defining the imagination, asserts that the idea of the affection of body does not represent the external body itself, but rather represents the external body as existent to us. This definition means that the Spinoza s theory of imagination is not a mere explanation of representation related to the idea-external body relation. Rather, the Spinoza s theory of imagination is intended for explaining the context in which the idea-affection correspondence is regarded, by us, as the representation concerned with the external body. I think the complexity of object reflects this context. For example, we see the sun as about 200 feet away from us. This vision is illusory, because the object which the idea represents is just a complex as a whole, composed of the nature of the sun and that of our body, each of which, in its turn, is a part of the whole. Then, this optical illusion would be a result from the nature of our body s - 118 -

nature. In the last section of this paper, I attempt to refute the objections as follows. These objections essentially depend on the one assertion that the ontological correspondence between the affection of body which is a mere physiological state and the idea of this affection, is irrelevant to our external representation. However, if we pay attention to the context of Ethics, we could know that Spinoza does not think that the affection of the body cannot be reduced to mere physiological state. Decisively, on the contrary to the commentators, the complexity of object shows that in the imagination theory of Spinoza, the direct representational relation between the idea and the external world does not really exist, and thus what ideas really represent is affections of our body, which are not similar to the external world. Therefore, for Spinoza, the imagination, or sense perception, is mutilated knowledge. This fact implicates the intention of the imagination theory of Spinoza. Keywords: Spinoza, Parallelism, Imagination, Affection of body, Representation Student Number: 2011-20058 - 119 -