untitled

Transcription

1

2

3

4

5

6 OPENING CEREMONY SPEAKERS Dae-Kyu Yoon is Director of the Institute for Far Eastern Studies and Vice President of Kyungnam University, Seoul Campus. Over the past decades, he has taught law as a professor at Kyungnam University and overseen countless projects in various capacities for the institute. He has lectured at Harvard University and the University of Washington as a guest professor and served as a member of different advisory committees of various governmental agencies such as the Korean Board of Audit and Inspection, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Legislation, and the National Assembly. As a scholar, he has written numerous articles and several books in both Korean and English on the legal systems of the two Koreas, including Law and Political Authority in South Korea (Westview Press, 1990) a seminal work in the field; Law and Democracy in South Korea: Democratic Development Since 1987 (IFES, 2010); and Inconvenient Truth on North Korea (Hanul, 2013). He holds a B.A. from Seoul National University College of Law, and LL.M. and Ph.D. from the University of Washington s School of Law. Lars-André Richter is the Resident Representative of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom (FNF) in Korea. He studied humanities in Tübingen, Leipzig, Paris and in Berlin, where he earned his doctorate at Humboldt University. After working for the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) and the newspapers Welt online and Welt am Sonntag he joined FNF in He was press officer and deputy press secretary of the foundation before taking over its Seoul office in Hyungseok Kim is Vice Minister of Unification, ROK. Vice Minister Kim served as Secretary to the President for Unification at the Office of the President ( ). He was Senior Representative for Inter-Korean Dialogue at the Office of Inter-Korean Dialogue ( ), the Unification Ministry spokesperson ( ), and Director General for Intelligence and Analysis (2011).

7 PANELISTS William Newcomb is a visiting scholar at the U.S.-Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. In 2011 he was appointed by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to serve on the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009). He subsequently was reappointed to the DPRK sanctions panel for successive mandates, most recently in April 2014, and served as the expert on finance through June 2014, when he resigned. A former US government economist, Mr. Newcomb in 2008 retired from the Treasury Department where he was Senior Economic Advisor to the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis. During , Mr. Newcomb was Deputy Coordinator of the State Department s North Korea Working Group and alternate co-chair of the North Korean Policy Coordinating Committee. From 1984 to 2005, he served as the Senior Economist for Asia, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, and wrote extensively on developments in China, the DPRK and Vietnam for US policymakers. Dmitry Kiku is Member of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 1874 (2009), and a career diplomat within Russia s Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1997, having served in Germany and Azerbaijan. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he was directly involved in United Nations sanctions-related matters as Counsellor in the Department of International Organizations, covering issues related to the implementation of sanctions measures concerning the DPRK, Iran, Somalia and Eritrea. He was also involved in the coordination of inter-agency cooperation in this area, including assistance to Russian government agencies in implementing relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. He has a Ph.D. in political science from the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. From , Mr. Kiku was a fellow of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii and a fellow of the United Nations Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament in He is fluent in English, German and Russian.

8 Neil Watts hails from East London, South Africa. He joined the United Nations Panel of Experts monitoring implementation of sanctions against the Democratic People s Republic of Korea, in July 2013, and is responsible for maritime transportation aspects. On joining the Panel he was immediately called upon to investigate the interdiction of the DPRK vessel Chong Chon Gang in Panama for sanctions evasion. Formerly a Captain in the South African Navy, he specialized in surface warfare, serving nearly 20 years at sea onboard a frigate, support vessel and fast attack missile patrol boats; also serving as Commander of the Maritime Warfare School 1998 to He is a graduate of Stellenbosch University and the Executive National Security Programme. During a career spanning 33 years, he has had appointments in the Naval Inspectorate General; Naval Education and Training Directorate, and Joint Operations where he served on the National Maritime Security Advisory Committee, the Priority Committee for Maritime Security, and a member of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Counter-piracy Assessment Group in Beomchul Shin joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) as the Director-General for Policy Planning in Before joining MOFA, he was the Head of the North Korean Military Studies Research Division at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) in Prior to that, he worked very closely with the Minister of National Defense of Korea as the Senior Policy Advisor in 2009 and He also has served in many advisory positions both at the National Security Council at the Office of the President and the National Assembly Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee. He is currently a member of the Board of Directors at the Korean Society of International Law as well. Dr. Shin received his B.A. from Chungnam National University and did his graduate studies at Seoul National University, School of Law. He received his S.J.D. (Doctor of Judicial Science) from Georgetown University Law Center in Keyu Gong is an associate professor and deputy director, Center for Asian-Pacific Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS), China. Dr. Gong graduated from Department of International Politics, Renmin University of China, received her M.A. in International Relations at SIIS and Ph.D. in World Economics at Shanghai Academy of

9 Social Science. Dr. Gong s research fields include the North Korea nuclear issue, Sino-DPRK and Sino-ROK relationships, economic cooperation of East Asia, and the strategy of major powers in the region, inter alia. Dr. Gong was a deputy director of Shanghai Luwan Development and Reform Commission in 2008, and a visiting fellow at the Freeman Chair in China Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), USA in She was also a visiting fellow of International Scholar Exchange Fellowship (ISEF) program of Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies (KFAS) in Mijin Kang is a Team Chief and reporter at Daily NK. As a reporter, Ms. Kang covers the ground reality in North Korea. She also lectures at universities and speaks at academic conferences and seminars on the subject. She has contributed to television and radio broadcasts for Korean Broadcasting Service (KBS) and Unification Media Group. Yong Suk Lee is the SK Center Fellow at Stanford University s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and is affiliated with the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and the Korea Program. His research intersects the fields of international, urban, and labor economics. His recent works focus on globalization and sanctions, and entrepreneurship and innovation. His works on globalization and sanctions examine how economic sanctions affect the regional distribution of economic activity in North Korea using satellite night lights data, and North Korea's trade patterns. Other projects examine how China s competition affects firm dynamics in Korea, and how inequality in South Korea evolved after the Asian Financial Crisis. His works on entrepreneurship examine the impact of entrepreneurship on urban economic growth and government initiatives to spur entrepreneurship in East Asia. Dr. Lee's works have been published in economics journals such as Economic Development and Cultural Change, Journal of Health Economics, and Labour Economics. Previously, he was Assistant Professor of Economics at Williams College. He received his bachelor s degree from Seoul National University, M.A. in Public Policy from Duke University (USA), and Ph.D. in Economics from Brown University (USA).

10 Christopher Green is currently a Ph.D. candidate at Leiden University in the Netherlands, and co-editor of Sino-NK, a scholarly collective of young Sinologists and Koreanists dedicated to documenting and analyzing the borderlands dynamics, transnational ties, and history of Northeast Asia. He is also former Manager of International Affairs for Daily NK in Seoul. His research interests span the socio-political economy, ideology and mediascape of the two Koreas, and the multi-faceted impact of inter-korean division. His writings have been featured in Asia Times, Asia Sentinel, and NK News, as well as Daily NK. He has been interviewed by NPR, the BBC, Sky News, Al Jazeera, Reuters and CNN, among others. Eul-chul Lim is currently Professor and Director of the ICNK Center at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES), Kyungnam University. He serves as a member of the Policy Advisory Committee for the ROK Ministry of Unification and a guest editorialist in the Maeil Business News, Korea. His research focuses on North Korea s economy, inter-korean economic cooperation and development-related issues including capacity building. He is widely published in the above mentioned areas. His book publications include The New Paradigm for Economic Reform: Theory and Practice of Development for North Korea (in Korean, 2007) and Kaesong Industrial Complex: History, Pending Issues, and Outlook (in English, 2005), inter alia. Prior to joining IFES, Dr. Lim worked as a specialist in the Department of North Korea in the Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA). He was also a visiting scholar at Georgetown University. MODERATORS Joun-yung Sun is currently a Chair Professor of the Graduate School of Kyungnam University. Ambassador Sun was Korea s Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 2000 through 2003, and before that he served as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia from 1990 to 1993 and to Geneva from 1996 to Ambassador Sun was Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade from 1998 to 2000, and Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic Affairs from 1993 to He received his education from the College of Law,

11 Seoul National University, and the Graduate School of International Service of the American University in Washington D.C. He served as Vice-President and CEO of the United Nations Association of Korea from 2006 to 2013, and has been a senior scholar of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars since Su-Hoon Lee is Professor at Kyungnam University. He served as Director of the university s think-tank, the Institute of Far Eastern Studies, from 2009 to From 2005 to 2009 he served as Chairman of the Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative under the Roh Moo-hyun government. He has authored/edited several books and published numerous articles, essays, reports, and columns (in Korean and English) in various academic journals and news media. He received his M.A. in Sociology from the University of Alabama (USA), and Ph.D. in Sociology from Johns Hopkins University (USA).

12 CONTENTS SESSION Ⅰ Crafting International Sanctions and North Korea Panel 1 Sanctions in Practice 3 William Newcomb (Visiting Scholar, US-Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins SAIS) Panel 2 The UN Security Council Sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) 15 Dmitry Kiku (Member, UN Panel of Experts) Panel 3 North Korea and International Sanctions 35 Neil Watts (Member, UN Panel of Experts) Panel 4 Crafting International Sanctions and North Korea 53 Beomchul Shin (Director-General for Policy Planning, MOFA, ROK)

13 SESSION Ⅱ Perspectives on the Ground Reality of Sanctions on North Korea Panel 1 Sanctions on North Korea and China 73 Keyu Gong (Deputy Director, Center for Asia-Pacific Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies) Panel 2 North Korean Sanctions: Helpful or Harmful? 85 Mijin Kang (Team Chief & Reporter, Daily NK) Panel 3 International Isolation and Regional Inequality: Evidence from Sanctions on North Korea 95 Yong Suk Lee (The SK Center Fellow, Stanford University) Panel 4 North Korea Sanctions Conference: Talking Points 109 Christopher Green (PhD Candidate, Leiden University, NL; Co-editor, SinoNK) Panel 5 The Impact of Sanctions on the North Korean Economy 127 Eul-chul Lim (Professor, Kyungnam University)

14

15 Session 1 Crafting International Sanctions and North Korea

16

17 Panel 1 Sanctions in Practice William Newcomb Visiting Scholar, US Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins SAIS

18

19 국문초록 제재의실제 (Sanctions in Practice) 제재는 UN 안전보장이사회 ( 안보리 ) 가적대행위또는안보리가국제평화및안보를위협하는행위라판단한사안에대해서취할수있는가장강력한비동적 ( 非動的 ) 대응조치이다 (UN헌장제7장 41조 ). 안보리는개별회원국에채택된조치에대한이행의무를부여하며, 안보리가승인한제재의범위는대개포괄적이다. 이는헌장상구체적으로 철도, 항해, 항공운송수단의봉쇄및우편, 전신, 무선통신등통신수단의중단등경제관계의전부또는부분적중단과외교관계의단절 을말한다. 의도치않은결과 (unintended consequences), 즉취약계층에대한비용부과와정책목표의달성과관련한제재의비효과성으로인해제재조치에대한근본적인검토와재평가가이루어졌다. 이러한검토에는스위스의 인터라켄프로세스 (Interlaken Process), 독일의 본-베를린프로세스 (Bonn-Berline Process), 스웨덴의 스톡홀름프로세스 (Stockholm Process) 등이있다. 평판이낮아진 포괄적제재 (comprehensive sanctions) 에서표적 (targeted) 제재또는소위 스마트 (smart) 제재로이어졌다. 표적제재와포괄적제재의효과성을비교한연구에따르면전자는분명히의도치않은인도적비용을줄일수있으나강압을통한정책목표달성이라는측면에서는포괄적제재보다더효과적이라고볼수없다. 호주 핀란드 독일 그리스 스웨덴정부는美브라운대왓슨국제연구소및제재이행을지원하는민간단체인 Compliance & Capacity International 와공동으로 UN제재의효과성제고를위한고위급검토 (High-Level Review) 를실시한바있다. 지난 11월출판된해당검토의개요서는 UN회원국과피해공동체를보호하고, 제재와그이행을정교하게하려는관련 UN기구내구상과논의의기점이자예방이라는제재의유익한효과를제고하고표적제재를더욱정밀하게하기위한 150개의권고를담고있다. 주요한사항은다음과같다 : 1 제재에대한국가 기구 기업 개인의인식제고 2 개별회 5

20 원국의이행강화 3 UN체제및개별회원국의역량강화지원 4 제재대상의개인및단체의권리보호를위한적법절차개선 6 UN 산하제재위원회의의사결정구조 ( 만장일치제 ) 개선등이다. 고위급검토가다루지않았던주제는제재결의의초안작성및승인절차로, 이는안보리내외교협상을통해이루어진다. 제재결의에서주목할점은특정국가의위협적인행위에대해부과된제재조치는그외국가의유사한행위에대해취해지는결의에사용되는표현의근간이된다. 결의에서표현의미세한차이는중요하며, 이러한차이는상황에따라달라진다. 특히안보리내에서국가간이견으로최종안의작성이어려운경우, 안보리는모호한용어나 결정한다 (decides) 보다는 촉구한다 (calls upon) 이라는표현으로대신한다. 북한의핵무기및대량살상무기 (WMD) 의개발을중단하기위해취해진안보리결의는점자강화된조치를담고있다. 결의 1718 (2006) 은사치품수출금지및북한의개인및단체를제제의대상으로지정하였으나, 이들의구체적인명단은지정되지않았다. 그러나이후결의에서중러가반대한선박수색조치가포함되었고교역 금융제한조치는확대되었으며, 석탄 철광 금광 희토류등에대한수출금지조치도포함되었다. 향후중요한점은강화된조치에대한올바른이행과강력한집행이다. 제재이행수준이낮아지면, 제재위반위험이높아진다. 일례로쿠바의경우, 북한에무기및항공기를수출한바있고, 앙골라, 우간다, 이집트등의국가도제재를위반하였다. 또한제재대상으로지정된북한의단체가여러회원국내활동하기도하였다. UN 안보리와개별회원국은북한외여타회원국이핵개발을관리가가능한일이라여기는것을막기위해서라도, 굳은결의로대북제재를이행하여야한다. 6

21 7

22 8

23 9

24 10

25 11

26 12

27 13

28

29 Panel 2 The UN Security Council Sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) Dmitry Kiku Member, UN Panel of Experts

30

31 국문초록 The UN Security Council Sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) UN안전보장이사회결의안 2270 (2016) 2016년 3월 2일 UN안전보장이사회는지난 1월 6일과 2월 7일실시된북한의 4차핵실험및탄도미사일발사와관련해추가적인제재를부과하는결의안 2270 (2016) 을만장일치로채택하였다. 해당결의안은의무적인선박수색, 광물거래에대한부분별제재, 그리고그간의대북제재에서전례가없는강력한조항을포함하였다. UN안전보장이사회는또한결의안을통해불법활동에연루된개인 16명과조선로동당중앙위원회산하군수공업부및국가우주개발국등단체 12개를새로이제재목록에포함하였다. 이와동시에결의안은 한반도및동북아지역전반에서의평화와안정유지중요성을강조 하고중국 북한 일본 한국 러시아 미국이참여하는 6자회담의재개를촉구 하였다. UN안전보장이사회는 향후북한의행위를지속적으로검토하고, 북한의이행여부에따라서제재의강화 수정 중단 해제를준비하겠다는점을재확인 하였으며, 추가적인핵실험또는미사일발사시중대한조치를취할것이라는결의를표명한다 고밝혔다. 2016년전문가패널의최종보고서지난 2월 24일전문가패널 (Panel of Experts) 은 UN안전보장이사회에제출한 2016년최종보고서 (S/2016/157) 에서북한은 1차핵실험이후지난 10년간핵무기및미사일개발프로그램을포기할의사가없었다는점을강조하였다. 북한은오히려핵무기및미사일프로그램을확대하고, 자국의불법활동에대해서국제사회의묵인과정당성을확보하기위해노력한바있다. 전문가패널은또한북한이제재를효과적으로회피하였다는점과해외국적의회사에대리인을파견하여불법행위를은폐하였다는점도지적하였다. 이러한북한의불법활동은회원국의결의안이행이미비한가운데촉진 지속되었다. 결 17

32 의안이행이미비한원인으로는회원국의부족한정치적의지, 이행에부적합한국내법, 결의안에대한부족한이해및낮은우선순위부여등이지적된다. 이에따라전문가패널은불법활동및제재회피에연루된북한의개인및단체의추가적제재대상지정을권고하였다. 18

33 Abstract The UN Security Council Sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) UNSC resolution 2270 (2016) On 2 March 2016, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2270 (2016) to impose additional sanctions on the DPRK in response to its fourth nuclear test on January 6, and its ballistic missile launch on February 7. The resolution includes mandatory cargo inspections, sectoral sanctions on North Korean trade in natural resources, and other rigorous provisions unprecedented in the DPRK sanctions regime. Through resolution 2270 (2016), the Security Council further designated a total of 16 individuals and 12 entities for their prohibited activities, including the Munitions Industry Department of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea and the National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA). At the same time the Security Council reiterates the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia at large and calls for resumption of the Six-Party Talks involving China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States. The Security Council also affirms that it shall keep the DPRK s actions under continuous review and is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK s compliance and expresses its determination to take further significant measures in the event of a further DPRK nuclear test or launch. 19

34 Panel of Experts 2016 Final report In its 2016 Final Report (S/2016/157) submitted to the Security Council on 24 February the Panel of Experts emphasized that a decade since the DPRK conducted its first nuclear test, no indications have been found that the country intends to abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. To the contrary, the DPRK continued efforts to enhance the scope of its nuclear and missile program, and to seek international acceptance and legitimacy of these prohibited programs. The Panel s investigations have shown that the DPRK has been effective in evading sanctions. Designated entities conceal their illicit activities by embedding agents in foreign companies. All these activities are facilitated by the low level of implementation of Security Council resolutions by Member States. The Panel has consistently highlighted the problems of non-implementation of the resolutions, which allows prohibited activity to continue. The reasons are diverse, but include lack of political will, inadequate enabling legislation, lack of understanding of the resolutions and low prioritization. The Panel has recommended several designations in light of the involvement of individuals and entities in prohibited activities or sanctions evasion. 20

35 21

36 22

37 23

38 24

39 25

40 26

41 27

42 28

43 29

44 30

45 31

46 32

47 33

48 34

49 Panel 3 North Korea and International Sanctions Neil Watts Member, UN Panel of Experts

50

51 국문초록 북한과국제제재 UN안전보장이사회결의안 2270 (2016) 2016년 3월 2일 UN안전보장이사회는대북제재의범위를확대한결의안 2270을채택하였다. 해당결의안은지난 2006년 10월북한의 1차핵실험이후 4차인 2016년 1월 6일 수소탄 실험과 2016년 2월 7일탄도미사일발사에따른대응조치였다. 결의안채택이후, 북한의관영매체는김정은이 16년 4월 24일잠수발발사탄도미사일 (SLBM) 시험이후핵탄두폭발시험을명령하였다고보도한바, 북한은 UN결의안을거부하고불법활동을지속하겠다는의사를표출한것으로보인다. 참고로북한은 1998년이후핵실험을실시한유일한국가이다. UN안전보장이사회 15개국은북한의핵실험이관련 UN결의안을노골적으로무시 위반하는행위로, 핵무기의비확산에관한조약 (NPT) 에대한도전이자동북아및세계의평화와안정을위협하고있다고강력히비판하였다. 북한에관한결의안은 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) 등으로, 세부조항이추가되면서제재의범위와내용이확대 심화되었다. 현재북한은앞서언급된결의안중어떤것도인정하지않고있다. 결의안의제재와관련하여명심해야할점은이는 UN차원에서회원국이공동으로부과하는다자적제재로, 회원국이북한과의양자관계에서부과하는독자적제재와는차이가있다는점이다. 결의안 2270은북한산광물의공급 판매 인도등에대한부분별제재와북한국적의은행및자산에대한새로운금융제재조항을포함하면서, 제재의범위및목록을크게확대하였다. 결의안은또한회원국에게북한영토또는이를경유하는선박화물에대한검색뿐만아니라자국민또는자국거주인원이북한에선박 항공기대여및승무원을제공하지않도록하며, 항공유의판매및공급도중단할것을권고하였다. 이러한금지조항은제재회피활동에연루된북한의개인및단체에적용되는바, 결의안의부속서에는개인 16명 ( 자산동결및국외여행금지 ), 정부기관및은행포함단체 12개 ( 자산동결 ), 원양해운관리회사 (Ocean Maritime Management) 에등록된선박 31척 ( 현재 27척으로자산 37

52 동결조치대상 ), 사치품 4 종수출금지등이포함되었다. 이외에결의안 2270은북한주민에대한부정적인인도적결과또는경제활동및협력을포함한인도적활동에부정적인영향이없도록하기위하여예외조항 (carve-out provision) 을포함하였다. 이에따라 인도적 또는 생계목적 의무역은제재조치에서제외된다. 해당조항은무역활동이북한의핵무기 / 탄도미사일개발프로그램또는그외불법활동을위한재원창출에쓰이지않는경우에만적용된다. 해당결의안은북핵의평화롭고외교적인해결에대한 UN안전보장이사회의결의를재확인하고, 한반도비핵화를달성하기위한 6자회담의재개를촉구하며, 다자적인대화노력을환영하였다. UN안전보장이사회는북한의활동을지속감시하고북한의이행여부에따라제재조치를수정및해제할준비가되어있다는점도확인하였다. 제재위원회및전문가패널 UN헌장 7장 41조에따라운영되는 1718 위원회 (2006), 1874 전문가패널 (2009) 은제재이행의검토에서중요한역할을수행하는바, 위반행위에대한효과적인대응 북한개인및단체의제재대상지정 회원국의제재이행지원등을수행한다. 결의안 2270은전문가패널의권한을 2017년 4월 24일부로연장한바있다. 기존의결의안 1874에따라권한을위임받은전문가패널은제재이행의강 약점파악및보고 신뢰성및사실에근거한독자적인평가 분석수행및이를통한위반행위감시및조사 결과보고서제출 결의안불이행에대한조사결과및권고사항보고등을수행중이다. 38

53 Abstract North Korea and International Sanctions United Nations Security Council Resolution 2270 (2016) On March 2, 2016, the UN Security Council unanimously passed resolution 2270, which expands the scope of existing sanctions against the Democratic People s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The resolution was adopted in response to the DPRK s announcement of a hydrogen bomb test on 6 January ) followed by a ballistic missile launch on 7 February This was the DPRK s fourth nuclear test since the first in October Subsequent to the adoption of this resolution, DPRK official media announced that Kim Jong Un had ordered more nuclear explosion tests to test warheads 2) followed by a Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile launch on 24 April ), thereby demonstrating a renewed intent to continue its prohibited programs in defiance of the resolutions. The DPRK is the only State to have conducted nuclear tests since The 15-member UN Security Council condemned in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted in violation and flagrant disregard of the relevant resolutions, the DPRK s actions constituting a challenge to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to peace and stability in the region and beyond. Previous UN responses to nuclear tests included the adoption of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013). With each passing resolution, the scope and substance of the sanctions regime has both widened and deepened, entailing very specific provisions. It took almost seven weeks for the members of the Security Council to come to an agreement on the language in resolution 2270 (2016). The DPRK, however, does not recognize any of the above-stated resolutions. It is important not to confuse the impact of separate bilateral sanctions imposed by States or groups of States with those of the United Nations. 39

54 The resolution significantly broadens the scope and list of targeted areas, including sectoral provisions targeting supply, sell or transfer of the DPRK s resources and adds new financial provisions targeting DPRK banks and assets. Additionally, all States are now obligated to inspect cargo within or transiting through their territory destined for or originating from the DPRK. The Resolution says that States should prohibit their nationals and those in their territories from leasing or chartering their flagged vessels and aircraft to it, or providing crew services. The prohibition applies also to any designated individuals or entities assisting in the evasion of sanctions. All States should prevent the sale or supply of aviation fuel. The annexes list 16 designated individuals (asset freeze/travel ban); 12 designated entities including government agencies and banks (asset freeze); 31 vessels (now 27) controlled by designated firm Ocean Maritime Management (vessels subject to asset freeze); and 4 categories of luxury goods. Resolution 2270 also contains important carve-out provisions to ensure that the resolution does not have adverse humanitarian consequences for the DPRK civilian population or to negatively affect humanitarian activities (including economic activities and cooperation) that are not prohibited by the resolutions. These provisions include exemptions if trade is conducted for humanitarian or livelihood purposes. These exceptions only apply if they do not generate revenue for the DPRK s nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other prohibited activities. The resolution reaffirms the Security Council s commitment to a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the situation and calls for resumption of the Six-Party Talks to achieve denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, also welcoming multilateral efforts through dialogue. The Security Council affirms that it will keep the DPRK s actions under continuous review and is prepared to modify or lift the measures in line with the DPRK s compliance with the provisions. The Committee and Panel of Experts Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, - the

55 (2006) Committee and its 1874 (2009) Panel of Experts plays a critical role in this continuous review and is mandated by resolution 2270 to respond effectively to violations of the measures, to designate additional individuals and entities be subject to the measures, and to assist Member States in implementing the measures imposed on the DPRK. Resolution 2276 (2016), extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts to 24 April The Panel has an important mandate 4) in examining and reporting on the strengths and weaknesses of implementation, monitoring and investigating potential sanctions violations - utilizing credible, fact-based, independent assessments, analysis, and then submitting a report, containing its findings on incidents of non-compliance and providing recommendations, to the Committee. 1) The Power of a Hydrogen Bomb, Rodong Sinmun, 7 January ) Kim Jong Un Watches Ballistic Rocket Launch Drill of Strategic Force of KPA, Rodong Sinmun, 11 March ) Kim Jong Un Guides Underwater Test-fire of Strategic Submarine Ballistic Missile, Rodong Sinmun 25 April ) Resolution 1874 (2009), Paragraph

56 42

57 43

58 44

59 45

60 46

61 47

62 48

63 49

64 50

65 51

66

67 Panel 4 Crafting International Sanctions and North Korea Beomchul Shin Director General for Policy Planning, MOFA, ROK

68 본글은 5월 30일기준으로작성된글로서각국의안보리결의이행보고서내용을담지못했다. 또한개인자격으로작성하였기에외교부의정책방향과관계가없음을밝혀둔다.

69 국문초록 국제사회의대북제재전략 스스로핵보유국임을주장하고, 노동당규약에도핵무력과경제건설병진론을포함시킨김정은정권의행태는역설적으로국제사회가북한핵문제, 나아가북한문제를더욱직시하도록만든원인을제공했다. 유엔안보리결의 2270호와한국을중심으로미, 일, 호, EU 등다양한국가들의대북독자제재가연이어발표되고, 그이행이강화되고있다. 현재국제사회의대북제재는 강력하고실효적인유엔안보리제재, 주요국의강력한독자제재, 국제사회의대북압박강화라는 3가지차원에서전개되고있다. 특히유엔안보리결의 2270호의이행과관련해서는유엔회원국들의안보리결의 90일이행보고서제출등대북제재의성과를보다분명하게알수있는단계가도래하게될것인데, 동계기에대북제재의효과를정확히판단하게될것으로보인다. 북한의비핵화를이루어내기위해서는주요국및국제사회와의공조를더욱견고히함으로써전방위압박을이루어내야한다. 이를위해한국정부는엄중한상황인식아래국제사회와긴밀히공조대응하고있다. 이번만큼은과거와다른단호한대응으로도발의악순환을끊어야한다는강력한의지를바탕으로북한이도발에대한응분의대가를치르도록함으로써핵개발로는생존할수없음을스스로깨닫고, 전략적셈법을바꿀수밖에없는환경을만들기위해노력하고있다. 이를통해김정은정권이비핵화에동의하지않을경우 정권안정에필요한경제여건악화, 핵개발에막대한비용및부품확보제한, 국제사회로부터의철저한고립으로인해 체제유지 가어려울수있다는두려움을갖도록만들어야한다. 그렇지않을경우왜곡된국가관과안보관을보유한김정은정권이스스로핵개발을포기할이유가없고, 한반도와동북아의평화와안정이위협받는상황이지속될것이다. 북한핵문제해결을위한노력은단기전이아닌장기전이될것이다. 따라서보다거시적인관점에서국제사회가공감할수있는원칙을만들고그원칙을지켜나가는노력이필요하다. 동시에과거의경험을바탕으로북한의협상전술을분석하고, 그에맞는대응을해나가야할것이다. 따라서당분간은대화논의보다는제재논의에집중해야하며, 55

70 대북제재의충실한이행이이루어질수있도록노력해야한다. 또한궁지에몰린북한이도발을통해국면을전환하거나, 위장평화공세를통해당장의위기를모면하려는태도를보일가능성이있음에유의해야한다. 철저한대비태세유지를통해북한의도발의지를억제해야하며, 관련국과의소통을확대하며북한의진정성있는태도가담보되어야만의미있는성과를도출할수있다는공감대를형성해나가야할것이다. 56

71 Abstract Crafting International Sanctions and North Korea At the recent held Workers Party Congress, Kim Jong-un amended the s Party charter to include his doctrine of simultaneously pursuing nuclear and economic development and declared North Korea a nuclear-armed state once again. Ironically, such actions have made the international community realize the gravity of the North Korean nuclear issue and all North Korean issues. As a result, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2270, and a number of countries including South Korea, the US, Japan, Australia, and EU countries announced that they will impose bilateral sanctions against North Korea and are working to strengthen the implementation of such sanctions. The international community is currently carrying out sanctions against the North on the following three fronts: firm and effective UNSC resolutions, strict bilateral sanctions by major countries, and intensified pressure from the international community. Regarding the implementation of Resolution 2270, we will be able to accurately assess the effectiveness of the sanctions against the North when UN members submit their 90-day report. To denuclearize North Korea, major countries and the international community as a whole need to work together more closely and pressure the North on all fronts. Recognizing the seriousness of the current situation, the Korean government is taking response measures in close coordination with the international community. The government is determined to end the vicious cycle of North Korea provocations and is responding more sternly than ever before. By making the North pay the due price for its provocations, we can make the Kim Jong-un regime realize that it cannot survive if it continues to develop nuclear weapons and create an environment that would leave the regime with no other choice but to change its strategic calculus. We need to make the Kim Jong-un regime see that maintaining power will become difficult if it doesn t 57

72 agree to denuclearization as North Korea will face deteriorating economic conditions; bear the high cost of nuclear development and face difficulties in obtaining nuclear material; and become completely isolated from the international community. If we fail to do so, Kim Jong Un, who has misguided views on vision and security, will never give up developing nuclear weapons with his own free will, and the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia will remain under threat. Addressing the North Korean nuclear issue will be a long race. Therefore, we need to think from a long-term perspective and establish principles that all members of the international community can agree to and follow. At the same time, we need to analyze North Korea s negotiation strategies by going over the past negotiations and develop effective counter strategies. For the time being, we should focus our efforts on imposing sanctions, rather than on resuming talks, and make sure that the sanctions against the North are implemented faithfully. We should also keep in mind the possibility that North Korea may try to turn the tables by making provocations or stage a false peace offensive to maneuver itself out of immediate crisis. We need to deter North Korea s provocations by maintaining our military readiness and strengthen communication among related countries so as to build consensus that meaningful outcomes can only be when North Korea shows sincerity. 58

73 Ⅰ. 서언 국제사회의비확산체제를비웃는듯한북한의핵개발은 4차핵실험을고비로중대한도전을맞고있다. 그어느때보다강력한국제사회의대북제재에직면하고있기때문이다. 스스로핵보유국임을주장하고, 노동당규약에도핵무력과경제건설병진론을포함시킨김정은정권의행태는역설적으로국제사회가북한핵문제, 나아가북한문제를더욱직시하도록만든원인을제공했다. 유엔안보리결의 2270호와한국을중심으로미, 일, EU 등다양한국가들의대북독자제재가연이어발표되고, 그이행이강화되고있다. 한국정부는북한의 4차핵실험과연이은장거리미사일발사도발이동북아안보지형에중대한변화를가져올수있다는엄중한상황인식아래국제사회와긴밀히공조대응하고있다. 이번만큼은과거와다른단호한대응으로도발의악순환을끊어야한다는강력한의지를바탕으로북한이도발에대한응분의대가를치르도록함으로써핵개발로는생존할수없음을스스로깨닫고, 전략적셈법을바꿀수밖에없는환경을만들기위해노력하고있다. 이러한노력을바탕으로국제사회의대북제재는 강력하고실효적인유엔안보리제재, 주요국의강력한독자제재, 국제사회의대북압박강화라는 3가지차원에서전개되고있다. 따라서이글에서는이세가지측면에서의대북제재내용을살펴보고향후그전략과전망을논의하기로한다. 그리고과거김정일정권과달리핵보유의지를공개적으로천명하고있는김정은정권을상대하며비핵화를이끌어내기위해서는국제사회의강력한제재를통해비핵화에동의하지않을경우 정권안정에필요한경제여건악화, 핵개발에막대한비용및부품확보제한, 국제사회로부터의철저한고립으로인해 체제유지 가어려울수있다는두려움을갖도록만들어야한다. 그렇지않을경우왜곡된국가관과안보관을보유한김정은정권이스스로핵개발을포기할이유가없고, 한반도와동북아의평화와안정이위협받는상황이지속될것이다. 59

74 Ⅱ. 유엔안보리결의 2270 북한의불법적인핵개발에국제사회는유엔안보리결의를중심으로대북제재를추진하고있다. 국제사회의평화와안정에관한 1차적인책임을지고있는유엔안보리의결의 (resolution) 는유엔회원국을구속하는정치적법적의미를지니기에북한핵개발의불법성과국제사회의북한비핵화의지를보여주는가장확실한근거가되고있다. 북한의핵개발과장거리미사일발사실험계기로이미안보리결의 1695, 1718, 1874, 2087, 2094호등이결의되고이행중에있었는데, 지난 1월북한의 4차핵실험이후약두달만에이루어진유엔안보리결의 2270호는유엔의비군사적조치로는가장강력하고실효적인제재결의로평가되고있다. 안보리결의 2270호는두달간의협상이말해주는것과같이, 유엔안보리상임이사국, 특히미국과중국등의협의를거쳐만들어졌다. 동결의는 무기거래, 확산네트워크, 해운 항공운송, 수출통제, 대외교역, 금융거래등모든분야에걸쳐대폭강화된제재조치들을총망라하여유엔안보리의비군사적조치로는유례없이강력하고실효적인제재결의로평가되고있다. 안보리결의 2270은과거의결의에비해몇가지중요한의미를지니는데, 첫째, WMD 차원을넘어서북한체제에까지영향을줄수있는포괄적인제재다. 과거대북제재결의가북한의핵 미사일 (WMD) 개발억제에초점을맞추었던데반해, 금번안보리결의는 WMD 차원을넘어서북한관련제반측면에심대한영향을줄수있는제재조치들이포괄적으로망라하고있다. 북한은행의해외지점폐쇄, 광물분야 (sectoral ban) 수출금지및핵심국가기관 ( 정찰총국, 39호실, 기계공업부, 국가우주개발국등 ) 제재대상지정등은북한정권의자금줄차단및대외활동억제가가능하며, 무엇보다도대북안보리제재결의중전문에최초로북한인권문제거론함으로써김정은정권을압박하고있다. 둘째, 제재범위및강도양측면에서대폭강화된제재결의다. 다음 < 표 1> 에서보는바와같이 북한의광물분야 ( 석탄, 철, 철광등 ) 수출금지, 대북항공유판매 공급금지 ( 민생등인도적예외인정 ), 불법행위연루북한외교관추방등강력하고실효적인신규제재요소다수포함하고있다. 또한기존안보리결의상 촉구 60

75 사항이었던내용을의무화하고, WMD 관련성등단서를대폭삭제 ( 북한행발모 든화물검색의무화, 북한은행의해외활동전면금지등 ) 하는등기존제재요소도 대폭강화하였다. < 표 1> 안보리결의 2270 호분야별주요내용 1) 전문 우주협력 북한주민이처한심각한고난 (grave hardship) 에깊은우려표명 북한주민들의수요가미충족된상태에서북한이무기거래로얻는소득이 WMD 개발에전용되는것을우려 북한의탄도미사일발사와관련된어떤형태의기술협력도금지 ( 위성발사또는우주발사체포함 ) 북한의소형무기 (small arms) 수입금지 무기거래 수리, 서비스제공등을목적으로한무기운송도결의위반임을명확화 북군대의작전수행능력발전등에직접기여가능한모든품목에대해금수적용 ( 예외 : 인도주의 민생목적 / 제재위건별결정시 ) * 재래식무기 catch-all 군사 / 준군사조직및경찰훈련을위한훈련관 자문관초청등금지 제재대상지정 단체 12 개및개인 16 명추가 자산동결대상이되는경제자산에선박등유 무형모든자산이포함됨을명확화 제재회피나위반에연루된북한외교관 정부대표추방 ( 예외 : UN 관련목적, 사법절차상필요성 인도주의목적 / 제재위건별결정시 ) 확산네트워크 북한의불법행위연루외국인추방의무화 ( 예외 : 사법절차상필요성 인도주의목적 / 제재위건별결정시 ) 제재개인 단체의사무소폐쇄및북한인파견대표추방 북한의위장회사활용에주목, 제재위가관련개인 단체를규명하여적절할경우제재대상으로지정토록지시 북한의민감핵활동 미사일개발에특화된교육 훈련프로그램제공방지 해운항공운송 자국영토내북한행발화물검색의무화 북한에대한항공기 선박대여및승무원제공금지 ( 예외 : 민생목적 불법행위기여방지노력을제재위사전통보시 ) 1) 외교부, 국제사회의대북제재진행상황및전망, 통일준비위원회시민자문단간담회자료 ( 참조 ) 61

76 북한내선박등록, 북한기사용및북한선박에대한소유 대여 운용 선급 인증 보험제공금지 ( 예외 : 민생목적 불법행위기여방지노력을제재위사전통보시 ) 금지품목적재의심항공기의회원국이착륙및영공통과불허 ( 예외 : 비상착륙 ) 제재대상자소유 운영및불법활동연루의심선박의회원국입항금지 OMM 선박 (31 척 ) 이자산동결대상임을확인 생화학 수출통제 대외교역 북한의모든화학 생물무기및관련프로그램포기결정 / 생물무기금지협약 (BWC) 이행및화학무기금지협약 (CWC) 가입 이행촉구 핵 탄도미사일개발에사용가능한물품목록을제재위에서작성 / 생물 화학무기수출통제리스트업데이트지시 WMD 관련 catch-all 수출통제의무화 / catch-all 물품에대한압류 처분의무화 WMD 개발연관시석탄, 철, 철광수출금지 ( 예외 : 1 민생목적으로 WMD 와무관한경우, 2 외국산석탄의나진항을통한수출은 WMD 와무관하며제재위사전통보시 ) / 금, 바나듐광, 티타늄광, 희토류는전면수출금지 대북항공유 ( 로켓연료포함 ) 판매 공급금지 ( 예외 : 인도주의적목적, 제재위사전허가시, 북한민항기의해외급유 ) WMD 관련북한정부 노동당소속단체에대한자산동결, 자산 재원이전금지 ( 예외 : 외교공관, 인도적활동 ) 북한은행의회원국내지점 사무소신규개설등활동금지, 90 일내기존지점폐쇄및거래활동종료 금융 회원국금융기관의북한내사무소 은행계좌개설등활동금지, 90 일내 WMD 관련기존사무소 계좌폐쇄 ( 예외 : 인도지원, 외교관계에관한비엔나협약, 유엔활동등 ) WMD 활동에기여할수있는대북무역에대한모든공적 사적금융지원금지 금 (gold) 의거래에대해서도기존금융거래금지의무적용명확화 FATF 권고 7 이행촉구사치품 예시목록에 7개품목추가 ( 총 12개품목으로확대 ) 셋째, 중국의안보리결의채택동참확보다. 북한의 4 차핵실험직후고민의흔적 을보이던중국을한 미, 한 중, 미 일과의긴밀한공조를통해설득함으로써, 중국의 결의채택동참을확보해냈다. 특히한 중간의전략적소통은진일보하여, 한 중 62

77 정상통화 (2.5) 및 외교장관유엔방문계기한 미 일 중 러 5국대사협의 (2.10), 한 중외교장관회담 (2.11) 등을통해중국의협조견인해내는데큰역할을했다. 특히, 시진핑주석이안보리결의의전면적이행방침을밝힌 3월 31일한중정상회담으로부터 5일후, 中상무부가북한으로부터의광물수입금지, 대북항공유수출금지공고를발표한것은중국도실질적조치를취하고있음을보여주는단적인예라고할수있다. 그결과 2016년 4월북중간무역량은전년동기대비약 20% 내외로감소한모습을보이고있다. 물론북중간밀무역에대한통제및기타우회로에대한중국당국의통제수준을포함하여종합적인판단이필요한영역이나, 북한의핵개발을원치않는중국의확고한인식을고려할때 ( 중국의또다른관심사인 ) 북한의불안정상황을야기하지않는다고판단하는수준에서대북제재의강도를유지할것으로보인다. 따라서향후중국의강도높은대북제재가지속될것인가의문제는중국이판단하는북한체제의안정성과제재와의관계와밀접한관련을지닐것이다. 또한날로격화되고있는미중관계추이도영향을미칠것이다. 최근리수용북한노동당부위원장의방중 (5.31.) 과시진핑주석면담 (6.1.) 은중국의대북제재관련전망을더욱어렵게만들고있기에향후보다면밀한관찰이필요하다. Ⅲ. 주요국의독자적대북제재 핵보유를대외적으로천명하고있는북한을비핵화트랙으로되돌리기위해서는북한김정은정권이보다아파할수있는제재가필요하며, 이를위해서는유엔안보리제재에더해국제사회의자발적인독자제재가시너지를이루어야한다. 이를위해서한국은물론이고미국, 일본, EU 등주요국 / 기구들은독자제재를발표하고이를추진하고있다. 먼저한국정부는 2월 10일개성공단전면중단발표에이어, 3.8 국무조정실주관관계부처합동 ( 외교부, 통일부, 해수부, 기재부, 금융정보분석원 ) 독자적대북제재조치를발표하였다. 먼저금융재제측면에서는北과관련한금융제재대상대폭확대하여총 40명개인과 30명단체에대한제재를하고있다. 특히금융제재는북한의 WMD 개발및주요외화수입원차단에기여할것으로전망된다. 둘째, 해운통제측면에서는 63

78 北기항제3국선박의 180일이내국내입항금지와제3국선박남북항로운항금지 ( 지속 ), 제3국편의치적北선박입항금지를발표하였으며, 외국선박의北기항기피촉진, 北의심물자수송등에장애물형성, 편의치적제도를제재회피수단으로악용할가능성을차단할것으로기대된다. 셋째, 수출입통제와관련해서는북한물품제3 국우회위장반입차단, 남북간물자반출입통제강화, 대북특화별도감시대상품목목록 (watch-list) 작성을포함하며, 안보리결의의무 (WMD에이용가능한어떠한품목에대해서도이전 공급 판매를금지 ) 의충실한이행에기여할것으로본다. 넷째, 외화자금원차단과관련하여北영리시설이용자제를계도하여 12개국 130여개식당운영, 연간수익 1,000만불내외추정되는북한의관련외화수입의상당부분을차단할수있도록했다. 세계비확산질서를이끌고있는미국역시독자적인대북제재를강화하고있다. 북한의 4차핵실험과인공위성발사를가장한장거리미사일발사실험이후미의회는 2월 12일최초로북한제재만을단일목적으로하는강력하고포괄적인대북제재법안 (North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016) 통과시켰으며, 오바마대통령서명으로즉시발효 (2.18) 한바있다. 동법안은이례적으로신속히통과된바, 한 미 일동맹국들이단합된대북경고메시지를강력하게전달해야한다는미의회내분위기반영한것으로평가된다. 동대북제재조치의핵심내용은다음의 < 표 2> 와같다. < 표 2> 미행정부독자적대북제재조치 제재분야개인 단체북한자체예외신규대상 내용 재무부가아래사유로지정 미국내자산동결 / 美입국금지 o ( sectoral ban ) 북한운수 광업 에너지 금융분야에종사 (operate in) o ( 광물거래 ) 북한정권을이롭게할수있는 (benefit) 북한과의금속 흑연 석탄거래 ( 판매, 구매 ) o ( 인권침해 ) 북한정권의인권침해에관여 o ( 해외노동자 ) 북한노동자의해외송출에관여 o ( 사이버안보저해 ) 북한정권의사이버안보저해행위에관여 o ( 검열 ) 북한정권의검열행위에관여 北정부 노동당미국내자산동결 / 미국의대북수출 투자금지美연방정부및유엔 ( 산하기구 ) 의공식활동 (official business) 단체 (15 개 ) 선박 (11 개 ) 제재대상지정발표 64

79 또한오바마행정부는안보리결의채택직후북한국적개인 (12) 단체 (6) 를제재대상으로추가지정 (3.2) 한데이어, 안보리결의및美대북제재법 (H.R. 757) 이행을위한신규행정명령발표 (3.16) 하였고, 북한을자금세탁우려국으로지정 (6.1.) 함으로써북한금융기관과북한과거래하는제3국금융기관의미국금융시스템접근을차단하였는데, 이러한일련의조치는대북제재관련관심의초점이미정부의이행에집중된상황에서, 제재이행에대한강력한의지를재확인하였고나아가국제사회의대북압박을견인했다. 일본역시북한의 4차핵실험과장거리미사일발사실험이후인 2월 10일강력한대북제재조치계획발표하였다. 일본정부는대북정책과관련하여 대화와압력, 행동대행동 방침을밝혀왔는데동원칙에입각하여 인적교류규제확대 ( 방북경험이있는핵 미사일관련기술자의일본재입국금지등 ), 대북송금원칙적금지 ( 인도적목적의 10만엔이하제외 ), 자산동결대상확대 ( 단체1, 개인10), 북한선박의일본입항전면금지 ( 인도적목적포함 ), 북한기항제3국선박일본입항금지日 北간전세항공편운항불허등의내용을발표하였다. EU의경우미국이나일본에비해추가적인독자제재조치를도출하는데시간이소요되었으나 5월 27일북한과의교역을대폭차단하는강력한대북제재조치를발표하였다. EU는북한항공기와선박의 EU 영공통과, 기착, 기항을금지하고금융및투자제한조치를한층강화하였다. 특히북한이소유, 운영하거나북한승무원이탑승한항공기나선박이 28개 EU 회원국공항이나항구에아예들어오지못하도록함으로써북한에대한상징적제재를넘어실질적타격을줄수있을것으로보인다. Ⅳ. 국제사회의대북압박강화 안보리결의채택 90일이지난현시점에서다양한분야에서성과가가시화되고있는데, 이러한국제사회의단합된대응은북한의대외활동망을위축시키고있다. 예를들면대북금융제재와관련하여기존북한과거래관계가있던해외금융기관들이북한과의금융거래에소극적인자세를보임에따라북한이국제금융거래에큰장애 65

80 를받고있는상황이다. 북한의국제금융시스템이용이어려워짐에따라인편으로다량의현금을운반하다가적발되는스리랑카사례가그대표적인사례이다. 2) 그밖에도북한과일정한협력을해오던국가들이북한과의협력관계중단을결정하였는데, 최근박근혜대통령국빈방문시우간다가북한과의안보, 군사, 경찰협력중단을발표한것이대표적인사례이다. 이처럼안보리결의 2270호채택이후 北해운차단 北금융거래제한 불법활동연루북한인사추방, 北연수생초청취소등다양한분야에서안보리결의가이행되고있다. 특히, 해운분야가주목되는데, 중 러를포함한유엔회원국들이 OMM 선박 (27척) 에대한입항을불허함에따라선박들이북한으로되돌아가는사례들이나오고있으며, 현재제재대상인북한선박의대부분은북-북간이동이외에는해외로운항하지못하고모두북측항구에발이묶인것으로파악되고있다. 특히, OMM 선박중모든제3국편의치적선박 (6척) 에대한등록취소가자발적으로이루어진것은고무적이라고할수있다. 국제사회의지속적인북한인권문제제기역시북한김정은정권에게부담요인이될것이다. 북한의열악한인권상황과유엔인권사무소의활동, 이에더해북한핵문제로인한관심증대는북한인권에대한국제사회의보다적극적인행보를낳고있다. 물론북한인권문제는핵개발과직접관련이없는사안으로볼수도있으나, 북한핵개발은김정은정권의총체적인문제로인한것이라는점과, 나아가김정은정권에중요한압박수단이될수있다는점에서핵과무관하게또는유관하게국제사회의대북압박수단으로관심을기울여야한다. 현재국제사회의다양한대북압박으로인해북한김정은정권은실제생활에서적지않은타격을받는것은물론이고정권운용에있어심리적으로위축될수전망이다. 북한권력층이즐기는고가의사치품이나레저활동은물론이고김정은위원장이즐겨한다는치즈와같은품목이제한될때, 대북제재의효과는북한권력층의일상생활에서쉽게목격될수있을것이다. 이러한제재의효과는절대주의체제를유지하고있는북한의권력구조를고려할때, 어떤정책적함의를지닐지모른다. 2) 스리랑카에서는미화 16 만 8 천불소지북한인 2 명이공항에서적발되어적발외화를몰수당하였다. 66

81 Ⅴ. 대북제재의추진전략 핵보유의지를더욱노골화하고있는북한을비핵화트랙으로다시불러들이기위해서는우방국들과긴밀한공조하에대북제재의철저한이행을위한전방위적외교노력지속전개해나가야할것이다. 지난 20여년의지난한노력과다양한시도는역설적으로북한핵문제에대한환상적인해법은없다는것을말해주고있다. 오로지국제사회의일치된비핵화의지를바탕으로북한의진정성있는비핵화의지를확보하고이를기반으로의미있는협상을진행하는것이유일한해법이다. 이를위해서는북한김정은정권은생존에위협이될수있다는두려움을느끼게만들어야한다. 김정은정권이이러한부담을갖지않을경우비핵화의길로돌아올이유가없다. 따라서미, 일, 중, 러등핵심관련국은물론이고기타국제사회와의철저한공조를통해북한김정은정권에게핵개발을지속할경우 정권의경제운용의어려움, 비용부과 (cost imposing) 를통한핵무기개발비용의증대, 국제사회에서의고립 (isolation) 및평판 (reputation) 악화로정권의존립이어려워질수있다는점을깨닫게만들어야한다. 북한핵문제해결을위한노력은단기전이아닌장기전이될것이다. 따라서보다거시적인관점에서국제사회가공감할수있는원칙을만들고그원칙을지켜나가는노력이필요하다. 동시에과거의경험을바탕으로북한의협상전술을분석하고, 그에맞는대응을해나가야할것이다. 이를위해먼저당분간은대화논의보다는제재논의에집중해야한다. 강도높은제재를통해김정은정권에게잘못된행동에대한징벌이따른다는점을분명히각인시켜야한다. 과거북한과의핵협상은북한의도발, 보상, 재도발이라는악순환을반복해왔다. 따라서이번만큼은북한에게교훈을안겨주어야한다. 그렇지않으면김정은정권은 5차나 6차핵실험을감행해도과거와똑같은패턴이지속될것이라는착각을하게될것이다. 따라서적어도당분간은어떠한경우에도북한에대해제재를유지해야할것이다. 다행히북한이변화할수밖에없도록대북제재를지속강화해나가야한다는국제사회의의지는그어느때보다확고한상황이다. 이러한모멘텀을지속해나가기위해주요국들과소통을강화해야할것이다. 둘째, 지금까지대북제재의충실한이행이이루어질수있도록노력해야한다. 전통 67

82 적으로유엔안보리제재는결의도출보다이행이더어렵다. 제재이행과정에서국가의경제적손실을감수해야만하기때문이다. 이로인해안보리제재역시시간이경과되면그이행의지가퇴색하는경우가종종발생하기마련이다. 따라서중국이나러시아와같이북한과밀접한경제적연계성을지닌국가들과긴밀한소통을통해충실한이행을지속확보해야한다. 6월에는중국을포함한유엔회원국들의안보리결의 90일이행보고서제출등대북제재의성과를보다분명하게알수있는단계가도래할것인바, 동계기에대북제재의효과를정확히판단하고주요국및국제사회와의공조를더욱견고히함으로써북한에대한비핵화압박을강화해야할것이다. 또한전문가패널을포함한유엔제재위원회, 대북제재유사입장국들과함께지속적인아웃리치를전개해나가야할것이다. 셋째, 북한의위장전술에속아서는안된다. 궁지에몰린북한이도발을통해국면을전환하거나, 위장평화공세를통해당장의위기를모면하려는태도를보일가능성이있음에유의해야한다. 철저한대비태세유지를통해북한의도발의지를억제해야하며, 관련국과의소통을확대하며북한의진정성있는태도가담보되어야만의미있는성과를도출할수있다는공감대를형성해나가야할것이다. 소통확대차원에서는양자적차원을넘어다층적이고복합적인노력을병행하여그효과를극대화해야한다. 그간추진해온한 미 일, 한 미 중등의소다자협의는물론이고중 러를포함한 5자대화를이끌어냄으로써, 국제사회가북한의핵보유나병진노선을수용하지않을것임을김정은정권에게분명히각인시켜야할것이다. Ⅵ. 결언 외교적협상을통한북한의비핵화는가능할것인가? 만일가능하다면이를위한어떠한기회요인도활용해야할것이며, 만일불가능하다면그다음단계에대한구상이필요할것이다. 필자는결국비핵화선택은김정은정권의몫이겠지만, 철저한주변환경조성을통해다른선택지가없음을알게한다면아직도대화를통한북한비핵화의여지는존재한다고본다. 물론동아시아에불고있는신냉전의바람이북한 68

83 핵문제해결에커다란도전요인으로등장하고있지만, 아직도희망적인기회요인이우리와함께하고있다는희망적사고를전하며글을맺고자한다. 북한핵문제해법의가장큰기회요인은북한김정은정권의특성이다. 전제주의적독재체제와절대권력자인김정은위원장의존재는한반도평화와안정의도전요인이기도하지만, 김정은이마음을바꾸면비핵화도가능할수있기에기회요인이될수도있다. 예를들면민주주의국가에서의자유선거와같이민주적절차에의해전체국민의총의로서핵보유가결정되었고, 최고지도자도이러한국민적의사를함부로꺾을수없는체제라면김정은의마음이바뀌었다고해서비핵화가가능하다고말하기어렵겠지만, 북한의경우는정반대이기때문에가능하다고할수있다. 김정은의마음에정권유지여부에대한공포심을불러일으킬정도의압박과제재가이루어진다면핵문제를해결될수있을것이다. 또다른기회요인은북한핵문제의국제적성격이다. 핵문제가남북관계의문제이면국제사회의관심이나관여는적고, 한국혼자북한을감당해야하는바그해결이더욱어려울것이다. 그러나북핵문제는그심각성과파급효과가단지한반도에국한되지않고, 동북아와국제사회에커다란함의를지니는만큼, 국제사회와의긴밀한협력이라는기회요인이존재한다. 북한핵문제에대한한국의관여는한국의국익측면도있지만, 국제비확산체제유지에대한기여측면도존재한다. 오히려비확산체제를더욱강력히유지해야만하는 P5 국가들의더욱적극적인노력을요구할수있다는점을잘활용하면이들국가들의보다적극적인노력을유도해낼수있을것이다. 북한핵문제는그복잡한과거가말해주듯쉽게해결될성격의일이아니다. 그러나남북간체제경쟁의최종승자는한국이다. 북한은현재의병진정책을고수한다해도핵보유국지위를얻지못하는영원한 불법적핵개발 수준에머물것이다. 북한비핵화에보다큰믿음과자신감을갖고일관된정책을전개한다면그성과는생각보다멀지않은시기에나타날수있다. 끝. 69

84

85 Session 2 Perspectives on the Ground Reality of Sanctions on North Korea

86

87 Panel 1 Sanctions on North Korea and China Keyu Gong Deputy Director, Center for Asia Pacific Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies

88

89 국문초록 대북제재와중국 대북제재와관련하여중국이오래전부터유념해온사실은제재는매우신중히행사되어야하며, 국제사회는실질적인조치를취하기전에제재의효과와그로인해발생할수있는결과를고려해야하고, 상호맞대응하려는자세는적대행위만고조시켜지역의평화와안정을해치게될것이란점이다. 중국은또한북한이자신의행위에대해책임을지고, 국제사회는공동으로북한의그릇된행위에대해대응해야한다고생각한다. 중국은엄격히 UN제재를이행할것이나, 제재의효과에대해서는냉정하게평가해야한다고생각한다. 하루아침에문제해결을기대할수없다. 제재는그자체가궁극적인목표가아니며, 제재만으로핵문제를해결할수없기때문이다. 북한은전략적환경이완화되지않는한스스로핵능력을포기하지않을것이기때문에국제사회는적대행위를줄이고안보딜레마를포괄적으로해결하는데공동의노력을경주해야한다. 북한의 4차핵실험이후통일전개시나리오는그가능성이더욱높아졌는바, 가속화된통일프로세스는다음의시나리오중하나로전개될수도있다 : (1) 제재강화로인한북한정권붕괴 (2) 내부쿠데타발생 (3) 김정은건강문제및이로인한사태발생. 중국은북한에핵위협은안전보다는위협을증대시키고, 핵억제력보유는북한과주민들의장기적인이익이될수없다는점을설득하고있다. 이와동시에미국에게는차단과봉쇄가문제의해답이될수없으며, 이는오히려북한의안보불안과불평등의식을심어주어핵보유에더욱매달리게될것이란점을전달하고있다. 75

90 Abstract Sanctions on North Korea and China China has long realized that sanctions must be very carefully exercised, that the international society must fully consider the effect and possible consequences before taking actual measures, and that a tit-for-tat mentality will do nothing but escalate hostilities and impair the peace and stability of the region. On the one hand, China believes that North Korea must be responsible for its behavior and that the international society should take concerted actions against its ill conduct. China will strictly implement the UN resolution. On the other hand, China advocates a sober assessment of the effect of sanctions. One cannot expect the NK nuclear issue to be resolved overnight. It is clear that sanctions per se are not the ultimate goal and that sanctions alone can never resolve the nuclear issue. It seems impossible for North Korea to abandon nuclear capacities while its strategic environment is not substantially ameliorated, the international society needs to join their efforts to further reduce hostilities and tackle the security dilemma on the whole. After the North s fourth nuclear test, unification scenario is even more likely that the accelerated unification process will take place in any of the other three scenarios. (1) Regime collapse as the result of escalatory sanctions (2) Coup d état (3) Concerns over Kim Jong-un s health China is trying to persuade NK that nuclear blackmailing brings it more danger than safety and that possessing nuclear deterrence is not in the long-term interest of NK as 76

91 well as its people. At the meantime, China also convince the US that blockade and containment do not solve problems either, as they can only push NK closer to seeking nuclear weapons out of a feeling of insecurity and unfairness. 77

92 Sanction on North Korea and China The multiple tests and satellite launches have established the North Korea as a nuclear-capable state, if not a nuclear-armed one. As things stand now, the nuclear crisis on the Peninsular will become increasingly complicated, politicized, and highly sensitive. The crisis in not only over North Korea s nuclear ambition, but, more importantly, over the Kim regime s survival and longevity, and East Asian regional security. It has involved an increasingly number of regional and global players such as major powers like China and the United States, international organizations like the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency. A political settlement that could serve the interests of all stakeholders seems increasingly unlikely, if not possible, especially when multilateral mechanisms are almost moribund. In the absence of a robust regional security architecture based on mutual trust and effective communication and dialogue, this protracted crisis is also becoming increasingly delicate, threatening to trigger military conflict as a result of strategic miscalculation. The North Korean nuclear test is just like a test for China s new leaders. It said that Kim Jong-un s political power is still the same old do what I want style made china s new leaders angry. More and more people thought that North Korea s fourth nuclear test is a good moment for China to re- evaluate our longstanding alliance with the Kim dynasty. Many people think China and North Korea are blood brothers or brothers and comrades, so that China maintained its position during the course of UN Resolution only to leave the back door open for not strictly implementing the sanctions in the future. That is not right. 78

93 China has long realized that sanctions must be very carefully exercised, that the international society must fully consider the effect and possible consequences before taking actual measures, and that a tit-for-tat mentality will do nothing but escalate hostilities and impair the peace and stability of the region. Therefore, on the one hand, China demonstrates its position in a very firm and express way, China believes that North Korea must be responsible for its behavior and that the international society should take concerted actions against its ill conduct. Speaker of China s MFA also reiterated that China will strictly implement the UN resolution. On the other hand, however, China advocates a sober assessment of the effect of sanctions. One cannot expect the NK nuclear issue to be resolved overnight, as it is deeply rooted in the history. It is clear that sanctions per se are not the ultimate goal and that sanctions alone can never resolve the nuclear issue. Now that it seems impossible for North Korea to abandon nuclear capacities while its strategic environment is not substantially ameliorated, the international society needs to join their efforts to further reduce hostilities and tackle the security dilemma on the whole. After the test, there are many doubts from the international society about China s policy including: does China still hold unique influence over NK? Will China adopt more hardline policies due to NK s repeated provocations? Will China strictly implement the UN resolution it has endorsed? Will China reconsider its NK policy on the whole? Some Chinese experts said that China should abandon North Korea. They believed that North Korea will not reform and open up to the world; North Korea is pulling away from china; a relationship between North Korea and China based on ideology is dangerous; North Korea s value as a geopolitical ally is outdated; 79

94 once North Korea has nuclear weapons, it cannot be ruled out that the capricious Kim regime will engage in nuclear blackmail against China. Even more they said that the best way of giving up on Pyongyang is to take the initiative to facilitate North Korea s unification with South Korea. After the North s fourth nuclear test, one unification scenario is that an increasingly provocative and assertive Kim Jong-un, equipped with nuclear missiles, seeks greater international space and national independence, and nuclear- blackmails the South into unification on the North s terms. But as things stand now, especially judging by the internal and external factors after the fourth test, it is even more likely that the accelerated unification process will take place in any of the other three scenarios. (1) Regime collapse as the result of escalatory sanctions After the fourth nuclear test, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2270 in a 15-0 vote in favor of stepping up economic sanctions against the North, imposing mandatory inspections of all cargo going into and coming out of the North, ban on financial transactions, restrictions on the export of North Korean strategic assets and supple of aviation fuel to the North. Unilateral sanctions by some Western countries and China s call for full implementation of the UN resolution will certainly inflict huge impacts on the North economy---potentially to the point that Kim Jong-un s regime collapses under extreme circumstances. The collective defection to South Korea by 13 North Koreans working in a China s restaurant in April 2016 might be an early signs of a cracking regime. Economic sanctions have blocked the North path toward reform and opening. Even if Pyongyang emulates Beijing, the end result may still be regime collapse 80

95 instead of economic takeoff. As some put it, Fearing that once opening itself to the outside word, swarming in may not be only foreign products, investment, and technologies, but also an avalanche of information which may invalidate what it has propagated, Pyongyang thinks it s best to reject reform and impose tight control over its people. (2) Coup d état In a little over four years of leadership from his father s sudden death to his coronation at the seventh Party Congress, Kim Jong-un had launched a sweeping reshuffle in which more than 70 senior officials were either executed, demoted, or sidelined---most notable among them was his uncle-in-law Jang Song-thaek. His quick and reckless move has left many outside observers concerned with the increasing possibility of internal rebellion. A Pyongyang watcher observes that In such a highly-tense environment of power struggle, some elites within the regime, fearing for their own security, might initiate a preemptive rebellion, coup d état, or assassination against Kim Jong-un, to preserve themselves, which might subsequently lead to great upheaval and collapse. Other think it possible that the erratic nature of and a deep sense of insecurity within the authoritarian regime usually create fear among its followers. Cruel and bloody power struggles are pervasive, increasing the possibility of coup d état. (3) Concerns over Kim Jong-un s health Kim s health has always been a subject of much speculation. Over the past four years, Kim Jong-un has put on much weight. Standing at 171 cm, he weighs 81