학술회의 총서 98-03

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5 The Korean Political Situation and Its Implication on Unification Dr. Sung Chul Yang Vice Chair, Unification & Foreign Affairs Committee A. Overall Assessment 1. The birth pains of a nine-month pregnancy could be incredible. Imagine how severe the birth pains could be for the opposition on becoming the ruling party after a 50-year struggle? As the previous ruling establishment has governed the country for the past 50years with few exceptions and interruptions, resistance and reluctance to President Kim Dae-Jung s government still runs deep. At best, the old-guard establishment forces play spectator roles; at worst, they obstruct the new government every step of the way. 2. For the first time political stability in South Korean governance is rock solid Recently, economists and pundits abroad have tended to lump the Korean financial and economic crisis with that of the Southeast Asian countries, e.g. Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines. The conspicuous difference between South Korea and Southeast Asia is the fact that South Korea has achieved considerable democratic governance while the Southeast Asian countries are still struggling with politically unstable situations. Above all, while Southeast Asia has potential or actual ethnic, communal and linguistic cleavages, South Korea enjoys social homogeneity, cultural unity and a strong sense of national cohesiveness. 3. South Korea economy is still fundamentally sound, safe and secure in overcoming the current IMF bailout crisis as well as political obstacles stemming from opposition gridlock. B. Political Significance of the June 4 th Election If President Kim s electoral victory last December was the first popular mandate for him and the National Congress for New Politics (NCNP) to rescue the Nation on

As the previous ruling establishment has governed the country for the past 50years with few exceptions and interruptions, resistance and reluctance to President Kim Dae-Jung s government still runs

6 the brink of collapse from the IMF financial crisis, landslide victory of the June 4 th local election is the second popular mandate for President Kim to speed up financial and chaebol restructuring, as well as overall government and political reforms. C. On North Korea and Unification President Kim s North Korean policy is fundamentally different from that of the previous administration on four accounts: First, he will never use or abuse North Korean and unification issues for domestic political use. Second, he will separate politics from non-political issues and concerns such as humanitarian aide, private business transactions, cultural and sports exchanges and mutual contacts among separated families. Third, as far as North and South Korean governments interactions and transactions are concerned, the principle of reciprocity shall be strictly observed and enforced. There will be no unilateral concessions. Forth, the format for contact and dialogue will be three tiered: 1) North-south bilateral talks be used for tackling the problem such as food or fertilizer aid to North Korea or resolving separated families issues which are inherently mutual concerns by revitalizing the 1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchange and Cooperation between the South and North ; 2) the four-party talks will deal with the peace and security issues in the Korean peninsula; and 3) the six-party talks, which could include Russia and Japan in addition to China and the USA may deal with political stability and security issues in Northeast Asia. In lieu of my own personal concluding remarks, twelve recommendations for maintaining peace and security in the Korean peninsula proposed by an independent task force sponsored the Council on Foreign Relations are appropriate and worth noting here: maintenance of combined US and ROK deterrence and readiness; acknowledgment that like South Korea, the United States seeks the gradual transformation and not the destruction or absorption of the North;

On North Korea and Unification President Kim s North Korean policy is fundamentally different from that of the previous administration on four accounts: First, he will never use or abuse North Korean

7 provision of humanitarian food assistance to the North in response to immediate needs, with a clear signal that longer term assistance will depend on Pyongyang s readiness to make structural economic changes, allow adequate monitoring, and address other humanitarian concerns; a South Korea lead in negotiations with the North, based on closely coordinated US and ROK approaches to Pyongyang; a series of initial steps, including easing of US sanctions, to promote market principles and to put pressure on North Korea to change its policies; a Subsequent package deal of larger reciprocal measures that might induce the North to improve relations with the South and reduce the military threat; a readiness to withhold any expanded assistance to the North (beyond those areas already stipulated in existing agreements or appropriate for immediate humanitarian reasons) if Pyongyang rejects the opportunity for reconciliation and threat reduction; a coordinated approach with Japan, and improved consultation with China and Russia in policy toward North Korea; sustained high-level attention to the Korea problem within the administration; adherence to the Agreed Framework and support for KEDO; continued support for South Korea in the current financial crisis, including US funding for the IMF quota increases; an articulation of long-term US objectives beyond the unification of the Peninsula.

series of initial steps, including easing of US sanctions, to promote market principles and to put pressure on North Korea to change its policies; a Subsequent package deal of larger reciprocal

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