Embassy of the Pyongyang, 24.XII.1956 People s Republic of Poland in Pyongyang [trans. note: tilted stamp] Secret [trans. note: tilted stamp] N o t e

Size: px

Start display at page:

Download "Embassy of the Pyongyang, 24.XII.1956 People s Republic of Poland in Pyongyang [trans. note: tilted stamp] Secret [trans. note: tilted stamp] N o t e"

건형 기
7 years ago
Views:

1 Digital Archive International History Declassified digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org December 24, 1956 Notes from a Conversation between the 1st Secretary of the PRL Embassy in the DPRK and Comrade Samsonov, 1st Secretary of the Embassy of the USSR on 20.XII.1956 Citation: Notes from a Conversation between the 1st Secretary of the PRL Embassy in the DPRK and Comrade Samsonov, 1st Secretary of the Embassy of the USSR on 20.XII.1956, December 24, 1956, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Polish Foreign Ministry Archive. Obtained for NKIDP by Jakub Poprocki and translated for NKIDP by Maya Latynski. Summary: The document features a conversation between Brzezinski Henryk and comrade Samsonov. To the questions of the 1st Secretary of the PRL Embassy in the DPRK, Samsonov states his opinion on the following topics: the group from the August plenum, different groups in the leadership of the DPRK, exchange of party cards, changes in economic policies, the standard of living of the population, agricultural production, Korean unification, and the role of the intelligentsia in the DPRK. Credits: This document was made possible with support from the ROK Ministry of Unification. Original Language: Polish Contents: English Translation Korean Translation

2 Embassy of the Pyongyang, 24.XII.1956 People s Republic of Poland in Pyongyang [trans. note: tilted stamp] Secret [trans. note: tilted stamp] N o t e From a conversation with comrade Samsonov, 1 st Secretary of the Embassy of the USSR on 20.XII.1956 During a meeting with Comr. Samsonov at the Soviet Embassy, whose goal was to discuss a range of problems with the DPRK, the following issues were brought up: 1) Group from the August plenum. Four persons from this group, who went over to China during the time that the 8 th Congress of the C[ommunist] P[arty] of China was taking place in Beijing, remain in China to this date. Because there were 2 members of the C[entral] C[ommittee] and one deputy member of the CC (Minister of Internal Trade, Chairm. of Tr. Uns. and dir. of dept. of construction materials in the Council of Ministers dep. memb. of the CC], and these people according to Comr. Samsonov reached the leadership of the KP of China. In Beijing, in agreement with the Soviet comrs. a decision was made. Then Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai came to Pyongyang for the September plenum of the Kor. Workers Party. Comr Samsonov believes that Mikoyan and Peng Dehuai conducted talks with the Korean leadership. As a result, the plenum adopted a new stance vis-à-vis the group from the August plenum, which is now not being called anti-party, but instead people who got lost and their mistakes should be treated as a dispute within the party and one must aim to remove mistakes by way of persuasion. Comr. Samsonov stated that the Korean comrs. consider the September plenum a watershed in the party s work in the sphere of methods of educating party members. On this occasion, Comr. Samsonov said that two deputies to the chairman of the Pyongyang committee of the Workers Party were also tied to the August group. Their party cards were given back to them at the September plenum and they were directed to work on a very low level of administrative work. (the August plenum removed them from the party). Later, answering the question of how the September plenum was conducted locally, Comr. Samsonov stated that it can be deduced from the information of leading persons at the Soviet Embassy, that after the September plenum of the CC of the Workers Party, no plenums of the P[rovincial] C[ommittee] or D[istrict] C[ommittee] took place, but meetings of party activists were conducted. The issue of such extreme change in the stance of the CC at the September plenum compared to the August plenum, when the whole group (without Choe Chang-ik [Choe Chang Ik] and Pak Chang-ok [Pak Chang Ok]) were thrown out of the party, was generally incomprehensible to the members of the party. Kim Il Sung explained that the change of stance toward this group proves the strength of the party and that ideological convincing is the best method of party work. On the question of the later fate of the August group, Comr. Samsonov stated that the former vicepremier Pak Chang-ok has become the director of one of the largest factories. Choe Chang-ik, former vice-premier, is still not working. In the opinion of Comr. Samsonov, the August group should be considered a healthy current in the

3 party. 2) Different groups in the leadership of the DPRK In response to the question whether one hears about the existence of Korean, Chinese and other groups in the DPRK leadership, Comr. Samsonov stated that indeed four groups existed: Soviet, Chinese, South Korean and North Korean. Kim Il Sung brought up the question of these groups at the plenum of the CC of the Workers Party in December of last year. Kim Il Sung asserted that after 10 years one should not call oneself a Soviet or a Chinese Korean, that we are all, said Kim Il Sung, members of one party and we stand on the foundation of one ideology regardless of whether we came from the USSR, from China or from the South. Koreans who have come from the USSR had Soviet citizenship. There were facts [sic.] that members of the government of the DPRK were Soviet citiz. At the beginning of the current year Soviet passports were taken away from all Koreans who had come from the USSR. Today all are Korean citizens. Kim Il Sung s speech, taking Soviet passports away caused the issue of the groups to calm down gradually. Today, affirms Comr. Samsonov, one barely hears about these groups. 3) Exchange of party cards. A campaign of exchanging party cards is continuing in the DPRK. Comr. Samsonov, following the Korean comrades, gave the reasons for the exchange of cards: a) Among the existing cards there are still many old ones from before There were many cards with the old name of the party, the Korean Workers Party of North Korea (beginning in 1948, the party s name was changed to the Korean Workers Party of Korea). Also, in the war period about 450,000 new party members were accepted, and they received substitute cards (certificates, 450,000 is nearly half of the number of members of the party, which in April 1956 had 1,154,000 members). b) There was bad paper in the old cards and many had been destroyed or were in poor condition. c) The exchange of cards was combined with an education campaign for the party members. d) On the occasion of the card exchange, the rehabilitation of wrongly punished comrades is being conducted. Comr. Samsonov informed that the arguments given in points c and d are treated by the Korean comrades as marginal in the campaign of exchange of party cards, and the facts given in points a and b were the deciding cause. 4) Changes in economic policies. Comr. Samsonov agreed with our opinion that the guidelines of the IIIrd Congress of the Kor. Workers Party in the sphere of the development of the national economy were calculated for the further development of the concept of making Korea a self-sufficient state in the industrial aspect, which, if one takes into account the financial possibilities, the destruction and the level of cadres is completely unrealistic. The August plenum of the CC of the Kor. Workers Party adopted a new course in economic policy calculated at abandoning the construction of huge and expensive factories, and it was decided to build those factories that, on the basis of Korea s natural wealth, will bring relatively quick economic results and at the same time allow for a quick raising of the standard of living. Comr. Samsonov can see the continuation of this program in the last December plenum of the CC.

4 5) The question of raising the standard of living of the population. In the opinion of the Soviet comrades, the DPRK government made substantial efforts in 1956 in the area of improvement of the living standards of the population. Comr. Samsonov relayed the following facts: a) Lowering of prices, which gave the nation 12,000,000,000 won in savings. The Soviet comrades converted this sum into rice at free-market prices, as a result of which the calculation showed that the population can purchase 120,000 tons of rice, at the latest lowering of prices, which represents a substantive position in the feeding of the population. b) After the III rd Congress of the Party, working people and students had their daily coupon ration of rice increased by 100 gr. c) In November an increase in wages was conducted, 35% on average. In 1957 the government of the DPRK intends to achieve much more in the sphere of raising the standard of living of the population than it did in ) Agricultural production. Last year 2,430,000 tons of grains were harvested, claims Comr. Samsonov. To feed the population of the DPRK the minimum is 3,000,000 tons. Imports did not fully cover the shortfall. From this stemmed difficulties in hiring new workers [CONNECTION?] (workers and their families obtain rice with coupons, non-workers do not receive coupons for rice). This year, according to Comr. Samsonov, the harvest is better than in Still in the opinion of Comr. Samsonov, they have not reached 3,000,000 tons. 7) On the question of Korea s unification. Comr. Samosonov agreed with us that the government of the DPRK in its resolutions and announcements treats the question of unifying Korea rather as propaganda. The existing program of unifying Korea proposed by the DPRK totally negates the government of Syngman Rhee The DPRK government does not want to talk with the government of Syngman Rhee. Of course, in these conditions it would be impossible in the near future to launch some talks with the current regime in the south. Also, as Comr. Samsonov stressed, one can observe a recent calming down of the tone (by the DPRK toward Syngman Rhee). While before official government documents labeled the southern government a clique or a dictatorship, in the latest DPRK protest over the reaching of an agreement between the USA and South Korea we read: American imperialists and Syngman Rhee. 8) About the role of the intelligentsia in the DPRK. In the opinion of the Soviet comrade, the old intelligentsia has been removed from having an influence in the life in the DPRK. The young intelligentsia, which indeed stands on the foundation of party and government policies, but this intelligentsia is only just being created. Still, the intelligentsia in the DPRK plays no visible role in political life. There has so far been no positive or negative critique of the factual state of affairs in the DPRK by the intelligentsia. Made 6 cop. 5 cop. MSZ [Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych Ministry of Foreign Affairs] Dep. V 1 cop. a/a

5 Brzezinski Henryk [trans. note: followed by signature] 1 st Secretary of the PRL Embassy in the DPRK

6 주평양대사관, 1956 년 12 월 24 일 폴란드인민공화국 평양 [ 역주 : 기울어진소인 ] 기밀 [ 역주 : 기울어진소인 ] 보고 1956 년 12 월 20 일소련대사관 1 등비서삼소노프동지와의대화 조선민주주의인민공화국과관련된다양한문제를다루고자한소련대사관의삼소노프대사와의회담에서다음의문제가논해짐 : 1) 8 월총회대표단관련 베이징에서열린중국공산당 8 차당대회에참석한사절단중 4 인이현재까지중국에머물고있다. 여기에는중앙위원회위원 2 인과중앙위원회부위원 1 인이포함되어있으며, 삼소노프동지의말에의하면이들은중국공산당의지도층까지접견했다 [reached the leadership of the KP of China] 고한다. 소련동지들과의합의에따라베이징에서는결정이이루어졌으며미코얀 [Mikoyan] 과펑더화이 [Peng Dehuai] 가조선로동당 9 월총회에참석차평양을방문하였다. 삼소노프동지는미코얀과펑더화이가조선지도층과대화를나누었다고생각한다. 그결과로총회에서는반역당원들이라불리는 8 월총회대표단에대한새로운결정을채택하였다. 이들의실수는당내의갈등으로여겨질것이며이들은설득되어야한다는것이결정되었다. 삼소노프동지는조선동지들이 9 월총회를당위원교육방안에대한당사업의분수령으로여긴다고이야기했다. 이에대해, 삼소노프동지는로동당평양위원회부위원장이 8 월대표단과관계가있다고했다. 그들은 9 월총회에서당권을반납했으며낮은행정사업으로좌천되었다. (8 월총회는그들을당에서제명한바있음 ). 이후에 9 월총회현지조직에대해답변하며삼소노프동지는, 소련대사관주요인사로부터의정보에의하면로동당중앙위원회 9 월총회이후지역위원회의총회는열리지않았으나당활동가회담은이루어졌다고전했다. 대표단전체 ( 최창익과박창옥을제외한 ) 의당제명이결정되었던 8 월총회에비하여중앙위원회 9 월총회에서눈에띄는입장변화는대체적으로당위원들의이해를얻지못했다. 김일성은이들에대한입장변화가당의위력을증명하며사상적교화가당사업의최선의방안이라고설명했다. 8 월대표단의말로에대한질문에, 삼소노프동지는전부수상박창옥은대공장중하나의공장주로좌천되었으며전부수상최창익은아직임용되지못했다고답했다. 삼소노프동지의의견에따르면, 8 월사절단은당의건강한움직임으로고려될수있겠다고한다. 2) 조선민주주의인민공화국지도층의분열관련

7 조선민주주의인민공화국지도층에조선인, 중국인, 그리고기타조직들이존재한다는이야기에대하여, 삼소노프동지는소련인, 중국인, 남조선및북조선인네개조직이존재한다고말했다. 김일성은작년 12 월로동당중앙위원회총회에서이문제를언급하였다. 김일성은 10 년이지났으면소련인, 중국조선인등이아니라한당의일원이라여겨야한다고주장하였다. 소련이건중국이건남조선이건간에한사상의기반에서있다고말했다. 소련에서넘어온조선인들은소련시민권을가지고있다. 조선민주주의인민공화국정부의위원들이소련시민이라는사실이있었다. 올해초소련에서이주한모든조선인들로부터소련여권이압수되었다. 오늘날이들은모두조선인이다. 소련여권을압수한김일성의발언은조직과관련된문제를점차잠잠하도록했다. 삼소노프동지는이제이조직들에대하여거의논해지지않는다고확언하였다. 3) 당권교체 당권교체에관한운동이조선민주주의인민공화국에서계속되고있다. 삼소노프동지는조선동지들에의해당권을교체하는이유를다음과같이들었다 : ㄱ ) 기존의당권중에는 1948 년이전의구식당권이다수존재하며북조선로동당과같은당의구식명칭이적혀있는것이많았다 (1948 년이후당명칭은조선로동당으로변경됨 ). 또한전쟁중, 450,000 여명의신규당원이합류하게되었으며그들은임시당권 ( 증서 ) 을수여받았다 (450,000 명은 1956 년 4 월 1,154,000 명의당원수의거의절반에달함 ). ㄴ ) 구권은재질이불량한것이다수섞여있었으며그중다수가훼손되거나상태가형편없었다. ㄷ ) 당권의교환은당원들에대한교화운동과병행되었다. ㄹ ) 당권교체와함께잘못하여처벌받은동지에대한복귀가이루어졌다. 삼소노프동지의말에의하면, 조선동지들은ㄷ ) 과ㄹ ) 의사유가당권교체운동에큰이유가아니며, ㄱ ) 과ㄴ ) 의요인을결정적인사유로여긴다고한다. 4) 경제정책의변화 삼소노프동지는국가경제개발에관한제 3 차조선로동당당대회의지침이산업적측면의자립에관한개념의추가적인개발을계산한것이라는우리의의견에동의했다. 만약재정적가능성을감안한다면, 이런경우간부단의해체와대등화는완전히비현실적인것이다. 조선로동당중앙위원회의 8 월총회에서는대규모의고비용공장건설을포기하는새로운경제정책이채택되었다. 이러한공장의건설은조선의풍부한천연자원을토대로비교적빠른경제적성과와삶의질향상을가져올것이라고예상되었었다. 삼소노프동지는지난 12 월중앙위원회총회에서이프로그램이연장되는것을목격하였다. 5) 인민의삶의질향상문제 소련동지의의견에따르면조선민주주의인민공화국정부는 1956 년인민삶의질향상을위해상당한노력을기울였다고한다. 삼소노프동지는다음과같은사실을나열하였다 :

8 ㄱ ) 물가를인하하여전국적으로 12,000,000,000 원을저축하였다. 소련동지들은이를자유시장가격으로양곡미로변환하였고, 계산결과인민들은가장최근의물가인하로상당량인양곡 120,000 톤을구매할수있는것으로나타났다. ㄴ ) 제 3 차당대회이후로동자와학생들은일일양곡미배급량이 100 그램늘어났다. ㄷ ) 11 월, 평균 35% 의급여인상이단행되었다 년조선민주주의인민공화국정부는 1956 년보다인민삶의질향상에보다힘쓰고있다. 6) 농업생산량 삼소노프동지의주장에따르면, 조선민주주의인민공화국인민에게필요한최소량은 3,000,000 톤이지만작년의양곡수확량은 2,430,000 톤에그쳤다고한다. 수입으로도부족량을채우지못했으며, 이로인해신규로동자고용에난관이발생하였다. ( 로동자와그들의가족은양곡미배급권을받지만, 비로동자는양곡배급권을받지못함 ). 삼소노프동지의말에의하면올해의수확량은 1955 년보다는나아졌지만여전히 3,000,000 톤을넘지는못할것이라했다. 7) 조선 / 한국의통일문제. 삼소노프동지는조선민주주의인민공화국이조선의통일문제를그들의결의와발표에서사실선전적으로다룬다는우리의의견에동의하였다. 조선민주주의인민공화국이제안한조선의통일프로그램은이승만의정부를완전히부정하고, 조선민주주의인민공화국정부는이승만정부와의대화를일절거부한다. 물론이러한상황에서는근시일내에남측의현정권과대화하는것은불가하다. 또한삼소노프동지는최근 ( 조선민주주의인민공화국의이승만에대한 ) 억양이다소누그러졌다는것을지목하였다. 이전의공식문서에서는남쪽의정부를독재자일당이라고명명한것과대조적으로, 최근미국과남조선사이협약체결에반대하는조선민주주의인민공화국문서에서는다음과같은용어를사용하였다. 미제와이승만 8) 조선민주주의인민공화국인텔리겐치아의역할에관하여. 소련동지의의견에따르면, 노쇠한인텔리겐치아들은조선민주주의인민공화국에더이상영향을미치지못하며, 이제겨우생성의단계이기는하나젊은인텔리겐치아들이당과정부정책의기반에영향을준다고한다. 그러나조선민주주의인민공화국의인텔리겐치아는정치에그다지가시적인역할이없으며조선민주주의인민공화국의당파적문제에대한인텔리겐치아들의비판은아직까지부재하다. 6 부복사. 5 부. 외무부 [MSZ: Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych] 제 4 국 1 부. a/a Brzezinski Henryk [ 역주 : 서명 ]

9 주조선민주주의인민공화국폴란드인민공화국 1 등서기관

2 동북아역사논총 50호 구권협정으로 해결됐다 는 일본 정부의 주장에 대해, 일본군 위안부 문제는 일 본 정부 군 등 국가권력이 관여한 반인도적 불법행위이므로 한일청구권협정 에 의해 해결된 것으로 볼 수 없다 는 공식 입장을 밝혔다. 또한 2011년 8월 헌 법재판소는

2 동북아역사논총 50호 구권협정으로 해결됐다 는 일본 정부의 주장에 대해, 일본군 위안부 문제는 일 본 정부 군 등 국가권력이 관여한 반인도적 불법행위이므로 한일청구권협정 에 의해 해결된 것으로 볼 수 없다 는 공식 입장을 밝혔다. 또한 2011년 8월 헌 법재판소는 일본군 위안부 피해자 구제에 관한 일고( 一考 ) 1 일본군 위안부 피해자 구제에 관한 일고( 一考 ) 김관원 / 동북아역사재단 연구위원 Ⅰ. 머리말 일본군 위안부 문제가 한일 간 현안으로 불거지기 시작한 것은 일본군 위안부 피해를 공개 증언한 김학순 할머니 등이 일본에서 희생자 보상청구 소송을 제 기한 1991년부터다. 이때 일본 정부는 일본군이 위안부