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OUGHTOPIA : The Journal of Social Paradigm Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Spring 2013) 목 차 The U.S. Return to Asia and China s Perception, Attitude, and Foreign Policy Jih Un Kim 5 디터 젱하스의 평화론: 문명화의 복합구성 이 동 기 31 자유민주주의의 여성 차별 에 대한 페미니스트 비판 재고: 탈서구중심주의적 대안을 위한 시론 문 지 영 67 한국의 낙태규제정책: 쟁점과 딜레마 조 희 원 109 재일동포와 원코리아페스티벌: 통일과 공생의 기제 지 충 남 139

The U.S. Return to Asia and China s Perception, Attitude, and Foreign Policy 5 The U.S. Return to Asia and China s Perception, Attitude, and Foreign Policy 1) Jih Un Kim * Ⅰ. Introduction Ⅱ. Signs of the U.S. Return to Asia Ⅲ. China s Responses Content Ⅳ. Why Assertive? Ⅴ. The Assertiveness Matters? Ⅵ. Conclusion Abstract The United States has played up China Threat discourses for the past twenty years. Further, along with the discourses, the Obama Administration has recently beefed up its presence in Asia. China has interpreted the U.S. rebalance toward Asia, dubbed as pivot to Asia by the U.S., as a U.S. strategic return to Asia to contain China. Apparently, China has been flared by the return: it has frequently and clearly expressed its suspicion of the ill intention of the U.S. return and sometimes criticized and admonished the U.S. while asserting its position. The critical and assertive rhetorics reflect China s perception that the country s global status has been escalated as well as the country s changing structure for foreign affairs which now allows more voices of hardliners including the military and nationalists to be delivered. However, the rhetorics have not turned into actions. Actually, China, especially, Chinese leaders and foreign policy-makers are cool headed, based on their realistic conclusion that their country is still far behind the U.S. for any power transition and their liberal paradigm that getting along with the U.S. is beneficial. In a nutshell, with the limited capacity and pragmatic calculation, China has not changed its foreign policy to respond to the U.S. Return to Asia. Key words: China, The United States, The U.S. Return to Asia, China s Perception and attitude, Foreign policy * Webster University / Political Science

6 OUGHTOPIA:The JournalofSocialParadigmStudies Ⅰ. Introduction In the United States, beginning with Ross Munro s Awakening Dragon, The Real Danger in Asia is from China, China Threat discourses have mushroomed. China has refuted the China Threat discourses as a simple concoction by hostile forces seeking to threaten China: they tarnish China s image and justify U.S. intervention in Asia (Johnston and Ross 2006). The real danger of China Threat discourses is their self-fulfilling prophesy: Expecting and preparing for a confrontation with China [sparked by China Threat discourses], U.S. policies may push China to the very behaviors [i.e., threats] Washington would like to prevent and toward a collision, warned Walter Clemens at Boston University (2012). To put it simply, borrowing Joseph Nye s terms, If we treat China as an enemy, we are guaranteeing a future enemy (New York Times 2013/01/25). Beyond China Threat discourses, for the past couple of years, the U.S. took a series of actions as well as rhetoric that alarmed China. For example, Leon Panetta, U.S. Defense Secretary under the first Obama Administration, revealed the plan that the U.S. would increase its ships in the Asia-Pacific by 10 percent (thus, to be 60 percent of the total U.S. fleet across the globe) at the cost of the Atlantic (New York Times 2012/11/10) Such actions and rhetoric, epitomized by the U.S. as pivot to Asia, has been construed by China as U.S. Return to Asia ( 重 返 东 亚, chongfan dongya) to contain China and trigger a new Cold War in the region (Renmin Ribao 2013/01/15). 1) Indeed, 1) Chinese analysts employ the term U.S. return to Asia to denote more attention to Asia (particularly East Asia) by the current U.S. government, compared to its predecessor s primary focus on the Middle East and terrorism. They interpret that the policy is driven by U.S.

The U.S. Return to Asia and China s Perception, Attitude, and Foreign Policy 7 Nye witnesses, he was struck [during his recent visit to China] by how many Chinese officials believe [containment of China] is already in place and is the central purpose of President Obama s pivot toward Asia (New York Times 2013/01/25). And, Ruan Zongze, a former senior diplomat of China stationed in the U.S., was quoted by China Daily as saying, China-U.S. ties have deteriorated [by Washington s rebalancing policy in the Asia-Pacific region], which triggered great antipathy from China (International Herald Tribune 2013/01/28). Now, apparently, the U.S. Return to Asia is exacerbating China s distrust of and hostility to the U.S., which, in turn, could justify and intensify China Threat discourses in the U.S. Against this backdrop, this paper purports to address what is, in reality, China s perception and attitude to the U.S. Return to Asia and whether the perception and attitude has changed China s foreign policy to the U.S. It concludes that China, in spite of sharp commentaries conveying its antagonism against the U.S. Return to Asia and asserting its status, entitlement, and security interests, has not put the commentaries into action. China of today, though provoked by the U.S. Return to Asia, remains realistic and pragmatic: not an actual threat. This conclusion is counter-intuitive and different from main interpretations of China s assertiveness. Not all, but, a plethora of policy-makers, scholars, and commentators in the U.S. have aroused apprehension that China s assertive rhetoric/attitude, along with its rising power and nationalism, will prod the country to change its policies/actions and challenge against the U.S. Based on empirical data and scholastic debate, this paper argues that China will not perception that its power decreased in the region for the past ten years when China s regional influence rose (International Crisis Group 2011, 5).

8 OUGHTOPIA:The JournalofSocialParadigmStudies change its course of actions toward the U.S., which sheds a fresh light to academic discussion on the topic. Ⅱ. Signs of the U.S. Return to Asia Within a short period of October to November 2011, the U.S. government quite revealed its willingness to commit to Asia. In October, the Foreign Policy online version published an article by that-time U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, titled, America s Pacific Century ; in the article, she emphasized the need of strategic turn to Asia, or pivot to Asia by stating: As the war in Iraq winds down and America begins to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, the United States stands at a pivot point. Over the last 10 years, we have allocated immense resources to those two theaters. In the next 10 years, we need to be smart so that we put ourselves in the best position to sustain our leadership, secure our interests, and advance our values. One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment -- diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise in the Asia-Pacific region (2011). 2) Exactly one month later, in November, she reiterated that the 21 st century would be America s pacific century when she went to Hawaii for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. Then, she moved to Manila Bay to stand 2) In the same article, she highlights the importance of alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand as the fulcrum for our strategic turn to the Asia-Pacific while she rejects the view, China s progress as a threat to the United States; America seeks to constrain China s growth (2011).

The U.S. Return to Asia and China s Perception, Attitude, and Foreign Policy 9 on an American warship and showcase the staunch military alliance between the Philippines and the United States. She even referred to the South China Sea area disputed by the Philippines and China as the West Philippine Sea (New York Times 2011/11/06). In the same month, Barack Obama visited Australia to expand the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region by announcing a plan to deploy Marines to Darwin. In his address to the Australian parliament, Obama said, The United States, as a Pacific nation, will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future and [Defense cuts] will not I repeat, will not come at the expense of the Asia-Pacific (New York Times 2012/06/27). Soon, he also visited Bali to be the first U.S. president joining the East Asia Summit (EAS) and reassure the US commitment to the freedom of navigation across the South China Sea (Glaser and Billingsley 2012). As a matter of fact, the current U.S. government hinted signs of U.S. return to Asia earlier than 2011. For example, Hillary Clinton s declaration of America s Pacific Century sounds much like her speech in October 2010, which, in turn, echoes Obama s self-description as America s first Pacific president in November 2009. In the speech, Clinton remarked, Together, the President and I will cover a significant portion of this vital region [of Asia] at a pivotal moment This [forward-deployed diplomacy to engage with Asia] has been our priority since Day One of the Obama Administration because we know that much of the history of the 21 st century will be written in Asia (U.S. Department of State 2010/10/28). Beyond the speech, the year 2010 witnessed a number of other signs of U.S. engagement with Asia. In June/July 2010, after the South Korean corvette Cheonan sank, the U.S. announced that the USS George Washington aircraft

10 OUGHTOPIA: The Journal of Social Paradigm Studies carrier would move to the Yellow Sea to participate in the U.S.-ROK military exercises. In July 2010, at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi, Hillary Clinton stated that the U.S. had a national interest in freedom of navigation and open access to Asia s maritime commons in the South China Sea (U.S. Department of State 2010/07/23). In October 2010, Hillary Clinton clearly stated to Japan s foreign minister, the Senkakus [Diaoyudao in Chinese] fall within the scope of Article 5 of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (U.S. Department of State 2010/10/27). And, in November 2010, the USS George Washington actually exercised in the Yellow Sea, following the North Korean shelling on Yeonpyeong, a South Korean island. Ⅲ. China s Responses China has frequently and clearly expressed its suspicion of the ill intention of the U.S. return to Asia ; sometimes criticized and admonished the U.S. while asserting its position. When the U.S. announced the USS George Washington s move to the Yellow Sea in response to the sink of Cheonan, China strongly opposed the U.S.-ROK military exercises in the Yellow Sea as a menace to its own security interests. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China commented at its press conference that We firmly oppose foreign military vessels and planes conducting activities in the Yellow Sea and China s coastal waters that undermine China s security interests (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC 2010/07/09). The PLA deputy chief of staff expressed his strong opposition of the exercises and the deputy secretary general of the PLA Academy

The U.S. Return to Asia and China s Perception, Attitude, and Foreign Policy 11 of Military Sciences stated in the Communist Party-run People s Daily, The drill area selected by the United States and South Korea is only 500 kilometers away from Beijing. China will be aware of the security pressure from military exercises conducted by any country in an area that is so close to China s heartland (Snyder 2010). RuoYuan, director of the Association of Chinese Military Science Studies, appeared on the Phoenix channel and delivered an even stronger remark on July 5 th, 2010: If the USS George Washington is dispatched to the Yellow Sea for the South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises, there is a possibility that the aircraft carrier will be a target for the PLA military drill (Hangyeoreh 21 2010/07/19, 67). Consequently, the location of the combined exercises was moved to the other side of South Korea, the East Sea. 3) When Hillary Clinton mentioned national interest and maritime commons and thus connotatively negated China s status over the South China Sea at the ARF meeting, her remarks were criticized as an attack on China by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC 2010/07/26). In the editorial section, the People s Daily defined her speech as an expression of U.S. hope to contain China. 4) China Daily carried an opinion of a former research fellow of the Central Party School, who urged that the U.S., an external power, wanted to interfere in the regional issue of the South 3) In September 2010, another round of joint military exercises was waged in the Yellow Sea, but without the U.S. aircraft carrier, due to China s opposition. 4) Andrew Jacobs of the New York Times quoted the Global Times, affiliated to the People s Daily, to report, China will never waive its right to protect its core interest with military means (New York Times 2010/07/26). The media in China have recently started calling the South China Sea as a core interest of China (as they do for Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang). And, Chinese military officials were reported to mention the sea as a core interest to their U.S. counterparts when they had a meeting. However, according to Wang Jisi, a faculty at Beijing University, the South China Sea has not been officially referred to as a core interest by the authorities.

12 OUGHTOPIA: The Journal of Social Paradigm Studies China Sea in order to contain China s rise and that China should counter US ploys (China Daily 2010/07/29, 8). When villages on the Yeonpyeong Island were shelled, the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry did not fail to express China s opposition to the scheduled U.S.-ROK joint naval drill in the Yellow Sea: We hold a consistent and clear-cut stance on the issue. We oppose any party to take any military actions in our exclusive economic zone (EEZ) without permission (Xinhua 2010/11/28). 5) Chinese Party or state media and academic analysts also voiced up their criticism of the United States for escalation of tension in the region. In an article of the Liaowang (Outlook), a prominent Party-run news magazine, the director of the Center for East Asian Studies of Renmin University commented that the U.S. had plotted to return to East Asia and increase its influence in the region by taking advantage of the circumstances of the Peninsula (Liaowang 2010/12/26). Similarly, in an interview with the China Central Television (CCTV) 2, the director of the Research Institute of World Politics, a division of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, observed that the U.S. had wanted to renew its leadership in the Asia-Pacific region through its allies of South Korea and Japan and that it would be invited to the region by the allies with the crisis continuing. In this sense, he noted, [The U.S.] is the biggest beneficiary of the crisis (Xinhua 2010/12/23). 5) China clearly revealed its sensitivity to U.S. military activities in its EEZ previously, prior to the Cheonan and the Yeonpeong Island incidents. In 2001, a Chinese fighter plane approached the U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance plane to cause their mid-air collision above the Hainan Island and, in 2009, Chinese government ships tried to block the USS Impeccable s surveillance near the island (South China Morning Post 2010/12/07). When China and the U.S. resumed their military dialogues on December 10, 2010, the deputy chief of the general staff of the PLA mentioned U.S. military surveillance operations in China s EEZ as a major obstacle to the mutual military ties (Global Times 2010/12/13).

The U.S. Return to Asia and China s Perception, Attitude, and Foreign Policy 13 Ⅳ. Why Assertive? For the turbulences in 2010, Wu Xinbo, a Chinese professor at the Center for American Studies of Fudan University, provides a summary of the reasons for China s assertiveness explained by U.S. (not Chinese) officials and scholars. One reason posited by the U.S. side (in neo-realist paradigm) has to do with China s judgment regarding the global power structure: China s views of itself as a rising power and the U.S. as a declining one emboldened the country to be assertive. Other reasons are internal or political: The Chinese military which holds a tough position on the US has gained more influence vis-à-vis the Chinese Foreign Ministry in the policy-making process; the Chinese public which generally favors a more nationalistic posture in China s external relations has become more vocal and influential; and, the Chinese leadership is reluctant to embrace a more conciliatory and cooperative foreign policy as it needs popular support for its power consolidation in a period of transition, which was climaxed recently in November 2012 when the 18 th National Party Congress was held (2012, 392). For example, David Lampton, a renowned China scholar at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, concludes, based on his conversations with Chinese officials, intellectuals, and professionals, that there is a growing sense of entitlement among both Chinese leaders and citizens, a feeling that China s record of growth entitle[s] the PRC to a greater voice in global affairs. There is a feeling that old wounds to national pride no longer need to be endured with acquiescence and that the perceived declining capacities of other

14 OUGHTOPIA: The Journal of Social Paradigm Studies countries quite naturally mean that the previously dominant states should be more respectful of China s core interests (2010, 16). Actually, Wang Jisi, a top-notch Chinese scholar and an expert for Sino-US relations at Beijing University, confirms that China has reshaped its view of the international structure and, accordingly, its attitude to the U.S.: many Chinese officials believe that their nation has ascended to be a first-class power in the world and should be treated as such (Lieberthal and Wang 2012, 8). Meanwhile, David Shambaugh, director of the China Policy Program at George Washington University, and Thomas Christensen, a professor at Princeton University who dealt with China as U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, agree that China s foreign-policymaking process has been inclusive of various actors and voices in recent years (2011, 7; 2011); among the actors and voices, Dingding Chen and Jianwei Wang at the University of Macau highlight the PLA as a growing influence in foreign-policy making of China (2011, 209). And, as empirically observed above, the PLA s stance toward the U.S. return to Asia has been assertive, in general (Lieberthal and Wang 2012, 13); the military stance has been supported by some high-ranking Chinese officials, particularly those in defense and security organs, who have openly stated their broadly-shared perception that the U.S. is the biggest threat to China s national security. As for public nationalism, another factor affecting China s assertiveness, Christensen notes that popular confidence or pride elated by the rise of their country and the decline of the U.S. since the financial crisis in 2008 has gushed out through media outlets including the Internet to attack the United States and criticize Beijing s soft policy toward the U.S. Concerned about legitimacy and social stability or in order to consolidate reputation as a protector of

The U.S. Return to Asia and China s Perception, Attitude, and Foreign Policy 15 national pride, especially in the period of leadership change, Chinese policymakers including elites are quite sensitive to nationalist criticism at home, which has caused the acerbic turn in Beijing s foreign policy. In this sense, China s strident responses to the cases of U.S. return to Asia are, in nature, a reaction to domestic insecurity rather than an outward assertion of power (Christensen 2011). Shambaugh also points that China s foreign policy of today - more correctly speaking, perspectives/discourses of Chinese international relations scholars and officials on the world and China s identity/role in it, which influence the country s foreign policy - is anchored on the Realists but with strong pull from the Nativists (2011, 24). 6) Chinese scholars concur with Christensen and Shambaugh regarding the role of Chinese nationalism. Chen and Wang comment that the government s tight control over foreign affairs has been weakened as public voices about foreign relations have become strong enough to be undoubtedly attended by the leadership. Especially, citing an article by Wang Jun, a professor of Minzu University of China, they take online nationalism as a powerful force that toughens the government s attitude and behavior to the U.S. as the government strives to avoid being accused as a soft actor by the public in the virtual space (2011, 209). 7) Wang Jisi also affirms, Chinese leaders clearly recognize that many Chinese expect and aspire to a more can-do PRC foreign policy as they perceive the shift of power balance between China and the U.S. (Lieberthal 6) According to Shambaugh, the Nativist school, as a collection of populists, xenophobic nationalists, and Marxists, is hyper-nationalistic and strongly anti-american. It portrays a strategic partnership between China and the U.S. as an illusion and contends that China s foreign policy to the U.S. is quite lenient (2011, 10-11). 7) Refer to Wang (2010, 141-155).

16 OUGHTOPIA: The Journal of Social Paradigm Studies and Wang 2012, 16). Ironically, behind the nationalistic assertion reflecting confidence lies the victim mentality derived from the century of humiliation (bainian guochi) as well. Shambaugh says, There is a certain element of retribution in the thoughts of China s Realists: Many Realists harbor a strong sense of aggrievement from China s long period of weakness, and believe that now that China is strong, it should retaliate against those countries that have done China wrong in the past (2011, 12-13). At least, if not retaliation, China s distrust of the U.S. that America seeks to contain China (with the U.S. return to Asia ) has been bred as China frequently refers to the history and thus arouses the victim identity in interpreting U.S. actions (Morris 2012, 135-136). 8) <Table 1> Why China is Assertive? Expounders Reasons U.S. Scholars Chinese Scholars Power Shift-China is rising; the U.S. is declining David Lampton Wang Jisi The PLA s Growing Influence in Foreign-policy Making Chen Dingding, Wang Jianwei Public Nationalism Thomas Christensen, David Shambaugh Wang Jun, Chen Dingding, Wang Jianwei, Wang Jisi V. The Assertiveness Matters? Though China has been suspicious of the U.S. return to Asia and its official 8) For a representative empirical study and constructivist analysis of China s popular nationalism and its role in Sino-U.S. relations, see Gries (2004).

The U.S. Return to Asia and China s Perception, Attitude, and Foreign Policy 17 and unofficial responses to it have been frequently assertive, the suspicion and responses have been mainly delivered in rhetoric, not in action. 9) Even the rhetoric has not been consistent in terms of its tone or contents. It was vociferous and firm for the territorial, thus sovereignty-related and nationalistic issue of the South China Sea and for the U.S.-ROK military exercises in the vicinity of China. However, for other intensive gestures by the U.S. to return to Asia under the slogan of America s Pacific Century, it was not sharp. Rather, it suggested practical or calm reactions as often as it pointed out that the U.S. return was to maintain American dominance in Asia and that China would not approve the U.S. attempt. For example, in the commentary section, the China Youth Daily reminded that China still could not match the U.S. in power and thus should stick to its domestic development, which resonates with the Tao Guang Yang Hui (keeping a low profile) strategy of China s leadership (China Youth Daily 2012/02/28). In an article titled, No Need for Alarm over U.S. Return to Asia, the People s Daily commented, The United States is a practical country, and its return to Asia policy is aimed at obtaining practical profits ; [the U.S.] wishes that China could maintain its sustainable development momentum so that they could benefit from it ; and, We should be more confident about the future peaceful development of Asia (People s Daily 2011/11/18). While acknowledging that the fierce U.S. return to Asia is clearly to encircle China, an editorial of the Global Times still advised that China should take it with aplomb, not because China cannot beat the U.S. in strength but because the 9) Probably, one response in action, thus exceptional, is the PLA s live-fire drills in the South China Sea as China s demonstration against the planned U.S.-ROK joint military exercises in the Yellow Sea, following the Cheonan incident.

18 OUGHTOPIA: The Journal of Social Paradigm Studies U.S., compared to China, does not currently have enough influence or attraction in the region. Thus, China does not need to panic about the U.S. return to Asia ; China will not confront the U.S. strategically and militarily (Global Times 2011/11/21). Even after the U.S.-ROK military exercises in the Yellow Sea, the People s Daily carried its interview with Huang Ping, president of the Institute of American Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; he, quoting that-time Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, emphasized that China would not adjust its foreign policy according to changes of U.S. policy (People s Daily 2010/12/06). When Obama committed the U.S. troops to Australia, the Foreign Ministry of China responded mildly: while it expressed its misgivings in a restrained way, it avoided the containment rhetoric and said, China would continue to deepen and strengthen China-US and China-Australia relations (Strait Times 2011/11/18). For now, many American and Chinese scholars are apparently in common to conclude that China s occasional assertiveness has not redirected (and will not in near future) its foreign policy toward the U.S. 10) Lyle Morris at the RAND Corporation warns, U.S. policymakers should not 10) A notable exception would be Aaron Friedberg, a professor at Princeton University and former deputy assistant for national security affairs under Vice President Dick Cheney. According to Andrew Nathan, a senior China scholar with authority at Columbia University, Friedberg is the most thoughtful and informative of a stream of China-threat books that have come out since the mid-1990s. Still, Nathan criticizes Friedberg s most recent book, which is based on the views of Chinese public intellectuals at think tanks and universities (as well as a few military officers). Citing Thomas Christensen, The Advantages of an Assertive China, he says, Chinese policymakers have consistently been more cautious in practice [or top officials in Beijing have a much more sober assessment, if Christensen is directly quoted] than the Chinese media have been in their rhetoric (2011). Also, refer to Friedberg (2011).

The U.S. Return to Asia and China s Perception, Attitude, and Foreign Policy 19 misinterpret that China s assertive rhetoric reflecting the victim identity is inherently malevolent. The rhetoric is often directed to nationalistic domestic audience in China to assuage their demand of hawkish reactions to U.S. encroachment on national sovereignty they perceive (e.g., the U.S. statements on the South China Sea and the planned or conducted U.S. naval exercises in the Yellow Sea); it is not to challenge against and threaten the U.S. directly. It should not be construed as a signal of conflict escalation directed at the U.S. (2012, 134). Christensen also points out that China s recent abrasive responses to the U.S. is by nature reactive to domestic nationalist citizens, lower-level government officials (especially, military officers), and commentators from universities and think tanks, who roar at perceived U.S. contempt of China s national pride and sovereignty (2011). One possible evidence that the Chinese government s assertive rhetoric is mainly responsive to domestic audience, not much oriented outward, is that the Global Times (Huanqiu Shibao), a popular government-owned newspaper that is a major forum for nationalistic and hawkish comments on the U.S. or Sino-U.S. relations, has taken a dual track: The Global Times has an English version, which is not as assertive as its Chinese version (Chen and Wang 2011, 203). Even though China s domestic politics, particularly, interplay with the military group and public voices, gradually affects its foreign policy toward the U.S., Wu Xinbo concludes, Such impact is largely manageable (2012, 404). Though Shambaugh appreciates the weight of the Nativists voices in recent foreign-policymaking process of China, he is also balanced to caution, [Native voices] cause a lot of thunder but little rain (leisheng da, yudian xiao) : their influence should not be overstated (2011, 22). 11) 11) A recent research on China s nationalism and foreign policy toward South Korea also

20 OUGHTOPIA: The Journal of Social Paradigm Studies Regarding China s grand strategy for the U.S., Randall Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu at Ohio State University admit that China can de-legitimate U.S.-led order in rhetoric and impose costs on the U.S. in practice in East Asia. However, they contend, China s resistance to the U.S. has been subtle and prudent. Fundamentally, China s grand strategy for the U.S. is accommodation since it has realistic awareness of its relative weakness and needs a stable relation with the U.S. for its own growth (2011). Importantly, Chinese leaders are cool-headed. Like Nathan and Christensen, Wang Jisi affirms that the central leadership s own view is always more prudent and moderate than nationalistic voices heard from media outlets. Prominent political figures, according to Wang, still favor and will maintain the strategy of Tao Guang Yang Hui to focus on their country s social and economic development while avoiding adversarial relationship with the U.S., which, in their perspective, is not in decline (2011). Echoing Wang, Shi Yinghong, director of Center on American Studies at Renmin University, also marks prudence and patience as a strategic culture of Chinese political leadership, which keeps China firmly within the limits of measured assertiveness. And, he continues, another profound feature or Chineseness rooted in political leaders is their obsession with the ideas that foreign policy should serve domestic purposes; for domestic economic growth, foreign policy should be conservative (2011, 251-252). 12) Similarly, Shambaugh, citing China scholars and pundits, characterizes the majority of senior Chinese leaders and policymakers as pragmatic actors: they suggests that China s popular nationalism does not affect the government s foreign policy as it is played down or confined by the government. See Kim (2011). 12) As Morris points out, Shi adds that even the limited assertion is often for domestic purpose of preventing popular discontent with the government s soft foreign policy.

The U.S. Return to Asia and China s Perception, Attitude, and Foreign Policy 21 think, if China s ties with major powers including the U.S. are strained, it would be a huge cost for China (2011, 15). 13) In addition, he notes, despite heated debate, international relations experts in China largely agree that the Tao Guang Yang Hui strategy remains a strategic guideline for China s diplomacy (2011, 18). After they review domestic debates over the Tao Guang Yang Hui in China, Chen and Wang also conclude that China s leadership remains cautious. While preoccupied with domestic problems, it does not share the view that China should pursue global leadership as the U.S. hegemony is over. It is likely to retain the Tao Guang Yang Hui for many years to come, assuring its neighbors, though it will probably test some modifications to the strategy (2011). VI. Conclusion Limited Capacity Bounded Willingness Recently, in his contribution to the New York Times, Wang Zheng, a faculty of Seton Hall University and a scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, succinctly but correctly commented for analysis of China s foreign policy: [A] country s foreign policy should be judged on the basis of its actions as well as its rhetoric Strong rhetoric is often used to compensate for weak or incoherent policies (New York Times 2013/03/18). In actions, Chinese leaders are in essence realists (Zhao 2012, 377). Even 13) Based on his own interview with a senior Foreign Ministry official of China, Shambaugh ascertains that government officials of China are the majority of the Major Powers School, which considers the U.S. as a power vital to China s overall interests or priorities (2011, 22).

22 OUGHTOPIA: The Journal of Social Paradigm Studies for the U.S. Return to Asia, they have been sometimes vocal but, with clear awareness of China s limited power vis-a-vis that of the U.S., have restrained any serious gesture or action for power transition in its foreign policy, as discussed above. Actually, Chinese scholars, who now enjoy more access to keen ears of policy-makers, have produced and used the concept of the Comprehensive National Power (CNP, Zonghe Guoli) to compare current and future power of major countries including China and the U.S.; their data indicate that China s CNP has been smaller than that of the U.S. and will be in near future. 14) By contrast, Michael Beckley, a faculty of Tufts University, summarizes his statistical findings to prove, Over the last two decades the United States has not declined; in fact, it is now wealthier, more innovative, and more militarily powerful, compared to China, than it was in 1991 (2011/12, 43). Importantly, in terms of military, war-fighting capabilities of the People s Liberation Army (PLA) of China are still far behind those of the U.S. military, due to such major setbacks as technological deficiency and corruption the PLA suffers (Erickson and Liff 2013). Moreover, neither does China have its enough muscle to challenge the U.S. Return to Asia, nor does it have intention to do so: it is not only realistic/realist but also pragmatic/liberal enough to avoid severing economic interdependence with the U.S. or integration into the global economic system the U.S. has mainly architected since it is the biggest beneficiary of the interdependence/integration. And, Chinese leaders believe that the economic fruits from the ties with the U.S. are a key prop for their political legitimacy and 14) For a CNP comparison by two of China s most creative economic and social thinkers, which is based on physical resources, human resources, infrastructure, knowledge resources, and capital, see Lampton (2008, 20-25).

The U.S. Return to Asia and China s Perception, Attitude, and Foreign Policy 23 domestic stability and that foreign policy should serve domestic politics by pursuing the status-quo. All in all, China s assertiveness to the U.S. Return to Asia should not be exaggerated and not be overly reacted by the U.S. or its allies. China is, for now, a conservative or, at most, reactive (mainly rhetorically) power with limited capacity and bounded willingness.

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26 OUGHTOPIA: The Journal of Social Paradigm Studies Li, Bing. Time to Counter US Ploys. China Daily (July 29, 2010). Li, Wen. How should China cope with America s return to Asia? China Youth Daily (February 28, 2012). Lieberthal, Kenneth and Wang, Jisi. 2012. Addressing U.S-China Strategic Distrust. John L. Thornton China Center (Brookings Institute) Monograph Series No.4. pp.1-50. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang s Regular Press Conference on July 8, 2010 (July 9, 2010).. Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Refutes Fallacies on the South China Sea Issue (July 26, 2010). Morris, Lyle. 2012. Incompatible Partners: The Role of Identity and Self-Image in the Sino-U.S. Relationship. Asia Policy No.13. pp.135-165. Nathan, Andrew. 2011. What China Wants: Bargaining With Beijing. Foreign Affairs Vol.90, No.4. pp.153-158. Ng, Grace. Beijing Avoids Rhetoric on US Troop Deployment. Strait Times (November 18, 2011). Nye, Joseph. Work with China, Don t Contain It. New York Times (January 25, 2013). People s Daily Online. How Should China Handle America s Return to Asia. People s Daily (December 6, 2010). Park, Minheui. Junggui Ppulnatda, Seohaega Chulleonginda (Angry China, Turbulent West/Yellow Sea). Hangyeoreh 21 No.819 (July 19, 2010). Ren, Weidong. Meiguo Yiyu Dazao Xinlengzhan Gejuma (Is U.S. Planning a New Cold War)? Renmin Ribao (January 15, 2013). Schweller, Randall and Pu, Xiaoyu. 2011. After Unipolarity: China s Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline. International Security

The U.S. Return to Asia and China s Perception, Attitude, and Foreign Policy 27 Vol.36, No.1. pp.41-72. Shambaugh, David. 2011. Coping with a Conflicted China. Washington Quarterly Vol.34, No.1. pp.7-27. Shi, Yinghong. 2011. China s contemporary Political Leadership, Foreign Policy, and Their Chineseness. East Asia: An International Quarterly Vol.28, No.3. pp. 1-11. Snyder, Scott. 2012. Consolidating Ties with New DPRK Leadership. Comparative Connections Vol.12, No.3. pp.91-99. Tatlow, Didi Kirsten. In Beijing, No Tears over Clinton s Departure. International Herald Tribune (January 28, 2013). U.S. Department of State. America s Engagement in the Asia-Pacific (October 28, 2010).. Remarks at Press Availability (July 23, 2010).. Joint Press Availability with Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara (October 27, 2010). Wang, Guanqun. S. Korea, U.S. Launch Large-scale Joint Naval Drill. Xinhua (November 28, 2010). Wang, Jisi. 2011. China s Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way. Foreign Affairs Vol.90, No 2. pp.68-79. Wang, Jun. 2010. Online Nationalism, Civil Society and Chinese Diplomacy. World Economics and Politics No.10. pp.141-155. Wang, Zhaokun. China Resumes Military Exchanges with US. Global Times (December 13, 2010). Wang, Zheng. Does China Have a Foreign Policy? New York Times (March 18, 2013). Whaley, Floyd. Clinton Reaffirms Military Ties with the Philippines. New

28 OUGHTOPIA: The Journal of Social Paradigm Studies York Times (November 16, 2011). Wu, Xinbo. 2012. Forging Sino-US Partnership in the Twenty-First Century: opportunities and challenges. Journal of Contemporary China Vol.21, No.75. pp.391-407. Xinhua. Bandao Jushi Jinjang, Meiguo Cheng Zuida Shouyizhe (As the Situation of the Korean Peninsula Gets Tense, the U.S. Becomes the Biggest Beneficiary). Xinhua (December 23, 2010). Zhao, Suisheng. 2012. Shaping the Regional Context of China s Rise: How the Obama Administration Brought Back Hedge in Its Engagement with China. Journal of Contemporary China Vol.21, No.75. pp.369-389. 투 고 일 : 2013년 05월 03일 심 사 마 감 일 : 2013년 05월 09일 수 정 일 : 2013년 05월 22일 최종게재확정일 : 2013년 05월 23일

The U.S. Return to Asia and China s Perception, Attitude, and Foreign Policy 29 국문초록 미국의 동아시아 회귀 와 중국의 인식, 태도 그리고 외교정책 김 지 운 지난 20년 동안 미국은 중국위협론 을 키워왔다. 그 위협론과 더불어, 오바마 정부는 최근 아시아에서 미국의 입지를 강화하고자 노력하여 왔다. 중국은 이러한 미국의 동아시아 회귀를 중국을 봉쇄하기위한 전략으로 해석하며, 미국을 겨냥한 비판과 경고 그리고 자국의 권리를 확인하는 목소리를 높여왔다. 이러한 중국의 강도 높은 대미 발언은, 신장한 중국의 위상과 군부와 민족주의자 등 강경파의 영향력 증가를 반영한다 고 볼 수 있다. 그러나, 이러한 중국의 발언이 곧 행동으로 옮겨진 것은 아니다. 실제로, 중국은, 특히, 중국의 지도자들과 외교 담당자들은, 미국과 비교해 자국이 갖는 힘의 한계를 인식함과 동시에 미국과 공생함으로서 얻는 경제적 이득을 계산함으로써, 대미 외교에 있어 균형과 냉정을 유지해 왔다고 볼 수 있다. 즉, 중국은, 미국의 동아시아 회귀를 겨냥하여 발언 수위를 높여 왔으나, 현실주의적 힘의 비교와 자유주의적 또는 실용주의적 상호의존/이득에 근거, 발언에 상응하는 외교정책의 변화를 실행해 오지 않았다. 주제어: 중국, 미국, 미국의 동아시아 회귀, 중국의 인식과 태도, 외교정책 저자 김지운은 University of South Carolina에서 정치학박사학위를 받았으며 현재 미국 Webster University 역사/정치외교학과 부교수로 재직 중이다. 연구 관심분야는 중국의 정치외교, 미-중 관계, 동아시아 관계, 환경안보 등이며 주요 논문으로는 Water Scarcity and Hexie Shehui (Harmonious Society) (2008), Chinese Nationalism, a False Alarm for Korea -The Case of the Beijing Olympics(2011) 등이 있다.

디터 젱하스의 평화론: 문명화의 복합구성 31 15) 디터 젱하스의 평화론: 문명화의 복합구성 * 이 동 기 ** 목 Ⅰ. 머리말 Ⅱ. 비판적 평화연구와 젱하스의 초기 평화연구 Ⅲ. 젱하스의 문명육모 평화론 차 Ⅳ. 문명육모 평화론에 대한 비판과 응답 Ⅴ. 맺는말 요 약 이 논문은 디터 젱하스의 평화론을 다룬다. 디터 젱하스가 제시한 복합구성 관점의 평화론은 평화 구성의 다양한 조건들을 연관시키고 어떻게 상호작용하는지 를 보였다는 점에서 평화론의 중요한 이론적 성취다. 젱하스는 원평비평 의 준칙에 기초한 인과적 평화주의 로 평화의 복합적 구조와 건설적 평화형성 정책을 위한 복합적 원인과 과정들을 구상했다. 젱하스의 문명육모 평화론은 폭력독점, 법치국가, 민주적 정치참여, 상호의존과 흥분통제, 사회정의 그리고 건설적 갈등해결문화 등 여섯 가지 문명화 요소에 기초했다. 그것은 유럽적 경험에 기초해 있긴 하지만 건설적 평화구상 의 사유 양상을 잘 보여 주었기에 다른 지역의 평화형성을 위해서도 매우 유의미한 경험이 라는 것을 부정할 수는 없다. 젱하스의 평화론은 지속적인 평화의 조건 과 과정 을 탐구했다는 점에서 특별한 함의가 있다. 한반도발 평화론 도 남북한 분단에 대한 더 나은 이해에 달려 있다기 보다는 더 많은 평화의 조건과 원인들의 복합구성 과정을 얼마나 정밀히 분석하고 상상하는가에 달려있다. 주제어: 디터 젱하스, 복합구성, 문명육모, 인과적 평화론, 원평비평 * 이 논문(저서)은 2010년 정부(교육과학기술부)의 재원으로 한국연구재단의 지원 을 받아 수행된 연구임. (NRF-2010-361-A00017) ** 서울대학교 / 서양현대사

32 OUGHTOPIA: The Journal of Social Paradigm Studies Ⅰ. 머리말 평화학은 20세기 파괴적 전쟁과 파국적 갈등 상황이 낳은 지적 숙고와 문화적 고투의 산물이다(Koppe 2010). 세계사적 맥락에서 본다면, 1914년 부터 1945년까지의 31년 전쟁 (홉스봄 1997), 히로시마와 아우슈비츠로 함축되는 20세기 전반 인류의 파국적 경험은 근대 사회의 문명 단 절 (Diner 1988)적 폭력 발산의 원인들과 과학기술의 인간 파괴적 성격에 대해 근본적으로 성찰하도록 만들었다. 게다가 20세기 후반 지구적 냉전 은 한편으로는 상상의 전쟁 (Kaldor 1990)으로서 정치문화와 일상세계 에 공포와 적대성을 내면화하도록 만들었고, 다른 한편으로는 곳곳에서 다양한 무장 충돌과 대리전, 즉 냉전 속의 열전들 (Greiner 2006)을 확산 시켰다. 아울러 1989/90년의 역사적 전환 이후에도 세계화의 부정적 영 향과 신자유주의로 인한 경제적 위기의 확산 및 테러리즘, 기후변화와 환경재앙 등의 요인으로 오히려 산사태 (홉스봄) 같은 갈등의 소용돌이 와 세계 문명의 위기는 증폭되었다. 지구 곳곳의 분쟁과 무장 충돌, 사회 도처의 폭력적 갈등, 다차원적 위험과 공포를 극복하기 위한 학문적 정립이 요청되었다. 20세기 후반에 비로소 자기정립한 평화학은 급박한 실천적 요구와 문명사적 위기를 배경으로 탄생했기에 애초부터 현실 개입과 조정해결의 실천성을 전제했고, 다른 한편으로는 독자적 학문 체계로서 발전하기 위한 학제적 접근을 요구했다. 이에 미국과 유럽의 일부 국가들에서 평화연구는 1960년대 후반부터 이미 의미 있는 학문적 축적을 쌓고 있을 뿐 아니라 최근에도 새롭게 발전하고 있다. 이미 국내에 요한 갈퉁(Johan Galtung)을 비롯한 일부 해외 평화연구의 문제틀과 개념들이 알려져 있지만(갈퉁 2000; 구갑우 2007; 하영선 2002), 아직까지는 제한적인 소개나 파편적인 수용에 그쳐 더 체계적이고 풍부한 관심과 함께 비판적이고 주체적인 논의가 아쉽다.

디터 젱하스의 평화론: 문명화의 복합구성 33 기실 평화학이 학계와 지식 사회에서 뿌리를 내리고 제도적인 차원에서 도 독립분과 학문으로 제대로 정립되려면 연구 대상과 주제 영역의 독자 특성화와 구체화 및 학문 내적 방법론과 이론적 논의의 심화가 필수적이 다. 즉 평화학은 기본적으로 현실적 평화 파괴와 폭력 갈등의 구체적 발현에 대한 실천적 관점과 정치적 관심을 유지하면서도, 다른 한편으로 는 신생 학문 분과이기에 더욱 필요한 다양한 이론적 숙고와 개념적 논의의 심화를 놓쳐서는 안 될 것이다. 평화학은 그저 현실의 평화요구적 쟁점과 평화운동의 화급한 논의들에 갇혀 있을 수만도 없고, 여타 분과 학문들에서 인습적으로 이루어지고 있는 평화 관련 논의들의 망연한 집합 내지 단순한 접합에 그쳐서도 안 될 일이다. 애초 유럽 평화학은 전후 1950년대 후반기 미국의 비판적 자연과학자 들의 반핵, 반전 여론 환기 노력 및 미국 사회과학 분과에서 수행된 앞 선 평화 연구의 영향을 꽤 받았다(Hauswedell 1997, 37-41; Koppe 2010, 27). 그러나 유럽, 특히 독일은 이차대전의 폐허와 파시즘 독재 및 홀로코 스트의 파국을 경험했고 냉전의 첨예한 격전지로서 핵무기 위협 및 군비 경쟁 등이 펼쳐진 곳이었기에 곧 다른 지역보다도 대중적인 평화 지향 및 평화에 대한 학문적 관심이 높아갔다. 그리하여 1970년대부터는 다양 한 평화연구소들과 평화학자들에 의해 의미 있는 연구 성과들을 생산하 며 국제 평화연구를 주도하고 있다. 게다가 대학 내 학제 과정으로서 뿐 아니라 사회문화적 기구나 제도로서도 성공적으로 안착했다(Imbusch 2010, 179-218). 아울러 1989/90년 독일분단과 유럽분열의 동시적 극복 후 유럽이 맞이한 평화의 시간 은 곧 유럽이 평화의 공간 이 되었음을 예시한다. 지난 40년 동안 독일 내지 독일어권 유럽에서 평화학의 학문적 이론적 발전에서 가장 주목할 인물은 단연 디터 젱하스(Dieter Senghaas)다. 1940 년 출생으로 프랑크푸르트 대학과 브레멘대학 교수를 역임한 젱하스는

34 OUGHTOPIA: The Journal of Social Paradigm Studies 요한 갈퉁과 더불어 유럽 내 비판적 평화연구(Kritische Friedensforschung) 조류의 가장 독창적이고 열정적인 학자의 한명으로 간주된다(Siegel 2003, 15-19; Senghaas 2013, 3-19; Senghaas 2000, 607-622). 1960년대 후반부터 등장한 이 비판적 평화연구 의 조류는 안보 문제나 전쟁방지에 초점을 맞춘 기왕의 전통적인 평화연구 경향과 꾸준히 비판적 대결을 벌이면서 폭력과 전쟁의 구조적 원인과 사회적 근원을 문제 삼았다(Wasmuht 1998, 165-191; Senghaas 1969, 7-17; Schlotter 외 2010, 19-21). 비판적 평화연구 는, 지배적 권력관계의 안정화에 복무하는 평정연구(Befriedungsforschung) 에 불과한 인습적 평화연구와는 달리, 현존 사회 체제의 자기파괴에 대항하는 근본적 체제 비판 의 성격을 지녔다. 바로 그와 같은 관점에서 젱하스는 무엇보다 미국의 선구적 평화학자 칼 도이취(Karl Deutsch)의 영향(Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung 2003)과 갈퉁의 지적 자극을 받아들여, 수많은 저작과 논문들로 다양한 방법론적 논의와 현실 비판적 연구를 선보이며 독일 내지 독일어권 유럽의 비판적 평화연구 를 선도했다. 특히 그가 1990년대 초반부터 적극 초들고 있는 문명화프로젝 트로서의 평화 론은 최근 유럽 평화학의 가장 의미 있는 지적 성과로 간주된다. 전쟁과 폭력 및 적대적 갈등의 해결책을 문명화 에서 찾는 젱하스의 평화론은 시민적(zivil, civil) 갈등 조정 이라는 구체적인 실천적 대안으로 연결되기에 단연 눈길을 끈다(Debiel 외 2010, 312-342). 그런데 비판적 평화연구의 다양한 조류 내에서 갈퉁의 구조적 폭력론 이나 에른스트-오토 쳄필(Ernst-Otto Czempiel)의 민주평화론, 또는 여성 주의적 관점의 평화연구가 아니라 특별히 젱하스의 평화론이 관심을 끄는 또 다른 이유는 무엇보다 그가 평화를 복합구성(Konfiguration: configuration) 의 문제로 보았다는 점이다. 한국에서 평화학은 지금까지 주로 분단문제의 극복이나 남북관계의 개선을 위한 정치적 분석의 자장 또는 현실 평화운동이나 화급한 평화요구적 주제의 환기를 위한 지적 관심의

디터 젱하스의 평화론: 문명화의 복합구성 35 제고 차원에 제한되었다. 그러나 앞에서 말한 대로 평화연구가 실천적 요구에 조응하면서도 학문 제도적으로 자기정립하려면 그것에 걸맞은 이론적 방법론적 숙고와 지평을 확대해야 한다. 그런 맥락에서 특별히 중요한 것은 특정 정치적 문화적 갈등 요인들의 단선적이고 병렬적인 해결이 아니라 다양한 비평화(peacelessness; Friedlosigkeit, 평화부재) 의 구조와 문화의 다층적 연관관계를 해명하고 평화 형성의 다층적 복합 프로그램(mehrfaches Komplexprogramm (젱하스)을 찾는 것일 테다. 이 글 은 여러 평화 요인과 조건들의 역사적-구체적인 요소들을 문명화 의 관점에서 다룬 젱하스의 평화론을 소개하면서 그 길을 개척하는데 일조 하고자 한다. 먼저 II장에서는 젱하스의 평화연구의 초기 국면을 다루는데, 냉전적 대결에 대한 분석적 개념과 사유 방식에 초점을 맞춘다. III장은 젱하스의 문명화 평화론의 전제와 내용을 포괄적으로 다루며, IV장은 지금까지 젱하스의 평화론에 대한 비판과 논쟁을 소개하면서 그것의 장점과 한계 들을 고루 살필 것이다. 이 글은 지면상의 한계로 젱하스의 평화론이 한반도와 동아시아의 평화 논의에서 어떤 의의와 적용가능성을 갖고 있는지를 본격적으로 다루지는 못한다. 다만 맺음말에서 젱하스의 평화 론이 한반도와 동아시아의 평화 논의에 어떻게 기여하고 자극을 줄 수 있을지에 대해 그 대강의 방향을 제시하고자 한다. Ⅱ. 비판적 평화연구와 젱하스의 초기 평화연구 1. 비판적 평화연구와 조직화된 평화부재 개념 1950년대 초 일부 학자들의 선구적 연구를 제쳐둔다면, 독일(및 유럽)

36 OUGHTOPIA: The Journal of Social Paradigm Studies 평화학의 역사는 세 시기로 나뉜다. 먼저 1957년에서 1972년까지 평화학 의 창립기, 1970년대와 1980년대 비판적 평화연구 의 발전기, 1990년대 부터 현재까지의 연구 관점과 주제의 확대시기로 구분된다(Koppe 2010). 유럽 최초의 평화 관련 전문연구소는 1959년의 요한 갈퉁이 주도한 오슬 로 평화연구소(Peace Research Institute Oslo, PRIO)였고, 1966년 스웨덴 정부는 스톡홀름 평화연구소(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI)을 창립했다. 독일에서는 1957년 괴팅엔 대학 소속의 18명 의 자연과학자들이 독일의 핵무장을 반대하는 괴팅엔선언 을 발표하면 서 평화에 대한 학문적 연구의 화급성이 확인되었다. 1958년 뮌헨에서 평화학연구협회(Forschungsgesellschaft für Friedenswissenschaft)가 설립되었 고, 1959년에는 화학자이자 평화연구자인 칼 프리드리히 폰 바이체커 (Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker)의 주도로 결성된 독일학자연맹(Vereinigung Deutscher Wissenschaftler)이 평화연구를 이끌었다. 1950년대 후반의 재무 장과 핵무기 반대를 주요 내용으로 하는 독일 평화운동의 흐름은 1969년 서독 연방대통령 구스타프 하이네만(Gustav Heinemann)으로 이어졌는데, 그는 곧, 즉 1970년에 국제 갈등과 개발국 문제를 중심으로 다룰 독일 평화와 갈등연구 협회(Deutsche Gesellschaft für Friedensund Konfliktforschung) 설립을 발의하고 지원했다. 이 기구의 재정적 조직적 지원을 통해 평화연구는 평화운동의 보조적 주변적 역할 수행을 넘어 본격적으로 학문적 성숙을 맞이할 수 있었다(Wasmuht 1998; Koppe 2010; Schlotter 외 2011). 1970년대 이후 비판적 평화연구 의 국면은 평화학의 이론적 발전과 개념적 정립과 관련해서 더욱 흥미롭다. 전쟁과 폭력의 사회적 근간을 문제 삼는 이 관점은 1970년대 초 유럽 대부분의 국가에서 평화연구의 출발로 정립되기 시작해 여러 비판에도 불구하고 아직도 유럽 평화학의 기본 관점으로 인정받고 있다(Schlotter 2011, 21-23). 이와 같은 관점의

디터 젱하스의 평화론: 문명화의 복합구성 37 연구를 수행하기 위해 제시된 이론적 방안으로는 요한 갈퉁의 구조적 폭력 개념만 있었던 것은 아니다. 1960년대 말 젱하스는 이미 조직화된 평화부재(Organisierte Friedlosigkeit, organized lack of peace) 의 개념으로 평화를 방해하는 요소들의 복합구성 을 주제로 다루었다. 젱하스는 이 개념으로 국가 간 구조 및 관계 그리고 사회적 전략과 동기들의 전체복 합체(Gesamtkomplex) 를 지시하면서, 다양한 평화부재의 국제정치 및 국내 정치적 사건들을 초래하는 국제 관계 및 국내 사회 구조와 의식 등의 전체 조건들을 복합적으로 분석 하고자 했다. 젱하스는 바로 이 전체복합체에서 비평화(Unfrieden) 조직을 특징으로 보여주는 특정한 구 조와 행위 양식들이 촉진된다고 보았다. 덧붙여 젱하스가 보기에, 이 평화 부재 는 그 나름의 고유한 역동성을 갖고 있어 억제체제(Abschrenkungssystem, deterrence system) 속에서 전염병적 법칙성을 띠며 확산된다. 평화부재 는 그 나름의 합리성을 갖고 있어 비록 자연적으로 성장하기 도 하지만 계획에 따라 진행되는 것이 사실이며 그렇기에 파악 가능한 것이다. 1) 바로 이 조직화된 평화부재 의 개념을 통해 젱하스는 정치사회적 상황 의 안정화 를 통한 갈등의 조정에 초점을 두던 당시의 지배적인 평화학 1) 조직화된 평화부재 개념에 대해서는 젱하스의 초기 글(Senghaas 1969, 17-20; Senghaas 1970, 28-30)들을 참조하라. 젱하스는 평화부재 개념을 주로 사용하지만 비평화 의 개념도 간헐적으로 대체해 사용하기도 했다. 젱하스에게 있어 양 개념 은 큰 차이가 없어 보이지만 비평화 는 주로 구조나 조직의 의미로 사용되었다. 한편, 비평화 개념을 최초로 사용한 이가 1967년 수거타 다스굽타(Suguta Dasgupta) 이고 이는 제3세계의 고유한 저개발 상황과 이에 기초한 3세계학자들의 문제의식 의 발로, 즉 미국식 평화연구에 대한 도전은 주류의 바깥에서 나왔다 라는 주장(구 갑우 2007, 89; 기요시 2003, 18)이 있는데, 그렇게 볼 수는 없다. 독일의 젱하스가 조직화된 평화부재 라는 개념을 제시한 때는 이미 1966년이고 당시에 그는 아직 미국 사회과학의 영향 하에 있었다. 오히려 당시 미국과 독일, 인도와 북유럽 등에서 유사한 문제의식이 동시적으로 발생한 것으로 이해할 필요가 있다. 이에 대해서는 크리펜도르프(Krippendorff, 1971, 47-60)를 참조하라.