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301 1) 공정거래법상컴퓨터소프트웨어의끼워팔기규제 윈도우 XP 와윈도우메신저의통합이경쟁에미치는 효과에관한법경제적분석 1998 5 20 PC. (i) Internet Explorer( IE ) (ii) (OEM, original equipment manufacturers), (ISP, internet service providers), (ISV, independent software vendors), (ICP, internet content providers) Netscape Navigator 1 2. 1) BK21,,.,,. 1) United States. v. Microsoft Corp., Complaint, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 981232(TPJ, 1998). Apple IE Office, Java Windows,

302 2000 4 DC., (i) PC (illegal maintenance of monopoly in the Intelcompatible PC operating system market) 2 ; (ii) (illegal attempt to monopolize the internet browser market) 2 ; (iii) Windows IE (illegal tying of Windows and IE) 1, 2) 2000 6. 3) 2001 6 DC PC,.,, (per se illegality rule), (rule of reason),. 4) 2001 9, 5) 11. IE (middleware) OEM. 2) United States. v. Microsoft Corp., Conclusions of Law, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 981232(TPJ, 2000). Jackson (exclusive dealing) 1. 3) United States. v. Microsoft Corp., Final Judgment, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 981232(TPJ, 2000). 4) United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34(D.C. Cir. 2001). 5) Justice department informs Microsoft of plans for further proceedings in the district court. U.S. Department of Justice, Sep. 6, 2001. http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/ press_releases/2001/8981.htm.

303 (default program), (API, Application Programming Interfaces) (Communications Protocols). 6) 7) 2002 9..,, (network externality) (paradigm shift) (succession of temporary monopolies), 0 (predatory pricing), (illegal tie-in) (innovative integration)..,., 6) Department of Justice and Microsoft Corporation reach effective settlement on antitrust lawsuit, U.S. Department of Justice, Nov. 2, 2001. (Second Revised Proposed Final Judgment, February 27, 2002, http://www. usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f10100/10146a.htm), 2002 8 Microsoft 113 272 API. Joe Wilcox, Microsoft discloses more Windows code, CNET News.com. http://news.com.com/2100-1001-955655.html. August 27, 2002. 7) Joe Wilcox, Breakaway states nix Microsoft pact, CNET News.com. http:// news.com.com/2100-1001-275440.html, November 6, 2001.

304,,,. 8), 9) (operating system). (leverage), 2001 10 XP, - 8) Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in Software Markets, Competition, Innovation and the Microsoft Monopoly: Antitrust in the Digital Marketplace, J.A. Eisenach and Thomas Lenard(eds.), Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers(1999); Carl Shapiro, Competition Policy in the New Economy, Foundations of Competition Policy Analysis, Routledge(2000); Howard A. Shelanski and Gregory J. Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 68, pp.95-197(2000); Richard Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 68, No. 3(2001);,, 2001-14, 2001.. 9) (expert witness) Schmalensee Fisher. Franklin M. Fisher, The IBM and Microsoft Cases: What's the Difference?, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 90, No. 2, pp.180-183(2000); Franklin M. Fisher and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, United States v. Microsoft: An Economic Analysis, Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 46, No. 1, pp.1-69(2001); Richard Schmalensee, Antitrust Issues in Schumpeterian Industries, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 90, No. 2, pp.192-196(2000); David S. Evans, Albert L. Nichols and Richard Schmalensee, An Analysis of the Government's Economic Case in U.S. v. Microsoft, Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 46, No. 2(2001). Richard J. Gilbert and Michael Katz, An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp.25-44(2001); Michael D. Whinston, Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don't Know, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp.63-80(2001).

305 10), (.NET). 11), Schumer XP. 12) XP -, API. 13),. 14) XP, 15) XP. XP. ( ) 2001 9 ( ). 16) 10 Windows XP (Window Messenger), 10) Jim Hu, Microsoft messaging tactics recall browser wars, Cnet news.com June 7, 2001. http://news.com.com/2009-1023-267971.html. 11) PROCOMP White Paper, Microsoft's Expanding Monopolies: Casting a Wider.NET, May 2001. http://www.procompetition.org/headlines/whitepaper5_15.pdf. 12) Joe Wilcox, Microsoft under pressure on Windows XP, Cnet news.com July 25, 2001. http://news.com.com/2100-1001-270472.html. 13) Joe Wilcox, New Microsoft messenger takes aim at AOL, Cnet news.com June 3, 2001. http://news.com.com/2100-1001-267747.html. 14) Ronald Cass and Albert L. Nichols, Windows XP: New Features Worry Competitors, But Would They Harm Consumers? NERA Working Paper, August 2001. http://www.nera.com/wwt/publications/3655.pdf 15) Rachel Konrad and Ian Fried, States criticize Microsoft behavior, CNET News.com. http://news.com.com/2100-1001-268764.html, June 20, 2001. 16) MS, 2001 9 5. http://joins.com.

306. 9,, 18 XP, 17) 2001 10 Windows XP. 18), Windows XP. 19) 2002 9 ( ).. (new economy),., XP. (tied product) (tying product) (operating system),. 17) XP, 2001 9 27. http://joins.com. 18), XP, 2001 10 4. http://joins.com. 19) Joe Wilcox, Microsoft expands Windows XP messaging, CNET News.com http://news.com.com/2100-1001-274258.html. October 11, 2001.

307. (per se illegal),.,, - -, (per se legal)., (rule of reason).,., Jefferson Parish(1984) 20). D.C.,..,,. XP.,., 20) Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, v. Hyde( Jefferson Parish ), 466 U.S.2(1984).

308,, /,....,, API (pro-competitive)., /., (foreclose) /.,. OEM IAP (foreclose). OEM IAP. 2001 11

309 2002 9 Windows XP Service Pack 1, (middleware), OEM. Service Pack 1 XP.,.. (Instant Messaging), 1:1,,,. (peer-to-peer, P2P). AOL 1997,. 21) 1:1,,,,. PDA(, personal digital assistant) 22), 21),, KISDI IT FOCUS 2001 7, pp.48-51.

310. 23), 2001 1. 24). 2001 8 30,,, MSN, ( ), ( ),,,,,., 2002 8 74%. 25) 2000 12 161 20%, 14.9%, MSN 13%, ICQ 8.7%, 8.7%, 5.6%, 5%, 24.1%, 26) 2002 9, MSN MSN. 27) 22), 2002 5 28, http://www.etimesi.com. 23), 2002 2 27, http://donga.com. 24) (IM) 1, 2001 12 26. http://joins.com. 25) (IM) 1, 2001 12 26. http://joins.com. 26), KISDI 2000 12. 27) 2002 8 20 860 MSN 66.7%, 10.5%, 7.0%, 5.3% ( 74%,, 2002 8 5. http://joins.com ). 10,,, 10, 50

311 2000 10 AOL AIM 2,150, ICQ 910 AOL 3,000 1,060, MSN 1,030 AOL 1, 28) 2002 5 AOL 1 MSN. 29), AOL MSN. 30) AOL MSN,,,, (Windows messenger) 2001 10 XP, XP, (,, 2002 3 13. http://www.etimesi.com ;,, 2002 7 19 ;, 2002 9 11., 2002 4 MSN 300 110 (,, 2002 4 4 ). 28) Jim Hu, AOL's lead in instant messaging arena dwindles, CNET News.com http://news.com.com/2102-1023-248700.html. November 16, 2000. 29) 2002 5 AOL AIM ICQ 1 5 1 2, MSN 4,600 ( ). Jupiter Media Metrix 2002 3 AIM 750, MSN 680, 450. Jim Hu, Cries to open up IM have quieted, CNET News.com http://news.com.com/2100-1023- 911820.html. May 13, 2002. 30) 1 AOL (interoperability). AOL AOL. Jim Hu, Gates urges regulators to address instant messaging, CNET News.com http://news. com.com/2100-1023-250008.html. December 18, 2000.

312. (Operating System). 1980 (main microprocessor) (, ). x86 (Intel-compatible PC operating system) text user interface MS-DOS 1990 graphical user interface Windows 3.1 Windows 95. TCP-IP, CD,,,. 31), (platform). 32),,,, (API) (expose) API (call). 33), 31) Steven J. Davis, Jack MacKrisen and Kevin M. Murphy, Economic Perspectives on Software Design: PC Operating Systems and Platforms, University of Chicago Graduate School of Business Working Paper(2001). (http://gsbwww. uchicago.edu/ fac/steven.davis/research ). 32) United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 53(D.C. Cir. 2001).

313,.,. PC, PC., (API) (pro-competitive). 34) API. 35) API, JAVA,, OEM, ISP, ICP (foreclose) 33) Windows Macintosh API, (porting). United States. v. Microsoft Corp., Findings of Fact, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 981232(TPJ, 1999), p.30. 34) Ronald Cass and Albert L. Nichols, Windows XP: New Features Worry Competitors, But Would They Harm Consumers? NERA Working Paper, August 2001. http://www.nera.com/wwt/publications/3655.pdf 35) United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 53(D.C. Cir. 2001).

314. 36), 37)..,, (primary product tying product) ( ) (complementary product tied product) (bundle).,,., (foreclosure) (extension of monopoly power). (the classical leverage theory) 36) United States. v. Microsoft Corp., Complaint, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 981232(TPJ, 1998). 37) Second Revised Proposed Final Judgment, February 27, 2002, http://www.usdoj. gov/atr/cases/f10100/10146a.htm 38), (, http://plaza.snu.ac.kr/~ssyi ).

315.,. (leverage)... 1917 Motion Picture Patents, (film projector), 39) 1936 IBM (tabulating machine). 40) 1947 International Salt (salt dispensing machine), 41) 1958 Northern Pacific Railway. 42) (restraint of trade), (restraint of competition) 1. 43) International Salt(1947) 39) Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502(1917). http://www.findlaw.com/casecode/supreme.html. 40) IBM Corporation v. United States, 298 U.S. 131(1936). 41) International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392(1947). 42) Northern Pacific Railway Company v. United States, 356 U.S. 1(1958). 43) A.B. Dick (1912). A.B. Dick,,,

316 Northern Pacific(1958) (per se illegal). International Salt(1947), 44) Northern Pacific(1958). (the Chicago school of antitrust) 1950. Aaron Director. 46) Posner. Henry v. A.B. Dick Company, 224 U.S. 1(1912)., Clayton Act 1914 (F. M. Scherer and David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic performance(1990), 3rd edition, p.567). 44) Not only is price-fixing unreasonable, per se, but also it is unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396(1947)( ). 45) Northern Pacific Railway Company v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6(1958). 46) Aaron Director & Edward Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 51, pp.281-296(1956); Ward S. Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 67, pp.19-36 (1957).

317,,,,, (one monopoly profit).,.,. Posner, ( ) 0.5 ( 1 0.5 ) 47) Richard A. Posner, Antitrust law: An economic perspective(2001), 2nd edition, pp.198-199.

318 1 90 95.. Whinston, Whinston (essential). 48),? (quality control), - - (economies of joint production, sales and distribution) (price discrimination).,..,, (price discrimination)., ( ),.. 48) Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure and Exclusion, American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 4(1990), Proposition 3, p.851.

319,,, (Pareto improvement),. 49) (price discrimination theory of tying). 50), (meter).,,. (,, A.B. Dick(1912), IBM(1936), International Salt(1947) ).,. (i) 49) Hal Varian, Price Discrimination, Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. 1, North-Holland: Amsterdam(1989); Dennis W. Carlton and Jeffrey M. Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization(2000), 3rd edition, New York.. 50) Richard A. Posner, Antitrust law: An Economic Perspective(2001), 2nd edition, pp.199-200; Ward S. Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 67, pp.19-36(1957).

320 (ii) (iii) (iv).. (negative correlation). 51) (economies of scope),. 52),.,,,,..,,., ( (negatively correlated) ).,, 51) George J. Stigler, The Organization of Industry(1968), pp.165-170; Walter J. Adams and Janet L. Yellen., Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 90, pp.475-498(1976). 52).

321..,,. TV (copyrighted feature motion pictures) block booking. Loew s(1962) 1. 53) Stigler 1963 block booking, 54). ( 1 2 100 ). < 1> A B 1 130 30 2 40 100, A 130, B 100 23,000. 1 A, 2 B 53) United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38(1962). 54) George J. Stigler, United States v. Loew's Inc: A Note on Block Booking, The Supreme Court Review, University of Chicago Press, pp.152-157(1963); George J. Stigler, The Organization of Industry(1968), pp.165-170.

322,. 140 28,000. 1 20 2.., B 100 1, 1 10 ( 1 A 130, 10 B )..,.. (contractual tying) (technological tying).,,.. (,, )

323 (protection of goodwill). 55) ( ) (, ),. (reputation), ( : ). (asymmetric information),.. - -, ( ).,,,, (anti-lock break system, ABS).,.,. -, - - (economies of scale) (economies of scope)., 1988 (Buick Skylark) $12,568 55) Richard A. Posner, Antitrust law: An Economic Perspective(2001), 2nd edition, pp.201-202.

324 $40,280. 56),.,,..,,.,. 1970 80 IBM IBM. 57), Innovation Data Processing, Inc. v. IBM, 585 F. Supp. 1470, 1476(D.N.J. 1984) IBM dump-restore, ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 448 F. Supp. 228(N.D. Cal. 1978), Telex Corp. v. IBM, 367 F. Supp. 258(N.D. Okla. 1973). 58) 56) Dennis W. Carlton and Jeffrey M. Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization (2000), 3rd edition, p.304. 57). 58) IBM Keith N. Hylton and Michael Salinger, Tying Law and Policy: A Decision Theoretic Approach, Boston University School of Law, Law and Economics Working

325,.. Motion Picture Patents(1917), IBM(1936), International Salt(1947), Loew s(1962),. Posner Bork(1978),,, -, (per se legal). 60). (controlling) Jefferson Parish(1984),,., (i), Paper No. 01-14, 2001(http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/papers ). 59) Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox(1978), New York: Basic Books, p.372. 60).

326 (ii), (iii) (iv). 61).,,,.,,,. 62) Jefferson Parish. O Connor (concurring opinion),,. 63), ; ;,. 64) 61) Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12-18(1984). Jefferson Parish(1984) 2002 Microsoft DC., There are four elements to a per se tying violation: (1) the tying and tied goods are two separate products; (2) the defendant has market power in the tying product market; (3) the defendant affords customers no choice but to purchase the tied product from it; and (4) the tying arrangement forecloses a substantial volume of commerce. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 85(D.C. Cir. 2001). 62). 63) Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 34-35(1984). 64) Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Jefferson Parish, 40.

327,. 65). 66). 1985 (The Vertical Restraints Guidelines, Section 5).,. 1992 1985,,. 67) (game-theoretic models of oligopoly) (the Post-Chicago school of antitrust).,,, 65), Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 56-57(2d Cir. 1980)., Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, 1994, pp.351-352.,. Jefferson Parish. 66) Microsoft D.C.,. 67) 1992 1997,.

328,, 3 (, ),,. Whinston Carlton and Waldman,... Whinston (1990, Proposition 3)., (one monopoly profit theory), Whinston ( ),. Whinston, ( ),. 68) Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure and Exclusion, American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 4, pp.837-859(1990).

329 Whinston,,., (replacement parts market) (PC ).,, (systems market) (stand-alone market).. (fringe firms).,...,,. ( ).

330., ( ).,,.,, Whinston. Whinston., ( ),,. Whinston. 69) Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman., The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp.194-220(2002).

331, 1998 5 20 IE 98,,,.,, (cross-platform programming language). Carlton and Waldman, Whinston. 70),. Whinston Carlton and Waldman 70) Feldman (defensive leverage). Robin Cooper Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 87, p.2079(1999). (bottleneck component), Janusz A. Ordover and Robert D. Willig, Access and bundling in high-technology markets, Competition, Innovation, and the Microsoft monopoly: antitrust in the digital marketplace, Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Thomas M. Lenard eds(1999).. Carlton and Waldman(2002).

332,. (network externality)., (exclusive dealing), (predatory pricing),,,.,, (asymmetric information),,, 1980.,. (game-theoretic models of industrial organization),,. ( : ),. Fisher, (exemplifying theory), (generalizing theory). 71) 71) Franklin M. Fisher, Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View, Rand

333 Whinston, (excessive entry), ( ).,, (practical legal standard). 72), Whinston Carlton and Waldman Whinston. 73). Carlton and Waldman, (virtual tie through pricing), (contractual tie), (physical tie).,, (, ), (exclusive dealing) (rule of reason) Journal of Economics, Vol. 20, p.117(1989). 72) Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure and Exclusion, American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 4, pp.855-856(1990). 73) Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp.211-212, 215(2002).

334,.,, (plausible). 74) Whinston Carlton and Waldman,.,. Jefferson Parish (1984),,,, Whinston Carlton and Waldman.,, 75), Jefferson Parish(1984) O Connor 4. 76) Microsoft IE 74) Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries, Working Paper No. 145, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, University of Chicago(2000). 75) Northern Pacific Railway Co., 356 U.S. 1, 5(1958). 76). Hylton and Salinger Jefferson Parish(1984) 4, (qualified per se illegality),. Keith N. Hylton and Michael Salinger, Tying Law and Policy: A Decision Theoretic Approach, Boston University School of Law,

335 DC Jefferson Parish(1984),.,.,. Jefferson Parish(1984),.,. O Connor,, 77),., Carlton and Waldman,.,. Law and Economics Working Paper No. 01-14(2001). Microsoft Jackson amicus brief Lessig,. Brief of Professor Lawrence Lessig as Amicus Curiae, p.7, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30(D.D.C. 2000)(No. 98-1233). Sidak. Gregory J. Sidak, An Antitrust Rule for Software Integration, Yale Journal on Regulation, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2001, pp.1-81. 77) Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. 2, 38, 39(1984).

336.. Jefferson Parish(1984). Microsoft D.C.. 78). Jefferson Parish(1984), Microsoft DC. 1. (1) (tying product) (tied product), (2), (3), (4). : Jefferson Parish(1984)., 78) United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34(D.C. Cir. 2001).

337,.. (complementary)... 27%,,. Hovenkamp.,,. 79) : Jefferson Parish(1984). 30%, Times-Picayune(1953) 80). 81),,. Eastman Kodak(1992) 82),. 79) Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy(1994), p.366. 80) Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 73 S.Ct. 872(1953). 81) Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy(1994), p.356. 82) Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Service Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2072(1992).

338 :. (coercion to purchase),. (i), (ii), (iii), (iv). 83). Jefferson Parish. 84),,. : (foreclosing a substantial amount of commerce). Jefferson Parish,. 85) 83) Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy(1994), pp.364-365. 84) Id. 85) It is for this reason that we have refused to condemn tying arrangements unless a substantial volume of commerce is foreclosed thereby... Similarly, when a purchaser is forced to buy a product he would not have otherwise bought even from another seller in the tied product market, there can be no adverse impact on competition because no portion of the market which would otherwise have been available to other sellers has been foreclosed (Jefferson Parish, 466, U.S. 2, 16(1984). Phillip Areeda and Louis Kaplow, Antitrust Analysis(1988), 4th ed., p.757 ).

339. 86) D.C. (platform software).. Jefferson Parish(1984), D.C.,,. D.C. Jefferson Parish, (net efficiency) ( ) (screen out) (proxy). D.C.,. D.C. (Operating System, OS ),., D.C.. D.C. 86).

340,,. D.C. IE (Application Program Interface, API ) OS 3,..,. (robust distinct market).., OS. OS.,,. OS API,. D.C. (malleability). 87) 87), IE API (an entire browser application).

341, D.C. (bundling). 1. D.C.., 3,...,, PC. 88), D.C....,.,. 88),,, D.C..

342. D.C. (Windows Messenger). D.C. D.C.. D.C..., D.C.,,.,., IE API D.C...,, XP

343,... D.C..,., D.C. D.C,.. AOL Time Warner Sun Microsystems, D.C D.C.., D.C. XP. D.C....,.. IE OEM ISP

344. XP OEM.. IE Netscape (foreclosure). 89) Hovenkamp,,, IE D.C. IE. 90) IE IE. XP. XP, (videoconferencing),,, API (expose) Groove. 91) 89). 90) Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application, 2002 Supplement, p.806. 91) Joe Wilcox, Microsoft expands Windows XP messaging, CNET News.com http://news.com.com/2100-1001-274258.html. October 11, 2001.

345,. 92). 93) XP. AOL. 94). 2 9,, 3. 10 ( ),, 92). 93) Jefferson Parish(1984).. XP. 94), Schumer XP.

346. ( ), 1993. 7. 30.. XP.,.. 10. ( ) 95).,. 10.,,,..,. 95) 4 (1992) 2 28, 38 41.

347.,,.. /.,,,, 96)... 97),,..,., Jefferson Parish(1984) Microsoft D.C. (2001) (qualified per se illegality rule). (market 96) competition on the merits. 97), ( ) ( 39 2 11 ), 10 ( ), pp.160-161;, (, 4 (1992) 2 28 ), 10 ( ), pp.162-163.

348 foreclosure),,. 98), 99). 1998. 100) ISP IE, 2. 1 Excel, MS Word Outlook, Excel Word Outlook.,.. 101) 102). 98) 65. 99),. 100), 10 11. 20( 1771 ). ( ). 101), /,, No. 1150(1999. 2. 15.) p.101. 102) ( 5 (1993) 7 30 ).

349. 3.. 15. 10.,... Jefferson Parish(1984)..,..,

350.,..,. 103),.,.,. D.C.... 103), :, No. 519(1994. 1.) pp.50, 53.

351... 104),.,,. XP?..., Jefferson Parish(1984) 104) 14, 10.,,, 1020, p.43.

352.,.,.,,.. 10.. XP.,.,. D.C. (malleability)., API,. XP API (commingling),

353 XP,.,,.,,., 3 IBM (product design).., 105). 106),. EC, (net-efficiency). 107) 105),. 106). 107) Jonathan Faull & Ali Nikpay, The EC Law of Competition(1999), Oxford, pp.168-169.

354,. 108) 23. 1 1. 109) 3 108). (protection of competition) (protection of consumer welfare)., ( ).... DC.. 109) 第 條 不公正去來行爲 1 ( ),. < 1996. 12. 30, 1999. 2. 5, 1999. 2. 5> 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. <1999. 2. 5> 7.

355. 2, 36 1 1. 23 1 3 5.,,.. 23. 110) 111).. 112)..,,. 8. 1 7. 110), (1995),, p.321. 111), (2002), 3,, pp.300-302. 112) &,, 1999, pp.124-125.

356. 23. 1., 113) 114). 1.. 1,,. 115) 23 1. 116) 113) &, pp.125-126. 114) &, p.127( ).,, 8, p.634(2002)( I ). 115) I, pp.635-640. 116),,.,.

357... 117). 118),,...,,, (competition on the merits)..,,. 119) 117), p.306, 1998. 9. 8. 96 9003 ( ); 1996. 12. 6. 96 2240 ( ). 118), p.306, 2001. 6. 12. 99 4686 ( ). 119),

358, 2 9 120). 121),,.., 1,, pp.165-169(2001)( )., ( ),,,, ( ),, ( ).,, 382 p.34 383 p.56 (, p.167 393 ). 120) 2 9.,,. 1.. 2.. 3.. 4.. 5.. 6.,,,. 121) 3,, 22-23 (,, 13, 1991. 11, pp. 152-153 ).

359,, 122)..,,,, 123).,,. 124),,.. 125) 122), p.306; &, pp.127-128;, (1987),,, pp.322-323; I, pp.640-641;, pp.171-172. 123) 2001. 6.12. 99 4686 ; 1998. 9. 8. 96 9003. 124) 2001. 1. 5. 98 17869 ( ); 2000. 10. 6. 99 30817 ( ). 125) &, pp.128-129 (1) (,,,, ), (2) (,,, ), (3) (,, )., p.173.

360. 126).,,,.. 127). 128) 89 29075 [ ]., 126),, p.173. 127) 1992. 10. 22. 92-124 ( ); 1999. 11. 30. 99-246 ( )( ). 128) 1998. 9. 8. 96 9003 ( [ ], ) 2001. 6. 15. 2001 175 ; 2001. 6. 12. 99 4686 ; 2001. 2. 9. 2000 6206 ; 2001. 1. 5. 98 17869 ; 2000. 10. 6. 99 30817.

361, 129),.,. 1. XP..,,,,.,,.. 130), ( ). 129). 130) 2002. 1. 11. 2002-004 ; 2001. 5. 2. 2001-073 ; 2000. 8. 26. 2000-224 ; 2000. 8. 8. 2000-203 ; 2000. 6. 16. 2000-88 ; 1999. 11. 30. 99-246 ; 1998. 5. 6. 98-71 ; 1997. 12. 23. 97-341 ; 1992. 10. 22. 92-124.

362. 131),....,.?? 132).,., 10 1 30 133) 131), p.327;, p.415. 132). 133). LAN 1 56kb. (56 kpbs ) MSN Mmssetup.exe 960 kb 17 Daum DaMeonly26.exe 4,848 kb 1 26 ymsgrkr.exe 2,149 kb 38 BuddyBuddy.exe 1,690 kb 30 Tachysetup.exe 954 kb 16 dwgenie.exe 4,688 kb 1 23

363.., XP. (price bundling).,., Mac OS 10.2 ichat, 134) Netscape Navigator 7.0 AOL AIM. 135),.,., ( ),.,, 136) 134) Joe Wilcox, Jobs unveils new ipods and imac, CNET News.com. http://news.com.com/2100-1040-944349.html, July 17, 2002. 135) Jim Hu, Netscape 7.0 rekindles browser battles, CNET News.com. http://news.com.com/2100-1023-920242.html, May 22, 2002. 136),, KTH, 1,000 7,000

364.,., 137)... Hovenkamp. Hovenkamp.,,.. 2001 6 D.C, ( )., 2002 9 11. http://www.etimesi.com. 137) 2002 1, 10 20 2002 1,, P2P., 2002 1 3.; P2P, 2002 1 31. http://www.etimesi.com. 2002 10 MSN messenger 5 MSN 8. Joe Wilcox, Microsoft puts a price on IM features, CNET News.com. http://news.com.com/2100-1023-959500.html, September 25, 2002.

365 (proxy). 138),.?.. 139)..,,... 140),.,., 138) United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34(D.C. Cir. 2001). 139), 2000. 8. 6. 2000-224 ( ); 96-20 (, ). 2002. 1. 11. 2002-005 ; 2001. 5. 2. 2001-073 ; 2000. 8. 26. 2000-224 ; 2000. 8. 8. 2000-203 ; 2000. 6. 16. 2000-88 ; 1992. 10. 22. 92-124. 140), p.416,., p.328.

366,.,., Hovenkamp ( ).,,.., XP., ( ). 141), XP. 1.,, 23 1 3 141) Jefferson Parish(1984), Apple Netscape.

367..,...,.., (i), (ii), (iii), (iv). Jefferson Parish(1984). 142),. XP PC OEM XP. XP OEMs 142) Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy(1994), pp.364-365.

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382. (new economy)...

383 166) An Analysis of the Competitive Effects of Incorporating Windows Messenger into Windows XP In September fall of 2001, Daum Communications Inc. ( Daum ) filed a complaint before the Korean Fair Trade Commission alleging that Microsoft Korea had violated the Korean Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act ( MRFT Act ) by tying the Windows Messenger program to Windows XP. Daum subsequently filed a lawsuit seeking an injunctive relief against the commercial launch of Windows XP. Daum alleged that Microsoft s action is aimed at monopolizing the fast-growing instant messenger market by leveraging its monopoly power in the operating systems market into the messenger market. Microsoft s critics, including Daum, argued that Microsoft s actions are reminiscent of its illegal efforts to keep its monopoly in the Intel-compatible PC operating systems market against the nascent threat of Netscape Navigator by tying its Internet Explorer with Windows 95 and 98 and by signing exclusionary contracts with computer manufacturers (OEMs) and Internet Service Providers (ISPs). According to Daum, if Microsoft is allowed to dominate the instant messenger market by unfairly taking advantage of its monopoly position in the operating system market, local firms will be discouraged from developing innovative products. In response, Microsoft argued that the functionalities of the Windows operating system have continually improved since the first introduction of MS-DOS in the early 1980 s (e.g., graphical user interface, internet connection, hard disk defragmentation, College of Law, Seoul National University Division of Economics, Seoul National University

384 security, multimedia functions), and integrating Windows Messenger into Windows XP is merely another instance of improving the Windows program to better serve consumers. Furthermore, by exposing Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) to third-party software vendors, integration of Windows Messenger into Windows XP allows faster and cheaper development of applications software that ultimately benefits consumers. In this paper, we evaluate these two conflicting views on the basis of economic theories of tying as well as jurisprudence developed by case law in the U.S., Japan, and Korea. Our conclusion is two-fold. First, the inclusion of Windows Messenger into Windows XP has negligible anticompetitive effects, because consumers can easily download competing messenger programs and usually use more than one messenger program. Also, it has not been reported that Microsoft engaged in exclusionary contracts with either OEMs or ISPs that limit the distribution of competing programs. Unlike internet browsers, instant messenger programs are relatively small in size so that it takes only a couple of minutes to download them in Korea, where broadband Internet access, such as ADSL and cable modem, is widespread. As a result, the main distribution channel for instant messengers is the Internet itself, which no company, including Microsoft, controls. Furthermore, the entry barriers to the instant messenger market are low. In the Internet browser case, which is still pending in the U.S., Microsoft invested more than 100 million U.S. dollars annually since 1995 in order to develop Internet Explorer. As a consequence, competing companies have to invest vast amounts of resources to compete with Internet Explorer and the entry barrier to the Internet browser market is high. In contrast, as many as 30 companies are currently competing in the instant messenger market in Korea, and such programs as BuddyBuddy and Genie have gained wide popularity among teens by offering large-size file swapping functionalities and games that are attractive to them. Second, the integration of Windows Messenger into Windows XP makes it easier for consumers to use instant messaging and also reduces third-party software vendors development costs by exposing APIs. For example, Window

385 Messenger s videoconferencing features could be used to enhance distance learning and software developers could use its file-sharing and whiteboard features to build online collaborative applications. An indirect evidence for efficiencies from integrating instant messengers into operating systems is that Apple s newest operating system includes ichat, its instant messenger program, and Netscape Navigator 7.0 is bundled with AIM, AOL s instant messenger program. As a matter of law, a comparative analysis of tying laws of the US, Japan, and Korea shows that rule of reason should apply under each jurisdiction for an assessment of the legality of an alleged tying of Windows XP to Windows Messenger. Under the MRFT Act, in particular, there are three main requirements for illegal tying: (i) the tying goods and the tied products are two separate products; (ii) consumers are forced to purchase the tied product; and (iii) this is unjust in light of normal trade practices and therefore threatens to impede fair trade. On the separate products question, based on the indirect industry custom that competing firms in the tying product market have integrated messenger programs into their operating systems and browsers, one can argue that Windows Messenger and Windows XP are one product for the purpose of the tying law. At the same time, however, one can also argue that there is currently a robust distinct market for the instant messenger. Hence, our analysis is inconclusive on the first element. More importantly, however, our analysis clearly establishes that Windows Messenger integration case fails to satisfy the second and third elements of the law. Although Window Messenger is installed automatically with Windows XP, consumers are free to use competing messengers alongside with Windows Messenger. Indeed, because different instant messenger programs are not interoperable with each other, many users do install and use more than one program at the same time. In this sense, consumers are not forced to use the tying firm s tied product, i.e., Windows Messenger. Furthermore, since competing firms in the platform system market have also integrated messenger programs and since competing firms in the messenger market are not

386 foreclosed from distributing their products, technological integration of a messenger program into the operating system is not unjust in light of normal trade practices. This legal analysis is strengthened by the recent release of Windows XP Service Pack 1. This free update allows final consumers and computer manufacturers to hide Microsoft middleware (including Windows Messenger) icons from the desktop and the Start menu and to set competing software as default programs. In sum, because of its negligible anti-competitive effects and substantial pro-competitive effects, an application of rule of reason, which is warranted under the relevant provision of the MRFT Act, leads to the conclusion that the integration of Windows Messenger into Windows XP does not violate the MRFT Act.