GDR Embassy to DPRK Pyongyang, 13 March 1972 N o t e on a Conversation with the 1 st Secretary of the USSR Embassy, Comrade Kurbatov, on 10 March 1972

Transcription

1 Digital Archive International History Declassified digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org March 13, 1972 Note on a Conversation with the 1st Secretary of the USSR Embassy, Comrade Kurbatov, on 10 March 1972 in the GDR Embassy Citation: Note on a Conversation with the 1st Secretary of the USSR Embassy, Comrade Kurbatov, on 10 March 1972 in the GDR Embassy, March 13, 1972, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, PolA AA, MfAA, C 1080/78. Obtained by Bernd Schaefer and translated by Karen Riechert. Summary: During the conversation there was an exchange of opinions on the following questions: 1. The DPRK Position on the Nixon Visit to Beijing and its Influence on the Situation in Korea, 2. Conversation of Comrade Brezhnev with Foreign Minister Ho Dam in Moscow, 3. Some Aspects of KWP Activity in the Communist World Movement, 4. 60th Birthday of Kim Il Sung on 15 April Credits: This document was made possible with support from the ROK Ministry of Unification. Original Language: German Contents: English Translation Korean Translation

2 GDR Embassy to DPRK Pyongyang, 13 March 1972 N o t e on a Conversation with the 1 st Secretary of the USSR Embassy, Comrade Kurbatov, on 10 March 1972 in the GDR Embassy During the conversation there was an exchange of opinions on the following questions: The DPRK Position on the Nixon Visit to Beijing and Its Influence on the Situation in Korea Based on a written draft, Comrade Kurbatov asserted the DPRK reaction demonstrates how the Korean leadership is very content with the result, in particular with the inclusion of the Korea Problem into the [Shanghai] Communiqué between China and the United States. It [Korean leadership] is very pleased with the support of the DPRK Eight-Point Proposal and the demand to dissolve UNCURK. The Korean leaders think that the Chinese maintained a firm position on Korea. As Rodong Sinmun writes, the Korean leadership is viewing this as a great assistance by the fraternal Chinese people. During Nixon s actual stay in Beijing, the Koreans stated how the DPRK position was laid out in Kim Il Sung s speech from 6 August Nixon would not arrive in Beijing as a victor but as a defeated. This Korean position had been reiterated in the [Kim Il Sung] interview with [the Japanese newspaper] Yomiuri Shimbun [in January 1972]. The Nixon visit was interpreted as forced upon the American president. This way the Korean side assisted China s policy and agreed to the discussion of the Korean question in the talks. In its publications the Korean leadership attempts to hide from its people the parallel interests of China and the United States. It is pursuing its nationalist course and fails to notice the anti-soviet aspect of rapprochement between the Chinese leadership and the United States. The Korean leadership asserts China is a socialist power, stands firm on the basis of proletarian internationalism, and so on. The Korean leadership s position entirely consists of a course of pragmatism. In their policy toward the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the Korean leaders are increasingly guided by pragmatic considerations. They are eager to achieve Korean unification primarily with Chinese assistance. It became evident that, in preparation for the talks with Nixon, Chinese leaders were not interested in tensions on the Korean peninsula (like, for instance, during the declaration of a state of emergency in South Korea). The Chinese were successful to move the Korean leadership from its entrenched position. The inclusion of the Korean question into the talks in Beijing, which had occurred not without the knowledge of the Koreans, speaks to new elements in relations between DPRK and China and to new aspects in the Chinese leadership s policy towards the DPRK. The Chinese increasingly take matters to solve the Korean question into their own hands. Kim Il Sung s visit to Beijing which allegedly did not occur in early February according to the official version served the purpose of finalizing the exact joint position on the Korean question for the talks with Nixon. Also the stay of a group of Koreans in Beijing in permanent close touch with the Chinese side further demonstrated the increased stability of relations between the two sides. The Korean side denies a visit by Kim Il Sung to Beijing. Yet Chinese diplomats do not express denials but indicate how permanent consultations are possible, and a visit must hot have been unusual. It can be assumed that the Koreans and Chinese recently had another exchange of opinions about the Nixon visit. The [ Rodong Sinmun ] editorial of March 4 seems to be an indication of that. It can be expected in this context that steps will be taken to create a favorable situation for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. The Korean leadership views such as its main objective in the near future. Information exists according to which the Korean leadership has been continuously informed by secret material about the course of negotiations with Nixon. The talks with him in Beijing proved that China and the United States have common interests and want to resolve Asian and other problems without the Soviet Union. He [Kurbatov] also referred to

3 differing assessments of the Nixon visit by DPRK and DRV [Democratic republic of Vietnam]. I thanked Comrade Kurbatov for his presentation and informed him in turn about the evaluation of the Nixon visit by our Embassy. Note: A comparison of the text of the [Shanghai] communiqué between China and the United States and the published version in the DPRK press shows that it was printed almost verbatim with only few omissions: The last sentence in the first paragraph, the third paragraph, the term Republic [of] Korea, and the last paragraph. Conversation of Comrade Brezhnev with Foreign Minister Heo Dam [Ho Tam] in Moscow Here Comrade Kurbatov remarked that Comrade Heo Dam told Comrade Brezhnev that the DPRK will assume a new position towards Japan. There are also new elements in Japan s attitude towards the DPRK. Another aspect of the talks with Comrade Brezhnev were Comrade Heo Dam s statements concerning the United Nations. The DPRK, according to Comrade Heo Dam, is expecting from the Soviet Union and the socialist countries to support and defend DPRK position in the U.N. The PR China would stand up and support the DPRK there as well. Comrade Heo Dam continued how it would be positive if the socialist countries will act in the U.N. in a coordinated and identical fashion with China s positions. The issues of Japan and the U.N. were not included in the Joint Message [of USSR and DPRK on the visit]. Comrade Brezhnev just listened to the statements on Japan and remarked about the U.N. that this question warrants close study. Comrade Kurbatov stated furthermore that currently the Soviet Union is excluding an attack by the South against the North. On DPRK-PRC relations Comrade Heo Dam noticed the improvement of relations, though they had not occurred at the expense of DPRK relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Moreover, Comrade Heo Dam said in his talk [with Brezhnev] that the Chinese side will be fully informed about what the Korean side expressed in its talk with the Soviet comrades. Although it is an important question, there had been no [Korean-Soviet] consultations about party relations [KWP-CPSU] on this level [Brezhnev-Heo Dam]. Later Ambassador Sudarikov will inform more extensively about the Heo Dam visit. Some Aspects of KWP Activity in the Communist World Movement Based on a written draft, Comrade Kurbatov made the following remarks: In 1971 and 1972 the KWP continued relations with communist and workers parties. It participated in party congresses of several parties and practiced exchanges of delegations. It invited delegations from different parties to the DPRK. As previously, the KWP builds its party relations on a bilateral basis and refrains from multilateral cooperation. It increases its efforts to summarize the ideology of Juche into a comprehensive system and declares Kim Il Sung s Juche ideology as the only basis for party activities. The 5 th Party Congress pushed through a petit bourgeois, nationalist line contradicting socialist development. These nationalist tendencies and the strengthening of relations with China have increased some negative tendencies in the communist movement and in KWP relations to the communist and workers movement. Despite official KWP declarations about the need to build relations with individual parties on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, by its actual activities in the international communist movement the KWP is contradicting Marxism-Leninism with the nationalist Juche ideology, and proletarian internationalism with autonomy and independence.

4 The KWP leadership does not consider the experiences of the communist world movement, and it does not follow the collectively agreed decisions of fraternal parties. Instead it praises Kim Il Sung as an eminent leader of the communist and workers movement and praises him as a genius of the revolution. The KWP is guided by his works where he provided wise analysis of the features in the current international situation. It is guided by Kim Il Sung as a leader of the anti-imperialist forces because his ideas accelerate the demise of imperialism and guide the world revolution on the path of victory. Kim Il Sung s works, his statements during internal meetings with foreign party officials, and his published speeches invite the assumption that he has a negative view of theory and practice of the construction of socialism and communism in the Soviet Union and the socialist fraternal countries. Apparently he sees the path to socialism in the DPRK as the only correct and exemplary one for other countries. For instance, he declared in a conversation with the delegation of the leftist party of Swedish communists visiting the DPRK that he does not agree with the CPSU course to develop the Soviet Union as a people s state, since in his opinion such leads to a weakening of the dictatorship of the proletariat. According to Kim Yeong-nam [Kim Yong Nam], Deputy Head of the [International] Department IV in the [KWP] Central Committee, who based his statement on sayings by Kim Il Sung, individual countries where the proletariat has risen to power cannot ignore the facts of a danger of imperialist aggression and the restoration of capitalism through encirclement by the international capital, before communism will be eventually established on a global scale. Based on Kim Il Sung s ideas, the Koran propaganda is currently leading a broad campaign that defines as supporters of revisionism all parties which do not agree with positions of Kim Il Sung on questions like personality cult, dictatorship of the proletariat, class struggle, and so on. In this context a couple of embassies from the socialist countries have reached the conclusion that such a campaign leads to the development of camouflaged anti-sovietism in the DPRK. All this said and considered, the appeals by the Korean leaders for unity and closeness of the communist movement are just declaratory in nature, dishonest, and they are not corroborated by practical measures. The tendency becomes ever more clear that the KWP leadership does not focus on the unity of the communist world movement but aims at the revolutionary peoples of the world, of which the so-called united front of the revolutionary people in Asia constitutes the core (Korea, China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos). This approach testifies to a gradual departure from the class position of proletarian internationalism for a transition towards a nationalist, pragmatic position. In this context internal Korean propaganda has begun to claim that the socialist countries have lost their revolutionary spirit and therefore can currently serve only as a material base for the struggle of the revolutionary peoples. In public propaganda this position was to be found in somewhat modified form in the Rodong Sinmun article Let us defend the Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Proletarian Democracy. As the KWP is counting China among the revolutionary countries, and based on the ideological and political closeness of positions [between DPRK and PRC], we have to conclude that the KWP is on the path to solidify party relations with China. Since 1971 they exchange party delegations. Korean propaganda welcomed the assignments for the struggle by the so-called 9 th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), as well as the implementation of the so-called Cultural Revolution. A Rodong Sinmun article celebrating the 50 th CCP Anniversary claimed, after the Cultural Revolution, the CCP turned into an even more pure, steeled and strong party. KWP and PRC have established contacts and organize informational changes. In the DPRK the Chinese journal Hongqi continues to be circulated. In pursuing its own goals, the KWP leadership does not pay attention to the anti-soviet aspects of China s foreign policy. At the same time it comes close to Chinese positions, as it showed in particular concerning the events in Sudan, India/Pakistan and the Middle East. Recently the KWP has increasingly activated its relationship with the Albanian Workers Party. So far DPRK efforts have not resulted in desired Korean reactions on the Albanian side, they only

5 activated bilateral relations on the state level. For the occasion of important anniversaries they exchanged congratulations to underline traditional and friendly relations. The most active development of relations is the one with the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) on a nationalist base and under the labels of autonomy and independence of the parties. Contacts between KWP and RCP are activated according to an agreement from KWP participation in the party congresses of the fraternal parties in 1971 (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, GDR, Poland, Soviet Union) has not resulted in progress of relations between the parties. The gatherings were used by the KWP leadership as a podium to propagate its special positions in front of the international communist movement, namely to emphasize autonomy and independence of parties as the base for their mutual relations. The KWP leadership is departing from an exchange of experiences and delegations with the fraternal parties. For instance, despite respective agreements, there were no party officials sent in 1971 for vacations in our respective countries. The KWP leadership pays close attention to the tendencies of parties that deviate from the documents of [the international communist and workers parties meeting in] 1969 [in Moscow]. It is anything but coincidence that after the 1969 Moscow meeting certain parties have paid visits to the DPRK (Sweden, Spain, Norway, Italy, Reunion). In its relations with the parties of capitalist countries the KWP leaders aim at, in our opinion, influencing these parties according to KWP policy and using them as a vehicle to establish diplomatic relations. We must pay close attention and this is a dangerous phenomenon that the KWP might establish relations with pro-chinese splittist groups. For the first time ever, a congratulatory telegram to the KWP was published by the Communist Party of Thailand, which is completely in sync with Chinese positions. An important vehicle to increase influence abroad is the propagation of Kim Il Sung ideas through dissemination of his works and the founding of circles. Recent observations show that more attention is paid to those circles. They attempt to include communists in them in order to create permanent organizations. The Korean leadership tries to gain increasing ground through ideological infiltration into the international communist and anti-imperialist movement. There are ever more publications of congratulatory telegrams to Kim Il Sung with praises of his personality. Those congratulatory telegrams and messages cannot hide their Korean authors. Among other things, they want to manipulate the Korean people into believing that the entire world is studying the works of Kim Il Sung. The slide of the Korean leadership into the nationalist Juche ideology, the proclamation of this ideology s universal character, and its dissemination abroad, creates an ever growing danger for the socialist community of states and the communist world movement. It requires us to pay increasing attention and to hold consultations between our parties how to approach and deal with these KWP activities. I thanked Comrade Kurbatov for his statements and expressed that we are in agreement about the assessment of KWP activities in the International Communist Movement. Note A public demonstration of DPRK-PRC relations are facts like how the PRC Embassy in France organized a friendship meeting when on 25 February the DPRK Mansudae Ensemble visited France (telegram of 29 February 1972). When the ensemble arrived in Geneva on 8 March, it was welcomed at the train station by, among others, the Chinese Ambassador to Switzerland and employees of the Chinese Embassy. In the evening of the same day the Chinese side hosted a reception in Geneva in honor of the ensemble (telegram of 10 March 1972). 60 th Birthday of Kim Il Sung on 15 April

6 At the end of our conversation, Comrade Kurbatov asked whether the GDR will give a present to Kim Il Sung or wants to award him an order. This is a very problematic question and the [Soviet] embassy has so far not reached a result in its discussions. Here I remarked that so far I only know that we are preparing a congratulatory letter. My personal opinion: A present should have symbolic character, if a present will indeed have to be given. Comrade Gensicke, attaché of our Embassy, also attended this conversation. Merten Acting Ambassador CC 1x Far East Department [Foreign Ministry] 1x Central Committee, Department IV 1x ZID [Foreign Ministry Central Information Service] 1x Embassy, Political Department

7 보고 1972 년 3 월 10 일독일민주공화국대사관에서이루어진소련대사관 1 등서기관쿠르바토프동지와의면담내용 다음의질문사항에대해의견교환이진행되었음 : 닉슨의베이징방문과이것이한국상황에미치는영향에대한북조선 (DPRK) 의입장 서면원고에의하면, 쿠르바토프동지는최근중국과미국간의 [ 상하이 ] 코뮤니케에한국문제가언급되었다는점에대해북조선지도층이특히만족하고있음을그들의반응을통해알수있다고주장하였다. 북조선지도층은북조선의 8 도제안과언커크 [1] 의해체를요청한그들의제안이수용되었다는점에서매우만족하였다. 북조선지도층은중국이북조선에대해견고한지지의입장을표명하였다고생각한다. 로동신문은북조선지도층이이번사건을 우애의중국인민 이보여준지지로받아들이고있다고적었다. 실제닉슨의베이징체류기간중, 북조선측은 1971 년 8 월 6 일김일성의연설문에명시되어있는자신의입장을전달하기도했다. 닉슨은베이징에승리자가아닌패배자로도착하게될것이다. 이와같은북조선의입장은 [1972 년 1 월 ] [ 일본신문 ] 인요미우리신문에실린 [ 김일성 ] 의인터뷰에도반복되어나타나고있다. 닉슨의방문은미국대통령에게가해진외압으로성사된것으로해석되었다. 이런방법으로북조선은중국의정책을지지하고회담에서북조선에대한질문들을논의하는데동의한것이다. 북조선지도부는인쇄자료에서중국과미국이공통된이해관계를가지고있음을그들의인민들로부터은폐하였다. 그들은민족주의노선을취하며미국과중국지도부가반 - 소련주의를계기로화해의움직임을보인다는것을간과하고있었다. 북조선지도부는중국이 사회주의권력자 이고 프롤레타리아국제주의의견고한기반을갖추고있다 고확신하고있었기때문이다. 북조선지도부의입장은전적으로실용주의노선위에있다. 소련및다른공산주의국가들에대한그들의정책에서도철저한실용주의적노선비중이계속해서증가하는것을찾아볼수있다. 그들은중국의지원하에한반도의통일을이루기를열망한다. 닉슨과의대화를준비하는과정에서중국의지도부가한반도내의긴장상황 ( 예를들어남한의국가비상사태선포에대해 ) 에대해큰흥미가없었다는점이명백해졌다. 중국측은북조선의지도층으로하여금그들의완고한입장으로부터변화시키는데성공하였다. 베이징대화에서한국에대한질문을포함시킨것은, 그것이북조선의온전한인지하에이루어지긴하였지만, 결론적으로북조선과중국간관계에새로운요인으로등장하였으며중국지도층이북조선에대해가지고있는정책적입장에또하나의관점을더하게되었다. 중국은한국문제를자신들의손으로해결하기를원했던것이다. 김일성의베이징방문은 공식적으로알려진바에따르면 2 월초에이루어지지는않았으나 닉슨과의대화에나타난북조선관련질문으로북조선과의정확한연대지점을확고히하고자하는목적을이루게되었다. 북조선방문단은베이징에서중국측과가까이머무르면서정기적으로접촉하였으며이는양국간의공조관계가보다안정되었음을보여준다. 북조선측은김일성의베이징방문을부인하고있다. 반면중국측은이러한사실을특별히부인하지는않았으나, 양국간의교류가충분히가능한것이며, 이와같은방문이특별한일이아님을언급하였다. 이에따라북조선과중국측은닉슨의방문과관련하여의견교환이있었음을어렵지않게추측해볼수있다. 로동신문 3 월 4 일자사설은이를함의하고있는듯하다. 이러한맥락하에북조선이남한에서미군을축출해내기위해유리한여건을조성하기위한단계적조치를밟아나갈것이라는점을추측해볼수있다. 북조선지도부는바로이점을가까운미래에달성할주요목표로보고있다. 북조선이지속적으로닉슨과의협상과정과관련된기밀

8 자료를전달받았다는정보가존재한다. 베이징에서양국간의대화를통해분명해진점은중국과미국은공동의이해관계를가지고있으며, 소련의개입없이아시아및다른문제들을해결하고자하는의지를확인했다는점이다. 그 [ 쿠르바토프 ] 는또한닉슨의방문에대해북조선과베트남민주공화국이서로다르게평가하고있다는점을또한지적하였다. 나는쿠르바토프동지의발표에대해감사인사를전하고닉슨방문에대한우리대사관의평가를다시전달하였다. 참고 : 중국과미국의 [ 상하이 ] 코뮤니케의내용과북조선에서발표한내용을비교해보면몇가지생략된부분을제외하고는거의누락된내용없이대화가원문그대로기록되었음을알수있다. 누락된사항은첫번째문단의마지막문장과세번째, 마지막문단의 대한민국 이라는단어이다. 브레즈네프동지와허담외무상의모스코바회담 쿠르마토프동지는허담동지가쿠르마토프동지에게북조선이앞으로일본에대해새로운입장을취하게될것이라고전했다고강조하였다. 여기에는북조선에대한일본의태도변화가새로운요인으로작용한것으로보인다. 브레즈네프동지와나누었던대화의또다른측면은허담동지가유엔에대해언급한부분이었다. 허담동지가전한바에의하면, 북조선은소련과다른사회주의국가들이유엔에서자신의입장을지지하고방어해주기를원하고있다. 북조선은중화인민공화국역시마찬가지로북조선을지지하고나서주기를기대하고있다. 허담동지는나아가유엔내의모든사회주의국가들이중국과같이모두합의되고일치된방법으로행동하기를낙관하는입장을계속해서표명하였다. [ 소련과북조선이방문에대해나눈 ] 공동성명 에는일본과유엔에대한현안은포함되지않았다. 브레즈네프동지는일본에대한발표문을듣고유엔에대한사항은면밀한검토가필요한부분이라고지적하였다. 쿠르마토프동지는나아가현재소련은북측에대한남측의공격을배제하고있음을언급하였다. 허담은북조선과중국간의관계에있어서개선의여지를보았는데, 북조선이소련혹은다른사회주의국가와의관계를대가로치르지않으면서이것을이룩할수있는가능성에대해이야기하였다. 나아가허담은 [ 브레즈네프 ] 와나눈대담에서북조선이소련동지들과의대화에서표명한입장을중국에게온전히전달하겠노라고언급하였다. 상당히중요한질문이었음에도불구하고, [ 브레즈네프 - 허담 ] 간의고위급면담에서정당간관계 [ 조선로동당 - 소련공산당 ] 에대한 [ 북조선 - 소련 ] 양국간의협의는이루어지지않았다. 향후수다리코프대사는허담의방문에대해보다자세히전할예정이다. 공산주의세계운동에서조선로동당활동에대한일부관점들 서면원고에의거하여, 쿠르마토프동지는아래와같은의견을남겼다 : 1971 년과 1972 년, 조선로동당은공산당과노동당과의관계를지속해나갔다. 여러정당의정당대회에참가하였고대표부와의교류에도참여하였다. 그는북조선으로여러정당들의대표부를초청하기도하였다. 이전과마찬가지로, 조선로동당은정당과의관계를양자간의교류를기반으로구축하였으며, 다자간의협력관계에는소극적이였다. 그들은주체사상을포괄적인시스템으로구축해나가기위한노력을더해나갔으며, 김일성의주체사상을정당

9 활동의유일한사상기반이라고선언하였다. 다섯번째당대회는공산주의의발전과모순되었지만프티부르주아 ( 소시민 ) 와민족주의자들사이로뻗어나갔다. 이러한민족주의적경향과중국과의관계강화는공산주의운동및조선로동당이공산주의및사회주의운동과갖는관계에도부정적인경향을증폭시켰다. 조선로동당이마르크스 - 레닌주의를기반으로개별정당들과관계를구축하는것이필요함을공식적으로선언하였음에도불구하고, 국제공산주의운동의활동가들에의해조선로동당은스스로마르크스 - 레닌주의와민족주의적주체사상간의모순을형성하고, 프롤레타리아국제주의는 자주 와 독립 과모순을초래하였다. 조선로동당지도부는공산주의세계운동에서의경험을인정하지않고, 동료정당들이집단적으로내린결정들에따르지도않았다. 대신그들은김일성을공산주의와로동운동의저명한지도자로추대하고그를혁명의귀재로찬양하였다. 조선로동당은김일성이 현재국제정세의특징에대한현명한분석을제공 한그의업적을자체방침으로삼았다. 그들에게김일성은 반제국주의적힘에대항하는지도자 였으며, 김일성의사상은 제국주의의종말을가속화하고전세계적혁명을승리로이끄는 힘이였다. 김일성의업적과해외관료들과의내부회의에서남겼던그의어록, 그리고공식적으로출판된그의연설문들에의하면김일성은소련과동료공산주의국가들에서이룩한공산주의와사회주의의건립과그성공에대해부정적인의견과입장을취하고있었다는추측을해볼수있다. 명시적으로그는북조선이사회주의이념을구축해나가는길을 유일하게정당하고다른국가들에게모범적인 것으로보았다. 예를들어, 스웨덴공산주의극좌정당대표단이북조선에방문하여함께대화를나누었을때그는소련공산당의인민국가개발방안은프롤레타리아독재의약화를가져올것이기때문에동의하지않는다는입장을표명한바있다. [ 조선로동당 ] 중앙위원회의 [ 국제 ] 4 부의부부장인김영남은김일성이했던말을빌려 공산주의가종국적으로범지구적으로구축되기이전까지는, 프롤레타리아가권력을쟁취한개별국가들은국제자본에의한제국주의의침략과자본주의의부활의위험을좌시하지않을수없을것이다 라고말했다. 김일성의이념을기반으로, 북조선의선전은현재모든정당들을개인숭배, 프롤레타리아독재, 계급투쟁등과같은질문들에대해김일성의입장과동의하지않는수정주의의지지세력으로규명하고있다. 이러한맥락에서몇몇사회주의국가대사관들은북조선내에서왜곡된 반 - 소련 정서가발전할것이라는결론에이르렀다. 이상의사안들이모두논의되고고려된바, 북조선지도부가표방하고있는통일과공산주의운동에대한친밀감은본질적으로선언적이며, 정직하지못하며, 실용적수단으로도입증되지못하였다. 이러한경향은조선로동당의지도부가전세계공산주의운동의통합보다는이른바아시아의혁명적인민통일전선으로그핵심 ( 북조선, 중국, 베트남, 캄보디아, 라오스 ) 을구성하고있음을어느때보다분명하게나타냈다. 이러한접근방식은프롤레타리아국제주의의계급적지위에서점차멀어져실용적입장인민족주의노선으로전환되고있음을증명한다. 이러한맥락에서북조선내부의선전은 사회주의국가들은혁명의정신을잃었으며, 따라서이들은현재혁명적인사람들이투쟁하는물질적인기반만을마련해줄수있을뿐이다 라는주장을펼치기시작했다. 로동신문의기사에는이러한대중선전이다소수정된형태로나타나 프롤레타리아독재와프롤레타리아민주주의를지켜내자 라고등장했다. 혁명국가들중에서이데올로기와정치적으로인접한위치 [ 북조선과중국간거리 ] 를바탕으로조선로동당은중국에큰신뢰를가지고있는데, 이로미루어, 조선로동당은중국과정당간의관계를강화하기위해노력하고있다는결론을내릴수있었다 년이래로그들은정당간대표부교류를지속해왔다. 북조선의선전은중국공산당의이른바 9 차당대회의 투쟁의과업 을환영하였으며, 소위 문화혁명 의이행도반겼다. 로동신문의기사는중국공산

10 당 50 주년기념일에 문화혁명이후, 중국공산당이더욱순수하고강철같이강한정당이되었다 라고언급하며축하하였다. 조선로동당은중국과계속해서연락망을구축하고정보교류책을조직하였다. 북조선에서는중국신문인홍치가계속해서유통되고있다. 조선로동당지도부는자신들의목표를추구하는과정에서중국외교정책의반 - 소련경향에주의를기울이지않았다. 당시수단, 인도 / 파키스탄, 중동에서의특정사건들과관련해나타난바와같이, 그들은중국과보다가까운입장을취했다. 최근조선로동당은알바니아로동당과의관계를부쩍활성화시켰다. 현재까지북조선의노력은그들이원하는알바니아의반응을이끌어내지못하였으며, 정부수준에서양국간의관계를작동시킨것에불과했다. 몇몇중요한기념행사의경우그들은전통과우애의관계를강조하는축하메세지를주고받았다. 양국관계의가장큰발전은루마니아공산당이민족주의의기반하에서정당의 자주 와 독립 을주창하였던데에있다. 조선로동당과루마니아공산당과의교류는 1971 년부터양측간의합의에의하여진행되었다 년조선로동당이형제정당 ( 불가리아, 체코슬로바키아, 몽골리아, 독일공산당, 폴란드, 소련 ) 의정당대회에참여하였다는사실이양정당간의관계개선을가져온것은아니다. 조선로동당의지도부는이와같은모임을세계공산주의운동의선두에서자신들이점유하고있는특별한위치를선전하기위한연단으로활용하였으며, 특히양정당간관계에서 자주 와 독립 을강조하는기회가되었다. 조선로동당지도부는형제정당과의경험및기존의대표단교류방식에서탈피하고있다. 예를들어, 양국간의관련협정에도불구하고 1971 년에는해당국가로휴가를떠난당원이전무했다. 조선로동당의지도부는 1979 년 [ 모스크바 ] 에서 [ 국제공산당노동당회의 ] 에서도출된협정에서벗어나는정당들의경향을예의주시하였다 년모스크바회의에서일부정당들 ( 스웨덴, 스페인, 노르웨이, 이탈리아, 레위니옹 ) 이북조선으로의방문을추진했던점은어디까지나우연에불과하였다. 우리의의견에의하면, 자본주의국가내정당들과의관계에있어서조선로동당의지도부는조선로동당의정책에의거하여영향력을행사하고외교적관계를맺기위한수단으로그들을사용하려했던것으로보인다. 우리는이러한점을주의하여관찰해야하며 이것은위험한현상이다 조선로동당이친 - 중국분리주의집단들과관계를구축하려고시도할수도있음을주목해야한다. 처음으로태국의공산당에서는조선로동당에게축하전보를발송하였으며, 이는중국의입장과정확히일치하는부분이다. 외국에서의영향력을강화하기위한가장중요한수단은김일성이이룩한그의근본사상과업적을전파하고선전하는작업이다. 최근그의사상적동지들에게더큰이목이집중되고있다는특징이발견된다. 그들은공산주의자들을포섭하여집단을보다견고한조직으로만들려시도하였다. 북조선지도부는국제공산주의와반 - 제국주의조직속으로이데올로기를투영시켜토대를보다견고히다지고자하였다. 지금은과거그어느때보다김일성과그의성품을찬양하는전보가많아지고있다. 조선인들이이와같은축하전보와메시지의배후에있는사실은숨겨지지않는다. 다른것들과마찬가지로, 그들은전세계가김일성의업적에대해연구하고있음을북조선사람들이믿도록조작하고자한다. 국가주의적주체사상에몰두한북조선지도부는이데올로기의국제보편적성격과해외로의전파를통해국제공산주의세계운동이일어나고있는공산국들에게전례없는위험을양산하고있다. 이는보다면밀한우리의주의를요하며, 조선로동당의활동에대해우리가어떻게접근하고대응해야하는가에관해우리정당들간상의해야할필요성을높이고있다.

11 나는쿠르바토프동지에게그가전해준이야기에대해감사를표했고, 국제공산주의운동에서조선로동당의활동에대한분석에대해동의하고있음을밝혔다. 주석 북 - 중관계가대중에공식적으로노출된부분은프랑스주재중국대사관이 2 월 25 일북조선의 만수대 앙상블의프랑스방문 (1972 년 2 월 29 일전보내용 ) 을주선하였던친교행사와같은것임. 앙상블이 3 월 8 일제네바에도착했을때, 그들은중국대사와대사관직원들로부터환영인사를받았음. 같은날저녁, 중국측은앙상블의영예로제네바에서리셉션을열기도하였음 (1972 년 3 월 10 일전보내용 ). 4 월 15 일김일성의 60 번째생일행사 우리대화의끝자락에, 쿠르바토프동지는독일민주공화국이김일성에게선물또는훈장을수여할계획이있는지에대해물었다. 이것은매우문제적발언이었으며 [ 소련 ] 대사관은이논의에대해아직결론을내리지않고있었다. 나는여기서그들이축하서한을준비하고있다는사실밖에알지못하고있음을짚어둔다. 내개인적인의견은선물이전달되어야한다면그선물은상징적인성격을가지고있어야한다는점이다. 대사관의대외연락관 (attaché) 인겐지케동지또한이대화에참여하였다. 메르텐부대사 참조 1x [ 외무부 ] 극동아시아과 1x 중앙위원회제 4 부 1x ZID [ 외무부중앙정보서비스 ] 1x 대사관정치부 [1] 국제연합한국통일부흥위원회