ABSTRACT With the payment and settlement systems becoming more and more complex and interconnected, the issue of their interdependency rises as an imp

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1 韓國開發硏究제 32 권제 2 호 ( 통권제 107 호 ) 우리나라지급결제시스템의상호의존성에관한연구 이준서 * ( 동국대학교경영대학부교수 ) 강경훈 ( 동국대학교경영대학조교수 ) A Study on the Interdependencies of Payment and Settlement Systems in Korea Junesuh Yi (Associate Professor, Dongguk Business School, Dongguk University) KyeongHoon Kang (Assistant Professor, Dongguk Business School, Dongguk University) * 주저자 ** 본논문은 2008 년도동국대학교도약연구지원사업으로수행되었다. *** 이준서 : ( ) juyi@dongguk.edu, (address) Dongguk University, 3ga 26, Phil-dong, Jung-gu, Seoul, Korea 강경훈 : ( ) khkang@dongguk.edu, (address) Dongguk University, 3ga 26, Phil-dong, Jung-gu, Seoul, Korea Key Word: (Payment and Settlement), (Interdependency), (Disruption), 2 (Secondary Round Effect), (Simulation) JEL Code: E58, G21 Received: Referee Process Started: Referee Reports Completed:

2 ABSTRACT With the payment and settlement systems becoming more and more complex and interconnected, the issue of their interdependency rises as an important academic issue as well as a policy topic. This study examines causes, forms, and risk management of interdependencies of payment and settlement systems in Korea, and presents their current situation. By way of simulations using BOF-PSS2 developed by the Bank of Finland, we quantify the effects of an operational disruption on the payment and settlement systems so as to figure out the degree of interdependency. As a result, the secondary round effect reaches up to 13.6 trillion a day, which amounts to 7.8% of the daily settlement value. Furthermore, if we also consider the amount of direct operational disruption, the volume of operational disruption occupies 22.3% of total value of the daily settlement, evidencing that the interdependencies of the payment and settlement systems in Korea is enormously widespread. The secondary round effects are found to be more severe with security companies rather than with banks, and to be more depended upon when it is perceived rather than it actually happens. In case that we expand the liquidity to include cash holdings and deposits as assets, the secondary round effect dramatically decreases in all types of financial institutions while foreign banks account for more share of all the secondary round effects increases. Based on these results, we suggest various policy tasks and directions to improve the risk management of settlement systems: expansion of off-setting settlements, introduction of a new settlement system for securities transactions, rapid provision of liquidity to financial institutions, more effective monitoring on participant institutions, and intensified information sharing and cooperation among the systems.

3 ABSTRACT

4 174 韓國開發硏究 / Ⅱ Ⅰ. 서론,,,.,,.., (interdependency).,., DvP( ),,.,... 1). 1) (Fed wire). 25, %. 1.

5 우리나라지급결제시스템의상호의존성에관한연구 175.,,.....,. Bernanke(1990) 1987, Lacker(2004), McAndrews and Potter(2002), Fleming and Carbade(2002) Devriese and Mitchell(2006), Ledrut(2007). Heijmans (2009), ABN AMRO, ING, Rabo. McVanel(2005) Ball and Walter(2007),.. (BIS) (CPSS) CPSS

6 176 韓國開發硏究 / Ⅱ. BOF-PSS ( ).,,,., 10 2,., (BOK-Wire+)..,.,.,.

7 우리나라지급결제시스템의상호의존성에관한연구 177 Ⅱ. 지급결제시스템의상호의존성에관한이론적논의 1. 상호의존성발생배경및요인....,..,. (DNS) (RTGS). DNS RTGS (hybrid) (BOK-wire+).,. IT,.,., DvP, CLS,..,.

8 178 韓國開發硏究 / Ⅱ.,..,,. 2. 상호의존성의유형 BIS CPSS [Figure 1] (system-based), (institution- based), (operational environmental). 가. 시스템연계에의한상호의존성 (system-based).. [Figure 2]..,,.,. i), ii), iii), iv).

9 우리나라지급결제시스템의상호의존성에관한연구 179 [Figure 1] Forms of Interdependencies System-based interdependencies Institution-based interdependencies Environmental interdependencies Payment or settlement system A Payment or settlement system B Payment or settlement system A Payment or settlement system B Payment or settlement system A Payment or settlement system B Financial institution Common service providers Source: BIS CPSS, The Independencies of Payment and Settlement Systems, [Figure 2] Traditional Domestic Interdependencies Markets Central Counterparty Money settlements Securities settlements Trade Flow Central Securities Depository Primary Large Value Payment System Central Bank Other Large Value Payment System Collateral Source: BIS CPSS, The Independencies of Payment and Settlement Systems, 2008.

10 180 韓國開發硏究 / Ⅱ,,., (CCP), (CSD), (LVPS).,.,, 17 (ECB) TARGET. 나. 참여기관 (institution-based) 에의한상호의존성..,,.,,,,,. CHIPS Fedwire Euro1 TARGET...,, RP

11 우리나라지급결제시스템의상호의존성에관한연구 181. CLS. 3. 상호의존성증대에따른위험관리 가. 새로운위험의발생 다. 운영환경 (operational environmental) 에의한상호의존성 IT,,,,...,..,..,,., DvP..,

12 182 韓國開發硏究 / Ⅱ.., DvP.,.,,... 나. 위험에동반되는비용,,.,,. Leinonen and Soramaki(2003), [Figure 3] Berger, Hancock, and Marquardt (1996)

13 우리나라지급결제시스템의상호의존성에관한연구 183 [Figure 3] Cost Structure of Payment and Settlement System. Enge and Overli(2006). Arjani(2006). 다. 결제불이행의전이. CPSS [Figure 4] DvP

14 184 韓國開發硏究 / Ⅱ [Figure 4] The Paths of Disruptions S1 S1 S3 original disruption original disruption S1 S2 original disruption S2 S4 S2 S5 Panel 1 Panel 2 Panel 3 Source: BIS CPSS, The Independencies of Payment and Settlement Systems, ,..,. SWIFT IT,..,.,..

15 우리나라지급결제시스템의상호의존성에관한연구 185 Ⅲ. 국내지급결제시스템의상호의존성현황,,,. 1. 시스템연계에의한상호의존성현황 [Figure 5]. (Large Value Payment System: LVPS) (Retail Payment System: RPS), (Securities Settlement System: SSS), CLS (Foreign Exchange Settlement System: FxSS). 2),,,.. BC (BC card settlement system) (non-bank depository institution settlement system: NBDI) (Over the Counter Bond Market Settlement System: OTC BMSS) (International Central Securities Depository: ICSD). (daily settelement value) 3 <Table 1> , , 10%, 20~30%. 2),, 2004.

16 186 韓國開發硏究 / Ⅱ [Figure 5] Interdependencies of Payment and Settlement Systems in Korea (Unit: trillion won) FxFTS ($7 billion) FxSS ($25.1 billion) 1.5 LVPS (172.8) BC card settlement system (0.3) 0.2 RPS (45.3) 0.5 NBDI Settlement System OTC BMSS (17.8) ICSD ($9.5 billion) SMSS (8.2) 0.6 Commercial Banks Note: Daily basis in Sources: Bank of Korea; Korea Securities Depository; Korea Exchange. <Table 1> Recent Trends in Daily Settlement Value between Settlement Systems (Unit: billion won) Year OTC BMSS LVPS 8,208 8,985 10,610 SMSS LVPS RPS LVPS 10,490 12,489 15,930 FxSS LVPS ,452 SMSS Commercial Banks Sources: Bank of Korea; Korea Securities Depository; Korea Exchange.

17 우리나라지급결제시스템의상호의존성에관한연구 187 <Table 2> Recent Trends in Daily Settlement Values of Major Settlement Systems Year LVPS 128, , ,798 SSS* 21,650 27,076 25,963 SMSS 8,084 11,737 8,237 OTC BMSS 13,566 15,339 17,726 FxSS 10,516 16,720 25,113 RPS 33,485 39,423 45,307 (Unit: billion won) Note: * daily transaction value Sources: Bank of Korea, Annual Report on Payment and Settlement Systems in 2008, 2009; Korea Securities Depository Statistics, %., 3 <Table 2> , 172.8,,, 144.4,,, , 26. 가. 거액결제시스템 (LVPS),,.,.,,,.

18 188 韓國開發硏究 / Ⅱ.,,., (BOK-Wire+),. (RTGS) (hybrid system)... 나. 소액결제시스템 (RPS), BC ,.. (Korea Financial Telecommunications and Clearings Institution: KFTC),,, 3). 다. 증권결제시스템 (SSS) (Security Market Settlement System: SMSS), 4) 3), CD, CMS, B2C, B2B,,,. 4),, RP.,,,,.

19 우리나라지급결제시스템의상호의존성에관한연구 189 (OTC BMSS)., (ICSD) ,,,,,.,.,.,,,.. 라. 외환동시결제시스템 (FxSS) 및기타결제시스템.. CLS SWIFT. (PvP), , BC. BC

20 190 韓國開發硏究 / Ⅱ ) 2. 참여기관에의한상호의존성현황..,,,... BC, 6). <Table 3>.,,., 60.9% %. 2.5% 30.2%, 4 2 DvP 40.4%., BC, 100%,., 5) 2006, BC ), 5.

21 우리나라지급결제시스템의상호의존성에관한연구 191 <Table 3> Daily Settlement Values of Financial Institutions Domestic Banks 1) Foreign Banks Security Companies (Unit: billion won, million shares) Insurance Companies Others Large Value Value 89,821 24,218 22, , ,577 Settlement 2) ratio Total Security Transaction (Stock) 3) Security Transaction (Bond) 4) Security Settlement by DVP shares 1,307 5,002 5) 40, ,860 51,371 ratio Value 277, ,612 5) 140, , , ,203 ratio Value 4,194 1,139 4, ,391 ratio Notes: 1) Domestic banks including commercial bank, special bank, and local bank. 2) Gross settlement basis. 3) Custody stock volume of participants group by KSD as of December ) Custody bond volume of participants group by KSD as of December ) Foreign companies including foreign banks and foreign security companies. Sources: Bank of Korea; Korea Securities Depository(KSD)., % 15.3% , %,. 1%.

22 192 韓國開發硏究 / Ⅱ <Table 4> Operational Networks of Payment and Settlement Systems Payment and Settlement System Operator Operational network (name) Controller LVPS Bank of Korea BOK-Wire+ Bank of Korea RPS KFTC SMSS Korea Exchange Check Clearing System GIRO system Interbank Shared Network Stock system Bond system Kosdaq system KFTC KOSCOM OTC BMSS KSD SAFE KSD FxSS CLS bank SWIFT CLS bank BC card settlement system NBDI settlement system BC card Nonghyup, Suhyup, Credit Unitons, Mutual saving banks, KFCC BC card settlement system Non-Bank Depository Institution settlement system BC card Nonghyup, Suhyup, Credit Unitons, Mutual saving banks, KFCC 3. 결제인프라에의한상호의존성현황,., IT 3. (KFTC),,. <Table 4>.

23 우리나라지급결제시스템의상호의존성에관한연구 193 Ⅳ. 자료및방법론 1. 자료.,,,,, DvP, PvP. 7) (8, 17, 19, 22, 26 ). RP,. 8),,, 9) , 10, 39, 2, 5, 2, 52.,,, DvP, PvP, 10).,., (settlement volume), (payment instruction value), (balance of current account), (intraday overdraft credit) <Table 5>. <Table 5>, 15,397, 210 7),,,, BC. 8) ),,,,, CLS,,,,, KFTC ),.

24 194 韓國開發硏究 / Ⅱ <Table 5> Summary Statistics of the Data for the Five Sample Dates Date Settlement Volume Payment Instruction Value Balance of Current Account (Unit: billion won, number) Intraday overdraft credit , ,656 22,386 9, , ,660 23,193 9, , ,185 25,018 9, , ,909 25,166 9, , ,318 22,691 9,289 average 15, ,146 23,691 9, , 9 33., - (fund transfer) <Table 6>.. <Table 6>, - 176, 9,625., %, 30, 27. 5,339, 2,771, 1,440., (general fund transfer) 101, 29, 20., DvP 4,179 3, 방법론

25 우리나라지급결제시스템의상호의존성에관한연구 195 <Table 6> Payment Instruction Values and Settlement Volumes of Financial Institutions Classified by Fund Transfer Systems Panel A: Payment Instruction Values (Unit: billion) Fund transfer system Domestic banks Insurance Foreign banks Fund intermediation Asset management Merchant bank Securities Total General 60, , , ,027 Security transaction 15, ,041 20,323 Call 23, , ,204 DVP 5, , ,275 11,154 PVP ,016 Net settlement 8, ,795 Others* 1, , ,195 Total 115, , , , ,717 Note: Treasury fund transfer, Treasury bond transaction etc. Panel B: Settlement Volumes (Unit: number) Fund transfer system Domestic banks Insurance Foreign banks Fund intermediation Asset management Merchant bank Securities Total General 2, ,651 Security transaction Call DVP 1, ,966 4,179 PVP Net settlement Others* Total 5, ,771 9,625 Note: Treasury fund transfer, Treasury bond transaction etc.

26 196 韓國開發硏究 / Ⅱ,.,., , 3,. BOF-PSS2,. BOF-PSS2. (RTGS), (CNS), (DNS),,,,,,..,.,. PSS2,,. Ledrut(2007) Heijmans(2009) McVanel(2005) Ball and Walter(2007).

27 우리나라지급결제시스템의상호의존성에관한연구 197,,,.... DvP. 10 2, , 2.. Bedford, Millard, and Yang (2005) 10, Amanuel and Conover (2005), Fedwire 27%., 2,.,.,.

28 198 韓國開發硏究 / Ⅱ...,..., (by-pass FIFO). V. 분석결과 1. 결제불이행발생시점및인지시점에따른파급효과,,, 13 6, 2 6., 10 2, 2,, 6, % %

29 우리나라지급결제시스템의상호의존성에관한연구 199 <Table 7> A Virtual Disruption's Secondary Round Effects Classified by Occurrence Disruption perception point Time and Perception Point Financial institutions Disruption occurrence time after 10 : 00 after 14 : 00 Value Financial institutions (Unit: billion won, number) Value No perception 46 13, ,218 after 2 hours 23 5, ,329 Instant perception 22 4, ,647., , (disruption occurrence time) (perception point) <Table 7>,., 4 4, , , <Table 7>

30 200 韓國開發硏究 / Ⅱ.,, , , 금융기관업종별파급효과 ) <Table 8>, 35~55% 60%, <Table 6> 4 2~5. 2., , 27 23%..,.,, ) 2.

31 우리나라지급결제시스템의상호의존성에관한연구 201 <Table 8> The Size of Secondary Round Effects on Financial Institutions (Unit: billion won, number) Disruption Domestic banks Insurance Foreign banks Asset management Merchant banks Securities Total OCT 1) PCP 2) V 5) N 6) V N V N V N V N V N V N after 10:00 NP 3) 3, , , , , IP 4) , , , , after 14:00 NP 1, , , , IP , , , Notes: 1) Occurrence Time. 2) Perception Point. 3) No Perception. 4) Instant Perception. 5) Volume. 6) Number 자금이체시스템별파급효과. 74~95%. <Table 6>.. <Table 9>, DvP,.,, DvP. 12)

32 202 韓國開發硏究 / Ⅱ <Table 9> The Size of Secondary Round Effects on Fund Transfer Systems (Unit: billion won, number) Disruption General Security transaction Call DVP Others* Total OCT 1) PCP 2) V 5) N 6) V N V N V N V N V N after 10:00 NP 3) 10, , , , IP 4) 3, , , after 14:00 NP 8, , IP 2, , Note: Treasury fund transfer, Treasury bond transaction etc. 1) Occurrence Time. 2) Perception Point. 3) No Perception. 4) Instant Perception. 5) Volume. 6) Number.. PvP ). 4. 가용유동성확대시파급효과 4 2 ~2 3., <Table 10>, 12) )

33 우리나라지급결제시스템의상호의존성에관한연구 203 <Table 10> The Size of Secondary Round Effects on Financial Institutions and Fund Transfer Systems after the Expansion of Liquidity Panel A: Financial Institutions (Unit: billion won, number) Disruption Foreign banks Asset management Merchant banks Securities companies Total OCT 1) PCP 2) V 5) N 6) V N V N V N V N after 10:00 NP 3) , , IP 4) , ,376 4 after 14:00 NP IP Note: 1) Occurrence Time 2) Perception Point 3)No Perception 4) Instant Perception 5)Volume 6)Number Panel B: Fund Transfer Systems (Unit: billion won, number) Disruption General Security transaction Call DVP Others* Total OCT 1) PCP 2) V 5) N 6) V N V N V N V N V N after 10:00 NP 3) , , IP 4) , ,376 4 after 14:00 NP IP Note: Treasury fund transfer, Treasury bond transaction etc. 1) Occurrence Time. 2) Perception Point. 3) No Perception. 4) Instant Perception. 5) Volume. 6) Number..,,. 50~100%, 26~98%. 60%.

34 204 韓國開發硏究 / Ⅱ. <Table 6> , 8,. 5. 증권사결제불이행시.,. <Table 11>, ~17. 15~ <Table 11> <Table 8>.

35 우리나라지급결제시스템의상호의존성에관한연구 205 <Table 11> The Size of Secondary Round Effects When the Disruption is Occurred in the Biggest Security Company Panel A: Financial Institutions (Unit: billion won, number) Disruption Asset Domestic Insurance Foreign Merchant Securities management banks companies banks banks companies Total OCT 1) PCP 2) V 5) N 6) V N V N V N V N V N V N after NP 3) , , :00 IP 4) , , after 14:00 NP , , IP , , Notes: 1) Occurrence Time. 2) Perception Point. 3) No Perception. 4) Instant Perception. 5) Volume. 6) Number. Panel B: Fund Transfer Systems (Unit: billion won, number) Disruption General Security transaction Call DVP Total OCT 1) PCP 2) V 5) N 6) V N V N V N V N after NP 3) 3, , :00 IP 4) 2, , after 14:00 NP 2, , IP 2, , Notes: 1) Occurrence Time. 2) Perception Point. 3) No Perception. 4) Instant Perception. 5) Volume. 6) Number.., 일자별상이.

36 206 韓國開發硏究 / Ⅱ <Table 12> Daily Differences in the Size of Secondary Round Effects after 10:00 after 14:00 Notes: 1) No Perception. Value Mean Min Max Standard deviation Number Mean Min Max (Unit: billion won, number) Standard deviation NP 1) 13,605 7,256 29,761 8, IP 2) 4,781 1,434 12,274 3, NP 9,219 5,851 17,587 4, IP 2, ,991 1, ) Instant Perception. <Table 12>, (9 19 ) 29 8 (9 8 ) (9 27 ) 17 6 (9 8 ) 3, <Table 5> 5..,.. Ⅵ. 시사점및개선방안, 2

37 우리나라지급결제시스템의상호의존성에관한연구 참여기관들의상계결제 (off-setting) 비중확대.. 14)., 80%.,. (BOK-wire+) (A) ) A 73 A ) A 20 14). 15),,.

38 208 韓國開發硏究 / Ⅱ 6, Ledrut(2007) (reciprocity), A 89.4%. A (in-strength), (out-strength).,,. [Figure 6] 9 8 A. (weighted reciprocity). Valverde and Sloe(2006). (1) A, A.. A ,. 17) Ledrut(2007) 16) 62 A. 17), >0, <0.

39 우리나라지급결제시스템의상호의존성에관한연구 209 [Figure 6] The Relationship between In-strength and Out-strength of Financial Institutions (Unit: billion won) 새로운증권결제방식도입필요 DvP

40 210 韓國開發硏究 / Ⅱ.,. (DvP). 18) DvP 1 DvP1, DvP2 DvP3.., DvP1, DvP2, DvP3., DvP3, DvP1, DvP1..,,.. 3. 원활한유동성공급방안모색 ),,, 2008.

41 우리나라지급결제시스템의상호의존성에관한연구 ,.., RP. 4. 참여기관에대한모니터링및정보공유체제강화. 2, 3...,.. 19)..., 19) 12.

42 212 韓國開發硏究 / Ⅱ BCP. 5. 새로운형태의상호의존성대비,..,...,,.,..... Ⅶ. 결론,,

43 우리나라지급결제시스템의상호의존성에관한연구 213,.,., 3,,,. 15 9, 10 6, 1., %,. 22.3%,.., ,..

44 214 韓國開發硏究 / Ⅱ.,,, ,,.,. 20),,..,,. 20) 1,, 2., 1.

45 우리나라지급결제시스템의상호의존성에관한연구 215 참고문헌,, 2004., 2008, 2009.,,, Amanuel, D. and D. Conover, Operational Disruptions in Fedwire: Simulating Liquidity Needs and Understanding Counterparty Response, BOF-PSS Seminar, Aug Arjani, N., Examining the Trade-off between Settlement Delay and Intraday Liquidity in Canada s LVTS: A Simulation Approach, Bank of Canada Working Paper No , Ball, D. and E. Walter, Unanticipated Defaults and Losses in Canada s Large-value Payments System, Revisited, Bank of Canada Working Paper No , Bedford, P., S. Millard, and J. Yang, Analysis the Impact of Operational Incidents in Large-value Payment Systems: A Simulation Approach, in H. Leinonen (ed.), Bank of Finland Studies, E31, Berger, A., D. Hancock, and J. Marquardt, A Framework for Analyzing Efficiencym Risks, Costs, and Innovations in the Payments System, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 28, 1996, pp.696~732. Bernanke, B. S., Clearing and Settlement During the Crash, Review of Financial Studies 3, 1990, pp.133~151. BIS CPSS, The Interdependencies of Payment and Settlement Systems, No. 84, June Devriese, J. and J. Mitchell, Liquidity Risk in Securities Settlement, Journal of Banking and Finance 30, 2006, pp.1807~1834. Enge, A. and F. Overli, Intraday Liquidity and the Settlement of Large Value Payments: A Simulation-based Analysis, Norges Bank Economic Bulletin 77, 2006, pp.41~47. Fleming, M. J. K. and D. Carbade, When the Bank Office Moved to the Front Burner: Settlement Ffails in the Treasury Market after 9/11, FRBNY Economic Policy Review 8, 2002, pp.35~57. Heijmans, R., Simulation in the Dutch Interbank Payment System: A Sensitivity Analysis, DNB Working Paper Series 199, Lacker. J., Payment System Disruptions and the Federal Reserve Following September 11, 2001, Journal of Monetary Economics 51, 2004, pp.935~965. Ledrut, E., Simulating Retaliation in Payment Systems, DNB Working Paper Series 133, 2007.

46 216 韓國開發硏究 / Ⅱ Leinonen, H. and K. Soramaki, Simulating Interbank Payment and Securities Settlement Mmechanisms with the BoF-PSS2 Simulator, Bank of Finland Discussion Papers 23/2003, McAndrews, J. and S. Potter, Liquidity Effects of the Events of September 11, 2001, FRBNY Economic Policy Review 8, 2002, pp.59~79. McVanel, D., The Impact of Unanticipated Defaults in Canada s Large Value Transfer System, Bank of Canada Working Paper No , Valverde, S. and R. Sole, Evolving Social Weighed Networks: Nonlocal Dynamics of Open Source Communities, Europhysics Letters, 1 February 2006.

DBPIA-NURIMEDIA

DBPIA-NURIMEDIA The e-business Studies Volume 17, Number 6, December, 30, 2016:275~289 Received: 2016/12/02, Accepted: 2016/12/22 Revised: 2016/12/20, Published: 2016/12/30 [ABSTRACT] SNS is used in various fields. Although