untitled

Transcription

1

2

3

4

5

6 OPENING CEREMONY SPEAKERS Dae-Kyu Yoon is Director of the Institute for Far Eastern Studies and Vice President of Kyungnam University, Seoul Campus. Over the past decades, he has taught law as a professor at Kyungnam University and overseen countless projects in various capacities for the institute. He has lectured at Harvard University and the University of Washington as a guest professor and served as a member of different advisory committees of various governmental agencies such as the Korean Board of Audit and Inspection, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Legislation, and the National Assembly. As a scholar, he has written numerous articles and several books in both Korean and English on the legal systems of the two Koreas, including Law and Political Authority in South Korea (Westview Press, 1990) a seminal work in the field; Law and Democracy in South Korea: Democratic Development Since 1987 (IFES, 2010); and Inconvenient Truth on North Korea (Hanul, 2013). He holds a B.A. from Seoul National University College of Law, and LL.M. and Ph.D. from the University of Washington s School of Law. Lars-André Richter is the Resident Representative of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom (FNF) in Korea. He studied humanities in Tübingen, Leipzig, Paris and in Berlin, where he earned his doctorate at Humboldt University. After working for the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) and the newspapers Welt online and Welt am Sonntag he joined FNF in He was press officer and deputy press secretary of the foundation before taking over its Seoul office in Hyungseok Kim is Vice Minister of Unification, ROK. Vice Minister Kim served as Secretary to the President for Unification at the Office of the President ( ). He was Senior Representative for Inter-Korean Dialogue at the Office of Inter-Korean Dialogue ( ), the Unification Ministry spokesperson ( ), and Director General for Intelligence and Analysis (2011).

7 PANELISTS William Newcomb is a visiting scholar at the U.S.-Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. In 2011 he was appointed by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to serve on the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009). He subsequently was reappointed to the DPRK sanctions panel for successive mandates, most recently in April 2014, and served as the expert on finance through June 2014, when he resigned. A former US government economist, Mr. Newcomb in 2008 retired from the Treasury Department where he was Senior Economic Advisor to the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis. During , Mr. Newcomb was Deputy Coordinator of the State Department s North Korea Working Group and alternate co-chair of the North Korean Policy Coordinating Committee. From 1984 to 2005, he served as the Senior Economist for Asia, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, and wrote extensively on developments in China, the DPRK and Vietnam for US policymakers. Dmitry Kiku is Member of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 1874 (2009), and a career diplomat within Russia s Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1997, having served in Germany and Azerbaijan. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he was directly involved in United Nations sanctions-related matters as Counsellor in the Department of International Organizations, covering issues related to the implementation of sanctions measures concerning the DPRK, Iran, Somalia and Eritrea. He was also involved in the coordination of inter-agency cooperation in this area, including assistance to Russian government agencies in implementing relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. He has a Ph.D. in political science from the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. From , Mr. Kiku was a fellow of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii and a fellow of the United Nations Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament in He is fluent in English, German and Russian.

8 Neil Watts hails from East London, South Africa. He joined the United Nations Panel of Experts monitoring implementation of sanctions against the Democratic People s Republic of Korea, in July 2013, and is responsible for maritime transportation aspects. On joining the Panel he was immediately called upon to investigate the interdiction of the DPRK vessel Chong Chon Gang in Panama for sanctions evasion. Formerly a Captain in the South African Navy, he specialized in surface warfare, serving nearly 20 years at sea onboard a frigate, support vessel and fast attack missile patrol boats; also serving as Commander of the Maritime Warfare School 1998 to He is a graduate of Stellenbosch University and the Executive National Security Programme. During a career spanning 33 years, he has had appointments in the Naval Inspectorate General; Naval Education and Training Directorate, and Joint Operations where he served on the National Maritime Security Advisory Committee, the Priority Committee for Maritime Security, and a member of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Counter-piracy Assessment Group in Beomchul Shin joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) as the Director-General for Policy Planning in Before joining MOFA, he was the Head of the North Korean Military Studies Research Division at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) in Prior to that, he worked very closely with the Minister of National Defense of Korea as the Senior Policy Advisor in 2009 and He also has served in many advisory positions both at the National Security Council at the Office of the President and the National Assembly Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee. He is currently a member of the Board of Directors at the Korean Society of International Law as well. Dr. Shin received his B.A. from Chungnam National University and did his graduate studies at Seoul National University, School of Law. He received his S.J.D. (Doctor of Judicial Science) from Georgetown University Law Center in Keyu Gong is an associate professor and deputy director, Center for Asian-Pacific Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS), China. Dr. Gong graduated from Department of International Politics, Renmin University of China, received her M.A. in International Relations at SIIS and Ph.D. in World Economics at Shanghai Academy of

9 Social Science. Dr. Gong s research fields include the North Korea nuclear issue, Sino-DPRK and Sino-ROK relationships, economic cooperation of East Asia, and the strategy of major powers in the region, inter alia. Dr. Gong was a deputy director of Shanghai Luwan Development and Reform Commission in 2008, and a visiting fellow at the Freeman Chair in China Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), USA in She was also a visiting fellow of International Scholar Exchange Fellowship (ISEF) program of Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies (KFAS) in Mijin Kang is a Team Chief and reporter at Daily NK. As a reporter, Ms. Kang covers the ground reality in North Korea. She also lectures at universities and speaks at academic conferences and seminars on the subject. She has contributed to television and radio broadcasts for Korean Broadcasting Service (KBS) and Unification Media Group. Yong Suk Lee is the SK Center Fellow at Stanford University s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and is affiliated with the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and the Korea Program. His research intersects the fields of international, urban, and labor economics. His recent works focus on globalization and sanctions, and entrepreneurship and innovation. His works on globalization and sanctions examine how economic sanctions affect the regional distribution of economic activity in North Korea using satellite night lights data, and North Korea's trade patterns. Other projects examine how China s competition affects firm dynamics in Korea, and how inequality in South Korea evolved after the Asian Financial Crisis. His works on entrepreneurship examine the impact of entrepreneurship on urban economic growth and government initiatives to spur entrepreneurship in East Asia. Dr. Lee's works have been published in economics journals such as Economic Development and Cultural Change, Journal of Health Economics, and Labour Economics. Previously, he was Assistant Professor of Economics at Williams College. He received his bachelor s degree from Seoul National University, M.A. in Public Policy from Duke University (USA), and Ph.D. in Economics from Brown University (USA).

10 Christopher Green is currently a Ph.D. candidate at Leiden University in the Netherlands, and co-editor of Sino-NK, a scholarly collective of young Sinologists and Koreanists dedicated to documenting and analyzing the borderlands dynamics, transnational ties, and history of Northeast Asia. He is also former Manager of International Affairs for Daily NK in Seoul. His research interests span the socio-political economy, ideology and mediascape of the two Koreas, and the multi-faceted impact of inter-korean division. His writings have been featured in Asia Times, Asia Sentinel, and NK News, as well as Daily NK. He has been interviewed by NPR, the BBC, Sky News, Al Jazeera, Reuters and CNN, among others. Eul-chul Lim is currently Professor and Director of the ICNK Center at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES), Kyungnam University. He serves as a member of the Policy Advisory Committee for the ROK Ministry of Unification and a guest editorialist in the Maeil Business News, Korea. His research focuses on North Korea s economy, inter-korean economic cooperation and development-related issues including capacity building. He is widely published in the above mentioned areas. His book publications include The New Paradigm for Economic Reform: Theory and Practice of Development for North Korea (in Korean, 2007) and Kaesong Industrial Complex: History, Pending Issues, and Outlook (in English, 2005), inter alia. Prior to joining IFES, Dr. Lim worked as a specialist in the Department of North Korea in the Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA). He was also a visiting scholar at Georgetown University. MODERATORS Joun-yung Sun is currently a Chair Professor of the Graduate School of Kyungnam University. Ambassador Sun was Korea s Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 2000 through 2003, and before that he served as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia from 1990 to 1993 and to Geneva from 1996 to Ambassador Sun was Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade from 1998 to 2000, and Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic Affairs from 1993 to He received his education from the College of Law,

11 Seoul National University, and the Graduate School of International Service of the American University in Washington D.C. He served as Vice-President and CEO of the United Nations Association of Korea from 2006 to 2013, and has been a senior scholar of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars since Su-Hoon Lee is Professor at Kyungnam University. He served as Director of the university s think-tank, the Institute of Far Eastern Studies, from 2009 to From 2005 to 2009 he served as Chairman of the Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative under the Roh Moo-hyun government. He has authored/edited several books and published numerous articles, essays, reports, and columns (in Korean and English) in various academic journals and news media. He received his M.A. in Sociology from the University of Alabama (USA), and Ph.D. in Sociology from Johns Hopkins University (USA).

12 CONTENTS SESSION Ⅰ Crafting International Sanctions and North Korea Panel 1 Sanctions in Practice 3 William Newcomb (Visiting Scholar, US-Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins SAIS) Panel 2 The UN Security Council Sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) 15 Dmitry Kiku (Member, UN Panel of Experts) Panel 3 North Korea and International Sanctions 35 Neil Watts (Member, UN Panel of Experts) Panel 4 Crafting International Sanctions and North Korea 53 Beomchul Shin (Director-General for Policy Planning, MOFA, ROK)

13 SESSION Ⅱ Perspectives on the Ground Reality of Sanctions on North Korea Panel 1 Sanctions on North Korea and China 73 Keyu Gong (Deputy Director, Center for Asia-Pacific Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies) Panel 2 North Korean Sanctions: Helpful or Harmful? 85 Mijin Kang (Team Chief & Reporter, Daily NK) Panel 3 International Isolation and Regional Inequality: Evidence from Sanctions on North Korea 95 Yong Suk Lee (The SK Center Fellow, Stanford University) Panel 4 North Korea Sanctions Conference: Talking Points 109 Christopher Green (PhD Candidate, Leiden University, NL; Co-editor, SinoNK) Panel 5 The Impact of Sanctions on the North Korean Economy 127 Eul-chul Lim (Professor, Kyungnam University)

14

15 Session 1 Crafting International Sanctions and North Korea

16

17 Panel 1 Sanctions in Practice William Newcomb Visiting Scholar, US Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins SAIS

18

19 국문초록 제재의실제 (Sanctions in Practice) 제재는 UN 안전보장이사회 ( 안보리 ) 가적대행위또는안보리가국제평화및안보를위협하는행위라판단한사안에대해서취할수있는가장강력한비동적 ( 非動的 ) 대응조치이다 (UN헌장제7장 41조 ). 안보리는개별회원국에채택된조치에대한이행의무를부여하며, 안보리가승인한제재의범위는대개포괄적이다. 이는헌장상구체적으로 철도, 항해, 항공운송수단의봉쇄및우편, 전신, 무선통신등통신수단의중단등경제관계의전부또는부분적중단과외교관계의단절 을말한다. 의도치않은결과 (unintended consequences), 즉취약계층에대한비용부과와정책목표의달성과관련한제재의비효과성으로인해제재조치에대한근본적인검토와재평가가이루어졌다. 이러한검토에는스위스의 인터라켄프로세스 (Interlaken Process), 독일의 본-베를린프로세스 (Bonn-Berline Process), 스웨덴의 스톡홀름프로세스 (Stockholm Process) 등이있다. 평판이낮아진 포괄적제재 (comprehensive sanctions) 에서표적 (targeted) 제재또는소위 스마트 (smart) 제재로이어졌다. 표적제재와포괄적제재의효과성을비교한연구에따르면전자는분명히의도치않은인도적비용을줄일수있으나강압을통한정책목표달성이라는측면에서는포괄적제재보다더효과적이라고볼수없다. 호주 핀란드 독일 그리스 스웨덴정부는美브라운대왓슨국제연구소및제재이행을지원하는민간단체인 Compliance & Capacity International 와공동으로 UN제재의효과성제고를위한고위급검토 (High-Level Review) 를실시한바있다. 지난 11월출판된해당검토의개요서는 UN회원국과피해공동체를보호하고, 제재와그이행을정교하게하려는관련 UN기구내구상과논의의기점이자예방이라는제재의유익한효과를제고하고표적제재를더욱정밀하게하기위한 150개의권고를담고있다. 주요한사항은다음과같다 : 1 제재에대한국가 기구 기업 개인의인식제고 2 개별회 5

20 원국의이행강화 3 UN체제및개별회원국의역량강화지원 4 제재대상의개인및단체의권리보호를위한적법절차개선 6 UN 산하제재위원회의의사결정구조 ( 만장일치제 ) 개선등이다. 고위급검토가다루지않았던주제는제재결의의초안작성및승인절차로, 이는안보리내외교협상을통해이루어진다. 제재결의에서주목할점은특정국가의위협적인행위에대해부과된제재조치는그외국가의유사한행위에대해취해지는결의에사용되는표현의근간이된다. 결의에서표현의미세한차이는중요하며, 이러한차이는상황에따라달라진다. 특히안보리내에서국가간이견으로최종안의작성이어려운경우, 안보리는모호한용어나 결정한다 (decides) 보다는 촉구한다 (calls upon) 이라는표현으로대신한다. 북한의핵무기및대량살상무기 (WMD) 의개발을중단하기위해취해진안보리결의는점자강화된조치를담고있다. 결의 1718 (2006) 은사치품수출금지및북한의개인및단체를제제의대상으로지정하였으나, 이들의구체적인명단은지정되지않았다. 그러나이후결의에서중러가반대한선박수색조치가포함되었고교역 금융제한조치는확대되었으며, 석탄 철광 금광 희토류등에대한수출금지조치도포함되었다. 향후중요한점은강화된조치에대한올바른이행과강력한집행이다. 제재이행수준이낮아지면, 제재위반위험이높아진다. 일례로쿠바의경우, 북한에무기및항공기를수출한바있고, 앙골라, 우간다, 이집트등의국가도제재를위반하였다. 또한제재대상으로지정된북한의단체가여러회원국내활동하기도하였다. UN 안보리와개별회원국은북한외여타회원국이핵개발을관리가가능한일이라여기는것을막기위해서라도, 굳은결의로대북제재를이행하여야한다. 6

21 7

22 8

23 9

24 10

25 11

26 12

27 13

28

29 Panel 2 The UN Security Council Sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) Dmitry Kiku Member, UN Panel of Experts

30

31 국문초록 The UN Security Council Sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) UN안전보장이사회결의안 2270 (2016) 2016년 3월 2일 UN안전보장이사회는지난 1월 6일과 2월 7일실시된북한의 4차핵실험및탄도미사일발사와관련해추가적인제재를부과하는결의안 2270 (2016) 을만장일치로채택하였다. 해당결의안은의무적인선박수색, 광물거래에대한부분별제재, 그리고그간의대북제재에서전례가없는강력한조항을포함하였다. UN안전보장이사회는또한결의안을통해불법활동에연루된개인 16명과조선로동당중앙위원회산하군수공업부및국가우주개발국등단체 12개를새로이제재목록에포함하였다. 이와동시에결의안은 한반도및동북아지역전반에서의평화와안정유지중요성을강조 하고중국 북한 일본 한국 러시아 미국이참여하는 6자회담의재개를촉구 하였다. UN안전보장이사회는 향후북한의행위를지속적으로검토하고, 북한의이행여부에따라서제재의강화 수정 중단 해제를준비하겠다는점을재확인 하였으며, 추가적인핵실험또는미사일발사시중대한조치를취할것이라는결의를표명한다 고밝혔다. 2016년전문가패널의최종보고서지난 2월 24일전문가패널 (Panel of Experts) 은 UN안전보장이사회에제출한 2016년최종보고서 (S/2016/157) 에서북한은 1차핵실험이후지난 10년간핵무기및미사일개발프로그램을포기할의사가없었다는점을강조하였다. 북한은오히려핵무기및미사일프로그램을확대하고, 자국의불법활동에대해서국제사회의묵인과정당성을확보하기위해노력한바있다. 전문가패널은또한북한이제재를효과적으로회피하였다는점과해외국적의회사에대리인을파견하여불법행위를은폐하였다는점도지적하였다. 이러한북한의불법활동은회원국의결의안이행이미비한가운데촉진 지속되었다. 결 17

32 의안이행이미비한원인으로는회원국의부족한정치적의지, 이행에부적합한국내법, 결의안에대한부족한이해및낮은우선순위부여등이지적된다. 이에따라전문가패널은불법활동및제재회피에연루된북한의개인및단체의추가적제재대상지정을권고하였다. 18

33 Abstract The UN Security Council Sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) UNSC resolution 2270 (2016) On 2 March 2016, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2270 (2016) to impose additional sanctions on the DPRK in response to its fourth nuclear test on January 6, and its ballistic missile launch on February 7. The resolution includes mandatory cargo inspections, sectoral sanctions on North Korean trade in natural resources, and other rigorous provisions unprecedented in the DPRK sanctions regime. Through resolution 2270 (2016), the Security Council further designated a total of 16 individuals and 12 entities for their prohibited activities, including the Munitions Industry Department of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea and the National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA). At the same time the Security Council reiterates the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia at large and calls for resumption of the Six-Party Talks involving China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States. The Security Council also affirms that it shall keep the DPRK s actions under continuous review and is prepared to strengthen, modify, suspend or lift the measures as may be needed in light of the DPRK s compliance and expresses its determination to take further significant measures in the event of a further DPRK nuclear test or launch. 19

34 Panel of Experts 2016 Final report In its 2016 Final Report (S/2016/157) submitted to the Security Council on 24 February the Panel of Experts emphasized that a decade since the DPRK conducted its first nuclear test, no indications have been found that the country intends to abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. To the contrary, the DPRK continued efforts to enhance the scope of its nuclear and missile program, and to seek international acceptance and legitimacy of these prohibited programs. The Panel s investigations have shown that the DPRK has been effective in evading sanctions. Designated entities conceal their illicit activities by embedding agents in foreign companies. All these activities are facilitated by the low level of implementation of Security Council resolutions by Member States. The Panel has consistently highlighted the problems of non-implementation of the resolutions, which allows prohibited activity to continue. The reasons are diverse, but include lack of political will, inadequate enabling legislation, lack of understanding of the resolutions and low prioritization. The Panel has recommended several designations in light of the involvement of individuals and entities in prohibited activities or sanctions evasion. 20

35 21

36 22

37 23

38 24

39 25

40 26

41 27

42 28

43 29

44 30

45 31

46 32

47 33

48 34

49 Panel 3 North Korea and International Sanctions Neil Watts Member, UN Panel of Experts

50

51 국문초록 북한과국제제재 UN안전보장이사회결의안 2270 (2016) 2016년 3월 2일 UN안전보장이사회는대북제재의범위를확대한결의안 2270을채택하였다. 해당결의안은지난 2006년 10월북한의 1차핵실험이후 4차인 2016년 1월 6일 수소탄 실험과 2016년 2월 7일탄도미사일발사에따른대응조치였다. 결의안채택이후, 북한의관영매체는김정은이 16년 4월 24일잠수발발사탄도미사일 (SLBM) 시험이후핵탄두폭발시험을명령하였다고보도한바, 북한은 UN결의안을거부하고불법활동을지속하겠다는의사를표출한것으로보인다. 참고로북한은 1998년이후핵실험을실시한유일한국가이다. UN안전보장이사회 15개국은북한의핵실험이관련 UN결의안을노골적으로무시 위반하는행위로, 핵무기의비확산에관한조약 (NPT) 에대한도전이자동북아및세계의평화와안정을위협하고있다고강력히비판하였다. 북한에관한결의안은 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) 등으로, 세부조항이추가되면서제재의범위와내용이확대 심화되었다. 현재북한은앞서언급된결의안중어떤것도인정하지않고있다. 결의안의제재와관련하여명심해야할점은이는 UN차원에서회원국이공동으로부과하는다자적제재로, 회원국이북한과의양자관계에서부과하는독자적제재와는차이가있다는점이다. 결의안 2270은북한산광물의공급 판매 인도등에대한부분별제재와북한국적의은행및자산에대한새로운금융제재조항을포함하면서, 제재의범위및목록을크게확대하였다. 결의안은또한회원국에게북한영토또는이를경유하는선박화물에대한검색뿐만아니라자국민또는자국거주인원이북한에선박 항공기대여및승무원을제공하지않도록하며, 항공유의판매및공급도중단할것을권고하였다. 이러한금지조항은제재회피활동에연루된북한의개인및단체에적용되는바, 결의안의부속서에는개인 16명 ( 자산동결및국외여행금지 ), 정부기관및은행포함단체 12개 ( 자산동결 ), 원양해운관리회사 (Ocean Maritime Management) 에등록된선박 31척 ( 현재 27척으로자산 37

52 동결조치대상 ), 사치품 4 종수출금지등이포함되었다. 이외에결의안 2270은북한주민에대한부정적인인도적결과또는경제활동및협력을포함한인도적활동에부정적인영향이없도록하기위하여예외조항 (carve-out provision) 을포함하였다. 이에따라 인도적 또는 생계목적 의무역은제재조치에서제외된다. 해당조항은무역활동이북한의핵무기 / 탄도미사일개발프로그램또는그외불법활동을위한재원창출에쓰이지않는경우에만적용된다. 해당결의안은북핵의평화롭고외교적인해결에대한 UN안전보장이사회의결의를재확인하고, 한반도비핵화를달성하기위한 6자회담의재개를촉구하며, 다자적인대화노력을환영하였다. UN안전보장이사회는북한의활동을지속감시하고북한의이행여부에따라제재조치를수정및해제할준비가되어있다는점도확인하였다. 제재위원회및전문가패널 UN헌장 7장 41조에따라운영되는 1718 위원회 (2006), 1874 전문가패널 (2009) 은제재이행의검토에서중요한역할을수행하는바, 위반행위에대한효과적인대응 북한개인및단체의제재대상지정 회원국의제재이행지원등을수행한다. 결의안 2270은전문가패널의권한을 2017년 4월 24일부로연장한바있다. 기존의결의안 1874에따라권한을위임받은전문가패널은제재이행의강 약점파악및보고 신뢰성및사실에근거한독자적인평가 분석수행및이를통한위반행위감시및조사 결과보고서제출 결의안불이행에대한조사결과및권고사항보고등을수행중이다. 38

53 Abstract North Korea and International Sanctions United Nations Security Council Resolution 2270 (2016) On March 2, 2016, the UN Security Council unanimously passed resolution 2270, which expands the scope of existing sanctions against the Democratic People s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The resolution was adopted in response to the DPRK s announcement of a hydrogen bomb test on 6 January ) followed by a ballistic missile launch on 7 February This was the DPRK s fourth nuclear test since the first in October Subsequent to the adoption of this resolution, DPRK official media announced that Kim Jong Un had ordered more nuclear explosion tests to test warheads 2) followed by a Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile launch on 24 April ), thereby demonstrating a renewed intent to continue its prohibited programs in defiance of the resolutions. The DPRK is the only State to have conducted nuclear tests since The 15-member UN Security Council condemned in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted in violation and flagrant disregard of the relevant resolutions, the DPRK s actions constituting a challenge to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to peace and stability in the region and beyond. Previous UN responses to nuclear tests included the adoption of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013). With each passing resolution, the scope and substance of the sanctions regime has both widened and deepened, entailing very specific provisions. It took almost seven weeks for the members of the Security Council to come to an agreement on the language in resolution 2270 (2016). The DPRK, however, does not recognize any of the above-stated resolutions. It is important not to confuse the impact of separate bilateral sanctions imposed by States or groups of States with those of the United Nations. 39

54 The resolution significantly broadens the scope and list of targeted areas, including sectoral provisions targeting supply, sell or transfer of the DPRK s resources and adds new financial provisions targeting DPRK banks and assets. Additionally, all States are now obligated to inspect cargo within or transiting through their territory destined for or originating from the DPRK. The Resolution says that States should prohibit their nationals and those in their territories from leasing or chartering their flagged vessels and aircraft to it, or providing crew services. The prohibition applies also to any designated individuals or entities assisting in the evasion of sanctions. All States should prevent the sale or supply of aviation fuel. The annexes list 16 designated individuals (asset freeze/travel ban); 12 designated entities including government agencies and banks (asset freeze); 31 vessels (now 27) controlled by designated firm Ocean Maritime Management (vessels subject to asset freeze); and 4 categories of luxury goods. Resolution 2270 also contains important carve-out provisions to ensure that the resolution does not have adverse humanitarian consequences for the DPRK civilian population or to negatively affect humanitarian activities (including economic activities and cooperation) that are not prohibited by the resolutions. These provisions include exemptions if trade is conducted for humanitarian or livelihood purposes. These exceptions only apply if they do not generate revenue for the DPRK s nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other prohibited activities. The resolution reaffirms the Security Council s commitment to a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the situation and calls for resumption of the Six-Party Talks to achieve denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, also welcoming multilateral efforts through dialogue. The Security Council affirms that it will keep the DPRK s actions under continuous review and is prepared to modify or lift the measures in line with the DPRK s compliance with the provisions. The Committee and Panel of Experts Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, - the

55 (2006) Committee and its 1874 (2009) Panel of Experts plays a critical role in this continuous review and is mandated by resolution 2270 to respond effectively to violations of the measures, to designate additional individuals and entities be subject to the measures, and to assist Member States in implementing the measures imposed on the DPRK. Resolution 2276 (2016), extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts to 24 April The Panel has an important mandate 4) in examining and reporting on the strengths and weaknesses of implementation, monitoring and investigating potential sanctions violations - utilizing credible, fact-based, independent assessments, analysis, and then submitting a report, containing its findings on incidents of non-compliance and providing recommendations, to the Committee. 1) The Power of a Hydrogen Bomb, Rodong Sinmun, 7 January ) Kim Jong Un Watches Ballistic Rocket Launch Drill of Strategic Force of KPA, Rodong Sinmun, 11 March ) Kim Jong Un Guides Underwater Test-fire of Strategic Submarine Ballistic Missile, Rodong Sinmun 25 April ) Resolution 1874 (2009), Paragraph

56 42

57 43

58 44

59 45

60 46

61 47

62 48

63 49

64 50

65 51

66

67 Panel 4 Crafting International Sanctions and North Korea Beomchul Shin Director General for Policy Planning, MOFA, ROK

68 본글은 5월 30일기준으로작성된글로서각국의안보리결의이행보고서내용을담지못했다. 또한개인자격으로작성하였기에외교부의정책방향과관계가없음을밝혀둔다.

69 국문초록 국제사회의대북제재전략 스스로핵보유국임을주장하고, 노동당규약에도핵무력과경제건설병진론을포함시킨김정은정권의행태는역설적으로국제사회가북한핵문제, 나아가북한문제를더욱직시하도록만든원인을제공했다. 유엔안보리결의 2270호와한국을중심으로미, 일, 호, EU 등다양한국가들의대북독자제재가연이어발표되고, 그이행이강화되고있다. 현재국제사회의대북제재는 강력하고실효적인유엔안보리제재, 주요국의강력한독자제재, 국제사회의대북압박강화라는 3가지차원에서전개되고있다. 특히유엔안보리결의 2270호의이행과관련해서는유엔회원국들의안보리결의 90일이행보고서제출등대북제재의성과를보다분명하게알수있는단계가도래하게될것인데, 동계기에대북제재의효과를정확히판단하게될것으로보인다. 북한의비핵화를이루어내기위해서는주요국및국제사회와의공조를더욱견고히함으로써전방위압박을이루어내야한다. 이를위해한국정부는엄중한상황인식아래국제사회와긴밀히공조대응하고있다. 이번만큼은과거와다른단호한대응으로도발의악순환을끊어야한다는강력한의지를바탕으로북한이도발에대한응분의대가를치르도록함으로써핵개발로는생존할수없음을스스로깨닫고, 전략적셈법을바꿀수밖에없는환경을만들기위해노력하고있다. 이를통해김정은정권이비핵화에동의하지않을경우 정권안정에필요한경제여건악화, 핵개발에막대한비용및부품확보제한, 국제사회로부터의철저한고립으로인해 체제유지 가어려울수있다는두려움을갖도록만들어야한다. 그렇지않을경우왜곡된국가관과안보관을보유한김정은정권이스스로핵개발을포기할이유가없고, 한반도와동북아의평화와안정이위협받는상황이지속될것이다. 북한핵문제해결을위한노력은단기전이아닌장기전이될것이다. 따라서보다거시적인관점에서국제사회가공감할수있는원칙을만들고그원칙을지켜나가는노력이필요하다. 동시에과거의경험을바탕으로북한의협상전술을분석하고, 그에맞는대응을해나가야할것이다. 따라서당분간은대화논의보다는제재논의에집중해야하며, 55

70 대북제재의충실한이행이이루어질수있도록노력해야한다. 또한궁지에몰린북한이도발을통해국면을전환하거나, 위장평화공세를통해당장의위기를모면하려는태도를보일가능성이있음에유의해야한다. 철저한대비태세유지를통해북한의도발의지를억제해야하며, 관련국과의소통을확대하며북한의진정성있는태도가담보되어야만의미있는성과를도출할수있다는공감대를형성해나가야할것이다. 56

71 Abstract Crafting International Sanctions and North Korea At the recent held Workers Party Congress, Kim Jong-un amended the s Party charter to include his doctrine of simultaneously pursuing nuclear and economic development and declared North Korea a nuclear-armed state once again. Ironically, such actions have made the international community realize the gravity of the North Korean nuclear issue and all North Korean issues. As a result, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2270, and a number of countries including South Korea, the US, Japan, Australia, and EU countries announced that they will impose bilateral sanctions against North Korea and are working to strengthen the implementation of such sanctions. The international community is currently carrying out sanctions against the North on the following three fronts: firm and effective UNSC resolutions, strict bilateral sanctions by major countries, and intensified pressure from the international community. Regarding the implementation of Resolution 2270, we will be able to accurately assess the effectiveness of the sanctions against the North when UN members submit their 90-day report. To denuclearize North Korea, major countries and the international community as a whole need to work together more closely and pressure the North on all fronts. Recognizing the seriousness of the current situation, the Korean government is taking response measures in close coordination with the international community. The government is determined to end the vicious cycle of North Korea provocations and is responding more sternly than ever before. By making the North pay the due price for its provocations, we can make the Kim Jong-un regime realize that it cannot survive if it continues to develop nuclear weapons and create an environment that would leave the regime with no other choice but to change its strategic calculus. We need to make the Kim Jong-un regime see that maintaining power will become difficult if it doesn t 57

72 agree to denuclearization as North Korea will face deteriorating economic conditions; bear the high cost of nuclear development and face difficulties in obtaining nuclear material; and become completely isolated from the international community. If we fail to do so, Kim Jong Un, who has misguided views on vision and security, will never give up developing nuclear weapons with his own free will, and the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia will remain under threat. Addressing the North Korean nuclear issue will be a long race. Therefore, we need to think from a long-term perspective and establish principles that all members of the international community can agree to and follow. At the same time, we need to analyze North Korea s negotiation strategies by going over the past negotiations and develop effective counter strategies. For the time being, we should focus our efforts on imposing sanctions, rather than on resuming talks, and make sure that the sanctions against the North are implemented faithfully. We should also keep in mind the possibility that North Korea may try to turn the tables by making provocations or stage a false peace offensive to maneuver itself out of immediate crisis. We need to deter North Korea s provocations by maintaining our military readiness and strengthen communication among related countries so as to build consensus that meaningful outcomes can only be when North Korea shows sincerity. 58

73 Ⅰ. 서언 국제사회의비확산체제를비웃는듯한북한의핵개발은 4차핵실험을고비로중대한도전을맞고있다. 그어느때보다강력한국제사회의대북제재에직면하고있기때문이다. 스스로핵보유국임을주장하고, 노동당규약에도핵무력과경제건설병진론을포함시킨김정은정권의행태는역설적으로국제사회가북한핵문제, 나아가북한문제를더욱직시하도록만든원인을제공했다. 유엔안보리결의 2270호와한국을중심으로미, 일, EU 등다양한국가들의대북독자제재가연이어발표되고, 그이행이강화되고있다. 한국정부는북한의 4차핵실험과연이은장거리미사일발사도발이동북아안보지형에중대한변화를가져올수있다는엄중한상황인식아래국제사회와긴밀히공조대응하고있다. 이번만큼은과거와다른단호한대응으로도발의악순환을끊어야한다는강력한의지를바탕으로북한이도발에대한응분의대가를치르도록함으로써핵개발로는생존할수없음을스스로깨닫고, 전략적셈법을바꿀수밖에없는환경을만들기위해노력하고있다. 이러한노력을바탕으로국제사회의대북제재는 강력하고실효적인유엔안보리제재, 주요국의강력한독자제재, 국제사회의대북압박강화라는 3가지차원에서전개되고있다. 따라서이글에서는이세가지측면에서의대북제재내용을살펴보고향후그전략과전망을논의하기로한다. 그리고과거김정일정권과달리핵보유의지를공개적으로천명하고있는김정은정권을상대하며비핵화를이끌어내기위해서는국제사회의강력한제재를통해비핵화에동의하지않을경우 정권안정에필요한경제여건악화, 핵개발에막대한비용및부품확보제한, 국제사회로부터의철저한고립으로인해 체제유지 가어려울수있다는두려움을갖도록만들어야한다. 그렇지않을경우왜곡된국가관과안보관을보유한김정은정권이스스로핵개발을포기할이유가없고, 한반도와동북아의평화와안정이위협받는상황이지속될것이다. 59

74 Ⅱ. 유엔안보리결의 2270 북한의불법적인핵개발에국제사회는유엔안보리결의를중심으로대북제재를추진하고있다. 국제사회의평화와안정에관한 1차적인책임을지고있는유엔안보리의결의 (resolution) 는유엔회원국을구속하는정치적법적의미를지니기에북한핵개발의불법성과국제사회의북한비핵화의지를보여주는가장확실한근거가되고있다. 북한의핵개발과장거리미사일발사실험계기로이미안보리결의 1695, 1718, 1874, 2087, 2094호등이결의되고이행중에있었는데, 지난 1월북한의 4차핵실험이후약두달만에이루어진유엔안보리결의 2270호는유엔의비군사적조치로는가장강력하고실효적인제재결의로평가되고있다. 안보리결의 2270호는두달간의협상이말해주는것과같이, 유엔안보리상임이사국, 특히미국과중국등의협의를거쳐만들어졌다. 동결의는 무기거래, 확산네트워크, 해운 항공운송, 수출통제, 대외교역, 금융거래등모든분야에걸쳐대폭강화된제재조치들을총망라하여유엔안보리의비군사적조치로는유례없이강력하고실효적인제재결의로평가되고있다. 안보리결의 2270은과거의결의에비해몇가지중요한의미를지니는데, 첫째, WMD 차원을넘어서북한체제에까지영향을줄수있는포괄적인제재다. 과거대북제재결의가북한의핵 미사일 (WMD) 개발억제에초점을맞추었던데반해, 금번안보리결의는 WMD 차원을넘어서북한관련제반측면에심대한영향을줄수있는제재조치들이포괄적으로망라하고있다. 북한은행의해외지점폐쇄, 광물분야 (sectoral ban) 수출금지및핵심국가기관 ( 정찰총국, 39호실, 기계공업부, 국가우주개발국등 ) 제재대상지정등은북한정권의자금줄차단및대외활동억제가가능하며, 무엇보다도대북안보리제재결의중전문에최초로북한인권문제거론함으로써김정은정권을압박하고있다. 둘째, 제재범위및강도양측면에서대폭강화된제재결의다. 다음 < 표 1> 에서보는바와같이 북한의광물분야 ( 석탄, 철, 철광등 ) 수출금지, 대북항공유판매 공급금지 ( 민생등인도적예외인정 ), 불법행위연루북한외교관추방등강력하고실효적인신규제재요소다수포함하고있다. 또한기존안보리결의상 촉구 60

75 사항이었던내용을의무화하고, WMD 관련성등단서를대폭삭제 ( 북한행발모 든화물검색의무화, 북한은행의해외활동전면금지등 ) 하는등기존제재요소도 대폭강화하였다. < 표 1> 안보리결의 2270 호분야별주요내용 1) 전문 우주협력 북한주민이처한심각한고난 (grave hardship) 에깊은우려표명 북한주민들의수요가미충족된상태에서북한이무기거래로얻는소득이 WMD 개발에전용되는것을우려 북한의탄도미사일발사와관련된어떤형태의기술협력도금지 ( 위성발사또는우주발사체포함 ) 북한의소형무기 (small arms) 수입금지 무기거래 수리, 서비스제공등을목적으로한무기운송도결의위반임을명확화 북군대의작전수행능력발전등에직접기여가능한모든품목에대해금수적용 ( 예외 : 인도주의 민생목적 / 제재위건별결정시 ) * 재래식무기 catch-all 군사 / 준군사조직및경찰훈련을위한훈련관 자문관초청등금지 제재대상지정 단체 12 개및개인 16 명추가 자산동결대상이되는경제자산에선박등유 무형모든자산이포함됨을명확화 제재회피나위반에연루된북한외교관 정부대표추방 ( 예외 : UN 관련목적, 사법절차상필요성 인도주의목적 / 제재위건별결정시 ) 확산네트워크 북한의불법행위연루외국인추방의무화 ( 예외 : 사법절차상필요성 인도주의목적 / 제재위건별결정시 ) 제재개인 단체의사무소폐쇄및북한인파견대표추방 북한의위장회사활용에주목, 제재위가관련개인 단체를규명하여적절할경우제재대상으로지정토록지시 북한의민감핵활동 미사일개발에특화된교육 훈련프로그램제공방지 해운항공운송 자국영토내북한행발화물검색의무화 북한에대한항공기 선박대여및승무원제공금지 ( 예외 : 민생목적 불법행위기여방지노력을제재위사전통보시 ) 1) 외교부, 국제사회의대북제재진행상황및전망, 통일준비위원회시민자문단간담회자료 ( 참조 ) 61

76 북한내선박등록, 북한기사용및북한선박에대한소유 대여 운용 선급 인증 보험제공금지 ( 예외 : 민생목적 불법행위기여방지노력을제재위사전통보시 ) 금지품목적재의심항공기의회원국이착륙및영공통과불허 ( 예외 : 비상착륙 ) 제재대상자소유 운영및불법활동연루의심선박의회원국입항금지 OMM 선박 (31 척 ) 이자산동결대상임을확인 생화학 수출통제 대외교역 북한의모든화학 생물무기및관련프로그램포기결정 / 생물무기금지협약 (BWC) 이행및화학무기금지협약 (CWC) 가입 이행촉구 핵 탄도미사일개발에사용가능한물품목록을제재위에서작성 / 생물 화학무기수출통제리스트업데이트지시 WMD 관련 catch-all 수출통제의무화 / catch-all 물품에대한압류 처분의무화 WMD 개발연관시석탄, 철, 철광수출금지 ( 예외 : 1 민생목적으로 WMD 와무관한경우, 2 외국산석탄의나진항을통한수출은 WMD 와무관하며제재위사전통보시 ) / 금, 바나듐광, 티타늄광, 희토류는전면수출금지 대북항공유 ( 로켓연료포함 ) 판매 공급금지 ( 예외 : 인도주의적목적, 제재위사전허가시, 북한민항기의해외급유 ) WMD 관련북한정부 노동당소속단체에대한자산동결, 자산 재원이전금지 ( 예외 : 외교공관, 인도적활동 ) 북한은행의회원국내지점 사무소신규개설등활동금지, 90 일내기존지점폐쇄및거래활동종료 금융 회원국금융기관의북한내사무소 은행계좌개설등활동금지, 90 일내 WMD 관련기존사무소 계좌폐쇄 ( 예외 : 인도지원, 외교관계에관한비엔나협약, 유엔활동등 ) WMD 활동에기여할수있는대북무역에대한모든공적 사적금융지원금지 금 (gold) 의거래에대해서도기존금융거래금지의무적용명확화 FATF 권고 7 이행촉구사치품 예시목록에 7개품목추가 ( 총 12개품목으로확대 ) 셋째, 중국의안보리결의채택동참확보다. 북한의 4 차핵실험직후고민의흔적 을보이던중국을한 미, 한 중, 미 일과의긴밀한공조를통해설득함으로써, 중국의 결의채택동참을확보해냈다. 특히한 중간의전략적소통은진일보하여, 한 중 62

77 정상통화 (2.5) 및 외교장관유엔방문계기한 미 일 중 러 5국대사협의 (2.10), 한 중외교장관회담 (2.11) 등을통해중국의협조견인해내는데큰역할을했다. 특히, 시진핑주석이안보리결의의전면적이행방침을밝힌 3월 31일한중정상회담으로부터 5일후, 中상무부가북한으로부터의광물수입금지, 대북항공유수출금지공고를발표한것은중국도실질적조치를취하고있음을보여주는단적인예라고할수있다. 그결과 2016년 4월북중간무역량은전년동기대비약 20% 내외로감소한모습을보이고있다. 물론북중간밀무역에대한통제및기타우회로에대한중국당국의통제수준을포함하여종합적인판단이필요한영역이나, 북한의핵개발을원치않는중국의확고한인식을고려할때 ( 중국의또다른관심사인 ) 북한의불안정상황을야기하지않는다고판단하는수준에서대북제재의강도를유지할것으로보인다. 따라서향후중국의강도높은대북제재가지속될것인가의문제는중국이판단하는북한체제의안정성과제재와의관계와밀접한관련을지닐것이다. 또한날로격화되고있는미중관계추이도영향을미칠것이다. 최근리수용북한노동당부위원장의방중 (5.31.) 과시진핑주석면담 (6.1.) 은중국의대북제재관련전망을더욱어렵게만들고있기에향후보다면밀한관찰이필요하다. Ⅲ. 주요국의독자적대북제재 핵보유를대외적으로천명하고있는북한을비핵화트랙으로되돌리기위해서는북한김정은정권이보다아파할수있는제재가필요하며, 이를위해서는유엔안보리제재에더해국제사회의자발적인독자제재가시너지를이루어야한다. 이를위해서한국은물론이고미국, 일본, EU 등주요국 / 기구들은독자제재를발표하고이를추진하고있다. 먼저한국정부는 2월 10일개성공단전면중단발표에이어, 3.8 국무조정실주관관계부처합동 ( 외교부, 통일부, 해수부, 기재부, 금융정보분석원 ) 독자적대북제재조치를발표하였다. 먼저금융재제측면에서는北과관련한금융제재대상대폭확대하여총 40명개인과 30명단체에대한제재를하고있다. 특히금융제재는북한의 WMD 개발및주요외화수입원차단에기여할것으로전망된다. 둘째, 해운통제측면에서는 63

78 北기항제3국선박의 180일이내국내입항금지와제3국선박남북항로운항금지 ( 지속 ), 제3국편의치적北선박입항금지를발표하였으며, 외국선박의北기항기피촉진, 北의심물자수송등에장애물형성, 편의치적제도를제재회피수단으로악용할가능성을차단할것으로기대된다. 셋째, 수출입통제와관련해서는북한물품제3 국우회위장반입차단, 남북간물자반출입통제강화, 대북특화별도감시대상품목목록 (watch-list) 작성을포함하며, 안보리결의의무 (WMD에이용가능한어떠한품목에대해서도이전 공급 판매를금지 ) 의충실한이행에기여할것으로본다. 넷째, 외화자금원차단과관련하여北영리시설이용자제를계도하여 12개국 130여개식당운영, 연간수익 1,000만불내외추정되는북한의관련외화수입의상당부분을차단할수있도록했다. 세계비확산질서를이끌고있는미국역시독자적인대북제재를강화하고있다. 북한의 4차핵실험과인공위성발사를가장한장거리미사일발사실험이후미의회는 2월 12일최초로북한제재만을단일목적으로하는강력하고포괄적인대북제재법안 (North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016) 통과시켰으며, 오바마대통령서명으로즉시발효 (2.18) 한바있다. 동법안은이례적으로신속히통과된바, 한 미 일동맹국들이단합된대북경고메시지를강력하게전달해야한다는미의회내분위기반영한것으로평가된다. 동대북제재조치의핵심내용은다음의 < 표 2> 와같다. < 표 2> 미행정부독자적대북제재조치 제재분야개인 단체북한자체예외신규대상 내용 재무부가아래사유로지정 미국내자산동결 / 美입국금지 o ( sectoral ban ) 북한운수 광업 에너지 금융분야에종사 (operate in) o ( 광물거래 ) 북한정권을이롭게할수있는 (benefit) 북한과의금속 흑연 석탄거래 ( 판매, 구매 ) o ( 인권침해 ) 북한정권의인권침해에관여 o ( 해외노동자 ) 북한노동자의해외송출에관여 o ( 사이버안보저해 ) 북한정권의사이버안보저해행위에관여 o ( 검열 ) 북한정권의검열행위에관여 北정부 노동당미국내자산동결 / 미국의대북수출 투자금지美연방정부및유엔 ( 산하기구 ) 의공식활동 (official business) 단체 (15 개 ) 선박 (11 개 ) 제재대상지정발표 64

79 또한오바마행정부는안보리결의채택직후북한국적개인 (12) 단체 (6) 를제재대상으로추가지정 (3.2) 한데이어, 안보리결의및美대북제재법 (H.R. 757) 이행을위한신규행정명령발표 (3.16) 하였고, 북한을자금세탁우려국으로지정 (6.1.) 함으로써북한금융기관과북한과거래하는제3국금융기관의미국금융시스템접근을차단하였는데, 이러한일련의조치는대북제재관련관심의초점이미정부의이행에집중된상황에서, 제재이행에대한강력한의지를재확인하였고나아가국제사회의대북압박을견인했다. 일본역시북한의 4차핵실험과장거리미사일발사실험이후인 2월 10일강력한대북제재조치계획발표하였다. 일본정부는대북정책과관련하여 대화와압력, 행동대행동 방침을밝혀왔는데동원칙에입각하여 인적교류규제확대 ( 방북경험이있는핵 미사일관련기술자의일본재입국금지등 ), 대북송금원칙적금지 ( 인도적목적의 10만엔이하제외 ), 자산동결대상확대 ( 단체1, 개인10), 북한선박의일본입항전면금지 ( 인도적목적포함 ), 북한기항제3국선박일본입항금지日 北간전세항공편운항불허등의내용을발표하였다. EU의경우미국이나일본에비해추가적인독자제재조치를도출하는데시간이소요되었으나 5월 27일북한과의교역을대폭차단하는강력한대북제재조치를발표하였다. EU는북한항공기와선박의 EU 영공통과, 기착, 기항을금지하고금융및투자제한조치를한층강화하였다. 특히북한이소유, 운영하거나북한승무원이탑승한항공기나선박이 28개 EU 회원국공항이나항구에아예들어오지못하도록함으로써북한에대한상징적제재를넘어실질적타격을줄수있을것으로보인다. Ⅳ. 국제사회의대북압박강화 안보리결의채택 90일이지난현시점에서다양한분야에서성과가가시화되고있는데, 이러한국제사회의단합된대응은북한의대외활동망을위축시키고있다. 예를들면대북금융제재와관련하여기존북한과거래관계가있던해외금융기관들이북한과의금융거래에소극적인자세를보임에따라북한이국제금융거래에큰장애 65

80 를받고있는상황이다. 북한의국제금융시스템이용이어려워짐에따라인편으로다량의현금을운반하다가적발되는스리랑카사례가그대표적인사례이다. 2) 그밖에도북한과일정한협력을해오던국가들이북한과의협력관계중단을결정하였는데, 최근박근혜대통령국빈방문시우간다가북한과의안보, 군사, 경찰협력중단을발표한것이대표적인사례이다. 이처럼안보리결의 2270호채택이후 北해운차단 北금융거래제한 불법활동연루북한인사추방, 北연수생초청취소등다양한분야에서안보리결의가이행되고있다. 특히, 해운분야가주목되는데, 중 러를포함한유엔회원국들이 OMM 선박 (27척) 에대한입항을불허함에따라선박들이북한으로되돌아가는사례들이나오고있으며, 현재제재대상인북한선박의대부분은북-북간이동이외에는해외로운항하지못하고모두북측항구에발이묶인것으로파악되고있다. 특히, OMM 선박중모든제3국편의치적선박 (6척) 에대한등록취소가자발적으로이루어진것은고무적이라고할수있다. 국제사회의지속적인북한인권문제제기역시북한김정은정권에게부담요인이될것이다. 북한의열악한인권상황과유엔인권사무소의활동, 이에더해북한핵문제로인한관심증대는북한인권에대한국제사회의보다적극적인행보를낳고있다. 물론북한인권문제는핵개발과직접관련이없는사안으로볼수도있으나, 북한핵개발은김정은정권의총체적인문제로인한것이라는점과, 나아가김정은정권에중요한압박수단이될수있다는점에서핵과무관하게또는유관하게국제사회의대북압박수단으로관심을기울여야한다. 현재국제사회의다양한대북압박으로인해북한김정은정권은실제생활에서적지않은타격을받는것은물론이고정권운용에있어심리적으로위축될수전망이다. 북한권력층이즐기는고가의사치품이나레저활동은물론이고김정은위원장이즐겨한다는치즈와같은품목이제한될때, 대북제재의효과는북한권력층의일상생활에서쉽게목격될수있을것이다. 이러한제재의효과는절대주의체제를유지하고있는북한의권력구조를고려할때, 어떤정책적함의를지닐지모른다. 2) 스리랑카에서는미화 16 만 8 천불소지북한인 2 명이공항에서적발되어적발외화를몰수당하였다. 66

81 Ⅴ. 대북제재의추진전략 핵보유의지를더욱노골화하고있는북한을비핵화트랙으로다시불러들이기위해서는우방국들과긴밀한공조하에대북제재의철저한이행을위한전방위적외교노력지속전개해나가야할것이다. 지난 20여년의지난한노력과다양한시도는역설적으로북한핵문제에대한환상적인해법은없다는것을말해주고있다. 오로지국제사회의일치된비핵화의지를바탕으로북한의진정성있는비핵화의지를확보하고이를기반으로의미있는협상을진행하는것이유일한해법이다. 이를위해서는북한김정은정권은생존에위협이될수있다는두려움을느끼게만들어야한다. 김정은정권이이러한부담을갖지않을경우비핵화의길로돌아올이유가없다. 따라서미, 일, 중, 러등핵심관련국은물론이고기타국제사회와의철저한공조를통해북한김정은정권에게핵개발을지속할경우 정권의경제운용의어려움, 비용부과 (cost imposing) 를통한핵무기개발비용의증대, 국제사회에서의고립 (isolation) 및평판 (reputation) 악화로정권의존립이어려워질수있다는점을깨닫게만들어야한다. 북한핵문제해결을위한노력은단기전이아닌장기전이될것이다. 따라서보다거시적인관점에서국제사회가공감할수있는원칙을만들고그원칙을지켜나가는노력이필요하다. 동시에과거의경험을바탕으로북한의협상전술을분석하고, 그에맞는대응을해나가야할것이다. 이를위해먼저당분간은대화논의보다는제재논의에집중해야한다. 강도높은제재를통해김정은정권에게잘못된행동에대한징벌이따른다는점을분명히각인시켜야한다. 과거북한과의핵협상은북한의도발, 보상, 재도발이라는악순환을반복해왔다. 따라서이번만큼은북한에게교훈을안겨주어야한다. 그렇지않으면김정은정권은 5차나 6차핵실험을감행해도과거와똑같은패턴이지속될것이라는착각을하게될것이다. 따라서적어도당분간은어떠한경우에도북한에대해제재를유지해야할것이다. 다행히북한이변화할수밖에없도록대북제재를지속강화해나가야한다는국제사회의의지는그어느때보다확고한상황이다. 이러한모멘텀을지속해나가기위해주요국들과소통을강화해야할것이다. 둘째, 지금까지대북제재의충실한이행이이루어질수있도록노력해야한다. 전통 67

82 적으로유엔안보리제재는결의도출보다이행이더어렵다. 제재이행과정에서국가의경제적손실을감수해야만하기때문이다. 이로인해안보리제재역시시간이경과되면그이행의지가퇴색하는경우가종종발생하기마련이다. 따라서중국이나러시아와같이북한과밀접한경제적연계성을지닌국가들과긴밀한소통을통해충실한이행을지속확보해야한다. 6월에는중국을포함한유엔회원국들의안보리결의 90일이행보고서제출등대북제재의성과를보다분명하게알수있는단계가도래할것인바, 동계기에대북제재의효과를정확히판단하고주요국및국제사회와의공조를더욱견고히함으로써북한에대한비핵화압박을강화해야할것이다. 또한전문가패널을포함한유엔제재위원회, 대북제재유사입장국들과함께지속적인아웃리치를전개해나가야할것이다. 셋째, 북한의위장전술에속아서는안된다. 궁지에몰린북한이도발을통해국면을전환하거나, 위장평화공세를통해당장의위기를모면하려는태도를보일가능성이있음에유의해야한다. 철저한대비태세유지를통해북한의도발의지를억제해야하며, 관련국과의소통을확대하며북한의진정성있는태도가담보되어야만의미있는성과를도출할수있다는공감대를형성해나가야할것이다. 소통확대차원에서는양자적차원을넘어다층적이고복합적인노력을병행하여그효과를극대화해야한다. 그간추진해온한 미 일, 한 미 중등의소다자협의는물론이고중 러를포함한 5자대화를이끌어냄으로써, 국제사회가북한의핵보유나병진노선을수용하지않을것임을김정은정권에게분명히각인시켜야할것이다. Ⅵ. 결언 외교적협상을통한북한의비핵화는가능할것인가? 만일가능하다면이를위한어떠한기회요인도활용해야할것이며, 만일불가능하다면그다음단계에대한구상이필요할것이다. 필자는결국비핵화선택은김정은정권의몫이겠지만, 철저한주변환경조성을통해다른선택지가없음을알게한다면아직도대화를통한북한비핵화의여지는존재한다고본다. 물론동아시아에불고있는신냉전의바람이북한 68

83 핵문제해결에커다란도전요인으로등장하고있지만, 아직도희망적인기회요인이우리와함께하고있다는희망적사고를전하며글을맺고자한다. 북한핵문제해법의가장큰기회요인은북한김정은정권의특성이다. 전제주의적독재체제와절대권력자인김정은위원장의존재는한반도평화와안정의도전요인이기도하지만, 김정은이마음을바꾸면비핵화도가능할수있기에기회요인이될수도있다. 예를들면민주주의국가에서의자유선거와같이민주적절차에의해전체국민의총의로서핵보유가결정되었고, 최고지도자도이러한국민적의사를함부로꺾을수없는체제라면김정은의마음이바뀌었다고해서비핵화가가능하다고말하기어렵겠지만, 북한의경우는정반대이기때문에가능하다고할수있다. 김정은의마음에정권유지여부에대한공포심을불러일으킬정도의압박과제재가이루어진다면핵문제를해결될수있을것이다. 또다른기회요인은북한핵문제의국제적성격이다. 핵문제가남북관계의문제이면국제사회의관심이나관여는적고, 한국혼자북한을감당해야하는바그해결이더욱어려울것이다. 그러나북핵문제는그심각성과파급효과가단지한반도에국한되지않고, 동북아와국제사회에커다란함의를지니는만큼, 국제사회와의긴밀한협력이라는기회요인이존재한다. 북한핵문제에대한한국의관여는한국의국익측면도있지만, 국제비확산체제유지에대한기여측면도존재한다. 오히려비확산체제를더욱강력히유지해야만하는 P5 국가들의더욱적극적인노력을요구할수있다는점을잘활용하면이들국가들의보다적극적인노력을유도해낼수있을것이다. 북한핵문제는그복잡한과거가말해주듯쉽게해결될성격의일이아니다. 그러나남북간체제경쟁의최종승자는한국이다. 북한은현재의병진정책을고수한다해도핵보유국지위를얻지못하는영원한 불법적핵개발 수준에머물것이다. 북한비핵화에보다큰믿음과자신감을갖고일관된정책을전개한다면그성과는생각보다멀지않은시기에나타날수있다. 끝. 69

84

85 Session 2 Perspectives on the Ground Reality of Sanctions on North Korea

86

87 Panel 1 Sanctions on North Korea and China Keyu Gong Deputy Director, Center for Asia Pacific Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies

88

89 국문초록 대북제재와중국 대북제재와관련하여중국이오래전부터유념해온사실은제재는매우신중히행사되어야하며, 국제사회는실질적인조치를취하기전에제재의효과와그로인해발생할수있는결과를고려해야하고, 상호맞대응하려는자세는적대행위만고조시켜지역의평화와안정을해치게될것이란점이다. 중국은또한북한이자신의행위에대해책임을지고, 국제사회는공동으로북한의그릇된행위에대해대응해야한다고생각한다. 중국은엄격히 UN제재를이행할것이나, 제재의효과에대해서는냉정하게평가해야한다고생각한다. 하루아침에문제해결을기대할수없다. 제재는그자체가궁극적인목표가아니며, 제재만으로핵문제를해결할수없기때문이다. 북한은전략적환경이완화되지않는한스스로핵능력을포기하지않을것이기때문에국제사회는적대행위를줄이고안보딜레마를포괄적으로해결하는데공동의노력을경주해야한다. 북한의 4차핵실험이후통일전개시나리오는그가능성이더욱높아졌는바, 가속화된통일프로세스는다음의시나리오중하나로전개될수도있다 : (1) 제재강화로인한북한정권붕괴 (2) 내부쿠데타발생 (3) 김정은건강문제및이로인한사태발생. 중국은북한에핵위협은안전보다는위협을증대시키고, 핵억제력보유는북한과주민들의장기적인이익이될수없다는점을설득하고있다. 이와동시에미국에게는차단과봉쇄가문제의해답이될수없으며, 이는오히려북한의안보불안과불평등의식을심어주어핵보유에더욱매달리게될것이란점을전달하고있다. 75

90 Abstract Sanctions on North Korea and China China has long realized that sanctions must be very carefully exercised, that the international society must fully consider the effect and possible consequences before taking actual measures, and that a tit-for-tat mentality will do nothing but escalate hostilities and impair the peace and stability of the region. On the one hand, China believes that North Korea must be responsible for its behavior and that the international society should take concerted actions against its ill conduct. China will strictly implement the UN resolution. On the other hand, China advocates a sober assessment of the effect of sanctions. One cannot expect the NK nuclear issue to be resolved overnight. It is clear that sanctions per se are not the ultimate goal and that sanctions alone can never resolve the nuclear issue. It seems impossible for North Korea to abandon nuclear capacities while its strategic environment is not substantially ameliorated, the international society needs to join their efforts to further reduce hostilities and tackle the security dilemma on the whole. After the North s fourth nuclear test, unification scenario is even more likely that the accelerated unification process will take place in any of the other three scenarios. (1) Regime collapse as the result of escalatory sanctions (2) Coup d état (3) Concerns over Kim Jong-un s health China is trying to persuade NK that nuclear blackmailing brings it more danger than safety and that possessing nuclear deterrence is not in the long-term interest of NK as 76

91 well as its people. At the meantime, China also convince the US that blockade and containment do not solve problems either, as they can only push NK closer to seeking nuclear weapons out of a feeling of insecurity and unfairness. 77

92 Sanction on North Korea and China The multiple tests and satellite launches have established the North Korea as a nuclear-capable state, if not a nuclear-armed one. As things stand now, the nuclear crisis on the Peninsular will become increasingly complicated, politicized, and highly sensitive. The crisis in not only over North Korea s nuclear ambition, but, more importantly, over the Kim regime s survival and longevity, and East Asian regional security. It has involved an increasingly number of regional and global players such as major powers like China and the United States, international organizations like the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency. A political settlement that could serve the interests of all stakeholders seems increasingly unlikely, if not possible, especially when multilateral mechanisms are almost moribund. In the absence of a robust regional security architecture based on mutual trust and effective communication and dialogue, this protracted crisis is also becoming increasingly delicate, threatening to trigger military conflict as a result of strategic miscalculation. The North Korean nuclear test is just like a test for China s new leaders. It said that Kim Jong-un s political power is still the same old do what I want style made china s new leaders angry. More and more people thought that North Korea s fourth nuclear test is a good moment for China to re- evaluate our longstanding alliance with the Kim dynasty. Many people think China and North Korea are blood brothers or brothers and comrades, so that China maintained its position during the course of UN Resolution only to leave the back door open for not strictly implementing the sanctions in the future. That is not right. 78

93 China has long realized that sanctions must be very carefully exercised, that the international society must fully consider the effect and possible consequences before taking actual measures, and that a tit-for-tat mentality will do nothing but escalate hostilities and impair the peace and stability of the region. Therefore, on the one hand, China demonstrates its position in a very firm and express way, China believes that North Korea must be responsible for its behavior and that the international society should take concerted actions against its ill conduct. Speaker of China s MFA also reiterated that China will strictly implement the UN resolution. On the other hand, however, China advocates a sober assessment of the effect of sanctions. One cannot expect the NK nuclear issue to be resolved overnight, as it is deeply rooted in the history. It is clear that sanctions per se are not the ultimate goal and that sanctions alone can never resolve the nuclear issue. Now that it seems impossible for North Korea to abandon nuclear capacities while its strategic environment is not substantially ameliorated, the international society needs to join their efforts to further reduce hostilities and tackle the security dilemma on the whole. After the test, there are many doubts from the international society about China s policy including: does China still hold unique influence over NK? Will China adopt more hardline policies due to NK s repeated provocations? Will China strictly implement the UN resolution it has endorsed? Will China reconsider its NK policy on the whole? Some Chinese experts said that China should abandon North Korea. They believed that North Korea will not reform and open up to the world; North Korea is pulling away from china; a relationship between North Korea and China based on ideology is dangerous; North Korea s value as a geopolitical ally is outdated; 79

94 once North Korea has nuclear weapons, it cannot be ruled out that the capricious Kim regime will engage in nuclear blackmail against China. Even more they said that the best way of giving up on Pyongyang is to take the initiative to facilitate North Korea s unification with South Korea. After the North s fourth nuclear test, one unification scenario is that an increasingly provocative and assertive Kim Jong-un, equipped with nuclear missiles, seeks greater international space and national independence, and nuclear- blackmails the South into unification on the North s terms. But as things stand now, especially judging by the internal and external factors after the fourth test, it is even more likely that the accelerated unification process will take place in any of the other three scenarios. (1) Regime collapse as the result of escalatory sanctions After the fourth nuclear test, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2270 in a 15-0 vote in favor of stepping up economic sanctions against the North, imposing mandatory inspections of all cargo going into and coming out of the North, ban on financial transactions, restrictions on the export of North Korean strategic assets and supple of aviation fuel to the North. Unilateral sanctions by some Western countries and China s call for full implementation of the UN resolution will certainly inflict huge impacts on the North economy---potentially to the point that Kim Jong-un s regime collapses under extreme circumstances. The collective defection to South Korea by 13 North Koreans working in a China s restaurant in April 2016 might be an early signs of a cracking regime. Economic sanctions have blocked the North path toward reform and opening. Even if Pyongyang emulates Beijing, the end result may still be regime collapse 80

95 instead of economic takeoff. As some put it, Fearing that once opening itself to the outside word, swarming in may not be only foreign products, investment, and technologies, but also an avalanche of information which may invalidate what it has propagated, Pyongyang thinks it s best to reject reform and impose tight control over its people. (2) Coup d état In a little over four years of leadership from his father s sudden death to his coronation at the seventh Party Congress, Kim Jong-un had launched a sweeping reshuffle in which more than 70 senior officials were either executed, demoted, or sidelined---most notable among them was his uncle-in-law Jang Song-thaek. His quick and reckless move has left many outside observers concerned with the increasing possibility of internal rebellion. A Pyongyang watcher observes that In such a highly-tense environment of power struggle, some elites within the regime, fearing for their own security, might initiate a preemptive rebellion, coup d état, or assassination against Kim Jong-un, to preserve themselves, which might subsequently lead to great upheaval and collapse. Other think it possible that the erratic nature of and a deep sense of insecurity within the authoritarian regime usually create fear among its followers. Cruel and bloody power struggles are pervasive, increasing the possibility of coup d état. (3) Concerns over Kim Jong-un s health Kim s health has always been a subject of much speculation. Over the past four years, Kim Jong-un has put on much weight. Standing at 171 cm, he weighs 81

96 more than 130 kg. At the seventh Party Congress, after speaking for a little over one hour, Kim s body began to sway, his voice increasingly coarse. Some speculate that the corpulent Kim is prone to cardiac, diabetes, arthrolithiasis, apoplexy, and other diseases. With poor sanitation and health infrastructure, the outbreak of a communicable and infectious disease may prove to be deadly for North Koreans. In the case of Ebola and MERS, Pyongyang panicked to the point of closing its borders. In addition, Pyongyang is also vulnerable to natural disaster such as floods and insect pests. It is China s growing concern that Washington and Seoul are trying to press Pyongyang to the point of collapse with stepped-up sanctions on the one hand, and dominate the unification process on Seoul s terms. Nevertheless, that it is not time yet for a complete policy shift, so that China shouldn t closely follow the US in its hardline steps towards NK. By simple reasoning, (1) if China turns cold towards NK, its influence will decrease; (2) if China severs its ties or channels of communication with NK, it will have no unique influence anymore; (3) if China exercises sanctions and blockade against NK, China-NK relations will suffer, and NK s hatred for the US in the past will turn to China; (4) if China tries to maintain the status quo of no war, no truce, and no unification on the peninsula, it will face severe pressure from not only North Korea, but countries like the US and ROK; (5) if China closely follows the US, then it will play an increasingly small role and finally get marginalized in the process; (6) if China engage itself more actively with its unique influence, then the peace and stability of the peninsula will be most likely guaranteed while the US and NK will both count more on China. Also by analyzing the historical and current situations, China should not adopt 82

97 a generally hardline policy: (1) China will lose its moral ground if NK thinks that China forsakes their traditional friendship and historical ties and turns into an accomplice of the US; (2) China sympathizes with the vast NK public who, rather than the top leadership, elites and the military, suffer most from the sanctions, blockade and isolation; (3) to some extent, NK is like a solid ball the more pressure from outside, the more united it becomes; (4) if China exerts its own will as a big power onto a smaller country likes NK, exemplified by sanctions, then it will set a bad example, thus it will have less latitude on similar issues in the future. Therefore, it can be seen that China should not detach itself or adopt a very hardline stance against NK, but it should further strengthen communication with NK. Socialist bloc does not exist anymore, neither are concepts of big brother and little brother. With 60 years experience, China s foreign policy is now based more on the principle of justness and rightness than on ideological concerns. With regard to China-NK relations, China has changed in the following aspects: (1) emphasizing on national interest rather than ideological similarities; (2) seeking complex interest rather than security alone; (3) caring about both NK and ROK, instead of leaning towards NK; (4) forsaking the Cold-War mentality of Zero-sum game and friend-or-enemy dichotomy; (5) avoiding self-orientation and imposing its own values onto others. China is trying to persuade NK that nuclear blackmailing brings it more danger than safety and that possessing nuclear deterrence is not in the long-term interest of NK as well as its people. At the meantime, China should convince the US that blockade and containment do not solve problems either, as they can only push NK closer to seeking nuclear weapons out of a feeling of insecurity and unfairness. 83

98

99 Panel 2 North Korean Sanctions: Helpful or Harmful? Mijin Kang Team Chief & Reporter, Daily NK

100

101 국문초록 대북제재북한에득인가독인가? 북한당국은국제사회의압박에도지속적인핵실험을강행하고있는바, 김정은체제의이러한무분별한핵실험강행은국제사회의대북제재를피해갈수없는처지로전락하고말았다. 김정은은체제유지를위해서강행하는핵실험이라는것을들통나는것을꺼려주민들에게 대북제재는지구상에남아있는단하나의사회주의국가를말살하려는제국주의세력들의발광 이라고선전하고있다. 하지만북한당국의선전과는다르게주민들은 핵실험때문에경제봉쇄 ( 대북제재 ) 를당하고있다면우리생활에아무런도움도안되는핵을과감하게포기했으면좋겠다 는말로현재어려운상황에대한불만을보이고있다. 일부에서는 대북제재가지속되다보면무슨일이라도나지않겠냐 는말로내부변화를바라기도한다는것이내부주민들의반응이다. 주민들의이런바람에도아랑곳않고북한전반의흐름은주민사상무장강조, 노력동원, 우상화건설과각종건설을진행하는등기존과다르지않게흘러가고있다. 하지만이런속에서작은변화들은연이어일어나고있는데, 김정은체제에대한불신이외부로표출되고있고이러한것은최대로강화되고있는국경단속과통제에도불구하고탈북행렬이끊이지않는것이다. 이를증명해주는것이 13명의북한해외파견노동자들의집단탈북이다. 4월에이어 5월에도이어진집단탈북은김정은에겐말이필요없는핵폭탄이될것이라는것이탈북민들의주장이다. 이러한상황에서북한이할수있는것은주민들을통제하고단속하는것과체제결속을위한사상강요뿐이다. 북한김정은체제가주민들에게사상무장을강요할수록당국에대한주민들의깊어지는불만은이젠더숨길수없는송곳이다. 대북제재에불안해진김정은은과연어떤대응을하고있을까? 보위부나보안서등권력기관들에언제든지한번은전쟁을해야한다면서대북제재에 87

102 강경하게맞서조선의본때를보여야한다는내부지시를내리기도했다. 또주민들에게해외노동자집단탈출을조국을배반한자들의운명은길거리에버려진인생이라는내용의강연을전국에내돌리기도했다. 또이들의집단탈북을북한주민들을내부로부터와해하려는남조선당국의속임수이며사상이올바르지못해서해외노동자들이탈출했다고말하고있다. 그러나주민들에게중요한것은생계이다. 북한국경지역을통해확인한바도시의주민들속에서도올해는사람가물이올것같은느낌이라는말까지나오고있는실정이다. 주민들의동요는체제불안정을불러온다는것을너무나도잘알고있는북한김정은의선택은국경지역을완전봉쇄하는작업으로주민지역을철거하고경비를강화하고밀무역을강력단속하고있다. 주민들은대북제재라는말만들어도목이마른다고말할정도라고한다. 북한김정은체제의대북제재가강행된후 10여일동안북한전역에서쌀가격이소폭상승했다가다시안정세를유지하고있는것으로확인되고있다. 북한주민들에게대북제재는어제오늘일이아니며대북제재가강행됐을때마다국가가생계해결을해준것이아니기때문에주민들은자체의힘으로살아나갈방법을모색하고있다. 하지만주민들의자력에도한계가있는법이다. 올해 7차당대회로매일이다시피동원과사상무장에내몰린주민들은이전보다배로어려운생계의연속을살아가고있는것으로확인됐다. 본론에서는국경지역을토대로조사한대북제재의영향을구체적으로이야기해보겠다. 88

103 Abstract North Korean Sanctions: Helpful or Harmful? North Korea continues to conduct nuclear tests despite pressures from the international community, sanctions are inevitable. Kim Jong Un s regime is insisting that "sanctions are insane acts by the imperialist forces that want to destroy the last remaining socialist country on earth," in fear that the North Korean people will come to the realization that nuclear tests are mainly for the purpose of regime maintenance. However, despite the state propaganda, the North Korean people are speaking out against the difficult situation, saying things like, if these nuclear tests are causing economic sanctions, I wish we would resolutely abandon the program. In some cases, some North Koreans are saying, as sanctions continue, something is bound to happen, revealing a desire for internal change. Despite this sentiment, there have been no major changes from the past. The status quo continues with strengthened ideological training, labor mobilization, indoctrination of the cult of personality and ongoing construction projects. However, there is a small change found in the growing distrust of the young leader, Kim Jong Un, leaking to the outside world. This is demonstrated by the increase in defections by the North Korean people, despite the strengthened border control and strict enforcement. This fact is evidenced by the recent group defection of 13 North Korean restaurant workers. Many North Koreans believe that the recent group defection that occurred in April and May is likely to deliver a detrimental blow to the Kim Jong Un regime. Under these circumstances, all the North Korean regime can do is to tighten control and restrictions on its citizens and to utilize its ideology to retain power. However, with tougher pressures imposed on the people by that very same ideology, its result is being seen to only deepen public resentment towards authorities. 89

104 How is Kim Jong Un responding to this insecurity caused by international sanctions? The National Security Agency and other power authorities in Pyongyang are reported to have made an internal order to strongly resist against the sanctions in order to show the outside world Choson s (North Korea) supremacy. In addition, nationwide talks are being given to citizens to prevent group defection by overseas workers. These talks condemn these defectors, saying that they betrayed their own country and are destined only for wasted lives on the streets. They also continue to insist that the defection resulted from the trickery of the South Korean government in an attempt to break North Korea down from within. However, the most important thing for the North Korean people is their livelihoods. The Kim Jong Un regime understands very well that public unrest will lead to regime instability, and as a result they have completely sealed the border area, strengthened the security and cracked down on smuggling. It s gotten to the point that even hearing the word sanctions is enough to put the North Korean people on edge. Ten days after the sanctions were imposed, rice prices rose slightly but stabilized soon after. Sanctions are nothing new to North Korea. Even after the first sanctions were imposed on the regime, the North Korean people had to find their own way of survival under a state that did not take responsibility for its citizens livelihoods. However, the North Korean citizens can only do so much. With the recently held 7th Party Congress, North Koreans are being mobilized on a daily basis for labor and ideological training, and are reporting that this is a hardship worse than before. In the following article, the impact of sanctions will be discussed in detail utilizing interviews conducted near the DPRK-China border area. 90

105 주제 : 다양한시각에서대북제재가북한사회및경제에끼치는영향을북한및접경지역현지조사를토대로살펴본다. 대북제재가강행된후북한시장의물가에서특별히눈에띈것은휘발유나디젤유등연유가격상승인데, 이는제재대상중명백하게밝혀진품목이기때문에관련수입국가들에서연유를중단한것과김정은체제가당제 7차대회와관련하여전국에서대대적인공사를벌이고있는것도요인으로될수있다. 현재대북제재가지속되고있는속에서여전히연유가격이하락하지않는것은북한전역에서봄철을맞아모내기를하고있는것도영향을미치고있다고내부소식통들은전했다. 지난 5월 19일현재양강도혜산시에서의휘발유 1kg당가격은 12800원으로 4월초 10700원보다 2100원또상승했다. 대북제재이전 7000원선에서팔리던휘발유가두달동안에 5800원정도로급상승했다. 휘발유나디젤유등연유도장거리장사를가야하는장사꾼들이자주사용하게되는품목이여서연유가격상승도주민들에겐엄청난걱정거리라는것이내부주민들의말이다. 북한내부주민들은대북제재를받고있다는압박감에불안감이상승하고있다면서대북제재가언제까지지속될지에관심을보이고있는실정이다. 주민들의불안함을알아챈양통제품으로단속하던개성공단제품판매를허용하기도했다. 일부주민들은한국의개성공단이철수하면서돌려주지않은생산품들이시중에나와팔린다는말도있지만어쨌거나주민들에겐생활의여유가없다는것이다. 5월초에연락이닿은황해남도사리원시거주주민은쌀가격은크게상승하지는않았지만대부분주민들이쌀을사먹을엄두를내지못하고가을고리대를찾아나서고있는실정이라고말했다. 고리대는주민들을새로운어려움속으로밀어넣는것밖에다른것을가져다주지못하기때문에올가을북한농사작황상황을봐야알겠지만풍년이라고해도고리대를갚고나면내년의고생은예약된시련이라는전망이다. 급기야춘궁기가한창이던 4월말경에는배추 1kg이쌀 1kg보다더높은가격인 7000원에판매되는상황까지초래됐다. 지난시기와다른차원에서대북제재를한다는말들이나돌면서주민들은이전의대북제재보다더심각할수있다는압박감이작용했다는것이주민들의반응이다. 이런압박감은주민들로하여금 인민생활에아무 91

106 런도움도주지못하는핵때문에애매한백성들만제재대상이된것 이라는말로당국의핵보유에확실한불만을보이고있다. 대북제재가언제까지어느정도의강도로진행될지는일반주민들보다김정은의관심이더크지않을까생각한다. 대북제재가지속적으로이어진다는것은주민들에게도불안을주기도하지만김정은에게는더큰위협이될수있다는것, 김정은의불안은내부체제를공고하게다지려는움직임에서볼수있는데, 7차당대회를통해내부결속을강조하고국제사회의대북제재에핵으로맞서겠다고주장하는것은김정은체제의불안감을역설적으로보여주고있는것으로풀이된다. 북한은당대회전일부지역들에서무국수와미역밥으로생계를하고있는현실을감안한양대회를앞두고권력기관과교육부문등특정기관들을대상으로식량을공급하는것으로주민들의불안함을해소하려는움직임을보이기도했다. 그리고바로시장에서팔리는식량가격이하락하기도했지만대회가끝난후바로이전가격으로거래되고있다. 또주민들을직접적으로통제하고단속하는것은각부분의핵심간부들인것만큼당대회에참가한대의원들에게냉동기와텔레비전, 그릇세트, 학용품, 식품등대량의선물을주는등민심달래기에급급하고있는모양새다. 당대회가끝난직후김정은의경제부분행보는주민들의경제생활을돌본다는이미지를줌으로써대북제재로불안한주민들의마음을사려는것이라는것이전문가들의분석이다. 하지만대북제재가이뤄진직후당대회를앞두고있는시점에서해외외화벌이기관종업원들의집단탈북은김정은체제에치명적타격을주었다고해도과언이아니다. 향후김정은체제는자신의권력을유지하기위해주민들에대한단속과통제를강화하면서사상적공세를더악착하게강요할것으로전망된다. 주변국인중국과러시아의강력한대북제재동참으로북한이언제까지어떤형식으로버틸지에관심이모이고있다. 92

107 결론 최근북한은형제의나라라고굳게믿었던중국까지강력하게대북제재에동참하고나서자내부주민들에게는중국을견제해야한다는인식을주고있는것으로전해지고있다. 그사례가아직미정인다음핵실험은중국에게본때를보이기위한것이라는것이내부고위간부의말이다. 고김일성주석시대부터 형제의나라 라고선전해오고있는중국의이번대북제재실행은북한에게불안을줄것만은명백하다. 대북제재의압박에서벗어나려는몸부림으로북한은주민들에게더많은부담을줄것으로전망된다. 현재무역담당간부들에게도외화과제를더꼼꼼하게받아내고있다는소식도들려오고있는것은이러한것을증명해주고있다. 외부의소식을많이접하고있는북한주민들의말에의하면북한주민들대부분이북한이핵을보유하고있기때문에, 또무모한핵실험을강행하기때문이라는것을알고있는상태다. 또김정은체제도주민들의이런생각을읽고있기때문에주민들에게 핵을가지고있기때문에강대국이라고자랑하는미국도감히우리를건드리지못하고있는것 이라며핵보유와핵실험에대해 자주적국방력을강화하는것 이라는감언이설 ( 甘言利說 ) 로핵보유의정당성을꾸미고있다. 김정은체제의이런 정당성 으로대북제재는지속될것이기때문에주민들은고스란히대북제재의영향에노출되기마련이다. 김정은체제가산림을복구하기위한데힘을쏟고있는조건에서이전처럼뙈기밭을마음대로일궈서농사를짓는일도쉽지않을것으로전망된다. 중국과의관계도악화조짐을보이고있고탈북방조등체제에위반된다고생각되는것을막기위해국경감시와통제도강화되고있어북한주민대부분이사용하고있는중국산생필품이나식량에대한수요가증가할것으로예상된다. 북한전역의이러한움직임을분석해본결과주민들은절망과당국의처사를믿지못하겠다는생각으로탈북을결심할수있다는결론이다. 최근일부주민들은중국에서북송되지만않는다면여기서굶어죽기전에가족을모두데리고탈북하고싶다는이야기를한다고내부주민은말했다. 이는그만큼대북제재로인한주민들의생활이어려워지고있다는증거다. 북한김정은이내부동향 93

108 을잘파악하여주민들의동요사태를막을것인지는지켜봐야하겠지만이런일에대해두려워하고있는것만은확실하다. 최근당대회를마치고경제분야에대한시찰을연이어이어가고있는것은주민들의생활을위해노력하고있는지도자의모습을보여줌으로써대북제재로불안한주민들의마음을일시적이라도안정시키려는목적으로보인다. 북한은대북제재의영향에서벗어나고자자국내생산을독려하고있는데이중에중요하게농업부분을강조하고있다. 한소식통에따르면북한은중국을통해올해농업분야에필요한비료를상당양을확보했지만내부주민들에게는흥남비료공장에서비료과제를성과적으로수행한것이라고선전하고있다. 이는주민들로하여금자체의힘으로대북제재를이겨낼수있다는메시지를전달하여주민들의열의를불러모으려는목적이다. 하지만대북제재가얼마동안어떤형태로이어지는가에따라북한김정은체제의대응과주민들의생활방식이달라질수있다는데이목이집중되고있다. 94

109 Panel 3 International Isolation and Regional Inequality: Evidence from Sanctions on North Korea Yong Suk Lee The SK Center Fellow, Stanford University

110

111 국문초록 대북제재로본국제고립과지역간불평등 본보고서는제재대상국이국제금융과무역으로부터고립될시, 이에따른내수경제및지역간불평등양상을검토하였다. 기존연구는제재가지역간불평등에미치는영향에대한통찰을제공한다. 대개전제주의적인대상국은선호지역으로자원을재분배하거나, 수입품대체를위해제조업개발을추진할수있으며, 자본및중간재에대한접근이제한적일경우천연자원에의존하기도하며무역마찰의발생이상대적으로적은지역으로무역거래를이동하기도한다. 본고는대북제재와관련한이러한이론적가설과예측을실증적으로검토한다. 북한은이러한검토에이상적인환경이라고할수있는바, 이는제재가 1990년대완화되었다가 2000년대급격히증가하는등변화하였고, 북한내부에서는노동이동의제약이존재하는등의상황으로지역간불평등에기초하여총체적인경제불평등을추론할수있기때문이다. 따라서본고는북한지역에대한야간위성사진을통하여제재가지역간불평등에미치는영향을살펴보고생산수준에관한무역통계자료를통해생산물의요소집약도 (factor intensity) 에기반하여생산에미치는제재의영향을검토한다. 이를위해경제제재는북한의국내경제불평등에외생변수 (exogenous variable) 로, 美하원외교위원회내다수파정당의석점유율은도구변수 (instrumental variable) 로활용하였다. 美하원외교위원회는대북제재와관련된법안을관장하기때문에, 위원회내다수파정당의의석점유율로부터제재의수준을예측할수있다. 본고는제재가도시와농촌지역간의야간광도격차를증가시킨다는점을관찰하였다. 북한정권의지역편애로인해정치권력의중심지인평양은제재의영향으로부터가장잘보호된다. 제조업이위치한도시와광업지대도제재가증가함에따라상대적으로그광도가증가되었다. 또한중국국경인접지역의광업및대중교역량도증가하였는데, 이는중국이제재를이행하지않았기때문으로보인다. 반면전통적으로항구였던지역은오히려광도가어두워졌다. 이로볼때대북제재가강화되자북한정권은경제활동을정치권력또는제조업및광업이위치한지역으로이동시켰다는점을알수있다. 생산에있어서는자본집약적생산품에서천연자원집약적물품으로전환한것을알수있었다. 이로볼때국제무역으로부터고립될시제재대상국은자원을정치권력이위치한도시 97

112 지역으로재분배하기때문에대상국의국내불평등이증가하고생산과무역활동을위해천연자원에더의존하게된다. 이는전제주의적지도자의행동양식을변화시키려는제재취지와다르게오히려대상국의경제불평등을악화시켜, 이미소외되었던내륙지역에더부정적인영향을주는것으로볼수있다. 98

113 Abstract International Isolation and Regional Inequality: Evidence from Sanctions on North Korea This paper examines how domestic economic activity and regional inequality evolve when a country becomes increasingly isolated from international trade and finance because of sanctions. How might sanctions affect regional economic inequality? Existing research provide insights to this question. As a country becomes increasingly isolated, the government, often an autocracy, could reallocate resources to regions favored by the regime, e.g., the capital city. The country could develop its manufacturing regions to substitute for imports. On the other hand, the country could rely more on its natural resources if limited access to capital and intermediate goods inhibits production capacity. Lastly, trade would likely move to regions within the country where trade frictions become relatively lower. I empirically test these hypotheses on North Korea. The fluctuation of sanctions on North Korea provides a unique setting to examine these predictions. Sanctions were initially relaxed during the 1990s but drastically increased since the mid 2000 s as North Korea pursued nuclear weapons. Furthermore, labor is not mobile in North Korea, which makes it an ideal setting to infer economic inequality from regional inequality. I use satellite night lights data to examine how sanctions impact regional economic inequality and use product level trade data to examine how sanctions impact production based on factor intensity. Though the economic sanctions were likely exogenous to domestic inequality within North Korea, I also use the majority party share of US House Foreign Affairs Committee as an instrumental variable. The Foreign Affairs Committee oversees legislations relating to sanctions and the majority party share strongly predicts the level of sanctions. I find that sanctions increase the luminosity gap between urban and rural areas. Consistent with regional favoritism, Pyongyang, the center of power is best shielded from sanctions. Manufacturing cities and mining areas also become relatively brighter as sanctions 99

114 increase. Furthermore, lights near the Chinese border increases with sanctions as well as trade with China, which did not enforce the sanctions. On the other hand, traditional port areas become darker. As the country becomes more isolated economic activity shifts towards cities with political power or manufacturing and mining capabilities. However, production shifts away from capital intensive goods to natural resource intensive goods. These results imply that isolation from global trade increases domestic inequality, in a way that resources become increasingly allocated to those in urban areas of political power, and pushes the country to rely more on natural resources for production and trade. Furthermore, despite the intention to change the behavior of autocrats, sanctions increase inequality at a cost to the already marginalized hinterlands. Keywords: Economic sanctions, Regional inequality, Industrial policy, Satellite lights data * Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, Encina Hall 309, 616 Serra St, Stanford, CA 94305, USA. Phone: Fax: yongslee@stanford.edu. I thank Dave Donaldson, Kyle Bagwell, Lorenzo Caliendo, Victor Cha, Ben Faber, Thibault Fally, Cecile Gaubert, Sheena Greitens, Stephan Haggard, Hyuncheol Kim, Brian Kovak, Deborah Solomon, David Yanagizawa-Drott, Andrew Yeo, seminar and workshop participants at Stanford University, Williams College, the American Economic Association Annual Meetings, the Urban Economics Association Annual Meetings, and the Midwest International Economic Development Conference for comments. I thank Yoonsang Bae for excellent research assistance. 100

115 Countries have increasingly used economic sanctions to punish and hopefully change the behavior of target countries by isolating them from the benefits of international trade and finance. In reality, sanctions have been mostly ineffective in changing the target country s behavior (Hufbauer et al. 2009). 1) Though examining how countries respond to sanctions is fundamental to the understanding of the efficacy and impact of sanctions, economics research has been surprisingly sparse on this topic. This paper examines how the spatial distribution of economic activity, and hence regional inequality, evolves when a country becomes increasingly isolated because of economic sanctions. How might sanctions affect regional economic inequality? Existing research provide insights to this question. Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996) theoretically show that producers in a closed economy benefit from locating near large cities because of the close linkages with consumers and intermediate goods suppliers. In a more open economy the benefits of locating near the primate city diminish as producers sell and buy more from abroad. This results in urban primacy often found in protectionist developing countries. Ades and Glaeser (1995) empirically confirm that trade protectionism is related to urban concentration in a cross-section of countries. As sanctions push countries into isolation the urban primacy predictions under protectionism could similarly follow through. However, in the same paper Ades and Glaeser find that political factors, rather than trade policy, are stronger determinants of urban concentration. Urban primacy is stronger in dictatorships and politically unstable regimes, since dictators can exploit the hinterlands at little cost and politically unstable regimes disproportionately cater to the population near the capital city to maintain power. Furthermore, the literature 1) Hufbauer et al. (2009) document that of the 174 sanction cases between 1915 and 2000 only 34 percent were at least partially successful, and moreover, most of the successes happened before the 1970s. 101

116 on distributive politics and regional favoritism show that leaders favor their political base or home towns, and that such favoritism is more stark in non democracies. Hodler and Rashcky (2014) identify the birthplaces of national leaders and find that the night light intensity near the leaders birthplaces becomes brighter when leaders come into power, especially in autocratic countries. Similarly, Burgess et al. (2015) find that more roads are built in districts that have the same ethnicity as the incumbent president in Kenya, and such ethnic favoritism weakens during democratic periods. Given that sanctions predominantly target autocracies (Lee 2015) and isolate those autocracies from world trade, sanctions could increase inequality between the center of political power and the hinterlands via the aforementioned economic geography and regional favoritism channels. Another channel by which sanctions could impact regional economic activity is via industrial development. Recently, when the West imposed sanctions against Russia for invading Crimea in 2014, a senior Russian official noted that sanctions could serve as a powerful incentive for Russia to development its industries and seek out new trade partners. 2) The argument that economic isolation or protectionism can result in industrial development is not new. As a matter of fact, the import substitution policies pursued by the many post-colonial countries in the mid-20 th century follows the same logic. If indeed sanctions promote industrial development, manufacturing regions as a consequence could see relative increase in economic activity compared to other parts of the country. On the other hand, in the context 2) In an interview with a Russian newspaper, Sergei Ivanov, the head of the Kremlin administration, stated that the imposed sanctions could serve as a powerful incentive for our industries to take more active part in our own development ( -to-boost-russian-industry-development.html) The Moscow Times notes that after a year of sanctions, import substitution and localization is Russia s new slogan. ( on/article/how-much-have-sanctions-really-hurt-russia/ html). 102

117 where sanctions aim to curtail not only the flow of consumption goods, but intermediate goods, and more importantly capital, the argument that sanctions could promote industrial development may not easily carry through as the Russian official suggested. If sanctions effectively constrain production capabilities, especially by restricting the flow of capital, target countries might rely more on existing endowments, such as, natural resources for production. Though research on the impact of sanctions on domestic industrial production is minimal, researchers have examined the impact of trade embargoes on welfare (Irwin 2005; Etkes and Zimring 2015), and how trade blockade impacts industrial development (Juhasz 2014). In particular, Juhasz (2014) uses events surrounding the Napoleon blockade in the 18 th century and finds that the blockade led to France s textile industry to upgrade technologically, particularly in regions where trade costs were higher. In this paper, I will examine whether sanctions similarly result in industrial upgrading or a shift towards more endowment based production. Finally, sanctions alter the relative trade friction between countries and sanctioned countries divert trade away from sanctioning countries to non-sanctioning countries (Lee 2015). In such context, trade activity would likely move to regions within the country where trade frictions become relatively lower. For example, the Mexico-US Free Trade Agreement led to the growth of production and trade activities in regions near the US border (Hanson 1993). The above discussion lends itself to several hypotheses on how sanctions might affect regional inequality, which I label as the regional favoritism, industrialization, and economic geography of trade channels. The regional favoritism channel hypothesizes that leaders of sanctioned countries, often autocrats, would disproportionately distribute resources to areas of political power. The industrialization channel hypothesizes that sanctions could trigger countries to 103

118 import substitute and divert resources to manufacturing regions or could shift production towards areas rich in natural resources. The economic geography of trade channel predicts that, as sanctions alter bilateral trade frictions, the geographic location of trade activity would move to regions with relatively lower trade costs. Also, limited access to foreign producers could promote urbanization as domestic producers take advantage of the differential trade costs and producer-consumer linkages to urban areas. These channels need not be exclusive and the different channels can be at work in the same location. For example, places of political power may also be important for manufacturing. The objective of this paper is to empirically examine whether the above channels are at work, and to then discuss the regional inequality implications and efficacy of sanctions. This paper examines the case of North Korea. The North Korean example is particularly appealing for a couple reasons. First, North Korea has been sanctioned essentially since the birth of the country, and the intensity of sanctions has fluctuated considerably, which provides sufficient variation for empirical analysis. Second, internal migration is strictly controlled in North Korea. Hence, the observed changes in the geographic distribution of economic activity predominantly reflect centralized planning and not migration towards better economic conditions. This distinction is important since migration towards urban areas for better economic opportunities would not necessarily imply that rising regional inequality reflect increasing economic inequality. Despite these appealing features, administrative data on North Korea especially at subnational levels are almost non-existent. To examine the impact of sanctions in North Korea I use two data sets, the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program s lights data and the UN Comtrade s commodity level international trade data. The satellite night lights data have 104

119 been used in the literature to proxy for economic activity in countries where economic data are sparse, particularly at sub-national levels (Henderson et al. 2012, Michalopolous et al. 2014, Hodler and Raschky 2014). I create an average luminosity measure for each one arc minute by one arc minute grid, which translates to approximately a one mile by one mile grid, between 1992 and I document North Korea s nuclear provocations and agreements that led countries and the UN to tighten or relax sanctions and create a sanctions index. In the 1990s North Korea agreed to abandon its nuclear program and various pre-existing sanctions were relaxed. However, the pattern reverses and sanctions on North Korea ramp up starting in the early 2000s when North Korea resumed long-range missiles and nuclear tests. During this period the number of North Korea s trade partners and traded goods decline. Moreover, trade with China, North Korea s main trading partner that did not enforce the sanctions, increased drastically. By 2013 trade with China comprised more than 80 percent of North Korea s trade. Sanctions on North Korea were most likely exogenous to the evolution of light intensity across regions within the country. However, to alleviate endogeneity concerns, the empirical analysis presents 2SLS estimates that use the majority party share in the US House Foreign Affairs Committee to instrument for the sanctions index. The US House Foreign Affairs Committee oversees legislation and performs oversight on issues related to sanctions. A larger majority party share would likely be able to convince the US government, the UN, and the allies to levy and implement sanctions against North Korea. I find that an additional sanction increases the difference in nighttime lights between the capital Pyongyang and the rest of the country by 5.8%, or by 1.7% in terms of GDP. I use Henderson et al. s (2012) elasticity estimate of 0.3 when translating lights to GDP. For manufacturing cities the difference in nighttime 105

120 lights increases by 1.3% with an additional sanction. I map North Korea s mineral deposits and mining areas by latitude and longitude and identify regions within 3km of the coordinates. I find that the nighttime lights difference between mining areas and the rest of the country increases by 4% or by 1.2% in terms of GDP with an additional sanctions event. The luminosity gap between Sinuiju, a trading hub abutting China, and the rest of the country increases by more than 10% with an additional sanction. As China did not impose the sanctions on North Korea, the relative trade costs with China became substantially lower compared to the rest of the world, and economic activity shifts to the Chinese border where the internal trade cost to China is lowest. To the contrary, I find that traditional port areas become relatively darker when sanctions increase. These results imply that sanctions caused economic activity to concentrate relatively more in the capital city, manufacturing and mining areas, and regions bordering China. This increase in regional inequality implies that the urban elites in Pyongyang or communist party members with manufacturing and mining ties, or trading rights with China were relatively shielded from the sanctions when the rest of the population became more worse off. The relative increase in nighttime lights in manufacturing and mining areas could either imply import substitution and industrial upgrading or more reliance on natural resources for production, especially if sanctions limited access to capital and intermediate goods and hurt production capacity. To probe into this, I examine how sanctions impact product level exports and imports by factor intensity. I find that exports shifts away from capital intensive goods and towards natural resource intensive goods. Furthermore, sanctions increase the imports of capital intensive goods. This suggests that sanctions did not result in industrial upgrading and increased production of more capital intensive goods, 106

121 but rather shifted industrial production towards natural resource intensive goods, potentially pushing the country backwards along the industrial development spectrum. Given that modern sanctions not only target final goods, but intermediate goods, and financial flows, the argument that sanctions could incentivize a country to promote industrial development is unsupported. Overall, the results imply that sanctions increase domestic regional inequality, in a way that benefits only a select set of regions and pushes the target country to rely more on domestic natural resources for production. Moreover, despite the fact that sanctions aim to punish the target country s leadership, sanctions increase inequality at a cost to the already marginalized hinterlands. The paper is divided into six sections. The next section provides background on the North Korean economy and the sanctions imposed. Section 3 introduces the data and present descriptive patterns on the nature isolation from sanctions. Section 4 discusses the estimation and identification strategy. Section 5 discusses the empirical results on the lights data and Section 6 the trade data. Section 7 discusses the implications for inequality and Section 8 concludes. 107

122

123 Panel 4 North Korea Sanctions Conference: Talking Points Christopher Green PhD Candidate, Leiden University, NL; Co editor, SinoNK

124

125 국문초록 North Korea Sanctions Conference: Talking Points 북한경제는김정은집권이후특히, 꾸준히성장하였다. 이는평양지역에서는분명히, 북한전역에서는미약하게나마관찰된다. 점진적으로강화되는 UN 및 3세계국가의제재에도불구하고, 북한의경제성장은지속되고있다. 그럼에도북한의해외투자자본유치는여전히필요에따라즉석으로집행되고, 비효율적이며, 더욱힘들어지고있다. 대북포용론자를불편하게하는사실은북한이경제정책을선회하지없다면, 투자대상으로서의그매력이하락할것이란점이다. 금년 5월초개최된북한의 7차당대회를두고정계 언론계 학계가희망섞인기대를했던부분도경제정책의변화였다. 그러나북한은당대회에서경제문제에대해서는약간의흥미만을보였다. 북한은내각 외무성 도별당간부의권한을제고하고, 국방위원회를대신한중앙군사위원회의존재감을강화하였으며, 군장성의실질적인권력을약화시켰다. 많은수의하급간부구성에도변화를주었는데, 이는북한이당의상급간부구성은신중히지속 유지하면서, 하급구성에서는젊은세대를포진시켜세대교체를추진하는듯한모습이었다. 당대회를두고외부에서는북한이인민경제건설에집중하려한다고해석하였다. 그러나이러한러시아연구 (Kremlinological) 식접근법의가장큰오류는젊은세대가역동성을, 간부구성의변화가정책변화를의미하지않는다는점이다. 북한과같은독재정치에서는공식계통을통한권한행사가이루어지지않기때문이다. 특정개인이당대회에서높은지위를부여받았다고해서이가실질적인정치권한보유로볼수없다. 이러한북한의정책결정 이행의구조에서는정책적제언이승인되려면상부에여지없이보고되어야하고, 이는보안기관의검열및당조직지도부를거치게된다. 그러나해당당대회에서북한의 2개주요보안기관및당조직지도부는아무런변화가없었다. 111

126 Abstract North Korea Sanctions Conference: Talking Points Particularly since the beginning of the Kim Jong-un era, the North Korean economy has been growing steadily. This is clearly visible in the capital, Pyongyang, less intensely nationwide, and in general the growth has continued unabated in the era of slowly intensifying sanctions put in place by the UN and third countries. However, the task of acquiring investment capital for development projects is ad hoc, inefficient and moreover getting more difficult all the time. The inconvenient truth for people who favor engagement as a policy toward the DPRK is that, absent a more generalized economic policy shift in Pyongyang, North Korea will only become a less and less attractive investment destination over time. It was precisely this type of policy shift that some politicians, journalists and academics hoped with varying degrees of optimism to witness at the 7 th KWP Congress in early May. The Congress, when it came, demonstrated a modicum of interest in economic affairs. It promoted the authority of officials from the Cabinet, diplomatic and provincial party sectors, elevated the Central Military Committee at the expense of the National Defense Commission, and diminished the practical political power of commanding officers of the military. A significant number of lower level officials were also changed, meaning that while the upper reaches of the party represent a case study in careful continuity, lower down there are signs of a new generation coming through the ranks. The observer may conclude that this indicates a government desire to focus on people s economic construction. However, the serious flaw in such a Kremlinological approach is that youth does not mean dynamism, and personnel changes do not necessarily mean policy changes, either. Power in an autocratic dictatorship like North Korea is not 112

127 exercised primarily through the kind of formal channels that party congresses focus on. Being high in the rankings at the 7 th Party Congress does not mean that an individual has actionable political influence. Policy decision and implementation structures being as they are means that policy proposals are funneled up to the top for ratification without fail. This means that they must go through the OGD, and are subject to censure by the security services. It is noticeable that the leadership of the OGD and the two main North Korean security agencies did not change at all at the 7th Party Congress. 113

128 North Korea Sanctions Conference: Talking Points Roadmap: 1) A plethora of sanctions, but how much impact? 2) North Korea in the era of sanctions: from 2006 to ) North Korea s economy at the 7th KWP Congress 1) A plethora of sanctions, but how much impact? Given the passage and implementation of six UNSC resolutions concerning the DPRK since 2006 (#s 1695, 1718, 1874, 2087, 2094, 2270), a number of Executive Orders from the US government in the same period (EO in 2008, EO13551 in 2010, EO13570 in 2011, EO13687 in 2015, and EO13722 in 2016), unilateral Japanese sanctions imposed in 2006 and 2009, and ROK sanctions dating from 2010 (May 24 th Measures) and 2016 (the closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex), not to mention the loss of income from Mt. Kumgang and Kaesong tours, one might reasonably anticipate stress and strain accruing to the North Korean economy over time. Of course, it is much too early to assess the impact of the latest punitive sanctions, both in the UN and from the USG, as these were only put in place pursuant to January s fourth North Korean nuclear test in January this year. However, there is general consensus that hitherto the impact of sanctions on various aspects of and individuals and entities in the DPRK with the possible exception of Banco Delta Asia has been far more limited than had been anticipated. Most notably, the North Korean economy has shown steady growth through much of this period, particularly since , the beginning of the Kim Jong-un era. 114

129 This growth has been achieved on the back of high prices for some of the natural resources of which North Korea has significant reserves, coupled to strong demand from the country s main trading partner, China, and greatly expanded labor exports to Russia, the Middle East and parts of Europe in addition to China. On those occasions when the economy has taken noticeable hits, it has been down to policy failures (or successes, depending on one s perspective). Examples include the country s fifth currency reform measure of November 30, 2009, or changing external economic circumstances beyond Pyongyang s ostensible control, such as falling coal and iron ore prices since January 2014 (see Fig.1 and Fig.2 below). Figure 1: Historic international coal price (USD/metric ton over 15yrs) Source: Infomine 115

130 Figure 2: Historic international iron ore price (USD/metric ton over 7yrs) Source: Infomine It is clear, however, that one of the major constraints on economic development in the DPRK is reserves of hard currency in the coffers of the state. The DPRK has suffered from a chronic lack of investment capital over many years, not least since the end of the Sunshine Policy era in Although we cannot robustly establish the causal driver of this state of affairs, it is at least plausible to hypothesize that international sanctions undermining North Korea s role in the arms trade, among other things have to some degree exacerbated the lack. 2) North Korea in the era of sanctions: from 2006 to 2016 On regular visits to North Korea frequently enough to bear witness to change over time, but infrequently enough that I do not find myself detained by the 116

131 minutiae of processes of change I have observed both the extent and the limits of economic change over the last ten years. In this section, based on my own observations coupled to secondary sources of information, I offer a brief assessment of the status of economic change in the North Korean economy in the Kim Jong-un era. Economic Activities in the Capital Early 2016 saw conflicting opinion over the condition of and outlook for the North Korean economy. The Bank of Korea said that it is growing at 1-1.5%p.a., while anecdotal estimates from knowledgeable observers put growth as high as 3-5%. On the other hand, one respected economic analyst from the Industrial Bank of Korea said in May that modest economic growth could easily turn into 2-4% economic contraction following the implementation of new UN sanctions focused on the mineral trade. In support of this outlook, Jang Jin-sung of New Focus and formerly Leiden University said that gasoline prices have risen rapidly in recent weeks, calling it an early indicator of a negative trend. Observations are of course inadequate to verify these claims about the health of the DPRK economy. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence adds to the discussion. Most of this comes from the construction sector. The situation can be characterized as follows: where projects in the DPRK that require investment capital are concerned, organizations nominally state bodies but closer to public-private partnerships, or PPPs all have plans, but not all of them have the capital to transform those plans into reality. In North Korea today, particularly Pyongyang, there is a stark dichotomy between what appear at time of writing to be successful investment projects (though they may not remain so), and those that are failing or have failed. 117

132 - The former includes a new department store on Tongil St., which is complete on the outside but not on the inside (according to informed sources). During April it was lit at night; more than one regular visitor to the city explained that this was the first time the building had been lit in that way. - A second commercial construction project in Pyongyang lies opposite the Daesong Department Store in Cheongryu-dong, Daedonggang-gu. According to one source, this new development is also to be a department store, offering amenities for people living nearby that others already enjoy elsewhere. As ever, information on usage of the building could not be independently verified. - Other development projects that show signs of progress include apartment buildings of varying quality, some prominently located along Ansan St. between Kim Il-sung Square and Yanggak Bridge, for example. However, forward progress is not the norm everywhere. One construction project in the vicinity of the Koryo Hotel, rumored to be a new hotel back in 2013, has ground to a complete halt and remains at a very elementary stage of construction not hugely dissimilar to that photographed by Geoffrey See of Chosun Exchange and reported positively by NK News. (See image below.) Information suggests that the Chinese partner withdrew from the project, and with the partner went all the capital. 118

133 Figure 3: Foundations of a new hotel in Pyongyang, which ground to a halt many months ago. Economic Activities on the Road Traversing national roads south from Pyongyang to Sinchon via Songnim and Sariwon in Hwanghae Province and south from Sinuiju to Ryongchon and Tongrim in Pyongan Province provides an opportunity to take stock of regional economic circumstances outside the capital, Pyongyang. Low-level market economic activities continue vibrantly in these areas. Hundreds of people are visible on local roads during the day, carrying both comestibles and other goods, mostly on the backs of bicycles. The inter-city bus system, which has been growing steadily since , operates with rising frequency in the Hwanghae region, and the buses tend to be full. Buses travelling from Pyongyang to Sinchon, Pyongyang to Sariwon, and Pyongyang to Jaeryong are just some of the routes available on just this one road. Note that Jaeryong is a small town not a city, and thus it seems that the inter-city bus system is deeply rooted. Concomitantly, there has been a noticeable increase in the supply of gasoline 119

134 in North Korea or at least, a noticeable increase in the intent to supply gasoline! It is well known that there are more vehicles in the DPRK today than ever before, a phenomenon concentrated heavily in Pyongyang and exemplified by the five (since the addition of a fifth, Moranbong, in recent months) taxi companies plying their trade on the streets of the capital. It is natural that there would also be more gas stations to meet demand: at least one hundred are known to be scattered nationwide. At one such location on the road to Mangyongdae in Pyongyang, there was a queue of fifteen to twenty vehicles mostly taxis waiting to get gas. Is this an indicator of economic growth? Of course it is. But one should be wary, as it may be an indicator of something else: fuel shortages, or institutional factors asserting themselves in the market. As noted previously in this paper, Jang Jin-sung claims that gasoline prices have risen significantly in recent weeks, and that shortages of fuel are starting to cause concern. This is one explanation, but queues can equally result from mundane institutional realities. It is not possible without additional intelligence to establish the operational and institutional links of each gas station in North Korea to its parent company. If that information were known, it would serve to explain customer bases and why queues at one gas station do not translate into drivers choosing to use other ones the market is not a competitive and free one; taxis are linked to individual companies that also import gasoline, hence the queues at some but not others. Conclusions The task of acquiring investment capital for North Korean development projects is ad hoc, inefficient getting more difficult all the time. The inconvenient truth 120

135 for people who favor engagement as a policy toward the DPRK is that, absent a more generalized economic policy shift in Pyongyang, North Korea will only become a less and less attractive investment destination over time. As it was precisely this type of policy shift that some politicians, journalists and academics hoped with varying degrees of optimism to witness at the 7 th KWP Congress in early May. This is why a brief discussion of the events that transpired at the April 25 th Palace warrants our time. 3) North Korea s economy at the 7 th KWP Congress In his New Year s Address on January 1 st, 2016, Kim Jong-un made the claim that the 7 th Congress would result in a fabulous blueprint for the future of North Korea. This did not happen. Much focus was therefore placed on Kim s brief allusion to a 5-yr economic development strategy, but there were almost no details of this: only the common sensical news that food security and power limitations are the government s ostensible top priorities (though, to reiterate, no details were provided as to how these priorities would be addressed). It should be accepted that in part the problem was the unreasonable nature of the expectations with which some observers went into the Congress. The sense of disappointment one may feel at the outcome fades considerably when we disabuse ourselves of the notion that Kim Jong-un was ever going to stand up and declare that it doesn t matter if a cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice. Dialing back our expectations accordingly, we reveal the following facts about the 7 th Congress: 121

136 - That it strongly favored continuity over change, and was about the demonstrative function of public displays of power more than the specificity of radical policy shifts. - But that is not to say that the Congress did not see change at all. After incorporating a range of analyses into my own observations, the conclusion I reached is that the 7 th Congress was carefully calibrated to convey continuity at the highest levels, but to allow for modest, risk-averse change lower down. One should not overstate the importance of the change that took place, but from this more nuanced starting point there is at least something to work with. It will be much easier to appreciate the historical importance of the 7 th Congress in twenty or fifty years time. Right now, today, there is a very grave danger of attributing too much to far too little, and there is no point falling into that trap. Therefore, here I am only going to very briefly draw out a handful of themes from the Congress, focusing primarily on economic matters. I am going to place them within the frame of Continuity and Change in North Korea, which is a sensible way to categorize the outcomes of the Congress. Continuity It is surely the case that any political party, anywhere, that suddenly stopped holding party conferences would promptly come to be viewed unfavorably in society. Following Albert Hirschman, not to mention common sense, it would be viewed as a symptom of organizational decline. This would not necessarily be the opinion of all citizens: most people simply would not notice, especially in the absence of a free press to disseminate criticism. But it would certainly be the case for members of the party in question. 122

137 It is safe to assume that the Korean Workers Party has known this for a long time, but has only acted on it since the dawn of the Kim Jong-un era. At the 3 rd Workers Party Delegates Conference on September 28, 2010, when Kim Jong Un was introduced publicly, party regulations were amended, calling for, among other things, Party Congresses to be convened every five years. So the observer can be sure this was not a sudden decision. The 7 th Congress was no outlier or snap event designed to cope with new and unexpected circumstances. Rather, it was a step on the transition from Kim Jong-il to stable autocratic rule under Kim Jong-un. Such is the nature of authoritarian transition and coalition building; barring a catastrophe, it is likely that another Congress will take place in approximately five years time. The 7 th Congress, then, had an overridingly demonstrative function. A party congress is the biggest and nominally the most important political event that the ruling party of North Korea can hold. It was a demonstration of a return to political normalcy and reestablishment of the guiding role of the KWP over national affairs. The Congress was an effective tool with which to speak directly to those with a stake in the political system. It was primarily a domestic event, for a domestic audience, specifically persons with a vested interest in the regime s continuation. As Milan Svolik would put it, this was about authoritarian powersharing rather than authoritarian control. Change Changes of varying degrees of probable importance took place in the ruling elite at the 7 th Congress. One of the most widely reported changes Kim Jong-un declared was the yr State Economic Development Strategy mentioned earlier, which suggested an attempt to signal a return to a form of economic 123

138 planning orthodoxy absent since the 1970s. Although we don t know what the strategy actually entails, it is likely to focus on the key economic issues that Kim Jong-un mentioned in his speech: namely, power and food, in addition to the country s nuclear deterrent. It is extremely unlikely that the declaration of the economic strategy indicates a return, or more pertinently a desire to return, to the days of full command economic planning. Those days are done. Rather, as befits a strategy, or 전략 over a plan, the government seems set to use it to stipulate areas of strategic focus, into which such funding as is available will be concentrated. However, unless or until the Supreme People s Assembly is convened to flesh out the 5-yr strategic approach, we cannot claim to know what those areas are. In any event, having established that the 7 th Congress did evince a policy interest in economic matters, a further question presents itself: Did personnel changes take place to support this process of economic development? The evidence here is mixed. It is true that the Workers Party s emphasis on officials from within the Cabinet structure has grown. Until the 7 th Congress, the only Cabinet elites within the Politburo were Cabinet Premier Pak Bong-ju and Deputy Premier Ro Du-cheol. This gave the Cabinet, which is charged with oversight of economic planning, limited power within the majority political structure. However, the 7th Congress changed some of that. Pak Bong-ju was promoted to the Standing Committee of the Politburo, but in addition to this, two other specifically Cabinet elites were promoted to candidate membership of the Politburo, namely Rim Cheol-ung and Ri Yong-ho, bringing the total to four. Additionally, Pak Bong-ju was appointed to the Central Military Committee, to some a notable shift as he is the first Cabinet official to hold such a post. Many expect this to focus policy debate over the implementation of the Byungjin line of simultaneous economic and nuclear development in the Central Military 124

139 Committee, though we shall have to wait and see. Finally, although personnel in the top echelons of the party barely shifted at the 7 th Congress, with just a couple of movements due to deaths and retirement, more than half (54.9%, or 129 out of 235) of lower level Central Committee cadres were changed. Conclusions The 7 th KWP Congress demonstrated an interest in economic affairs. It promoted the authority of officials from the Cabinet, diplomatic and provincial party sectors, elevated the Central Military Committee at the expense of the National Defense Commission, and diminished the practical political power of commanding officers of the military. A significant number of lower level officials were also changed, meaning that while the upper reaches of the party represent a case study in careful continuity, lower down there are signs of a new generation coming through the ranks. The observer may conclude that this indicates a government desire to focus on people s economic construction. There has been practical evidence of just such a desire since , although it is not hard to find evidence to the contrary. However, there is a serious flaw in the Kremlinological analysis I have put forward. It is that youth does not mean dynamism, and personnel changes do not necessarily mean policy changes, either. Power in an autocratic dictatorship like North Korea is not exercised primarily through the kind of formal channels that Party Congresses focus on. Being high in the rankings at the 7 th Party Congress does not mean that an individual has actionable political influence. For evidence of this phenomenon, we need look no further than two prominent party officials: Kim Yong-nam and Choe Tae-bok. According to credible 125

140 intelligence, the 90-yr old veteran Kim, ostensibly the head of state, has never even chosen his own secretary. Instead, he leaves decision to the party structure. Choe, ostensibly the science and education secretary of the party, is not even afforded the basic respect one would anticipate by his juniors within the Workers Party structure, being referred to by name only even to his face. What does this kind of anecdotal evidence tell us? It is a reflection of one of the major requirements for survival in the North Korean power elite: a nearpathological avoidance of risk. Policy decision and implementation structures being as they are means that policy proposals are funneled up to the top for ratification without fail. This means that they must go through the OGD, and it is noticeable that the leadership of this body, just like the top leaderships of the two main North Korean security agencies, did not change at all at the 7th Party Congress. This is why party personnel changes do not necessarily lead to policy changes, and why I am keen not to overstate the political results of the 7 th Congress. In due course we will see whether anything that happened at the Congress in early May really has any impact on the ground. 126

141 Panel 5 The Impact of Sanctions on the North Korean Economy Eul chul Lim Professor, Kyungnam University

142

143 국문초록 대북제재가북한경제에미치는영향 이글에서는국제사회의대북제재가북한당국의대응, 시장그리고 7차당대회에서드러난향후경제정책에미친영향들을분석하고평가했다. 제재는 7차당대회준비와관련한당국의대응에적지않은영향을미쳤다. 고립압박은자강, 자립, 자력을강조하는새로운시대정신의창조, 동원체제의강화, 각종충성자금모금확대, 저축강요, 밀수및인력수출확대등의현상을만들어냈다. 제재는또한북한시장활동에도영향을미치면서주민들의불만을유발시키고있는듯하다. 물가와환율에미치는영향은미미했지만주민들의불안감을자극하면서안전자산선호경향이강화되고있고, 각종동원과세부담등의증가로장사활동시간이축소되고, 주민들의생계난을가중시키고있다. 북한당국은 7차당대회를성공적으로치루는데필요한자금수요가급증한바있으나, 대북제재에따른외화수입감소를내부자금동원을통해서충당하였다. 즉충성자금확보와노동력동원등으로제재의효과를반감시킨것이다. 북한은과거에도대내외적난관에봉착했을때경제적돌파구를열기위해주민들의노동력을최대한동원시켜단시간내생산력증대를이뤄내는성과를보여줬다. 이번에도비슷한경로를밟고있는것으로보여지지만, 과거와달리강도높은제재가지속되는환경에서내부자원과노동력에만의존하는위기관리전략이효과를발휘할수있을지는좀더지켜봐야할것으로보여진다. 그간 7차당대회를성과적으로마무리하기위해모든인적, 물적자원을의도적으로총동원하고집중하고있는시기라일시적이라도생산과공급은높은수준에서유지되었다. 공장기업소, 협동농장들은일단생산량을크게늘려야했기때문이다. 하지만일반주민들은각종모금과세부담에시달리고, 노동력제공을하다보니시장과밀수활동이줄어들면서소비위축현상이발생하였다. 주민입장에서는제재와당대회준비라는이중고에시달리면서고통이가중된측면이있다. 북한당국은대내경제에미치는악영향과리스크를기관 기업소및주민들에게전가하거나, 분산시키는방식으로불안정요소를완화하고있다. 물가, 환율의안정세가이어 129

144 지고있고, 중국으로부터의상품유입도지속되고있다. 4월부터북중교역규모가감소되기시작하고있지만주로북한의대중수출주력품목인석탄, 납,, 금광물자원이감소한탓에시장물가나환율에는큰영향을미치지는않고있다. 대북제재는 7차당대회에서의새로운국가경제발전전략구상에도상당한영향을미친것으로파악된다. 당대회에서드러난북한의전략과정책에는외부제재에맞서고, 이를극복하기위한다양한구상과종합적인전략들이담겨있다고해도과언이아니다. 결국북한은장기화될가능성이큰제재국면을우리식경제관리방법을토대로동원체제와과학기술에의존하면서경제부문별로제시된목표들을실현하려할것이다. 이과정에서오랜기간대북제재에길들여져온북한의자력갱생능력은더욱강화될것으로전망되며, 외화난등이심화되더라도자강력제일주의와같은독특한생존전략으로제재국면을정면돌파할가능성이높아보인다. 130

145 Abstract The Impact of Sanctions on the North Korean Economy In this article, the impact of international sanctions on the North Korean economy is analyzed with particular focus on the changes in its economic policy witnessed through the response of the North Korean regime, markets, and the 7th Party Congress. Sanctions have had a considerable effect on the North Korean authorities in relation to the 7th Party Congress. Enduring isolation and pressure has created the spirit of the new era that stresses self-development, independence, and self-sustenance. It has also led to strengthening of the mobilization system, expansion of loyalty funds, compulsory savings, smuggling, and labor force exports. Sanctions have also affected the market activities in North Korea, leading to public discontent. While impacts on inflation and the exchange rate were negligible, it worsened public anxiety and raised the desire for risk-free assets. In addition, the increased labor mobilization and various tax burdens resulted in a reduction in time invested in business activities that had a direct effect of disrupting people s livelihoods. North Korea saw an increase in the amount of capital necessary to successfully host the 7th Party Congress and, as a result of the reduced foreign exchange earnings from sanctions, opted to mobilize the necessary funds internally. In other words, the collection of loyalty funds and increased workforce mobilization marred the effects of sanctions. In the past, North Korea has mobilized the labor force of the ordinary people, increasing productivity within a short period of time in order to make economic breakthroughs in times of internal and external challenges. North Korea is demonstrating similar behavior once again. However, only time will tell if North Korea will be able to exercise effective risk management strategy in a high intensity environment with continuing sanctions, relying only on internal resources and labor. 131

146 Amidst the preparation of the 7th Party Congress, all human and physical resources were mobilized with concentration on increasing production and overall supply to the highest level, albeit for the short-term. Plants, enterprises, and cooperative farms alike were forced to significantly increase yields as ordinary people suffered from a variety of loyalty payments and tax burdens, leading to decreased consumption, a withering market and reduced smuggling activities as people were preoccupied with providing labor to the state. Between the international sanctions and the preparation for the Party Congress, the North Korean people only suffered. North Korean authorities are attempting to mitigate the domestic economic instability by transferring and dispersing the risks and burdens onto economic institutions, enterprises and ordinary citizens. This has resulted in the continued stabilization of prices, exchange rates, and has also kept up the influx of products from China. The trade volume between North Korea and China has been declining since April, but this drop has been mainly concentrated on coal, lead, gold and other mineral resources and has not had a significant impact on market prices and exchange rates. International sanctions are believed to have made a significant impact on the creation of the new economic development strategy announced in the 7th Party Congress. It is not an exaggeration to say that the North Korean strategy and external policies revealed in the Party Congress are focused on dealing with international sanctions head-on, with a variety of initiatives and comprehensive strategies to overcome hardships. Pyongyang is likely to exert all efforts to realize economic goals based on the our-style economic management methods and to continue to rely on their mobilization system, science and technology as sanctions are unlikely to end anytime soon. Through this process, North Korea can be expected to further strengthen its self-reliance capabilities as they grow further accustomed to sanctions. Even amidst the tough foreign currency situation, it is highly likely that North Korea will find unique survival strategies such as a self-development first policy to overcome the difficulties associated with sanctions. 132

147 I. 서론 한국정부는북한의 1월 6일 4차핵실험과 2월 7일의장거리미사일발사이후개성공단폐쇄, 유엔안보리제재견인, 북한인권법및테러방지법통과, 독자적대북제재, 한미군사훈련등으로북한을고강도로압박해왔다. 2월 10일한국정부가개성공단폐쇄라는초강력대북제재선봉에나선이후국제사회는북한의 4차핵실험과미사일발사에대응한유엔안전보장이사회 ( 안보리 ) 차원의다자제재및개별국가차원의양자제재로북한을압박하고있다. 유엔안보리는지난 3월 2일민생목적혹은대량살상무기 (WMD) 와무관한경우를제외하고철광석과석탄, 금, 티타늄, 희토류등북한의광물거래를금지하는대북제재결의 2270호를통과시켰다. 새대북제재결의 2270호는안보리역대최초로북한수출입모든화물에대한의무적검색을실시하고, 북한의핵 탄도미사일프로그램개발에기여할수있는자금창출및기술이전등을더욱어렵게만드는조치들이포함됐다대북제재의목적은북한이핵실험과장거리미사일발사와같은도발을더이상하지못하게하고, 상응하는엄중한대가를치르도록함으로써, 북한의잘못된셈법을완전히변화시키겠다는것이다. 박근혜대통령은 2월 16일국회연설에서 지금부터정부는북한정권이핵개발로는생존할수없으며, 오히려체제붕괴를재촉할뿐이라는사실을뼈저리게깨닫고스스로변화할수밖에없는환경을만들기위해보다강력하고실효적인조치들을취해나갈것 이라고밝혔다. 미국, 일본, 중국, 러시아, 스위스, EU 등국제사회도북한의핵과탄도미사일과관련한불법적활동을용납하지않을것이며북한이국제적의무를준수할때까지불법적활동에따른비용을높여나가겠다는입장을견지하면서강도높은독자적제재를부과해왔다. 국제사회의제재는북한당국의대응을비롯해내부시장과 7차당대회의경제정책방향에도적지않은영향을미친것으로파악된다. 특히이번대북제재는북한이 36 년만에개최한노동당대회에직접적영향을주었기때문에이둘사이의상호연관성을고려한검토가요구된다. 따라서본글에서는국제사회의제재가북한당국의대응에어떤영향을미쳤고, 시장에는어떤변화가발생했는지, 그리고당대회에서제시된향후경제정책수립에미친영향등을분석및평가할것이다. 한국이나국제사회가대북제재를통해얻고자하는기대효과는무역, 금융거래제 133

148 한 -> 수출감소 -> 수입능력감소 -> 외화유입감소 -> 생필품 / 중간재 / 자본재수입감소 -> 후생악화 -> 북한의대내외경제위축과민심의동요-> 김정은정권압박 -> 군사도발억제등인것으로파악된다. 이글에서도이런주요영향변수를고려해대북제재가북한경제에미치는영향을논의하고자한다. 연구방법으로는탈북자인터뷰를비롯해북한내부소식을전하는전문매체들의보도, 정부측의브리핑자료등을토대로필자의분석과평가를추가할것이다. 대북제재조치의내용이나이행실태는이글에서별도로설명하지않고, 영향중심으로논의를전개하고자한다. 보다엄밀한관찰을위해서는정량적분석도병행되어야하지만제재기간이짧은데다가, 신뢰할만한통계를확보하기어렵기때문에정성적분석위주로접근할것이다. 대북경제제재의유효성을실증적으로분석하려는시도는있어왔으나, 제재의목적달성을객관적으로평가하는기준의설정이쉽지않고, 이용가능한통계가많지않아총체적으로효과를파악하는것은늘한계가있어왔다. 그렇지만이런제약아래에서도국제사회의대북제재가북한경제에미치는영향을파악하려는노력은향후대북정책수립에좋은참고자료가될것으로기대된다. II. 북한당국의대응에미친영향 국제사회의대북제재는 7차당대회준비와관련한당국의대응에적지않은영향을미쳤다. 고립압박은자강, 자립, 자력을강조하는새로운시대정신의창조, 동원체제의강화, 각종충성자금모금확대, 저축강요, 밀수및인력수출확대등의현상을만들어냈다. 국제사회의강력한제재는당대회의성공적개최에돌출변수로작용했고, 북한당국으로서는 70일전투등집단적동원과경쟁을통해제재의부정적영향을최소화하려노력하였다. 1. 사상적대응 국제사회는북한을굴복시키려하고있고, 북한은이를방어하는데사활을걸고있 다. 김정은은자신의건재함과리더십을이번압박과제재를돌파하는데걸고있는 134

149 듯하다. 여기서주목되는대목은북한은외부세계의제재압박을자강, 자립, 자력을키우는계기로적극활용하고있는점이다. 이른바 자력자강의투쟁기풍 의투쟁기풍을확산시키고있는것이다. 이런분석은지난 4월 3일국방위원회대변인이 미국의 초강도제재 는조선을자립, 자력, 자강의강국으로전변시키고있다고강조한데서도뒷받침된다. 또한김정은은려명거리건설을지시하면서, 그어떤형태의제재와압력속에서도더욱억세게뻗치고일어나세계를향해과감히돌진하는조선의기상, 인민의최고이상실현을위해나아가는조선의모습, 우리가일단마음먹은것은다할수있으며우리식대로남들이보란듯이잘살수있다는것을똑똑히보여주는정치적계기가될것이라고강조했다. 노동당기관지노동신문은 70일전투 를마무리하면서이기간산업생산은물론, 사상적인측면에서도성과를거뒀다며 온갖적대세력들의제재와전쟁책동을쳐갈기며당의두리 ( 주위 ) 에굳게뭉친일심단결의위력을힘있게떨쳐왔다 고평가했다. 1) 북한의대외선전용주간지통일신보는 자강력 을내세우며오히려주민생활이나아지고있다는주장을펼쳤다. 2) 이매체는이어 미국이추종세력들과야합해감행하는제재는군사분야는말할것도없고인민생활에필요한물자로부터주요공장설비, 첨단기술에이르기까지거의모든분야의거래를제한하고차단하는방향에서진행되고있다 고밝혔다. 그러면서이는 공화국의과학기술발전을억제하고경제를질식시키며인민들의생활을극도로어렵게하여 불만 을유도하기위한극악한반공화국압살책동 이라고비난했다. 이매체는하지만 인민들은지난수십여년간적대세력들의제재와봉쇄속에서도자강력의기치를높이들고자립경제토대를갖추어왔다 며 부당한제재의회오리는몰아쳐도인민생활에더욱편리한조건들이지어지고있다 고주장했다. 또 부당한제재는공화국인민을굴복시킨것이아니라자기것에대한긍지, 자기의무궁무진한자원에대한자부심을더욱굳게해주는결과를낳고있다 고도말했다. 또하나주목할만한대응은새로운시대정신으로 백두산영웅청년정신 을강조하고 1) 노동신문, 2016 년 5 월 3 일. 2) 북한의대외선전용주간지통일신보는 4 월 9 일 제재효과에대한생각 이라는제목의수필형식글을 연합뉴스, 2016 년 4 월 10 일에서인용보도. 135

150 있는점이다. 김정은은 4월 23일 70일전투 의대표적사업으로추진됐던백두산영웅청년3호발전소의완공현장을방문한자리에서처음으로 백두산청년영웅정신 을언급했다. 그는이자리에서 고난의행군, 강행군시기에는혁명적군인정신과강계정신이창조되였다면오늘의어려운시기에는백두산영웅청년정신이창조되였다 고밝혔다. 즉김정일시대의심각한경제난과자연재해를혁명적군인정신과강계정신으로이겨냈다면, 핵 미사일도발로가해진국제사회의제재국면에서는새로운시대정신으로돌파한다는것이다. 준공에앞서김제1위원장이완공된발전소를둘러보며 새로운시대정신을창조했는가를웅변으로보여주는교양거점 이라고강조했다. 3) 새로운시대정신의학습장 으로적극활용할것임을시사하는발언으로해석된다. 실제발전소건설과정에서청년들의역할이컸고, 김정은제1위원장도이를높게평가하고있는점을고려하면갈수록청년들과과학기술을앞세운대응이강화될것으로전망된다. 4) 2. 노력동원 북한은 자력갱생, 자강력제일주의 를앞세워 70일전투등 집단주의적경쟁 을독려, 당대회에서내세울성과창출에주력해왔다. 5) 북한이제재압박에대응하는또다른방식은노력동원의강화이다. 특히대북제재에대비하여과학기술발전에기초한 자재 설비 원료의국산화 를내세우며전력을비롯한석탄 금속 철도부문의현대화등기간산업을강조하는것이특징이다 전쟁이후철저히파괴된경제를복구하기위한작업은북한주민의노력동원으로추진되었다. 당시소련이 5개년계획안을지지하지않았을뿐만아니라, 소련과동구및중국의경제적지원수준이낮았기때문이다. 1959년 3월부터시작된 천리마운동 은그러한노력동원이더욱더조직화된 3) 북한백두산영웅청년 3호발전소가 4월 28일준공됐다. 북한은이를두고 또하나의청춘기념비 라고강조했다. 조선중앙통신, 2016년 4월 28일. 4) 실제김일성사회주의청년동맹 ( 청년동맹 ) 이백두산일대영하 30도의살인적추위를이겨내면서거의맨손으로공사를진행했다. 김제1위원장은 우리나라수력발전소건설력사상 ( 역사상 ) 가장불리한자연지리적조건을극복해야하는엄혹한난관과시련속에서도새로운기술혁신안들과합리적인건설공법들을적극받아들여겨울철에는수력발전소건설을할수없다던기존건설공법에종지부를찍었다 고추켜세웠다. 5) 통일부, 북한제7차당대회준비동향, 브리핑자료, 2016년 4월 19일. 136

151 것인데, 이러한노력동원을통하여북한은점점 동원체제 로굳어져갔고, 이런체제가경제건설의동력이되었다. 이런동원체제는김정은시대에도그대로계승발전되고있고, 특히대북제재에대한대응수단으로서노력동원은매우유용하게활용되고있다. 노력동원은속도전을통한충성경쟁과결합되어경제건설의추동력이되고있다. 특히고위간부들은김정은에게잘보이기위해경쟁적으로속도를강조하면서성과를독려하고있다. 노동신문을보면, 집단주의적경쟁열풍 이강조된다. 따라배우기 와 경험교환운동 이이뤄진다는것으로, 집단주의적경쟁열풍아래따라배우기, 경영교환운동이벌어지고있다는의미다. 북한에서통상 70일운동 이나 100일운동 이벌어지면공장, 기업소, 경쟁을시키는것을말한다. 해당공장기업소에서굉장히중요하게간주된다. 예를들면, 탄광에서는굴진 ( 掘進 ) 소대, 채탄 ( 採炭 ) 소대가있는데, 기존에는이두개의부분이나연관성있는집단끼리경쟁시켰으나, 지금은밖에있는여러가지부속작업반들도동일선상에서경쟁을시키고있는점이이전과다른특징이다. 6) 북한은제7차노동당대회를준비하기위해평양시민을포함한모든주민을대상으로 2월 23일부터 70일전투 참여를독려하는등총동원체제를가동해왔다. 특히단기간에성과를내려고주민들을야간작업에동원하는것은물론주말과휴일에도건설현장등에투입했다. 7) 인력동원에의해김정은일가우상화건축물및당대회치적사업건립이이뤄졌고, 군자리혁명사적지리모델링 (4.12), 여명거리건설 미래상점리모델링등이추진되었다. 양강도에서는김정은의 후대사랑 을선전할육아원공사에주민들을총동원한것으로전해졌다. 8) 북한이 3.24 노동신문을통해발표한 70일전투 1개월실적에서섬유의류가공업, 전력등의분야에서성과가있는것으로보이나, 실제생산과일치된다고보기는어렵다. 각종매체를통해 2월성과초과달성 등을선전하고있으나, 이는체계적인투자가아닌단순노력동원에의한성과라는한계가있다. 북한주민들에게는 70일전투 동원에따른생계활동지장및각종공사비조달을위한상납금강요등이있었다. 6) 北농촌, 70 일전투 로심각한전력난에시달려, 데일리엔케이, 2016 년 3 월 21 일. 7) 당대회한달앞둔북한 주민 총동원령 기관엔 강제모금, 연합뉴스, 2016 년 4 월 6 일. 8) 北, 김정은충정의선물 육아원건설에주민총동원, 데일리엔케이, 4 월 14 일. 137

152 [ 표 -1] 70 일전투 1 개월 (2.23~3.22) 성과선전 (3.24, 노동신문 ) 부문전력석탄금속 기계 화학철도경공업농임수산건설자료 : 통일부 주요선전내용 - 70 일전투 한달동안 93 백만 kwh 증산 - 70 일전투 한달동안계획보다 20 만톤초과생산 - 주체철, 철광석, 철정광생산에성과 - 변압기 전동기 발전기생산계획각각 108%, 102%, 150% 달성 - 흥남비료련합기업소매일 114% 이상생산계획달성 - 김종태전기기관차련합기업소의생산 수리일일실적 110% 초과 - 평양 함흥 개천철도국에서수송증대성과달성 - 김정숙평양제사공장 김정숙평양방직공장 1/4 분기계획조기달성 - 하당은하피복공장 ( 평양시소재 ) 매일생산계획 200% 달성등 - 각지농촌, 대용비료생산 1.2 배성과 - 강계 평북돼지고기공장, 돼지고기생산성과확대 - 자서림산사업소, 전년동기대비통나무생산 1.2 배달성 - 김책수산사업소매일물고기잡이 120% 수행 - 주요건설대상 만리마 속도창조 * 백두산영웅청년 3 호발전소건설, 김일성경기장개선공사, 중앙동물원 2 단계개건공사 흥미로운대목은북한이 2월 23일부터 70일전투 를진행하고있는가운데, 새로운총화항목으로 양심총화 가등장한점이다. 기존항목은일별, 주별성과등주로일과관련된내용이다. 9) 북한당기관지 < 노동신문 > 은 3월 30일 70일전투에떨처나선경성애자공장일꾼들에게는유다른총화항목이있다 면서 양심총화 를소개했다. 총화항목은노동자들을대하는일꾼들의관점과입장을총화하는항목으로규정되고있다. 새로생긴 양심총화 가전국적으로실시되는지는밝히지않았으나, 이보도로내용으로보아전국으로확산된것으로보인다. 신문에따르면, 양심총화 는 노동자들을위해어떤좋은일을했는가 를생각하는항목으로해당공장근로자들은아침마다현장으로나가면서오늘은무슨좋은일을할것인가를생각한다고한다. 예로는 밤새워일하는노동자들을위해집에서푸짐한식사를마련해현장으로가는일, 앓고 9) 北 70 일전투 총화신규항목에 양심총화 등장, 통일뉴스,2016 년 3 월 30 일. 138

153 있는종업원에게약봉지를쥐어주면서집으로등을떠밀어보내고자기가대신일하기 등이다. 양심총화항목이생겨난후부터생산실적이높아졌다고북한언론은전하고있다. 북한은 70일전투 시작과함께, 전투총화 라는명목으로매일, 매주총화를강조하고있다. 여기에는일별, 주별사업실적에대한평가가주를이루고있으며, 당에대한충정심을검증받는계기 라고설명하고있다. 앞서 < 노동신문 > 은 3월 16일 70일전투 총화에대해 오늘의 70일전투의일총화, 주총화를무심히여기지말아야한다. 승리의열쇠가바로거기서마련된다 고강조했다. 그리고당조직, 당지도소조가일별, 주별성과와대책전형을따져전투목표를무조건수행하도록장악통제하며, 총화를통해얻은경험과교훈을토대로당적지도를해야한다고방침을내렸다. 또한, 현실의요구와단위의특성에맞게전투총화형식과방법을개선해경쟁열의를고조시키며, 따라앞서기, 따라배우기, 경험교환운동 을벌려야한다고제시했다. 3. 충성자금 ( 헌금 ), 세부담증가제재로인하여개성공단을비롯하여그동안의외화벌이수단들이차단되면서이를탈피하기위해북한당국이더많은 충성자금 을걷어들였다. 유엔안전보장이사회의대북제재영향으로광물수출등주요외화벌이통로가막혀 7차당대회준비자금조달에어려움을겪자행정기관별, 무역회사별로모금액을강제할당하고있다. 모금액을채우지못할경우다른불이익을주는방식으로각기관의성과달성을독려하고있다. 북한은 2015년 11월 미래과학자거리 를준공한데이어이번에는 2배규모의제2 의미래과학자거리인 려명거리 조성계획을발표하고내각의행정기관별로모금액을강제할당했다. 내각의행정기관별로자금조달목표를지정해놓고목표량을채우지못하면대대적인인사조치에나서고있다. 자금조달방법으로행정기관별로려명거리내아파트한채씩배정해분양자금을통해자금을바치라고조치했다. 그러나이미지난해미래과학자거리조성과정에서똑같은방법을동원해지금은자금줄이마른상태라빚을내할당량을충당하는분위기인것으로전해진다. 려명거리조성사업은연내완료가목표이고, 유엔의대북제재에도자력갱생에문제가없다는대내외선전 139

154 에활용될가능성이크다. 10) 무역회사들에게는구체적으로충성자금 ( 예시 : 3000달러 ) 액수를정해헌납을지시한것으로전해졌다. 이에따라무역회사들은중국에서식품을비롯한과일을대량수입, 북한돈주 ( 신흥부유층 ) 들에게판매하는방법으로외화벌이에나서고있다. 11) 충성자금을상납못할경우무역권을빼앗길수있어무역회사들은단순외화벌이가아닌생존권사수차원에서상납목표액을맞추고있다. 북한당국은김일성생일을비롯한국가명절을맞아해마다무역회사들에충성자금을강요하면서높은액수를헌납한무역회사들에게무역권을보장해주는방법으로일종의충성경쟁을유도하고있다. 때문에무역회사들은올해 3월본격시행된강력한대북제재속에서도생필품을비롯한식품수출입을통한충성자금확보에나섰다. 특히사과등과일은제재항목에포함되지않아안전하게외화벌이를할수있어인기있다고한다. 상납금뿐만아니라무역성을비롯한모든무역회사들에올농사에필요한영농자재와방대한비료수입과제도하달됐다. 이역시수출입허가권과연계되어무역회사들의과업달성을압박하고있다. 예를들면, 평양국가계획위원회는국가무역기관들의연간수출입무역와크 ( 허가증 ) 를승인해준다는점을악용, 비료상납을강요하고있다. 12) 행정기관, 무역회사뿐아니라금광노동자등일반회사에도충성의외화자금상납과제가주어진다. 금광노동자들도 외국에서들여오는것이없으면국내에서돈이될만한것에집중할수박에없고, 금생산과제가증가하면결국힘들어지는것은노동자들뿐인셈이다. 13) 행정당국에충성자금헌납압박이가해지다보니, 보안성같은경우는외화벌금의확대하는방식으로외화확보에나서고있는것으로나타났다. 노동당 7차대회를앞두고사회기강잡기위한명분으로공안당국이특히중국무역상인들을대상으로사소한위반에도벌금을부과하며외화수거에나서고있는것이다. 14) 나선지방으로상품을싣고들어가던중국상품차는교통규정을좀어겼다는이유로인민폐 500위안 10) 당대회한달앞둔북한 주민 총동원령 기관엔 강제모금, 연합뉴스, 2016년 4월 6일. 11) 北, 김일성생일 黨대회에 3천달러충성자금헌납지시, 데일리엔케이, 2016년 4월 15일. 12) 北, 무역회사는봉? 충성자금이어비료상납강요, 데일리엔케이, 2016년 4월 22일. 13) 北간부 충성자금가중 불러올핵 미사일안반가워, 데일리엔케이, 2016년 2월 22일. 14) 북공안당국, 교통위반벌금도외화요구, 자유아시아방송, 2016년 4월 6일. 140

155 을내고풀려난사례가있는데, 보안원들은대부분돈을많이다루는상품차량을단속해서는거액을요구한바있다. 원래북한은 주체 를강조하면서국가운영에필요한자금이나벌금따위는북한돈을기준해적용해왔다. 공장기업소에서는월급도중앙은행에서조선돈 ( 북한돈 ) 으로일괄받아노동자들에게지급하고, 법기관에서도벌금을조선돈으로부과해왔다. 하지만, 현재중국까지동참한유엔제재로돈줄이막힌북한이내각과중앙기관, 공장기업소에충성자금과제를할당하고, 외화수집에총력을기울이는것으로알려졌다. 4. 저축강요북한당국은경제제재에대한대응으로행정기관, 무역회사가아닌일반주민에게도금전적인부담을떠넘기고있는것으로전해진다. 부족한자금을충당하기위해일반주민에게저축을강요하고있는것이다. 15) 일본의언론매체인 아시아프레스 (3.19) 에따르면함경북도의지역사무소는 70일전투 를계기로 은행에돈이없다 며모든주민에게매달북한돈 1천원을은행에저축할것을강요하기시작했다. 매달 1천원씩예금하면이자를붙여준다며올해 1월부터당대회가열리는 5월까지총 5천원을저축할것을강권하고있다는것이다. 그러나문제는북한주민은한번은행에저금하면찾기어렵다는것을알고있으니까은행에돈을맡기는사람이거의없다는점이다. 얼마의이자를줄것인지에대한지역사무소의설명도없다. 북한주민은은행에돈을맡기면다시돈을찾을때인출액의절반을수수료로빼앗기고큰손해를보는것을잘아는데다 2009년화폐개혁당시은행에예금한돈을많이잃어버린경험이있어최근지역사무소의호소에도저축에응하는주민은거의없다고아시아프레스측은밝히고있다. 다만북한당국이은행에돈이없다는것을인정하고, 또당대회를위해서 모금 이아닌은행에 저금 하라는것이주목할만한부분이다. 돈을모금할경우강탈이되기때문에그게아닌이자를붙여돌려주겠다는식이니까표면적으로는자발적참여가된다. 하지만저금실적이저조하자북한당국은 70일전투 와관련해주민에게성금 15) 북, 70 일전투 구실로은행에저축강요, 자유아시아방송, 2016 년 3 월 19 일. 141

156 을바칠것을강요하고, 북한에거주한화교와북한에서사업하는외국기업도성금 모금에동참하기를요구하고있다고한다. 5. 각종불편법수단동원 제재를회피하기위해대상단체, 개인들은명칭변경, 가명사용, 수출입서류위조통제품목을밀거래하는한편위장계좌나인편으로각종불편법수단을동원하고있다. 16) 제재로인한외화수입축소를만회하기위한노력은밀수의증대로이어지고있기도하다. 한동안거래가끊겼던북한문화재가최근중국골동품시장에나돌기시작한것이하나의사례이다. 17) 이른바충성자금마련을위한북한근로자들의외화벌이가해외오지, 말레이시아보르네오섬에위치한사라왁주. 에있는탄광에까지이르고있다. 18) 아프리카탄자니아에병원을설립해외화벌이에나서는현상이포착되기도한다. 19) 지난 1991년부터들어서기시작한탄자니아의북한병원은모두 13개로늘어났다. 6. 인력수출및관광객유치확대 북한이더많은외화벌이를위해해외파견근로자의선발기준을일부완화한것으로알려졌다. 20) 예를들면총각과비당원은해외파견에서제외하던모집기준이최근해제되면서지원자가늘고있다는것이다. 예전에는노동당에입당하지못한비당원과미혼자에한해서는해외파견을일체금지했다. 이같은조건은해외에서근로자들의이탈을방지하기위해북한내부양가족을볼모로하는일종의인질정책과관련이있다. 해외파견인력을통한외화벌이가북한이당초예상했던목표에미달하자당자금을확보하기위해해외인력수출을더욱늘리려는것이라는해석이다. 하지만실제인력수출이증대되었는지는확인되지않고있다. 16) 국회정보위간단회브리핑자료, 2016년 4월 27일. 17) 연합뉴스, 2016년 4월 12일. 18) 해외탄광까지내몰린北외화벌이일꾼, KBS 9시뉴스, 2016년 3월 29일. 19) 북, 탄자니아에또 외화벌이 병원설립, 자유아시아방송, 2016년 4월 6일. 20) 북, 외화벌이위해인력수출증강, 자유아시아방송, 2016년 2월 23일. 142

157 한편, 북한당국이 7차당대회자금마련을목적으로노동자를송출한중국회사측에 6개월치임금을먼저송금해줄것으로요구한것으로전해졌다. 대북제재및종업원집단탈북등의영향으로해외북한식당운영이어려워지자자구책마련에나선것으로풀이된다. 특히북한당국은이들이받는월급을늘리기위해노동시간을 12시간에서 13시간으로확충하는것도허가했다. 노동시간연장에따른비용은북한근로자책임자에게따로지불되었지만정작근로자에게는돌아가지않고있다고한다. 21) 한편, 북한은국제사회의강력한대북제재에도불구하고외국인관광객유치를위한노력은멈추지않았다. 22) 중국베이징에기반을둔고려여행사도지난 4월 10일평양에서열린 제29차만경대상국제마라톤경기대회 에역대최대인 588명의외국인을이끌고참가한바있다. III. 시장에미친영향 대북제재는북한의시장을비롯한대내경제에도적지않은영향을미치고있다. 북한시장의안정성에영향을미치는물가, 환율등일부변수와특징중심으로현재상황을살펴보고자한다. 23) 제재가북한의대외경제에는상당히부정적인영향을미치고있는것으로파악되고있지만, 북한당국은대내경제에미치는악영향과리스크를기관 기업소및주민들에게분산시키는방식으로불안정요소를최소화하고있다. 7차노동당대회준비를위해통제했던시장활동도대회종료이후다시정상적으로허용하고있다. 제재가북한시장에미치는영향을주요현상중심으로살펴보면다음과같다. 물가, 환율의안정세가이어지고있고, 중국으로부터의상품유입도지속되고있다. 5월중순기준으로쌀값과기름값, 환율, 생필품가격등이비교적안정세를보이면서당장북한주민에큰타격을주지않는것으로나타났다. 24) 다만, 쌀가격은떨어지지 21) 北, 黨대회자금확보급급 中, 6개월봉급먼저달라, 데일리엔케이, 2016년 4월 24일. 22) 유엔제재한달 북한관광영향미미, 자유아시아방송, 2016년 4월 12일. 23) 사실엄격한관찰을위해서는정권상층부, 중산층, 서민등층위를구분해서제재가미치는영향을살펴봐야한다. 143

158 않고있긴하지만, 이전처럼물건을넉넉히구입하려는주민들은갈수록줄어들고있고, 시장에서는물건의공급은이전보다확대되었지만, 수요가감소하는현상이발견되고있다. 이에따라옥수수등일부품목의가격은오히려하락하였다. 4월부터북중교역규모가감소되기시작하고있지만 25) 주로북한의대중수출주력품목인석탄, 납, 금, 금등이줄어들었기때문에시장물가나환율에큰영향을미치지는않고있다. 북 중간물동량이줄고절차도많이까다로워졌지만, 이것이교역축소에커다란영향을미치고있는것으로보여지지는않는다. [ 표 ] 올해대북제재이후북한각지역의물가동향표 ( 단위 : 북한원 ) 자료 : 아시아프레스 ( 자유아시아방송, 2016 년 5 월 28 일 ) 대북제재에대한불안감으로달러, 위안화등안전자산선호경향이일시적으로나타나긴했지만환율역시안정되어있다. 5월중순에는오히려위안화에대한환율이떨어졌다. 26) 제재가주민들에게는각종세부담의증가, 정치학습시간의증가, 봉사노동시간의 24) 대북제재, 당장주민에영향미미, 자유아시아방송, 2016년 5월 28일. 25) 中, 4월대북수입규모 22.3% 대북제재효과나오나? 중국해관총서북 중교역통계 북중전체교역액도 10% 하락, 데일리엔케이, 2016년 5월 24일. 26) 대북제재, 당장주민에영향미미, 자유아시아방송, 2016년 5월 28일. 144