제 34 권제 2 호 2018 년 ( 여름 ) 통권 101 호, pp. 99-135. 대북및안보정책평가의세대및이념요인 배진석 *..... 국문요약 이연구는대북정책과안보정책영역에서세대및이념요인의작동메커니즘을분석하기위해세가지가설을제시하였다. 첫째, 대북및안보정책에대한평가는연령에따라단선적으로변화하지않는다. 둘째, 대북및안보정책에미치는이념의영향력은세대에따라달리나타난다. 셋째, 정책조합에따라세대및이념이영향력을미치는조건이달라진다. 2017년대선직전에조사된설문조사결과를바탕으로분석한결과이연구는다음의사항을발견했다. 첫째, 다른요인들을통제한이후에도 1970년대출생세대가그이전혹은이후세대보다대북교류협력정책을지지하는비율이높고사드배치에찬성하는비율이낮았다. 둘째, 1970년대생과그이전세대에서는이념인식이대북및안보정책에영향을미쳤으나, 그이후청년세대에서는진보- 보수의이념인식이유의미한영향력을미치지못했다. 셋째, 전통적인진보-보수의정책조합에서연령은효과가없고이념이영향력을발휘했지만, 전통적인진보-보수의정책조합이엇갈릴때에는이념대신연령효과가확인되었다. 진보-보수라는이념균열내에부분집합으로쌍을이루던교류협력-강경 ( 대북관계 ), 자주-한미동맹 ( 안보 ), 복지-성장 ( 경제정책 ) 의조합이청년세대-중장년세대라는세대균열과중첩, 강화되어왔다면, 이연구의경험적발견은이념적으로양극화된한국의정치균열구조가세대균열축을중심으로완만한각도로교차하는현상이나타나고있다는증거가된다. 주제어 : 대북정책, 안보정책, 연령효과, 이념효과 DOI: 10.17331/kwp.2018.34.2.004 **. 저서및논문 : 5,, 26 1 : 107-140 (2018).
100 한국과국제정치 Ⅰ. 문제제기 2017 19 ( ),.,.,..,.?.,. -..,,??, -??, -
대북및안보정책평가의세대및이념요인 101??.,.., (descriptive statistics).,,.. ( ), ( ).,,.. (EAI) 2017,., 1970.,,.,., ( - ) ( - )
102 한국과국제정치, ( - - ). (cross-cut).,.,....,... Ⅱ. 선행연구 - - (, 2005;, 2005;, 2016;, 2006;, 2002;, 2014).
대북및안보정책평가의세대및이념요인 103, (, 2006: 166). (2005), -.,,,,,,.,..,., (, 2005: 197). (, 2014).,. 2002 16., 2002 386 (, 2003;, 2002).
104 한국과국제정치 2007 17, 2012 18. (, 2013;, 2016;, 2015;, 2014;, 2014). 1960 ( ), ( ). 2007 386 (, 2009;, 2009;, 2012;, 2008;, 2014). 1960.. 2012 386 (, 2013;, 2015;, 2014). 1960, (, 2017). 1960, 20. - - - -.. (, 2012), 2000,, (, 2014).
대북및안보정책평가의세대및이념요인 105. 20.., (, 2011;, 2015;, 2012)..? -,.,.... -. (Converse, 2000), (ambivalent attitude conflict) (Basinger and Lavine, 2005; Zaller and Feldman, 1992). (2013)
106 한국과국제정치. -,. (, 2014). -.,., -.. (2013),.,. (2014),. 20~30,.. (2018) 50%,. 1970
대북및안보정책평가의세대및이념요인 107.,.. < 가설 1> 연령대효과 1970.,. (2016)., -.,. < 가설 2> 이념의연령대별차별효과,.,. (2012, 2013) -,
108 한국과국제정치., - -. - - -. < 가설 3> 정책조합의이념및세대분화 - -, - -. Ⅲ. 예비분석. 1. 남북관계및사드배치관련이념별분포 < 1>
대북및안보정책평가의세대및이념요인 109. 54.8% 58.0%. 70.0%, 39.4%. 53.7% 62.5%. 34.6%, 77.4%.,.,.. < 그림 1> 남북관계및사드배치관련이념별분포 70.0 53.7 62.5 77.4 54.8 58.0 39.4 34.6 진보중도보수전체 대북교류협력정책지지 사드배치찬성 출처 : 동아시아연구원, 2017 년대선패널조사 1) 1), 2017.
110 한국과국제정치 < 1> 30%, 34.6%. 39.4%, 22.6%.,,. 2. 남북관계및사드배치관련연령대별분포 10. (cohort). 2) (, 2014), 2017, 1. 3) 20, 30, 40., 2) (~1949 ), (1950~1961 ), (1962~1970 ) (, 1992, 1994;, 1999). (~1959 ), 386 (1960 1962~1969 1970 ), X /IMF / (, 2006;, 2013;, 2015;, 2014;, 2014; Cho and Eom, 2012). 3)..
대북및안보정책평가의세대및이념요인 111 1970. 70. 4) < 2> 2012 2017, 5.,. 70, 40 90. U., 2012. < 그림 2> 남북관계관련연령대별분포 : 2012 및 2017 년비교 61.8 54.8 57.5 43.7 58.5 53.6 68.3 66.0 65.6 59.6 58.4 47.7 55.3 40.4 평균 90 년대생 80 년대생 70 년대생 60 년대생 50 년대생 40 년대생 2012 년 2017 년 4) 70,.
112 한국과국제정치. 2012 70 40 13%p, 2017 25.6%p. U, 2012 2017.. 2012 2017 61.8% 54.8% 7%p.,.. 14.9%p 40 13.8%p 90. 70 2.3%p.. 70,. < 3> < 2> 2017. U, U. 50 83.8%, 70 80 43~44%. 20 90, 70 80 10%p.
대북및안보정책평가의세대및이념요인 113 < 그림 3> 남북관계및사드배치관련연령대별분포 83.8 66.0 55.1 53.6 59.6 58.7 43.7 43.2 44.4 45.0 90 년대생 80 년대생 70 년대생 60 년대생 50 년대생이전 대북교류협력정책지지 사드배치찬성 < 2> < 3> 80 90,.?. 3. 연령대별이념분포 < 4>. 11 ( 0~ 5~ 10),. (box plot) 40 5.91, 50 5.47, 60 4.86, 70 4.32, 80 4.38, 90 4.22.
114 한국과국제정치 < 그림 4> 주관적자기이념평가의연령대별분포 10 8 이념 6 4 2 0 출처 : 배진석 (2017: 170). 40 년대생 50 년대생 60 년대생 70 년대생 80 년대생 90 년대생 (, 2017: 169-171). 40 50., 40 50 1 (Q1, ) (median) 5. 40 50 (0~4) 25%. 3 (Q3, ) 7 25% (8~10). 70~90. 4, 70, 80, 90. Q1 Q3 3, 5. 60. 60 4.86 (5)
대북및안보정책평가의세대및이념요인 115, Q1 Q3 4, 6,. < 4>.. 80 90,..,., -. -,. 4. 정책조합의이념및세대분화,.,. < 5>. 54.5%, 45.5%. 57.8%, 42.3%.,.
116 한국과국제정치 < 그림 5> 남북관계및사드배치관련조합비교 전체 1,091명 (100%) 연령평균 : 46.9세이념평균 : 4.75 교류협력 : 54.5% 연령평균 : 46.2세이념평균 : 4.23 남북관계강경 : 45.5% 연령평균 : 47.3세이념평균 : 5.39 반대 : 42.3% 연령평균 : 42.2세이념평균 : 3.97 < 조합A> 33.3% 연령평균 : 43.4세이념평균 : 3.89 < 조합D> 9.0% 연령평균 : 37.9세이념평균 : 4.26 사드배치찬성 : 57.8% 연령평균 : 50.0세이념평균 : 5.35 < 조합B> 21.3% 연령평균 : 50.2세이념평균 : 4.72 < 조합C> 36.5% 연령평균 : 49.7세이념평균 : 5.72 < 5> A, 33.3%.. 3.89. 43.4. C, 36.5%. 5.72. 49.7. A C 70% -. - 30%. 21.3% B. -. 50.2, 4.72. D. 9%
대북및안보정책평가의세대및이념요인 117, 37.9. 4.26 A. < 5>,,. < 6> < 7>. < 그림 6> 남북관계및사드배치관련이념별분포 교류 - 사드찬성 < 조합 B> 25.1% 19.2% 18.0% 교류 - 사드반대 < 조합 A> 27.7% 15.9% 37.1% 20.0% 51.6% 6.7% 59.4% 강경 - 사드찬성 < 조합 C> 10.2% 9.2% 강경 - 사드반대 < 조합 D> 진보중도보수 < 6> < 7> < 5>. < 6>,,
118 한국과국제정치. A C < 6>. A C. A (51.6%) > (27.7%) > (15.9%), C (59.4%) > (37.1%) > (20.0%). < 6> A C. B D. B 25.1%, - < 그림 7> 남북관계및사드배치관련연령대별분포 교류 - 사드찬성 < 조합 B> 26.9% 18.4% 14.7% 교류 - 사드반대 < 조합 A> 47.3% 35.9% 24.6% 4.3% 25.8% 32.8% 44.2% 강경 - 사드찬성 < 조합 C> 8.6% 16.6% 강경 - 사드반대 < 조합 D> 70 년대이전출생 70 년대출생 70 년대이후출생
대북및안보정책평가의세대및이념요인 119. D,. < 7> < 5>.. < 2> < 3>, 70 U U. 70, < 7>. A 70 47.3%. 70 35.9%, 70 24.6%. C 70 (44.2%) > 70 (32.8%) > 70 (25.8%). A C 70 U U < 7>,. < 7> B D. B 70 26.9%, 70 (18.4%) (14.7%). D 70 16.6%, 70 (8.6%) (4.3%). B D. - A C.
120 한국과국제정치 Ⅳ. 회귀분석 1. 자료, 변수및분석모형 2017. 5).?,.. 1, 0. 1, 0....,.. 70, 70 3 5) 2017 4 18~20 (1 ). 1,500, 19.5% (95% ±2.5%).
대북및안보정책평가의세대및이념요인 121.. (0) (10) 11, 5. ( ), ( ), (5 ), (3 ) ( ). 2017 ( ). - (, 2014), ( ). < 1>. < 표 1> 기초통계량 변수 관측치 평균 표준편차 최소값 최대값 연령 1157 46.8522 14.42082 20 86 이념 1139 4.751536 2.122083 0 10 교육 1156 0.6963668 0.4600252 0 1 성별 1157 0.5401901 0.4985977 0 1 수입 1137 4.098505 1.220774 1 5 계층인식 1157 1.629213 0.7913528 1 3 호남출신 1152 0.1805556 0.3848166 0 1 영남출신 1152 0.3012153 0.4589853 0 1 탄핵찬성 1129 0.870682 0.3357003 0 1 대북교류협력정책 1135 0.5480176 0.4979084 0 1 사드배치 1110 0.5801802 0.4937517 0 1 복지확대 1140 0.5201754 0.499812 0 1, (logistic regression).
122 한국과국제정치 2. 분석결과 1) 대북정책의방향성및사드배치찬성여부 < 2>. 1~4, 5~7 70. 1,.,.,. < 2> < 3> 70 U. 90 80 70 70. 1. 2~4 1 3. 2 70. 70. 3 70, 4 70. 70, 70
대북및안보정책평가의세대및이념요인 123 < 표 2> 대북교류협력정책지지여부 세대간비교 세대내비교 모형1 모형2 모형3 모형4 모형5 모형6 모형7 70년대이전 70년대생 70년대이후 연령 0.0315** 0.0335** 0.0315** 0.0137-0.00310 0.0527 0.0447 + (0.00641) (0.00992) (0.00640) (0.00946) (0.0169) (0.0580) (0.0269) 이념 -0.170** -0.170** -0.168 ** -0.167** -0.185** -0.325** -0.0558 (0.0392) (0.0391) (0.0392) (0.0393) (0.0555) (0.107) (0.0726) 교육 0.280 0.272 0.238 0.265-0.0658 1.073 * 0.599 (0.184) (0.186) (0.186) (0.185) (0.249) (0.478) (0.427) 성별 -0.0445-0.0458-0.0470-0.0388-0.0406 0.290-0.170 (0.147) (0.147) (0.147) (0.148) (0.227) (0.321) (0.264) 수입 -0.0101-0.00781-0.0202-0.0498-0.0792-0.348 + 0.0356 (0.0710) (0.0715) (0.0711) (0.0727) (0.109) (0.211) (0.138) 계층인식 0.0755 0.0767 0.0914 0.0952 0.351 + -0.0626 0.0116 (0.107) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.188) (0.260) (0.151) 호남출신 0.797** 0.801** 0.816** 0.796** 1.148 ** 0.117 0.531 (0.214) (0.215) (0.215) (0.215) (0.305) (0.495) (0.415) 영남출신 0.139 0.140 0.132 0.120 0.236-0.433 0.210 (0.167) (0.167) (0.167) (0.167) (0.261) (0.361) (0.297) 탄핵찬성 1.015** 1.009** 0.974** 0.987** 0.878** 1.945 + (0.258) (0.259) (0.259) (0.257) (0.284) (1.177) 복지확대 0.360* 0.360* 0.367* 0.377* 0.0467 0.502 0.752** (0.156) (0.156) (0.157) (0.157) (0.240) (0.330) (0.291) 사드배치 -1.596** -1.593** -1.583** -1.592** -1.791** -1.533** -1.394** (0.162) (0.162) (0.163) (0.163) (0.293) (0.337) (0.261) 70년대이전 -0.0737 (0.273) 70년대생 0.343 + (0.177) 70년대이후 -0.644* (0.254) 상수 -0.965-1.029-0.985 0.205 1.417-0.799-1.670 (0.632) (0.676) (0.631) (0.781) (1.334) (3.036) (1.106) N 1,023 1,023 1,023 1,023 462 250 306 pseudo R-sq 0.192 0.192 0.195 0.197 0.229 0.244 0.137 주 : ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 ( 괄호안은표준오차 )
124 한국과국제정치. 2 70. 70 70, 70 2~4...,., 1~4.. 5~7 70, 70, 70,., 5 6, 7. 70 70. 7 70.., 5 6, 7. 70 70, 70.,
대북및안보정책평가의세대및이념요인 125 (2014).. 70 70, 70.,,. < 3> < 2>,., 1. < 2> 3 2~4 70. < 2> < 3> 70, 2 4. 70,.. < 2> < 3>., 5 70 6 70. 70, 70 70.,
126 한국과국제정치 < 표 3> 사드배치찬성여부 세대간비교 세대내비교 모형1 모형2 모형3 모형4 모형5 모형6 모형7 70년대이전 70년대생 70년대이후 연령 0.0233** 0.0150 0.0231** 0.0364** 0.0703** -0.114* -0.0257 (0.00680) (0.0106) (0.00681) (0.0104) (0.0227) (0.0564) (0.0273) 이념 0.168** 0.168** 0.167** 0.166** 0.166** 0.273** 0.0927 (0.0416) (0.0417) (0.0417) (0.0416) (0.0628) (0.102) (0.0733) 교육 -0.221-0.198-0.184-0.204-0.140-0.0730-0.129 (0.192) (0.193) (0.193) (0.192) (0.272) (0.467) (0.423) 성별 0.475** 0.479** 0.478** 0.474** 0.317 0.217 0.959** (0.152) (0.152) (0.153) (0.152) (0.255) (0.310) (0.262) 수입 -0.185* -0.192* -0.173* -0.158* -0.154-0.201 0.0864 (0.0766) (0.0768) (0.0770) (0.0786) (0.136) (0.200) (0.139) 계층인식 0.170 0.164 0.154 0.156 0.177 0.325 0.0216 (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.208) (0.251) (0.146) 호남출신 -0.235-0.250-0.251-0.234 0.0664-1.025* 0.00187 (0.206) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) (0.308) (0.488) (0.411) 영남출신 0.245 0.247 0.255 0.256 0.707* 0.156 0.0292 (0.180) (0.180) (0.180) (0.180) (0.326) (0.349) (0.301) 탄핵찬성 -1.046** -1.013** -1.007** -1.043** -0.847* -0.405 (0.372) (0.373) (0.372) (0.372) (0.421) (1.185) 복지확대 -0.751** -0.752** -0.761** -0.765** -1.004** -0.672* -0.634* (0.159) (0.159) (0.159) (0.159) (0.255) (0.322) (0.293) 대북 -1.625** -1.619** -1.602** -1.602** -1.830** -1.507** -1.393** 교류협력정책 (0.165) (0.165) (0.165) (0.165) (0.300) (0.338) (0.261) 70년대이전 0.278 (0.274) 70년대생 -0.308+ (0.175) 70년대이후 0.450 + (0.266) 상수 1.195 + 1.433 + 1.191 + 0.351-1.633 5.151* 1.025 (0.715) (0.752) (0.715) (0.873) (1.776) (2.575) (1.667) N 1,023 1,023 1,023 1,023 462 238 311 pseudo R-sq 0.245 0.246 0.247 0.247 0.303 0.200 0.159 주 : ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 ( 괄호안은표준오차 )
대북및안보정책평가의세대및이념요인 127 70. 70, 70. 70. 70., 20~30.. 2017, 1970. (, 2014). 1980,. 1970 16~19. (, 2017: 178), 1970 2002 2017. < 2>, 5 70
128 한국과국제정치. < 2> 70,. 2) 이념과연령대의상충,.., - 2017. < 4> < 5>, < 6>, < 7>. A 1, 0. B~D. < 4> - 4. A( - ) C( - ), B( - ) D( - ). < 5>. A, C. < 2> < 3>. B D -
대북및안보정책평가의세대및이념요인 129 연령 이념 교육 성별 수입 계층인식 호남출신 영남출신 탄핵찬성 복지확대 상수 < 표 4> 남북관계및사드배치관련전통적진보 - 보수시각과상충적태도 모형 A: 조합 A 모형 B: 조합 B 모형 C: 조합 C 모형 D: 조합 D 교류 - 사드반대교류 - 사드찬성강경 - 사드찬성강경 - 사드반대 0.00910 0.0208** -0.00880-0.0545** (0.00629) (0.00676) (0.00623) (0.0107) -0.232** -0.0423 0.251** -0.0409 (0.0406) (0.0394) (0.0388) (0.0611) 0.558** -0.150-0.239-0.466 (0.190) (0.189) (0.182) (0.288) -0.247 + 0.0997 0.481** -0.515* (0.144) (0.157) (0.145) (0.227) 0.147* -0.0630-0.0570 0.191 (0.0735) (0.0728) (0.0691) (0.126) -0.0805 0.111 0.0518-0.228 (0.102) (0.108) (0.0994) (0.175) 0.606** 0.297-0.825** -0.319 (0.192) (0.205) (0.221) (0.339) -0.0650 0.103 0.0870-0.379 (0.172) (0.182) (0.161) (0.273) 1.699** 0.577* -1.245** 0.393 (0.443) (0.269) (0.238) (0.567) 1.051** -0.449** -0.535** -0.285 (0.156) (0.165) (0.151) (0.236) -3.192** -2.408** -0.00619 0.216 (0.732) (0.666) (0.604) (1.076) N 1,076 1,076 1,076 1,076 pseudo R-sq 0.146 0.036 0.145 0.086 주 : ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 ( 괄호안은표준오차 ),. B, D. ( B), ( D)..
130 한국과국제정치 Ⅴ. 요약및결론 2017.,.,.. 1970.,.,. 1970,. 1970 -., -, -.,
대북및안보정책평가의세대및이념요인 131,.,.,. -.., - - ( ), - ( ), - ( ) -,,. - - (, 2005;, 2005;, 2016;, 2006;, 2002;, 2014). (, 2014),.,,. (, 2014),., 10
132 한국과국제정치.,,,,. 2017.,.,. 투고일 : 2018년 4월 1일 심사일 : 2018년 5월 5일 게재확정일 : 2018년 5월 7일 참고문헌. 2003, :,, ( : ).. 2005,,, 4 2 : 193-217.. 2009, 386?: 2007 2008,, 3: 18 ( : ): 69-96.. 2011, : N,, 1 2 : 1-38.. 2005,,, 13 2 : 6-32.
대북및안보정책평가의세대및이념요인 133. 2015, 2007~2015:,, 7 2 : 3-41.. 2006, 17 :,, : 16 17 ( : ): 269-299.. 2013, : 1997 2012,, 12 1 : 113-140.. 2016, : 15,, 15 3 : 37-60.. 2009, 2008 : 386,, 8 1 : 65-86.. 2016, :,, 9 2 : 31-67.. 2012,,,, 2012 ( : ): 35-62.. 2017, : 1992~2017,, 6:, 19 ( : ): 161-192.. 2012, 20,, 21 1 : 157-186.. 2008, 17,, 14 2 : 117-142.. 2015, 386 :, 21, 25 1 : 133-164.. 2014, 386 :,, 20 1 : 200-230.. 2006,,, 12 4 : 163-182.. 2014, :, 21, 24 3 : 271-292.. 2016, : 20,, 23 7 : 317-332.. 2002,,, : 53-79.. 2014,,, 7 4 : 1-40.
134 한국과국제정치. 2018, 2017 ( : ).. 1992,,, 26 1 : 145-167.. 1994, 14,, 28 1 : 257-274.. 1999, :,, 33 2 : 115-134.. 2012, :,, 150 : 157-197.. 2013,??:, EAI, 2013-02 ( : ).. 2014, :,, 22 2 : 73-112. Basinger, Scott J. and Howard Lavine. 2005, Ambivalence, Information, and Electoral Choice, American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 2: 169-184. Cho, Jinman and Kihong Eom. 2012, Generation Effects? An Empirical Analysis of the Korean National Assembly and Presidential Elections, Asian Perspective, Vol. 36, No. 3: 353-386. Converse, Philip E. 2000, Assessing the Capacity of Mass Electorates, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 3: 331-353. Zaller, John and Stanley Feldman. 1992, A Simple Theory of the Survey Response: Answering Questions versus Revealing Preferences, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 36, No. 3: 579-616.
대북및안보정책평가의세대및이념요인 135 Abstract Generation and Ideology Factors of Evaluation on North Korea and Security Policy Jin Seok Bae This study presented the following three hypotheses to analyze the mechanism of generation and ideology factors in North Korea policy and security policy area. First, the assessment of North Korea and its security policy does not change simply linearly according to age. Second, the influence of ideology on North Korea and security policy varies from generation to generation. Third, depending on how the policies are combined, the conditions under which the generation and ideology can exert influence vary. Based on the results of the survey conducted in 2017, this study found the following. First, even after controlling for other factors, the generation born in the 1970s favored the engagement policy toward North Korea than their predecessor or later generations, and they were less supportive of THAAD deployment. Second, ideology influenced policy evaluation toward North Korea in the older generation, but it did not in the younger generation. Third, only ideology variable exerted influence in traditional progressive-conservative policy combinations, age variable was not effective. However, age effect was confirmed instead of ideology when the traditional progressive-conservative policy combinations were staggered. The empirical finding of this study is evidence that the politicized structure of Korea, which is ideologically polarized, is cross-cut at a gentle angle along the generation cleavage. Key words: North Korea Policy, Security Policy, Age Effect, Ideology Effect