Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow rational choice Snyder Scott Snyder Jerrold Post Alexander Mansourov Essence of Decision where you stand depends on where you sit Graham Allison
circular reasoning biographical profile Alexander George operational code micro foundation subjective game theory misperception Zeev Maoz Mark Schafer and Stephen Walker
predominant leader single group multi coalition Joe Hagan and Margaret Hermann Structural Environment Causal Mechanisms Decision Outcomes Stephen Walker & Jerrold Post Ole Hosti actor-general perspective
actor-specific perspective Valerie Hudson naive scientist Alexander George bounded rationality Alexander George Nathan Leites Leites content analysis Alexander George Alexander George George Herbert Simon Nathan Leites
Alexander George Alexander George cognitive consistency theory Stephen Walker Philip Converse motive
Stephen Walker power affiliation achievement Stephen Walker Stephen Walker Jonathan Renshon
VICS Verbs In Context System VICS VICS verbal action physical action Intensity VICS Mark Schafer and Stephen Walker Reward Stephen G Walker et al
Punishment Support Oppose Promise Threat VICS n VICS Profiler Plus automated coding Profiler Plus hand coding intercoder reliability VICS Scott s pi Stephen Walker and Mark Schafer
Diagnostic Propensities P P P P P Choice & Shift Propensities I I I I P Philosophical Belief I Instrument Belief P Alexander George P P b P P a P b
I P a VICS I I a P P P b
High naffiation (Alikeness) TYPE A Nuclear Self TYPE DEF (Ambition) High npower Mark Schafer and Stephen G. Walker TYPE C High nachievement (Ideals) TYPE B Mark Schafer Ole Holsti A~F Stephen G. Walekr D, E, F A, B, C A, B, C, DEF Stephen G Walker
P P b DEF I P a C Russell J. Leng A B C DEF Stephen Walker C C DEF DEF
CO CF CO CF C DEF subjective game Zeeve Maoz Steven J. Brams Steven Brams TOM Theory of Move TOM TOM TOM A A B A Avinash Dixit
Self S Other O Survivor TOM Start Survivor Start Survivor Survivor cycling back c nonmyopic equilibrium Nash equilibrium TOM Mark Schafer and Stephen G Walker
Start Survivor Start Survivor Start Survivor Start Survivor
Start Survivor Start Survivor Brams P P P P
cognition Leites George Shimon Peres Yitzhak Rabin
Diagnostic Propensities Rabin Peres Rabin Peres P P P a b Choice & Shift Propensities I I I a b Stephen Walker Scott Crichlow
muddling through negotiating from strength Snyder bounded rationality ideal type negotiating from strength Stephen Walker
Allison, Gram, and Zelikow, Philip Brams, Steven J. 1994. Theory of Moves. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Crichlow, Scott. 1998. Idealism or Pragmatism? An Operational Code Analysis of Yitzhak Rabin and Simon Peres. Political Psychology 19, No. 4. Converse, Philip. 1964. The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics. David Apter, ed. Ideology and Discontent. New York: Free Press. Dixit, Avinash, and Nalebuff, Barry. 2006.. :. George, Alexander L. 1969. The Operational Code : A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making. International Studies Quarterly 23, Issue 2. George, Alexander L. 1979. The Causal Nexus between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making Behavior: The Operational Code Belief System. Lawrence S. Falkowski, ed. Psychological Models in International Politics. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. George, Alexander L. 1987. Ideology and international Relations: A conceptual analysis. Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 9. Hagan, Joe D. 2001. Does Decision Making Matter? Joe D. Hagan and Margaret Hermann, eds. Leaders, Group, and Coalitions: Understanding the People and Processes in Foreign Policymaking. Melden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
Holsti, Ole. 1976. Foreign Policy Formation Viewed Cognitively. Robert Axelrod, ed. The Structure of Decision: the Cognitive maps of Political Elites. Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press. Hudson, Valerie M. 2005. Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations. Foreign Policy Analysis 1. Leites, Nathan. 1951. The Operational Code of The Politburo. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. Inc. Leng, Russell J. 1993. Interstate Crisis Behavior, 1816-1980. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Mansourov, Alexander Y. 1994. North Korean Decision-Making Processes Regarding the Nuclear Issue. Nautilus Institute Special Report. Maoz, Zeev. 1990. National Choices and International Processes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Post, Jerrold M. 2004. Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World: The Psychology of Political Behavior. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Renshon, Jonathan. 2008. Stability and Change in Belief Systems: The Operational Code of George W. Bush. Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, No. 6. Schafer, Mark, and Walker, Stephen G. eds. 2006. Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Schafer, Mark. 2000. Issues in Assessing Psychological Characteristics at a Distance: An Introduction to the Symposium. Political Psychology 21, No. 3. Simon, Herbert. 1984. Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychological with Political Science. The American Political Science Review 79, No. 2. Snyder, Scott. 1999. Negotiating on the Edge. Washington D.C.: United States institute of Peace press. Walker, Stephen G. 1983. The Motivational Foundations of Political Belief Systems: A Re-Analysis of the Operational Code Construct. International Studies Quarterly 27, No. 2. Walker, Stephen G. 2000. Forecasting the Political Behavior of Leaders with the Verbs in Context System of Operational Code Analysis. Hilliard, OH: Social Science Automation. Walker, Stephen G. 2003. Operational Code Analysis as a Scientific Research Program: A Cautionary Tale, Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds., Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field. Cambridge: MIT Press. Walker, Stephen G. and Post, Jerrold M. 2003. The Search for Causal Mechanisms, Jerrold M. Post, ed., The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders: with Profiles of Hussein and Bill Clinton. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. Walker, Stephen G. Schafer, Mark and Young, Michael D. 1998. Systematic Procedures for
Operational Code Analysis: Measuring and Modeling Jimmy Carter's Operational Code. International Studies Quarterly 42, No. 1. Walker, Stephen G. Schafer, Mark, and Young, D. Young. 2003. Profiling the Operational Codes of Political Leaders. Jerrold M. Post, ed., The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders: with Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
wants to maintain the existing state-led development strategy, while the United States is easily succumbed to the temptation of using its power as the key currency country to pass its burdens to the rest of the world. International cooperation through an international institution or forum such as G20 is certainly wanted and desirable, but its success is circumscribed by the very absence of a hegemonic state. However, this does not mean that the current situation will inevitably lead to another major crisis. Adjustments on each of the three levels are going on and the world economy can muddle through the current mess and maintain its road to recovery for the time being. Simply the world is not ready for a major transition at the moment of the current crisis. Key words: Global Financial Crisis, Global Imbalances, Adjustment, East Asian Revenge, Economic Systemic Frictions, Market-led Adjustment, Key Currency, G20 The North Korean Supreme Leaders Operational Code and Its Causal Effect on Negotiation Strategy Hwa Sung Cho The purpose of this paper is to explain a causal relationship between the North Korean supreme leaders operational code and negotiation strategy in foreign policy. As an advanced research method, operational code analysis focuses on leader s beliefs system that represents of her concept of the fundamental nature of the political universe and the most effective strategy for political action. The operational codes of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il contain three important characteristics. As for philosophical beliefs, they cognize the surrounding environment, including their opponents, as hostile world. Contrary to their cognition of outer world, they think that they seek their goal not with conflictive means but with cooperative one. In regard to strategic flexibility, it seems they combine all kinds of tactics into a successful strategy at negotiation process. Considering the operational code s causal effects on decision-making, this article applies a subjective game theory, Theory of Move(TOM), to inferring North Korea s negotiation strategy from Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il s operational code construct. Based on the result of analysis of TOM, the North Korean leaders' operational codes anticipate two distinct negotiation strategies. One strategy for North Korea s successful negotiation is muddling through at a state of deadlock, which means that North Korea
maintains her key position until other countries make a concession first. Negotiation from strength is the other important North Korea's negotiation strategy. According to the latter, North Korea tries to be in a more advantageous position than others. It explains why North Korea chooses conflictive means, like brinkmanship strategy, in the early phase of negotiation. Key words: operational code, negotiation strategy, subjective game theory, leadership style, Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il