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, 57 Wolf, S. (1990). Freedom within reason. Oxford : Oxford University Press. * 2002 10 16 / 1 2003 2 4 / 2 2003 3 12 * : ( M. A., ), (, Ph. D. ). I,,, ( ),.,.. e-mai l : ghahn@kangwon. ac. kr
58 4 2 Abstra c t Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Moral Education Ahn, Ga n Hun* The free will problem is usually viewed in terms of the trichotomy of nonreconciling determinism / reconciling determinism / libertarianism and also by the dichotomy of incompatibilism vs. compatibilism. This study defends reconciling determinism in the trichotomy and compatibilism in the dichotomy. Compatibilism appears to be most sound because free choice is different from capriciousness. If there were no deterministic aspects of human beings at all, their actions would be unpredictable. Moreover, if one does not have a free will, one could or should not be held morally responsible for one's action. Moral responsibility presupposes free will which is not exempted from causality. 'Freedom to do otherwise' does not mean examption from causality. In broad sense, cause-effect relationships include reason-action relationships. Of course, causal relationships are known on the basis of inductive evidence, whereas one can know the reasons for one's own action. Free will is a necessary condition for moral responsibility and it should also be seen as compatible with determinism. When we face value conflicts, we need a set of criteria for defining what is desirable because these criteria serve as a basis for making moral choices. One of the main criteria is a moral belief system based on such principles as the principle of benefit maximization and that of equal respect. Moral choices and actions are influenced by moral belief system. Moral belief system plays an important role in one's criteria for making moral judgment. The criteria become the motives of choices. The preceding view of the relationship between free will, determinism, and moral belief system has implications for moral education. Moral education is related to the formation of moral acts and belief systems. Formation of good habits means an internalization of norms * Professor, Department of Philosophy, Kangwon National University
, 59 such as moral principle and moral belief system. Thinking and acting soundly are the most desirable moral characteristics of a person. A reasonable person requires to have a foresight about future consequences of his/ her own actions. A moral agent should examine his/ her impulses with a moral belief system for self-control. Key Words : free will, compat ibilism, criteria for moral judgment