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1 42 2 (2010): (Freedom House) (political rights) (civil liberties) ),? * 2010 ( ) (NRF B00027). 1) 58 LeDuc et. al, Table 1.2: ( ).

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3 .. (public leadership). 4) ( )... 5).,,. 6) 4) Edwards ) Conley 2001, 54, Table 4.1. Kernell ),.. 45

4 4. 2 :,. 3 : ,. (mandate) ( - 118). 2,., 2 1, 2 (Vestiture Clause). 7) (general),

5 . (air-tight compartments) ( - 99). 8)., (political question). (Lindsay) (184). (constitutional question). 9),. 7) 1 1 All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. 2 1 The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.... 8),. 9) (Shane) (governmental audacity) (18). 47

6 2 (judicial activism). (judicialization of politics). 10).. < 1>. < 1>,,. (advice and consent). 11). 12) 10) W. ( The Federalist Society Hamburger 209 ). 11), He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,...,(). 12).,. 4, Auerwald 44.

7 < 1> - (2 2 - : : : & : 1 ) - (2 3 ) -[ ] (2 2 2 ) -[ ] (2 2 2 ) -: with a stroke of a pen -: > - & (2 3 ) -: (2 3 ) - (2 3 ) - (2 2 3 ) - (2 3 ) - (2 3 ) - (2 2 1 ) -: rally-round-the-flag -: (public leadership) (1 8 ) : ( 2/3 ) - ( ) -:, & -: & & ( ) ) : * 1 8 * -: 1. (express powers):. 2. : (inherent powers) (implied 13)

8 powers). 3. :. 20 (executive agreement) (gentlemen s agreement).. 14) (divided government). 15),,.. ( - 110). 16) 14) (NAFTA) (KORUS FTA). 15) W. (2002~2006, ) -. Conley 2009, ) United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. (1936) Fisher 9.

9 2. 17) 2 3, (pocket veto). 2/3. 18) (Virginia) (vesting clause) ) 17) Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 343 U.S. (1952),. 18) 7 10.,. 2/3 3/4 2/3. 19) (Virginia) (president) (Committee of Detail). 36, 3. 51

10 1 (enumerated power). 20). (prerogative power).. 21) ),,. 20) Nelson 51-59, The Pacificus-Helvidius Letters (1793). Nelson 10-14, Letters of Cato, Nos. 4 and 5 (1787). 21) (separate institutions) , Neustadt ) (Virginia) (New Jersey). (Pinckney) 2 3. Farrand 157.

11 . 23)...,. (express power), (inherent power) (implied power)., (executive prerogatives)...,. 24) 23). Edwards

12 .,,,. 25),. 26), (constitutional presidency).,,. < 2> ) (building blocks),. Cronin and Genovese ) Azari 2007, 3 Conley 2001, ) Buchanan 16.

13 .. 27) (Hamiltonian) - (Madisonian-Jeffersonian).,... 28) 27) Mead , ) (Aaron Burr). 12 (unitary presidency) (Southern Democrats) (Constitutional Union) Nelson 95-99, Abraham Lincoln s Letter to Albert G. Hodges (1864). 55

14 ) < 2> Madisonian-Jeffersonian - - -, (Barbary) 2 -, 3 Hamiltonian - -, 4 -, (Embargo Act) 4 -, 3 -, Milkis and Nelson 2008 Nelson /3 29) Silverman 8.

15 , ,,,,,. 30). 31) < 3> 30) 40~50 80~90. 31) (information and discernment) 57

16 (Jacksonian) (Wilsonian). < 3> 1 Jacksonian 2 Wilsonian Mead and Leone 2002 Nelson ,.. ( 1832 ). Azari 2009, 16-18, Nelson ( 40)..

17 ... Gould 49-54, Pestritto ,,. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 32).,. 33) 1970,. 34) 32) Stack and Campbell ) W. [] 34) Koh 160, Silverstein

18 . 35).,,,. 36)..,..,. (authority) (influence). 37), 35).. Preston ). 28,,,. Jones 254, Table 7-1, ) (authority) (formal powers) (personal influence) (power).

19 (separated institutions sharing powers).. 38), (statesman) (politician).,,.. (mandate)... 39)..,.., Neustadt 7. 38), (Neustadt 34). 39) Aberbach

20 .. 40).,. 20. (powers) (influence),,, (constitutional mandate) (Dahl 365). 41) (constitutional prerogatives).. 42) 40) (Fenno s paradox). 41) (pseudodemocratization). 42),..

21 (mandates)... 43). < 1>. (1988) (1960), (1976), (1984), W. (2004). 44). 45) (1948) (1992). (constitutional Shane ) "(myth)" (Grossback et al. 190). 44) Conley 2001, ) Gould

22 mandate) W. (2000). 46) < 1> : Guide to U.S. Elections, 6 th ed. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc. (2009). 1. (%): (popular vote) 2. (%): (electoral vote) 3. /(%): / 4. (*) ( ) : (80 ), (84-86 ), (91-94 ), (97-102, ), ( , 107 ), (110 ) 46) W.. Hamburger and Wallsten

23 . 47).., W ) 21 (communications operation),., (going public). 47) Campbell and Steinberg ). Kumar

24 ,., ),, ) Spitzer 94, Silverstein 140.

25 ..,.,. 50),,.,. 51). (pendulum) (polarization) W... 50) Rozell and Sollenberger ).. Jentleson

26 ..... (superiority)..?,,.. 주제어 :,,,,,,., :, (1997):

27 (2002): (2009): (1998): Aberbach, Joel. Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, Auerwald, David, Advice and Consent: The Forgotten Power. Congress and the Politics of Foreign Policy: Real Politics in America. Eds. Campbell, Colton, Nicol Rae, and John Stack, Jr. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, Azari, Julia. Delivering the People s Message: Presidential Mandate Claims from Truman to George W. Bush, presented at the APSA Annual Meeting, The Constitutional Origins of Presidential Rhetoric, presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Buchanan, Bruce. The Policy Partnership: Presidential Elections and American Democracy. New York: Routledge, Campbell, Kurt, and James Steinberg. Difficult Transitions: Foreign Policy Troubles at the Outset of Presidential Power. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, Conley, Patricia Heidotting. The Legislative Presidency in Political Time: Unified Government, Divided Government, and Presidential Leverage in Congress. Rivals for Power: Presidential Congressional Relations, 4 th ed. Ed. Thurber, James A. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Presidential Mandates: How Elections Shape the National Agenda. 69

28 Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Cronin, Thomas, and Michael Genovese. Paradoxes of the American Presidency. New York: Oxford University Press, Dahl, Robert A. Myth of the Presidential Mandate. Political Science Quarterly (1990): Edwards, George C. III. On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit. New Haven: Yale University Press, Edwards, George C. III, and Stephen Wayne. Presidential Leadership: Politics and Policy Making. 8 th ed. Boston: Wadsworth, Farrand, Max, ed. The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, vol. 3. New Haven: Yale University Press, Fisher, Louis. The War Power: No Checks, No Balance. Campbell et al Gould, Lewis. The Modern American Presidency. 2 nd ed. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, Grossback, Lawrence J., David A. M. Peterson, and James A. Stimson. Mandate Politics. New York: Cambridge UP, Hamburger, Tom, and Peter Wallsten. One Party Country: The Republican Plan for Dominance in the 21 st Century. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Jentleson, Bruce. American Diplomacy: Around the World and along Pennsylvania Avenue. A Question of Balance: The President, the Congress and Foreign Policy. Ed. Mann, Thomas. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, Jones, Charles. The Presidency In a Separated System. 2 nd ed. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, Kernell, Samuel. Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership. Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1997.

29 Koh, Harold Hongju. Why the President Almost Always Wins in Foreign Affairs. The Constitution and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy. Eds. Adler, David, and Larry George. Lawrence: University Press of Kentucky, Kumar, Martha. Managing the President's Message: The White House Communications Operation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, LeDuc, Lawrence, Richard Niemi, and Pippa Norris. Introduction: Comparing Democratic Elections. Comparing Democracies 2: New Challenges in the Study of Elections and Voting. Eds. LeDuc, Lawrence, Richard Niemi, and Pippa Norris. London: Sage Publications, Lindsay, James, From Deference to Activism and Back Again: Congress and the Politics of American Foreign Policy. The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence. 4 th ed. Eds. Wittkopf, Eugene, and James McCormick. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, Mead, Walter, and Richard Leone. Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World. New York: Routledge, Milkis, Sidney, and Michael Nelson. The American Presidency: Origins and Development th ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press, Nelson, Michael, ed. The Evolving Presidency: Landmark Documents, Washington, DC: CQ Press, Neustadt, Richard. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan. New York: Free Press, Pestritto, Ronald. Woodrow Wilson: The Essential Political Writings. Lanham: Lexington Books, Preston, Thomas, and Margaret Hermann. Presidential Leadership Style and the Foreign Policy Advisory Process. Wittkopf and McCormick

30 Rozell, Mark, and Mitchel Sollenberger. Executive Privilege and the Unitary Executive Theory in the George W. Bush Administration. Thurber Shane, Peter. Madison s Nightmare: How Executive Power Threatens American Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Silverman, Gordon. Imbalance of Powers: Constitutional Interpretation and the Making of American Foreign Policy. Oxford: Oxford UP, Spitzer, Robert. The President, Congress, and the Fulcrum of Foreign Policy. Adler and George Stack, John, and Colton Campbell. Congress: How Silent a Partner? Campbell et al Guide to U.S. Elections. 6 th ed. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., ( )

31 Abstract Okyeon Yi In this paper, I argue that the principle of separation of power in foreign policy under presidentialism invites a blind spot in American democracy. Although the Constitution specifies separation of power both in the conduct of domestic and foreign affairs, independent elections of President and legislators differentiate the kind of collective mandates on Capitol Hill from the unitary mandate bestowed upon President, thus prompting him to proclaim public leadership. The key to a successful governing, then, lies in the art of pursuing separated institutions sharing powers persistently. However, the realm of foreign affairs poses a more challenging task, both constitutionally and politically, than its counterpart in domestic policy. Furthermore, we came to witness a modern presidency whose relentless claim on mandate, or what is dubbed as judicialization of politics, was found irrelevant to the electoral outcome itself, thus creating a peril in constitutional presidency. In this paper, I explore this paradox in American democracy by comparing across constitutional and political sources of such claims. Key Words: American democracy, presidentialism, separation of power, foreign policy, public leadership, mandate, judicialization of politics 73

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2 大韓政治學會報 ( 第 18 輯 1 號 ) 과의 소통부재 속에 여당과 국회도 무시한 일방적인 밀어붙이기식 국정운영을 보여주고 있다. 민주주의가 무엇인지 다양하게 논의될 수 있지만, 민주주의 운영에 필요한 최소한의 제도적 조건은 권력 행사에서 국가기관 사이의

2 大韓政治學會報 ( 第 18 輯 1 號 ) 과의 소통부재 속에 여당과 국회도 무시한 일방적인 밀어붙이기식 국정운영을 보여주고 있다. 민주주의가 무엇인지 다양하게 논의될 수 있지만, 민주주의 운영에 필요한 최소한의 제도적 조건은 권력 행사에서 국가기관 사이의 대한정치학회보 18집 1호, 2010년 6월:49~74 노무현 대통령과 이명박 대통령의 지도력과 국정운영 비교 : 임기 초 지도력 특성과 국민지지 * 1) 이 강 로 전주대학교 요 약 한국에서 민주주의가 뿌리를 내리기 위해서는 대통령의 지도력 행사에 제도만이 아 니라 여론과 같은 외부적 요인을 통해 체계적으로 견제할 수 있어야 한다. 대통령의 지도력 특성을