외국인 소유 지분 증가에 따른 통신사업자의 경영성과 변화 -시장의 반응을 중심으로 2005. 12
1 1990..,,......,... 2005 12
3 1 9 1 17 2 20 1 20 2 21 3 24 4 25 3 28 1 28 2 29 3 30 4 32 4 35 1 37 2 KT 39 3 44 4 SK 47 5 51 5 53
4 1 53 2 54 1. KT 54 2. SK 56 3. 58 3 60 1. 60 2. KT 63 3. SK 69 4. 74 4 77 6 78 80 85
5 3 1 1990 32 4 1 2 36 4 2 39 4 3 KT 40 4 4 KT 42 4 5 KT 43 4 6 KT 44 4 7 46 4 8 47 4 9 SK (1) 49 4 10 SK (2) 50 4 11 SK 51 4 12 SK 51 5 1 KT 100 64 5 2 KT 50 64 5 3 KT 100, 10 67 5 4 KT 50, 10 67 5 5 KT 10, 10 67
6 5 6 KT 100, 15 68 5 7 KT 50, 15 68 5 8 KT 10, 15 68 5 9 SK 20 70 5 10 SK 15 70 5 11 SK 25, 10 70 5 12 SK 15, 10 71 5 13 ( )SK Vs 72 5 14 ( )SK SK 10 72 5 15 ( )SK SK 15 72 5 16 ( )SK SK ( 2 ) 10 73 5 17 ( )SK SK ( 2 ) 15 73 5 18 75 5 19, 10 75 5 20 76
7 5 21 10( 3 ) 76 5 22 7( 3 ) 76
8 2 1 26 2 2 26 4 1 KT 41 4 2 45 4 3 SK 48 5 1 KT 54 5 2 KT 1 55 5 3 KT ROA 55 5 4 SK 56 5 5 SK 1 57 5 6 SK ROA 57 5 7 58 5 8 1 59 5 9 ROA 59 5 10 KT 63 5 11 KT Brandes 65 5 12 KT Templeton 65 5 13 KT CRMC 66 5 14 SK 69 5 15 74
9. 05 11... 2005. 1. 1 2005. 12. 31.., 1.,,.,,.,. 1990,.,
10, (control)., (event study method). (endogeneity). KT,. KT,.. SK, SK. 2,,..,.
11,..,,, CEO,. 경영환경 주식소유구조 이사회구성 기업성과 사업특성.. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny(1988),.. 주식소유구조 이사회구성 기업성과 경영환경
12., (event study method)..,,.,.. 3 1990,,,..,
13..,...,,..,., 1990,.,.
14 4 4,. KT,., KT. Jensen(1993). SK SK, SK. SK, SK, SK SK SK SK.
15 5 5. 3 1990 (KT, SK ) 1...,.,. KT DR, (sensitivity check). SK. SK SK SK...
16 6,. KT,.. SK, SK..,. M&A,, M&A. (structural model).
1 17 1.,., Alchian(1950),,.. Morck, Shleifer and Vishney(1988), Demsetz (1983).,.. (voting rights) (cash-flow rights). 1990,
18, 10.,. (corporate governance mechanism).. KT, SK,., (event study method). KT,.. M&A.. SK, SK.
1 19.,.. 2 3. 4 5. 6.
20 2 (mechanism). 1),, M&A.. 1,. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) Jensen and Meckling(1976) (a nexus of contracts)... (residual claimants),.,. 1) Shleifer and Vishney(1997) p.737
2 21, Shleifer and Vishney(1997) (incentive contracts), CEO,, M&A,., M&A,, CEO CEO,. 2) 2,.. Berle and Means(1932) 1920.., 2) Holmstrom(1979), CEO Fama(1980), M&A Manne(1965)
22., (free-rider). Berle and Means, Demsetz (1983), Demsetz and Lehn(1985)..,.,. Demsetz Morck, Shleifer and Vishney(1988) McConnell and Servaes(1990) (convergence of interests and managerial entrenchment),,..,.
2 23., (endogeneity). 3)4) CEO, M&A, CEO.,, (cash-flow right) (voting right)., 5) Baek, Kang and Park(2004).. 3) Cho(1998),,, Himmelber, Hubbard and Palia(1999) 2SLS, Demsetz and Villalonga(2001) 2SLS, Joh(2002). 4) Borsch-Supan and Koke (2000) 5) La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny(1999), Claessens, Djankow and Lang(2000), Lemmon and Lins(2001), Mitton(2002).
24 3,,,. 6), /,.. Hermalin and Weisbach(1989),..,,.. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990, 1997), Yermack(1996) CEO.., 6) Jensen(1993).
2 25. Shivdasani and Yermack(2000). (event study),.,. 7) 4,.,.,. 2 1.,,, CEO,. 7) Hermalin and Weisbach(2003)
26 2 1 경영환경 주식소유구조 이사회구성 기업성과 사업특성. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny(1988),. 2 2. 2 2 주식소유구조 이사회구성 기업성과 경영환경., (event study).
2 27,. Kole and Lehn (1999),, CEO (pay-performance sensitivity). 8). 8) Denis and Sarin(1999) 600 10, CEO,.
28 3 1990..,,,.,. 1.. 1991, 1 3, 25. 200. 1976, 10., 97. 9) 9) 200 1993 1994, 1997 4. 25
3 29 33%,.,.,,,., 1999 7 KT 49%, KT 1998 9 33%, 2001 4 49%. 10% 33% 1999 1, KT 1999 3% 15% 2002. 10) 1999, KT. 2 1997.. 50. 10) WTO, WTO 1998 33% 2001 49%, KT 20%(1998 ) 33%(2001 ).
30,. 1998 2, 1/4 1. 2000 1 2 1/2, 2001 2.. 11),. 2002 50%,,. 12) 3, 11) 12) KT 2002 KT,.
3 31. 1981,. 1982 1984. 1987, 1991 1996. 1999, ADSL. 1984. 1988 1994 SK 1997 3 SK SK. 1997 PCS IMT-2000, Wibro. 13) 13) (2005)
32 3 1 1990 1991 ( ) 1994 ( ) 1995 ( ) PCS (KT, LG, ) 1996 ( ) ( ) 1997 ( ) ( ) 4 1990,,,..,., M&A 14) 14) (JP
3 33..,...,,,..,., 1990,. ), ( ), ( ), (GM), ( ),.
34,..
4 35 4 1990 KT, SK,., (governance mechanism),. 2. DR,. 15),., (control group) 2,. 4 1 2. 2,., 15),,,,,.
36 2.,., 2001 100%. 4 1 2 1998 14.97 14 16% 12% 39 1999 13.06 11 29% 27% 45 2000 10.54 9 70% 60% 44 2001 9.61 8 104% 100% 47 2003 9.17 8 122% 100% 47 :, 2002.,,,. 16),, (cross-holding). 16),.
4 37 1 2005 30,. 17) KT,, SK, KTF, LG., KTF, LG 49% KT SK. 18) 2003 LG 17) 18) KTF KT. KT KT. KTF (%) 1999 KT 38.68 2000 KT 38.68 2001 KT 40.26 2002 KT 40.26 2003 KT 46.9 2004 KT 48.7 ( ) KTF ( ) ( ) KT 1999 13 11 2 18 2 2000 9 7 2 29 2 2001 10 8 2 25 2
38 ( ) ( ) ( ) KT 2002 8 2 6 300 1 2003 9 2 7 350 2 2004 9 2 7 350 2 LG LG BT Holdings 2. BT Holdings., LG BT Holdings. LGT 1999 LG 28.15 BT 24.13 2000 LG 28.14 BT 24.12 2001 LG 35.64 BT 16.59 2002 LG 35.64 BT 16.59 2003 LG 37.37 BT 16.59 2004 LG 37.37 BT 14.56 LGT LG BT 1999 9 3 6 200 4 2 2000 9 3 6 200 4 2 2001 7 2 5 250 4 1 2002 6 1 5 500 2 2 2003 6 1 5 500 2 2 2004 6 1 5 500 2 2
4 39. 4 2 (2005 6 ) KT SK KTF LG 48.96% 49% 48.05% 16.42% 27.6% 2 KT KT 1981 12, 1987 2002. DR 19), 1999 5 1 DR 5% 19% 2001 2 DR 37%. 20) KT 1998 33%, 2002 49% 49%., KTF.. 19) DR(Depository Receipt),. KT DR J.P. Morgan, UBS DR, DR. 20) KT IR
40 4 3 KT 1981. 12. 10. 1987. 7. 1993 1996 1997. 10. 1998. 12. 1999. 5. 2000. 6. 2001. 2001. 6. 2001. 12. 2002. 5. 2002. 8. 90 25%, 91 24% 93 (10%), 94 (10%), 96 (8.8%) 28.8% 1 DR 14.4% 1.1% (7 ) 2 DR 17.8% 11.8% 1% 4 1 2001 2005 6 KT., 2002 49% 2 2004. KTF LGT 49% KT,,,.
4 41 4 1 KT ( : %) 60.00 50.00 40.00 30.00 20.00 10.00 0.00 20011130 20020228 20020531 20020830 20021129 20030228 20030530 20030829 20031128 20040227 20040531 20040831 20041130 20050228 20050531 : KISVALUE, 2001,. 4 4 KT 5%. 1998 71.2% DR 2002. 2002 SK, Brandes Investment. SK 2003 KT SK, Brandes Investment 1.
42 4 4 KT (%) 1998 71.2 7.4 1999 58.99 2000 58.99 2001 40.15 2002 SK 9.64 Brandes Investment 6.07 2003 3.32 2004 3.74 : KT 2003 2004 Brandes Investment, Brandes Investment DR. 21). 4 5 KT., Templeton Franklin Investment, Brandes Investment Partners, Capital Research and Management Company(CRMC). Templeton Inv. Templeton Franklin. 21) 2003 KT
4 43 4 5 KT Templeton Brandes CRMC 1999 0.40 0.39 0.79 2000 0.73 0.27 0.99 2001 4.21 3.57 7.78 2002 5.18 4.79 1.47 11.44 2003 6.82 5.8 4.06 16.86 2004 7.80 7.33 7.72 22.85 2005 7.78 1) 7.85 2) 6.1 3) 21.73 : 1. Templeton 2005 3 2. Brandes 2005 2 3. CRMC 2005 10 : ( : %) 1998 1999 DR 2004 22%. 7%, KT. Templeton. KT 2002.,, 2002. 4 6. 98 15 2004 12,
44 114% 200%.,,. Jensen(1983) Yermack(1996),. 4 6 KT / (%) 1998 7 8 15 114 0 1999 7 7 14 100 0 2000 7 7 14 100 0 2001 7 6 13 86 0 2002 7 9 16 129 1 2003 4 8 12 200 1 2004 4 8 12 200 1 : 2002, : 3 1997 6 2. 9,. LG,, SK,. 2002 DR. 2003
4 45 LG LG.. 4 2 60.00 50.00 40.00 30.00 20.00 10.00 0.00 20011130 20020430 20020930 20030228 20030731 20031230 20040531 20041029 20050331 : KIS-VALUE 4 2 2001. 2003 10%, 2003 49%. 4 7 5%. 2002.. 2003 LG
46, 25% LG., 2003. 2003.. 4 7 (%) (%) 9.81 8.23 1999 7.3 SKT 6.74 42.36 5.28 5 9.01 2000 7.48 22.61 SKT 6.12 8.92 2001 7.48 22.13 SKT 5.73 8.43 2002 7.07 20.91 SKT 5.41 Newbridge 10.72 2003 AIF 8.32 AOF 5.35 29.48 5.09 Newbridge 10.72 2004 AIF 8.32 6.18 30.57 AOF 5.35 :
4 47 4 8 / (%) 1999 4 9 13 225 0 2000 3 11 14 366 0 2001 4 8 12 200 0 2002 2 9 11 450 0 2003 1 10 11 1000 4 2004 1 7 8 700 4 : 4 8. 2000 14 2002,. 2003,.. 4 SK SK SK 1994. SK ADR,,
48. 4 3 SK. SK WTO 49% 2004. 4 9 SK, SK. 2002 KT SK. 4 3 SK 60.00 50.00 40.00 30.00 20.00 10.00 0.00 20011228 20020531 20021031 20030331 20030829 20040130 20040630 20041130 20050429 : KIS-VALUE 1998, SK SK. SK 1999 35% SK.
4 49 4 9 SK (1) (%) (%) 1992 64.01 64.01 1993 64.01 7.19 73 1994 ( ) 1 21.3 20 41 13.13 1995 19.33 ( ) 1 20.64 53 ( ) 1 20.27 1996 11.39 18.99 50.65 17.99 1997 Citibank ADR 10.04 SK( ) 6 20.63 48.66 SK( ) 13 21.05 1998 Citibank ADR 10.31 6.66 18.28 56.3 Citibank ADR 18.97 1999 17.86 SK( ) 47 36.48 73.31 Citibank ADR 4 11. Templeton Investment, Templeton ADR 1997 0.09%,. 1%. SK, Templeton
50. 4 10 SK (2) (%) (%) 6.5 2000 13.39 Citibank ADR 15.8 69.86 SK( ) 6 34.17 SK( ) 5 34.2 Citibank ADR 14.63 2001 6.91 72.63 6.5 10.39 Citibank ADR 18.9 2002 SK( ) 7 25.78 54.91 SK 10.23 SK( ) 7 24.61 2003 Citibank ADR 19.78 54.92 SK 10.53 SK( ) 6 24 2004 Citibank ADR 27 62 SK 11 : 4 12 SK. 1996 20 2004 8, 2004 100%., SK.
4 51 4 11 SK ( : %) Templeton Inv. 1997 0.09 0.09 1998 3.03 3.03 1999 1.63 1.63 2000 0.72 0.72 2001 2.29 2.29 2002 1.80 5.74 7.54 2003 1.50 6.26 7.75 2004 4.94 6.39 10.13 2005 6 5.02 0.14 5.17 : 4 12 SK (%) 1996 20 0 20 0 1997 11 4 15 36 1998 10 4 14 40 1999 6 4 10 66 2000 6 5 11 83 2001 6 6 12 100 2002 6 6 12 100 2003 6 6 12 100 2004 4 4 8 100 : 5,. KT
52,., KT. Jensen (1993). SK SK, SK /. SK, SK, SK SK (parent company discount) SK SK. SK.,..
5 53 5 1. 2 (control variables), (endogeneity problem) (system equation) (cross section) (panel data)..,.. KT SK 1982 1994 1997 7., (event study).,.
54,. 2 KT, SK, 1990 2004,,., ROA, 1. KIS- Value. 1. KT 5 1, 5 2, 5 3 KT, 1 ROA 5 1 KT (천억) 140.0 91~ 98 연평균매출증가율 12.4% 98~ 02 연평균매출 증가율 7.5% 02~ 04 연평균매출 증가율 0.6% 25.0% 120.0 19.6% KT매출 연매출증가율 20.0% 100.0 80.0 60.0 13.4% 14.8% 12.7% 10.4% 10.0% 11.3% 7.4% 9.4% 7.6% 11.6% 15.0% 10.0% 40.0 1.7% 2.4% 5.0% 20.0 0.0-1.1% 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 0.0% -5.0%
5 55 5 2 KT 1 (천원) 350000.0 300000.0 91~ 98 1인당매출증가율 평균 12.6% 02~ 04 98~ 02 1인당 1인당 매출증가율 매출증가율 평균 14.9% 평균 8.5% 30.1% 35.0% 30.0% 250000.0 KT1인당매출 1인당매출증가율 25.0% 200000.0 150000.0 100000.0 50000.0 0.0 18.0% 8.9% 19.1% 16.7% 16.7% 15.6% 12.0% 11.8% 10.9% 8.2% 6.3% 1.8% 1.4% 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 20.0% 15.0% 10.0% 5.0% 0.0% 5 3 KT ROA 10.0% 8.0% 90~ 98ROA구간평균 3.8% 8.1% 98~ 02ROA구간평균 4.9% 9.0% 02~ 04ROA 구간평균 5.2% 6.0% 4.0% 4.7% 5.1% 6.5% 4.7% 3.3% 4.3% 4.8% 4.2% 6.2% 2.0% 0.0% 1990 1.5% 1.6% 0.5% KT ROA -0.3% 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004-2.0%. 1998 2002.
56, 1998,,. 90 PCS, 1999 KT. 2000 SO, 2002 12. 1, ROA,. KT 98 2003. 2. SK 5 4 SK (천억) 03~ 04 120.0 90~ 94 연평균매출 94~ 03 연평균매출 연평균매출 증가율 82.3% 증가율 35.1% 증가율 6.1% 130.0% 100.0 105.1% 102.3% 110.0% 80.0 75.3% 82.9% 90.0% 60.0 40.0 20.0 65.7% SK텔레콤매출 연매출증가율 68.9% 31.2% 0.9% 20.9% 34.4% 8.1% 38.7% 10.3% 1.9% 70.0% 50.0% 30.0% 10.0% 0.0 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004-10.0%
5 57 5 5 SK 1 03~ 04 1인당 (천원) 91~ 94 1인당 94~ 03 1인당 매출증가율 2500000.0 90.0% 매출증가율 평균 31.3% 매출증가율 평균 30.9% 평균 4.2% 82.2% 80.0% 2000000.0 62.3% 70.0% 60.0% 1500000.0 47.6% 47.5% 50.0% 1000000.0 500000.0 32.5% 33.9% 11.2% 26.3% 13.9% SK텔레콤1인당매출 1인당매출증가율 3.9% 4.4% 8.4% -0.1% 40.0% 30.0% 20.0% 10.0% 0.0% 0.0 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004-10.0% 5 6 SK ROA 16.0% 14.0% 12.0% 10.0% 8.0% 90~ 94 ROA구간평균 10.8% 94~ 03 ROA구간평균 8.1% 14.2% 11.9% 11.4% 10.2% 10.5% 10.7% 9.8% 8.4% 7.0% 03~ 04 ROA 구간평균 12.6% 14.5% 10.7% 6.0% 4.0% 6.5% 3.7% 4.9% SK텔레콤 ROA 2.0% 2.8% 0.0% 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 SK, 1, ROA 5 4, 5 5, 5 6. 1994 SK
58, 2003 ( )SK. 1994 SK ( ), 94. SK, ( ) SK SK ( )SK SK. SK 90. 94, 97 PCS. 2003,., 2003 ROA. 3. 5 7 (천억) 16.0 98~ 03 연평균매출증가율 4959.8% 03~ 04 연평균매출 증가율 7.1% 35000.0% 14.0 12.0 10.0 23237.6% 하나로매출 연매출증가율 25000.0% 15000.0% 8.0 1354.2% 145.5% 51.9% 9.7% 4.4% 5000.0% 6.0-5000.0% 4.0 2.0-15000.0% 0.0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004-25000.0%
5 59 5 8 1 (천원) 1000000.0 97~ 03 1인당매출증가율평균 2588.4% 03~ 04 1인당매출증가율 평균 2131.5% 14000.0% 900000.0 800000.0 700000.0 11681.20% 하나로텔레콤1인당매출 1인당매출증가율 12000.0% 10000.0% 600000.0 8000.0% 500000.0 6000.0% 400000.0 4000.0% 300000.0 200000.0 100000.0 905.60% 142.62% 46.41% 16.10% -2.80% 2000.0% 0.0% 0.0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004-2000.0% 5 9 ROA 4% 2% 1.2% 2.6% 97~ 03 ROA 평균 3.4% 03~ 04 ROA 평균 3.0% 0.3% 0% 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004-2% -4% -3.8% -3.4% -6% -6.8% -4.9% -8% -10% -8.9% 하나로텔레콤 ROA 5 7, 5 8, 5 9 1997, 1, ROA 2003 2003
60., 2,,. M&A. 3 1. (Event study method) Fama et. al.(1969) Brown and Warner(1980, 1985), Dodd and Warner(1983)..., (AR: abnormal rate of return), Brown and Warner(1985). (mean adjusted returns model), (market adjusted returns model)., (1). (1)
5 61, i t ; i t ; i ;,. (2). (2), t (market index) ; OLS OLS, (3) CAPM(capital asset pricing model). 22) ˆ ˆ (3), ˆ와 ˆ OLS ; (1), (2), (3) AR,. (3)., 22) & (1997), & (1996), et. al.(2000), (1989), (1997), Brown and Warner(1985), DeFesco et. al.(1990), Dodd and Warner(1983).
62., (3). (4) (4) (market model) (event dummy),.. Lambert and Larcker(1985), Larcker(1983), Tehranian and Waegelein(1985) (, SEC) (proxy), Brickley et. al.(1985) SEC, DeFusco et. al.(1990) SEC., (, ) (t 0) 7 (leakage). 3, 3. 23) (sen- sitivity check) 10 (event size). 23), 200 5.
5 63 2. KT 1998 12 23 2005 9 16 24), KT. KT 5 10., (event study)., (+). DR KT. 5 10 KT.16.12.08.04.00 -.04 -.08 -.12 -.16 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 KT_STOCKRETURN KT 10, 50, 100,. 25) 24) KT 1998 12 25) 10 184
64 5 1 KT 100 ( : ) 19990528 Brandes Investment Partners 1,451,380 20010629 Templeton Global Advisors Limited 2,816,309 20010702 Brandes Investment Partners 4,750,000 20020226 Brandes Investment Partners 1,228,647 20041116 Brandes Investment Partners 1,005,121 5 2 KT 50 ( : ) 19990528 Brandes Investment Partners 1,451,380 19990609 Templeton Global Advisors Limited 587,533 19990610 Templeton Global Advisors Limited 508,452 19991012 Templeton Global Advisors Limited 2,816,309 20010522 Templeton Global Advisors Limited 948,650 20010702 Brandes Investment Partners 4,750,000 20020226 Brandes Investment Partners 1,228,647 20020228 Brandes Investment Partners 753,083 20030611 crmc 500,000 20030923 Brandes Investment Partners 539,635 20040714 crmc 537,500 20041116 Brandes Investment Partners 1,005,121 26).. KT 3 1 2 8 26)
5 65 5 11 KT Brandes 2.500% Brandes 2.000% 1.500% 1.000% 0.500% 0.000% -0.500% -1.000% May 1999 August 1999 October 1999 December 1999 March 2000 May 2000 July 2000 September 2000 November 2000 January 2001 March 2001 May 2001 July 2001 September 2001 November 2001 January 2002 March 2002 June 2002 August 2002 October 2002 December 2002 February 2003 April 2003 June 2003 August 2003 October 2003 December 2003 February 2004 April 2004 June 2004 August 2004 October 2004 December 2004 February 2005 5 12 KT Templeton 1.200% 1.000% 0.800% 0.600% 0.400% 0.200% 0.000% -0.200% -0.400% -0.600% May 1999 October 1999 August 1999 December 1999 February 2000 April 2000 August 2000 June 2000 October 2000 December 2000 April 2001 February 2001 June 2001 August 2001 October 2001 February 2002 December 2001 April 2002 June 2002 October 2002 August 2002 December 2002 February 2003 June 2003 April 2003 August 2003 October 2003 December 2003 April 2004 February 2004 June 2004 August 2004 December 2004 October 2004 February 2005-0.800%
66 5 13 KT CRMC 1.000% 0.800% 0.600% 0.400% 0.200% 0.000% -0.200% February 2002 March 2002 April 2002 July 2002 November 2002 December 2002 January 2003 February 2003 July 2003 August 2003 September 2003 October 2003 November 2003 December 2003 January 2004 February 2004. 0., 및 OLS ; 10 (shock) KT (+). 100 50 0 95%. KT, (+). 10.
5 67 5 3 KT 100, 10 Co_Efficient Std_Error t Prob. 만 0.000264 0.00508 0.519555 0.6034 만 0.893755 0.024207 36.92102 0.0000 만 0.010131 0.003077 3.292806 0.0010 R-Squared 0.454699 1655 5 4 KT 50, 10 Co_Efficient Std_Error t Prob. 만 0.000303 0.00514 0.589930 0.5553 만 0.894988 0.024229 36.93854 0.0000 만 0.006341 0.002308 2.747492 0.0061 R-Squared 0.453617 1655 5 5 KT 10, 10 Co_Efficient Std_Error t Prob. 만 0.000255 0.000638 0.400037 0.6892 만 0.894638 0.024283 36.84156 0.0000 만 0.00643 0.001034 0.621198 0.5346 R-Squared 0.451249 1655 100 50 15. 27)
68 5 6 KT 100, 15 Co_Efficient Std_Error t Prob. 만 0.00031 0.000511 0.59892 0.5493 만 0.893592 0.024215 36.9019 0 만 0.008093 0.002577 3.140457 0.0017 R-Squared 0.454378 1655 5 7 KT 50, 15 Co_Efficient Std_Error t Prob. 만 0.00025 0.00052 0.48484 0.6279 만 0.894823 0.024258 36.88819 0 만 0.003726 0.001956 1.904445 0.057 R-Squared 0.452323 1655 5 8 KT 10, 15 Co_Efficient Std_Error t Prob. 만 0.000386 0.000672 0.573717 0.5662 만 0.89449 0.024282 36.83683 0 만 0.00085 0.001011 0.83837 0.4019 R Squared 0.451354 1655 27) 100 50.
5 69 3. SK 1996 1 3 2005 9 26, KT. SKT. SK KT 26.4% 28) KT., KT 475, SKT 168 29). 5 14 SK.15.10.05.00 -.05 -.10 -.15 -.20 1996 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 SKT_STOCKRETURN. KT 10, 50 100, SK 28) 2005 9 SKT 82,276,711. 29) 1998 1 5 Templeton., KT 1.5%, SKT 2.9%.
70 26%. KT 50 100 SKT 15 25. 5 9 5 10. 5 9 SK 20 ( : ) 19980105 Templeton 1,684,594 20010423 Templeton 372,651 5 10 SK 15 ( : ) 19980105 Templeton 1,684,594 19990726 Templeton 156,862 20010423 Templeton 372,651 20040127 Templeton 150,339 20040722 Templeton 176,967 5 11 SK 25, 10 Co_Efficient Std_Error t Prob. 만 1.72E 0.6 0.000521 0.003295 0.9974 만 1.014707 0.024556 41.32142 0.0000 만 0.002165 0.005596 0.386957 0.6988 R-Squared 0.403259 2534 KT SK 5 11,
5 71 5 12, SK t 0.3 90%. 5 12 SK 15, 10 Co_Efficient Std_Error t Prob. 만 6.59E 0.6 0.000525 0.012569 0.9900 만 1.014906 0.024551 41.33808 0.0000 만 0.000642 0.003562 0.180349 0.8569 R-Squared 0.403232 2534, SK., SK SK.. SK SK,. SK ( )SK. 30) ( )SK 5 13. 30).
72 5 13 ( )SK Vs 2003-04-03, SK 8.64% 1 1 2003-06-25, SKG 2004-01-29, 2004-02-24 5 2004-10-25, SK ( )SK SK, 0 90% 5 14 ( )SK SK 10 Co_Efficient Std_Error t Prob. 0.001204 0.000619 1.946092 0.0519 0.847413 0.037175 22.79549 0.0000 0.004562 0.002529 1.803374 0.0717 R-Squared 0.362906 920 5 15 ( )SK SK 15 Co_Efficient Std_Error t Prob. 0.001319 0.000627 2.102139 0.0358 0.844493 0.037169 22.72042 0.0000 0.004468 0.002128 2.099727 0.0360 R-Squared 0.363706 920
5 73. 1 2002 1 2005 9. ( )SK, 2003 4 3 2004 10 25 5 16. 5 16 ( )SK SK ( 2 ) 10 Co_Efficient Std_Error t Prob. 0.001113 0.000607 1.833172 0.0671 0.846190 0.037166 22.76810 0.0000 0.007608 0.003924 1.938726 0.0528 R-Squared 0.363257 920 5 17 ( )SK SK ( 2 ) 15 Co_Efficient Std_Error t Prob. 0.001149 0.00061 1.882021 0.0601 0.842708 0.03723 22.63507 0 0.006304 0.003278 1.923372 0.0547 R-Squared 0.363216 920, SK SK.
74 4. 1998 11, 2002 1 3 2005 9 30. 2002,. 5% 2003 11 19. 31) 5 15.15.10.05.00 -.05 -.10 -.15 2002 2003 2004 2005 HANARO_STOCKRETURN KT SK 2003 11 19. 2003 11 19 5 18. 31) 462135180.
5 75 5 18 ( : ) AIF 38,456,250 AOF 24,721,875 20031119 Newbridge 49,535,799 united classic 20,392,746 ht holdings 12,818,750 KT SK, t 0.01 90%. 5 19, 10 Co_Efficient Std_Error t Prob. 0.000268 0.001442 0.185968 0.8525 0.759727 0.089017 8.534635 0.0000 0.009266 0.013217 0.701061 0.4834 R-Squared 0.074450 923 2003 11 19 10 21...
76 5 20 2003-08-29, 5 2003-09-09 AIG 11 2003-10-21, 11 2002 1 3 2003 12 30., 2004., 90% 0. 5 21 10( 3 ) Co_Efficient Std_Error t Prob. 0.002343 0.001476 1.587488 0.1131 1.000494 0.077809 12.85837 0.0000 0.010663 0.006062 1.757846 0.0792 R-Squared 0.258618 490 5 22 7( 3 ) Co_Efficient Std_Error t Prob. 0.002252 0.001467 1.535108 0.1254 1.000257 0.077830 12.85185 0.0000 0.011500 0.006765 1.699956 0.0898 R-Squared 0.258309 490
5 77 4. 3 1990 (KT, SK ) 1... 2.,. KT DR, (sensitivity check). SK. SK SK SK...
78 6 1990,...,,...,.,,..,..
6 79, (firm specific unobservable characteristics)..,.
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85 1 KT( : ) SK ( : ) ( : ) 1990 57117 870 n.a 1991 57888 1209 n.a 1992 60282 1600 n.a 1993 60898 1981 n.a 1994 60047 3257 n.a 1995 59084 4355 n.a 1996 60047 5429 n.a 1997 59753 6253 277 1998 56549 3464 524 1999 47532 3250 1038 2000 46095 2962 1501 2001 44094 3082 1519 2002 44012 4095 1576 2003 37652 4164 1489 2004 38036 4249 1600 2 KT (100 ) Co_Efficient Std_Error t Prob. 만 0.000162 0.000509 0.316245 0.7519 만 0.893572 0.024266 36.86539 0.0000 만 0.006352 0.003084 2.060018 0.0396 R-Squared 0.452527
86 Co_Efficient Std_Error t Prob. 만 0.000148 0.000509 0.290198 0.7717 만 0.894327 0.024259 36.86525 0.0000 만 0.005848 0.003083 1.896601 0.0581 R-Squared 0.452313 Co_Efficient Std_Error t Prob. 만 0.000295 0.000507 0.582124 0.5606 만 0.893027 0.024190 36.91651 0.0000 만 0.011308 0.003075 3.677789 0.0002 R-Squared 0.455578 Co_Efficient Std_Error t Prob. 만 0.00027 0.000511 0.53341 0.5938 만 0.894566 0.024227 36.92444 0.0000 만 0.007229 0.002578 2.803849 0.0051 R-Squared 0.45372 3, 10 Co_Efficient Std_Error t Prob. 0.000380 0.001442 0.263714 0.7921 0.762482 0.088957 8.571346 0.0000 4.5E 0.6 0.013208 0.003406 0.9973 R-Squared 0.073955 N 925
87 4 ( )SK 2003. 3. 26 ( 100% ), SK 2003. 4. 3, SK 8.64% 1 2003. 4. 10, SK 12.39% 2003. 4. 16, SK 14.99% 2003. 4. 18, SK 2003. 5. 12, SKG SK 2003. 5. 16, 2003. 5. 19 SKG ( 4 3,000 ) 2003. 6. 3, SKG 2003. 6. 10, SK 3,, SK SKG 2003. 6. 13 3, 2003. 6. 14, 2003. 6. 15 SK, SKG 2003. 6. 18 SK 2003. 6. 25 SKG 2003. 7. 20, SKG 2003. 8. 11, 2003. 10. 26 SK SKG 2003. 11. 19, 2003. 11. 20, 2003. 12. 11, 2003. 12. 18 SK, SK 2003. 12. 22, SK SK, 157.7 2003. 12. 23, 2003. 12. 24 SK SK, 398 2003. 12. 26 SK, 399 9.7% 2004. 1. 19, SK 2004. 1. 29 5 2004. 1. 30 SK IR 2004. 2. 15 SK, 12 2004. 2. 17 2004. 2. 22 SK, 5 2004. 2. 24 SKT SK,,
88 2004. 3. 1 FT, 2004. 3. 3 SK 2004. 3. 6, 2004. 3. 7 SK 2004. 3. 8, 2004. 3. 12 SK, SK 2004. 10. 25, SK 2004. 11. 5 SK, 2004. 11. 9, SK 2004. 12. 15, 2004. 12. 22, SK ' 2005. 3. 11 SK,... 2005. 5. 13, 2005. 6. 20, 2005. 7. 18, SK 5 2003. 3. 28 2003. 6. 24, 4 5,000 2003. 7. 1 LG 5,000 2003. 7. 3, 2003. 7. 8, LG 2003. 8. 5, LG 2003. 8. 29, 5 2003. 9. 2 CP 1,200 SK, BW 1 2003. 9. 9, AIG 11 2003. 9. 27 2003. 10. 2 LG 2003. 10. 15 LG, 13 4,000 2003. 10. 21, 11
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