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Ⅰ. 개관 Ⅱ. 기업환경의변화 1. 외부적환경의변화 2. 내부적환경의변화 Ⅲ. 상사법의해결과제 1. 기업 ( 사업자 ) 개념의도입 2. 기업집단법제의수용 3. 기업지배구조의개선 4. 경영권방어법제의도입 Ⅳ. 입법정책방향 1960 20,.. 60,. * (hyunyoon@yonsei.ac.kr).

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.,.. 4 SNS (IoT), (AI),,. (fast follower), 4 (first mover). 1960 1997 IMF 5 1%. 2011 2016 6, 2%. 2) 4 1 GDP 53,000, 42,000, 11 1 GDP 2 (2016 27,500 )., 2) http://news.donga.com/3/all/20170828/86050051/1 ( 2017. 8. 30 )

...,,,, 700. (dynamic) 20 (IMF) 3). 2016 591,694 26,858 (4.54%), 811 (0.14%), 3,386 (0.57%), 560,639 (94.75%). 4) 1,836 0.3%. 5) 13 3) http://opinion.mk.co.kr/view.php?year=2017&no=68573 ( 2017. 1. 31 ).,,,.,, KIET (2017. 8.), 20-22. 4) 2016 8-1-2 http://www.nts.go.kr/ 5) http://www.asiae.co.kr/news/view.htm?idxno=2017090322525281291 ( 2017. 9. 4. ).

(2,660 ) 285 SK (438 ), 480 (282 ) 100. 6).,., ( ).. ( ).,,,., 85%, 68.3%. 7) 6).,.,, 2006-41(2006. 12), 26.

,..,.. ( ),, (fictitious capital),. 8). 2016 45 9) 57.3% 4.1% 50.6%, 2.6%. 10) 7), (, 2016. 4), 19. 5, 50% ( 16). 8) 19 Volkswagen, Daimler, Siemens, Deutsche Bank. 9),,. 10) 2016

, (CSR, corporate social responsibility)...,,,,.,... (3) (2016. 7. 7) http://www.ftc.go.kr/ 40 3.5% 39%.,, 46 3 (2017. 6), 648, 649.

.,. 60. (,, )..,.,,,. ' ' ' '. 11),. 12), 11) Ein Unternehmen ist jede auf Dauer angelegte Organisation selbständiger wirtschaftlicher Tätigkeit, mag sie auch nicht auf Gewinn gerichtet sein. 12), :, 11 3 (2009. 10), 282.

. 13),,, '.. 14),.,. 15),.,. 16) 13), 290. 14), ( 2 ). 30/100. 15), (, 1999), 13. 16).

( 342 2, 369, 412 5 ). 17),. 18).,,,. 19) 17), 1995, 1998, 2011. 18),, ( ), 4. 19),.,,,,

,. 20).,.. Konzern Rozenblum 21),. 22).,, 44 1 (2015.), 391., (, 2015), 15-34. 20) 5 ' ( )' 10 ' ( )' ( 14 ). 2017 5 31, 1,653, 1,163. 21) Cass. crim. 4. 2. 1985, Rev. soc. 1985. 22),, 29 3 (2015. 9), 66.

(corporate governance),. 23),,,. 24),,., M&A. 25) (agency theory) (MSV: maximizing shareholder value)'.. 23), (, 2016), 4. 24), ( 2 ) (, 2016), 33. 25),, 433.

.,,,,,, ( vs. ),, ( vs. ).,, ( vs. ), (,, ),, M&A.,. (shareholder capitalism),. (stakeholder capitalism),,,

,. 26),.,,. ( )..,..,,. 27).,,., 26),, 26 2 (2007), 170. 27), 172.

( 542 ). 28) (controlling shareholder).. 50%,.. 29) (minority shareholder) 1%,. 30). 28)., 100 1 25 ( 94, 157 ). 29) 100 95 ( 360 24 ). ( 542 8 ), 100 10 ( 542 8 ). 30) 1%, 3 ( )., 100 1. 1% ( ).

( 360 24, 360 25). ( 366, 546 2 ). 31).,. 32),.,.. 33) 20% 31), 2. 3 2 2 1 2. 32) 8.6 7.2, 7.3, 8.3.,, KERI Brief(, 2015. 4. 2), 15-06. 33), ( 23, 23 2), ( 45 3) ( 355).

.. (ownership) (management).,,,.. 34) 68.3%,. 35). 36) ( )., (ownership vacuum) 34) 5 20 20% ( ).,, 0%,,, 10%,,,, 20%, 30%, 60%, 90%. M. J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, Stanford Law Review, Vol 53, No. 3(Dec., 2000), pp. 539-606 at p. 604. 35),, 38. 36), :, KERI Insight, KERI (16-06), 5.

(opportunistic behavior).., K., K,, (monitoring). 37),. (agency cost) ( )., ( ) (inefficient investment choices) (inefficient or insufficient effort). 38) 37),, 9-14.,,. 38),,,

.,.. 39) (controlling minority shareholders).. 40) ( ),. 41)42) 49 (2013), 259, 253. 39),, 25 6 (2012.12), 3997. 40), :, 11 2 (2008. 2), 171-172. 41),, 3 1 (2006), 33, 40 ;,, 259, 270. 42)., V S ( ) B. S αs B. X Y Vx Vy

(shareholder activism).,.,. 43) ( ),.. (conglomerate), 44) αvx + Bx αvy + By. Vx < Vy αvx + Bx > αvy + By Y X. α B, ( ). http://seven00.tistory.com/412. 43),, 27 2 (2017), 237 3). 44), 239.

. 45) (empty voting) 46), (wolf pack) 47),,. 48). 49) 45) 1~2 (golden leash). Golden Leash M. D. Cain/J. E. Fisch/S. J. Griffith/S. D. Solomon, How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case of the Golden Leash, University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol. 164(2016), pp. 649-702; M. Tonello, Activist Hedge Funds, Golden Leashes, and Advance Notice Bylaws, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, Jan. 7, 2016. https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/01/07/ 46), ( ),.,, 241. 47) ( 3%, 5%), 5%. (Barnes and Noble) (Dupont). 48),, 26 1 (, 2016. 3), 53-55. 49)

. (agency cost).,, 26 1 (2014), 233, 242 ;,, 16 1 ( 44 )(2009), 387-389 DiLillo v. Ustman Technologies, Inc., No. B148198, 2001 Cal. App. LEXIS 1527, at*3 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2001),.

., (share owner), (share holder). (stewardship code). 2010, 50) 2016. 12. 19.. 51) ' '. 52),,,. 53) 50) (2011 ), (2013 ), (2014 ), (2016 ), (2016 ) 10, 2018 1. 51), (Stewardship Code) (, 2016. 10), 22. 52), (, 2016), 86 ;,, (, 2015), 29. 53) 2

. 54)55), 56). 57) (shareholder capitalism) (pension fund capitalism). 58) ( ),. 1. 54),, 23 3 (2013. 4), 72 ;,, 23 2 (2012. 5), 128. 55) (fiduciary duty)., ( 32) ( 33), ( 87 )., (fiduciary duty), 22 2 (2015. 5), 584. 56). 1950 9% 1960 14%, 1970 22%, 1980 32%, 1990 45%, 2000 55%, 2015 63%.., (, 2016. 12), 19 7). 57) 2016 102 6 7%. 58),, 24 1 (2013), 68.

(pension fund socialism). 59) ( 65%)... (Kongruenz zwischen Einfluß und Risiko)., 1 1 ( 369 ),. 60) M&A. 61) 59), 69-70 ;,, 5 1 (2011. 2), 88., 20 11,. 60) 2009. 11. 26. 2009 51820.

( ), 62) 2008 (CEM, Control Enhancing Mechanism)..,,, ( ).,,..,,. ( ),. 61),, 24 2 (2014), 154 ;,, 22 3 (2008. 9), 37-40 ;,, 251. 62), -, 51 1 ( 63 )(2010. 2), 167-174.

,,., 63),,,.,.,. 1997 IMF M&A, M&A. 1997 IMF 63), SK, CJ, LIG STX,,.

. 64), 65) M&A. 2000.,,,..,. 66) 64) 2004 42% 2017 7 34%, 600. 5% 285, 50% 36 ( 24, 12 ),, SK, POSCO,, KB, KT&G,. http://marketdata.krx.co.kr/ 65),,,., ( 7 ) (, 2017), 222. 66) 2008,,

( ) M&A. 67) 3 ( )., 10%. A B A 10%. A 10% B. A 10%, A B. A A B.,. 68) ( ),,. ( ) (1 10 ),,,. 67),, 648. 68),, 23 2 (2010), 648..

,. 69) (dual class shares).,., 70), 71) (dual class stock)., 1 1. 2014. 2014 2016. 1998. 69) 2016 39.5, SK 6.4, 3.6, POSCO 1.5, LG 1.1. 70),, (2015. 6), 12-19. 71) (EU) 500 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 101. 66%. 51%, 41%.

,,,,. 72) (Florange Act) (tenure voting) 2 2. < > 73) 72), (tenure voting), 12 2 (2015), 285 < 1>. 73), 1 1, KERI Brief(, 2015. 5. 4). 5.

(poison pill, ) M&A. M&A ( ).,, 74), M&A.,,. 75),. (golden share). 1 M&A.. 1984,, EU 74) 2001 240,,, 26 2 (2016), 189, 243. 75) 2010 ( ).., 11 1 (2010), 255.

2002,,.,, M&A. 76) (golden parachute) M&A CEO,,. (silver parachute), (tin parachute)., M&A M&A. M&A.. ( ). 76),, 16 3, (2015. 12), 133-134.

. M&A., M&A,. 77) M&A (Mannesmann). 1980 (Rhine Capitalism), 1990 (Anglo-American Capitalism),. M&A,,. 2000, 2001. 78) M&A 77),, 642. 78) (Mannesmann) 2000 (Vodafon) 2001 (WpÜG, Gesetz zur Regelung von Öffentlichen Angeboten zum Erwerb von Wertpapieren und von Unternehmensübernahmen)., M&A, 25 2 ( 39 )(2007. 6), 41-74.

.,. R&D,. M&A., M&A.,.. (vitality), '., ( ). 79) 79), 2013 (shadow voting),

,, (institutional settings). ( ),,..,..,,., ( ). ( ),.,., ( ). 80), (2% )., 3,. ( ). 80) Ford, BMW Henkel, Heineken.

,.,.,., ( ). ( ).. 3 5,., (, ). (,,,, )., (, 2016. 9), 44.

참고문헌, (, 2016. 04),,, 49 (2013), (fiduciary duty), 22 2 (2015. 5),, 25 6 (2012.12), ( 2 ) (, 2016),, 44 1 (2015), 1 1, KERI Brief(, 2015. 5. 4),, KERI Brief (, 2015. 4. 2),, 24 2 (2014),, (2015. 6),, 26 2 (2016),, 22 3 (2008. 9), (, 2015), -, 51 1 ( 63 )(2010. 2),, 16 1 ( 44 )(2009), (tenure voting), 12 2 (2015),,

46 3 (2017. 6),, 5 1 (2011. 2.),, KIET (2017. 8),, 26 1 (2014),, 3 1 (2006),, (, 2015).. 11 1 (2010),, 23 2 (2010),, 26 1 (, 2016. 3), 7 (, 2017), (, 1999), :, KERI Insight, KERI (16-06),, 23 2 (2012. 5),, 16 3, (2015. 12), (, 2016. 9), :, 11 3 (2009. 10.),,

24 1 (2013),, 23 3 (2013. 4), :, 11 2 (2008. 2),, 27 2 (2017), M&A, 25 2 ( 39 )(2007. 6), (, 2016),, 2006-41(2006. 12.),, 29 3 (2015. 9), (, 2016),, 26 2 (2007), (Stewardship Code) (, 2016. 10) M. J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, Stanford Law Review, Vol 53, No. 3(Dec., 2000) Matteo Tonello, Activist Hedge Funds, Golden Leashes, and Advance Notice Bylaws, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation(Jan., 2016) M. D. Cain/J. E. Fisch/S. J. Griffith/S. D. Solomon, How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case of the Golden Leash, University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol. 164(2016)

국문초록 60,.,.,.. M&A..,.,.,.,,., 4,,,

. 기업집단, 기업지배구조, 주주자본주의, 지배주주, 소액주주, 대리인 비용, 주주행동주의, 스튜어드십코드, 경영권방어

Abstract Business Environment Changes and the Commercial Act's Tasks to Resolve the Current Issues Shin, Hyun Yoon* Since the adoption of the Commercial Act, corporations in Korea that have developed the national economy exist in a variety of forms from small businesses to large conglomerates competing in the global market. The amount and the velocity of transactions have increased enormously. In addition, as science and technology have developed, transaction styles have changed from analogue to digital pattern. As the national economy has developed, a large number of corporate groups have been formed. As the legal foundation and interests between shareholders and creditors have dynamically changed, a main challenge in relation to affiliated companies is to adjust and regulate issues of corporate groups within the context of the Commercial Act. In particular, a recent corporate governance issue is that a shareholder holding only a fraction of shares can exercise control over the entire corporate group via internal ownership among affiliated companies. In this respect, corporate governance scholars actively discuss how to reduce dominant shareholders' excessive influence over corporations and how to prevent dominant shareholders from avoiding business and legal responsibility. In addition, external factors that corporations face constantly change, and the market globalization facilitates capital flows among jurisdictions. Accordingly, another major issue to corporations is how to defend them from the potential takeover attempts. 81) * Professor, School of Law, Yonsei University.

In the changing business environments, in order to maintain and develop corporations as the main axis of the market economy with capitalism, it is of significance that the Commercial Act, as the foundation law, properly regulates organizations and activities of corporations. To do so, policy-making should be proceeded with empirical data and objective indices in a way that can achieve business efficiency and general justice. In addition, policy-making through enactments should be considered while two goals -stability and efficiency- are harmonized within the scope of the principle of private autonomy. Particularly regarding regulations on corporations, a cautious approach should be maintained. During the course of the policy-making process or enactments, it is recommended to avoid groundless, hypothetical approaches and biases arising from hasty generalization. Most of all, enactments should be made based on balanced views on efficiency/inefficiency and policy effects/side-effects. Moreover, in order to avoid biases in political stance and interest groups' influence, enactments should be proceeded in a neutral and reasonable manner. This Article first sketches changes of internal and external environments that corporations recently face. Then, this Article reviews four tasks in application of the Commercial Act: the relevance of the concept of "merchant"; the possible enactment of corporate group law; major issues to improve corporate governance; and the adoption of takeover defense mechanisms. Subsequently, this Article provides my opinions on the direction of enactments to resolve the aforementioned tasks and issues. 82) : 2017 9 14 : 2017 9 15 : 2017 9 20

business group, corporate governance, shareholder capitalism, controlling shareholder, minority shareholder, agency cost, shareholder activism, stewardship code, management right defense